Iraq News by Laurie Mylroie
The central focus of Iraq News is the tension between the considerable, proscribed WMD capabilities that Iraq is holding on to and its increasing stridency that it has complied with UNSCR 687 and it is time to lift sanctions. If you wish to receive Iraq News by email, a service which includes full-text of news reports not archived here, send your request to Laurie Mylroie .
IRAQ NEWS, TUESDAY, MAY 4, 1999
I. AZIZ, IRAQ DEMANDS THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS, REUTERS, MAY 3
II. INDYK, US POLICY ON IRAQ, APR 22
III. FORWARD EDITORIAL, "CHALLENGING CHALABI," APR 23
IV. RAMADAN, US WILL ATTACK IRAQ, REUTERS, APR 27
V. REPORTED SADDAM LETTER, WE WILL SMASH U.S., AL HAYAH, APR 29
IRAQ'S UNCONVENTIONAL WEAPONS PROGRAMS
On Wed, Apr 27, PBS' Frontline aired the documentary, "Spying on
Saddam: Investigating the UN's dramatic thwarted effort to uncover
Iraq's Chemical, Biological and Nuclear Weapons." Produced in
cooperation with the BBC's Panorama, the program has a webpage at:
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/unscom/
Among other things, the show made the point that with UNSCOM/IAEA
gone from Iraq--it has been over 4 1/2 months--the Iraqis are probably
out shopping for proscribed weapons, including fissile material for a
bomb. As an Iraqi defector, Dr. Khidir Hamza, who had been director of
Iraq's nuclear weaponization program, explained, if Baghdad succeeded in
acquiring the fissile material, it could produce a bomb within two to
six months, which could be delivered by missile.
Indeed, two very knowledgeable officials told "Iraq News" that they
were quite concerned about Iraqi efforts to acquire fissile material.
One even said that intelligence information exists that the Iraqis are
trying to do just that.
Also, Baghdad might be able to make significant progress in its
missile program through illicit purchases, as the Iraqis have done such
extensive testing that they know exactly what components they need.
This, even as the US has no policy to deal with the problem. A
source familiar with the UK/Dutch draft UNSC resolution to reestablish a
form of UNSCOM in Iraq, characterized its language as "woolly." The
draft is clear about the need for a monitoring system, but it is fuzzier
regarding Iraq's extant proscribed capabilities. It lacks language
that calls for identifying those capabilities and eliminating them.
That, even as "Iraq News" doubts Baghdad will accept anything less
than the Russian proposal, which calls for lifting sanctions. Indeed,
Tariq Aziz, yesterday, reaffirmed Iraq's position. "There will be no
discussion on any next step before lifting the sanctions," he told
journalists, following a three-day international conference in Baghdad,
as Reuters reported.
Finally, Tim Trevan, former senior UNSCOM advisor/spokesman has
written an excellent book describing UNSCOM's experience; Iraq's
retained unconventional capabilities; and the dangers they pose,
"Saddam's Secrets: The Hunt for Iraq's Hidden Weapons." Unfortunately,
it is not available in most US bookstores and must be special ordered.
It can be obtained from Amazon.com or the US publisher, Trafalgar
Square, 800 423 4525; 802 457 1911. [The UK publisher is
HarperCollins.]
US POLICY
US policy on Iraq remains what it has long been--do nothing; stick
your head in the sand; and hope no one notices that there is a serious
problem. Martin Indyk, Asst Sec State for NEA, spoke at the Council on
Foreign Relations, Apr 22. Indyk explained the three "pillars" of US
policy, "First, we will contain Saddam Hussein in order to reduce the
threat he poses both to Iraq's neighbors and to the Iraqi people.
Second, we will seek to alleviate the humanitarian cost to the Iraqi
people of containment. Finally, we will work with forces inside and
outside Iraq, as well as Iraq's neighbors, to help a stable, peaceful
Iraq rejoin the community of nations when the departure of Saddam
Hussein makes this possible." Notably, Indyk said nothing about UNSCOM
or a reconstituted UNSCOM.
Indyk also said, "Sanctions prevent Saddam Hussein from
reconstituting his military or WMD capabilities." How? An effective
and muscular UNSCOM, fully backed by the US, might have addressed the
threat posed by Saddam's WMD capabilities, both retained and those he is
reconstituting/will reconstitute. But the Clinton administration never
gave UNSCOM such support.
Under the Bush administration, when Iraq blocked UNSCOM inspections,
UNSCOM would surround a site and the US would threaten to attack Iraq,
if Baghdad did not back down. Sometimes the threats were belated,
sometimes the Iraqi climbdown was less than total, and the whole
business imperfect, but that was the general thrust of the Bush
administration's dealings with UNSCOM.
But Clinton never once--in six years--threatened Iraq with the use of
force in support of a specific inspection. Rather, Clinton's threats to
use force, which began with the Iraqi challenges starting in November,
1997, aimed at more nebulous goals-the principle that UNSCOM would
determine the composition of UNSCOM teams and then the principle that
UNSCOM could, however hindered, inspect any site it chose. And when the
Clinton administration finally did use force, it brought about the end
of the UNSCOM/IAEA presence in Iraq, handing Baghdad a critical victory
in its efforts to undermine the system of post-war constraints.
Indyk also explained the conditions under which the US would use
force against Iraq today, "Should [Saddam] reconstitute or deploy
weapons of mass destruction; should he again threaten his neighbors or
our forces in the region; should he move against his own people,
especially in the north; or, should he challenge us in the no fly
zones."
But can the US be confident that it will know when Iraq reconstitutes
and/or deploys weapons of mass destruction, particularly with UNSCOM/the
IAEA gone? And what if Iraq acquires a nuclear bomb/s? And what about
terrorism, including unconventional terrorism?
The other option for dealing with the Iraqi threat would be to launch
a vigorous campaign to overthrow Saddam. But that is not administration
policy. Indyk did say, "Make no mistake; we are now clearly committed
to supporting the Iraqi people in bringing about a change of regime in
Baghdad. . . . The support of Iraqi exiles, including the politically
active opposition, along with neighboring states, however, is
indispensable. Our approach is to work in an intensive and coordinated
way with these partners to support the aspirations of the Iraqi people
for a new Iraq under new leadership. Free Iraqis-those in exile and
those who live in relative freedom in northern Iraq-bear a special
responsibility to develop a coherent vision based on the restoration of
civil society, the rebuilding of the economy, and the promotion of a new
role for Iraq as a force for peace and reconciliation in the region.
They can also play an effective role in delegitimizing Saddam, in
helping to build the case for his prosecution as a war criminal, and in
getting the truth into [and] out of Iraq." But as for implementing the
Iraq Liberation Act, that was "premature."
Anyone familiar with how the administration is, in fact, dealing
with the Iraqi opposition knows that it is paying lip service of a sort,
while dragging its heels in moving toward any implementation of the ILA.
The Forward, April 23, took on a particular tendentious report in the
Wash Post, Apr 22, "Congress's Candidate to Overthrow Saddam Hussein:
Ahmed Chalabi has Virtually No Other Backing." As the Forward editors
wrote of the article, "This is the one that has the sneering reference
to Mr. Chalabi from Secretary Albright's assistant for Near Eastern
Affairs, Martin Indyk. Why Mr. Clinton wants to have his foreign policy
team mocking the judgment of Senators Lott and Lieberman and Brownback
and a few others who have been marshaling support for the democratic
opposition in Iraq, we don't know."
Indeed, the Wash Post was parroting the line that the
administration was putting out even before the April 7,8 INC executive
committee meeting, discussed in the Wash Post article. Prior to that
meeting, the State Dept was calling in Iraqis and telling them that only
the US Congress supported Chalabi. Other Iraqis did not, it claimed, or
hoped to demonstrate.
Moreover, the Wash Post article, written by Dana Priest and David
Ottoway, included a very serious and important misstatement of fact.
They wrote, "In March 1995 an attempt by the INC to coordinate an
offensive against the Iraqi army ended in the death or imprisonment of
hundreds, perhaps thousands of Iraqis. Chalabi accused the CIA of
pulling support at the last minute because of the administration's own
infighting over whether an opposition dominated by Kurds and Shiites
could ever be effective in Sunni-ruled Iraq."
But Priest/Ottoway conflated the events of March, 1995 and
September, 1996, reversing the implications of each. As explained in
David Wurmser, Tyranny's Ally America's Failure to Defeat Saddam
Hussein, (Washington, AEI Press, 1999) and in an ABC News/Peter Jennings
Special, Feb 9, 98: In Mar 95, the INC, including Jalal Talabani's PUK
and Massoud Barazani's KDP, planned a modest offensive against the Iraqi
army in the north. The idea was to precipitate defections and to extend
slightly the territory under opposition control. The operation was
modeled on the Kurds' success in liberating their territory in 1991.
It will be recalled that following the post-war Kurdish exodus, the
US led "Operation Provide Comfort," to return the Kurdish refugees to
Northern Iraq. A small safe haven was established near the Turkish
border, centered around the towns of Zakho/Dohuk. A much larger no-fly
zone--Iraqi air space north of the 36th parallel--was established to
protect the safe haven. By late summer, all coalition forces had been
withdrawn from Northern Iraq, save for a small forward post, the MCC
(Military Coordinating Commission) in Zakho, fast on the Turkish border,
even as the no-fly zone was maintained.
And by November, 1991, the Kurdish militias had succeeded in
liberating all of Iraqi Kurdistan, a vast area, roughly the size of
Austria, and many times the size of the original safe haven. The
no-fly zone protected the Kurds against Iraq's helicopter gunships,
while the Iraqi army would not fight. It either surrendered or went
home. And without the army, the mukhabarat could not maintain control.
Repeatedly, the people joined the militias in assaulting the security
offices and prisons, and the mukhabarat were too few in number to
resist. As in Ceaucescu's Rumania, tyranny crumbled overnight.
That is what the INC sought to do, in an initial, limited fashion,
in Mar 95. But as the operation was to begin, the White House sent word
that it did not support the action. It feared that the operation would
cause Saddam to attack the opposition and the US would be obliged to
defend them.
Despite the negative word from the White House, nonetheless the INC,
along with the PUK, proceeded. And the operation worked. As intended,
it caused defections. Warren Marik, now retired, was then a CIA officer
in Northern Iraq, present when those events occurred. Marik has
explained on numerous occasions that the action was, as he puts it, "a
successful poking operation." It achieved what it set out to
accomplish.
But then the KDP took advantage of the PUK's engagement with the
Iraqi army to attack its rival, the PUK. So the PUK pulled out to fight
the KDP and the operation against the Iraqi army was halted.
Thus, Priest/Ottoway were quite mistaken when they wrote that a
large number of Iraqi oppositionists died in March, 1995. They died in
September, 1996, in yet another instance of Clinton fecklessness over
Iraq, strongly criticized by a number of prominent people at the time,
including Bush Undersec Def, Paul Wolfowitz, who wrote of "Clinton's Bay
of Pigs," in the WSJ, Sept 27, 96.
In Jul 96, Sadddam wrapped up one option that the US had for ousting
him, when he arrested a group of CIA-backed coup plotters. Then, in
late Aug, he turned his attention to the other option that the US had
for overthrowing him, represented by the INC, headquartered in the
Kurdish city of Irbil. Iraq's Republican Guards marched north, over an
open plain, under the blue skies of a Middle Eastern summer. The US
could see that those forces were planning to attack, or at least might
be. And despite US promises to protect the INC, the US did nothing.
And when Saddam attacked the INC over the Labor Day weekend, Clinton
announced that US interests lay in the south, not the north, and lobbed
some cruise missiles on air defense sites in the south.
And because the Clinton administration threw away its options for
overthrowing Saddam in the summer of 1996, and even now is not prepared
to correct its mistakes, Martin Indyk is reduced to the pretense that
economic sanctions and the occasional bomb will take care of the threat
posed by Iraq, even without UNSCOM/IAEA.
IRAQ
For over two months, the Iraqis have largely been quiet. The sense
that they were moving toward another crisis--generated by their threats
in February to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and others--just disappeared in
March and were never resumed. Iraqi challenges to the no-fly zones, and
US/UK strikes on Iraq, have continued, but Iraq's rhetoric is far more
subdued, at least for now. A number of readers have suggested that
Baghdad is nonetheless probably using the time to good effect, like
illicit weapons purchases, which is also the view of "Iraq News."
That said, there are two recent reports, of which note might be
taken. On Apr 27, Vice-President Taha Yassin Ramadan said in an
interview with an Egyptian paper, "We expect the United States to launch
a surprise military attack against Iraq any moment." But "Washington
would pay a dear price if it does so," as Reuters reported.
On Apr 29, Al Hayah reported that Saddam had "sent a letter to
'higher ranks in the party, state and the Army,' pointing out that 'the
showdown with the United States is not far away.' The sources said that
President Saddam Husayn 'promised a crucial confrontation that will end
in Iraq's favor.' He said in his letter: 'Iraq will confront--with
determination, vigor, and a devastating response that will be remembered
throughout history--the latest US attempt to inflict harm on it."
I. AZIZ, IRAQ DEMANDS THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS
Iraq won't Accept Less than Lifting of Sanctions
BAGHDAD, May 3 (Reuters) - Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister Tareq Aziz said
on Monday that his country would not accept anything less than the
removal of sweeping U.N. trade sanctions. Aziz was referring to
discussions at the U.N. Security Council on how to deal with Iraq after
U.S. and British air and missile attacks against the country in
December.
"The stand already announced by the (Iraqi) leadership is that there
will be no discussion on any next step before lifting the sanctions,"
Aziz told reporters in Arabic at the end of a conference in Baghdad.
A divided U.N. Security Council last month discussed proposals to
deal with Iraq but reached no agreement. Britain and the Netherlands
have proposed abolishing the U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) in charge
of Iraqi disarmament and replacing it with a similar but enlarged and
better financed body. UNSCOM has not been allowed to return to Iraq
since it withdrew its weapons inspectors from Baghdad in mid-December,
shortly before the United States and Britain launched air and missile
strikes against Iraqi targets.
"The Security Council failed because of American control on the
Security Council and the exploitation by America of the veto privilege,"
Aziz said.
"The majority of the international community wants sanctions against
Iraq lifted...but arrogant America uses its power and influence to
blackmail and pressure them," he said.
In doing so, the United States was delaying the lifting of U.S.
Security Council sanctions imposed on Iraq for its August 1990 invasion
of Kuwait, Aziz said.
He spoke at the end of a three-day conference on the political, legal
and humanitarian aspects of the U.N. sanctions and recent U.S. and
British air attacks against Iraq.
The conference was attended by representatives of political parties
and personalities from Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America and a
number of leading Arab figures.
II. INDYK, US POLICY ON IRAQ
Amb. Martin S. Indyk
Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs
Remarks to the Council on Foreign Relations, NYC
April 22, 1999
[Section on Iraq]
Eight years after the Gulf War and Saddam's persistent defiance of
the international community, we are under no illusions that Iraq under
Saddam Hussein will comply with UNSC resolutions on disarmament, human
rights, accounting for POW's and the return of stolen property.
In view of this reality, our policy rests on three pillars. First, we
will contain Saddam Hussein in order to reduce the threat he poses both
to Iraq's neighbors and to the Iraqi people. Second, we will seek to
alleviate the humanitarian cost to the Iraqi people of containment.
Finally, we will work with forces inside and outside Iraq, as well as
Iraq's neighbors, to help a stable, peaceful Iraq rejoin the community
of nations when the departure of Saddam Hussein makes this possible.
Our containment policy is designed to protect the citizens of Iraq
and its neighbors from an aggressive and hostile regime. Sanctions
prevent Saddam Hussein from reconstituting his military or WMD
capabilities. Operations Northern and Southern Watch prevent Saddam
from using his air force against the civilian populations north of the
36th parallel and south of the 33rd. We maintain a robust force in the
region, which we have made clear we are prepared to use should Saddam
cross our well-established red lines. Those red lines include: should he
reconstitute or deploy weapons of mass destruction; should he again
threaten his neighbors or our forces in the region; should he move
against his own people, especially in the north; or, should he challenge
us in the no fly zones. We are also committed to maintaining
sanctions against the Iraqi regime that is in defiance of the UNSC
resolutions, while lifting the burden of sanctions off the backs of the
Iraqi people through the expansion and streamlining of the oil-for-food
program.
This humanitarian relief program is the second pillar of our policy.
Sanctions were never directed against the Iraqi people. In fact, food
and medicine are specifically exempt from sanctions. Iraq has always
been free to buy and import these goods, but Saddam Hussein has chosen
not to do so in order to manipulate public opinion by deliberately
causing the suffering of his own citizens. Our response has been to
first establish, and then expand the oil-for-food program, which
provides a mechanism for the international community to use revenues
from the sale of Iraqi oil for the purchase of humanitarian supplies for
the Iraqi people. Despite attempts at interference by the regime, the
oil-for-food program has ensured that the people of Iraq receive the
food and medicine, which their own government denies them. There is a
fundamental principle at work here. As long as Saddam is in defiance of
the UNSC resolutions, we will never allow him to regain control of
Iraq's oil revenues. They will continue to be escrowed by the UN and
their uses controlled by the UN sanctions committee.
Although effective, containment has its costs. As we have seen
repeatedly since 1991, a contained Iraq under the leadership of Saddam
Hussein remains a threat both to the region and to the Iraqi people.
Both are paying a very high price for Saddam's continued rule. In our
judgment, both deserve better.
For these reasons, President Clinton announced in November that the
United States would work with the Iraqi people toward a government in
Iraq which is prepared to live in peace with its neighbors and respect
the rights of its people. Make no mistake: we are now clearly committed
to supporting the Iraqi people in bringing about a change of regime in
Baghdad.
In pursuit of this objective, the United States will adhere to two
important principles: one, we will uphold the territorial integrity of
Iraq; and two, we will not seek to impose from the outside a particular
government or leaders on the people of Iraq. We do support a change of
government that will be responsive to the aspirations of the Iraqi
people -- one that takes meaningful steps toward a democratic future for
the country and can represent fairly the concerns of all of Iraq's
communities. And we will work with a new Iraqi government, as it
fulfills its international obligations, to lift the sanctions, to deal
with the large debt burden, and to reintegrate Iraq into the
international community.
If it is to be successful, change must come from within, from the
Iraqis themselves. It cannot be "made in America." The support of Iraqi
exiles, including the politically active opposition, along with
neighboring states, however, is indispensable. Our approach is to work
in an intensive and coordinated way with these partners to support the
aspirations of the Iraqi people for a new Iraq under new leadership.
Free Iraqis -- those in exile and those who live in relative freedom in
northern Iraq -- bear a special responsibility to develop a coherent
vision for a brighter future. They must take the lead in developing and
promoting an alternative vision based on the restoration of civil
society, the rebuilding of the economy, and the promotion of a new role
for Iraq as a force for peace and reconciliation in the region. They can
also play an effective role in delegitimizing Saddam, in helping to
build the case for his prosecution as a war criminal, and in getting the
truth into the out of Iraq.
Congress has provided the Administration with a number of important
tools to support Iraqis who are working toward a better future for Iraq.
These include $8 million in Economic Support Funds. We are using
these funds to strengthen opposition political unity, to support the
Iraq war crimes initiative, to support humanitarian programs and the
development of civil society, and for activities inside Iraq.
We have established Radio Free Iraq, which operates independently and
broadcasts daily in Arabic uncensored news and information to the Iraqi
people.
We have named a Special Coordinator for Transition in Iraq, Frank
Ricciardone, who is managing the overall effort. Mr. Ricciardone has
already had some success in helping some of the disparate opposition
groups work together and elect a new interim leadership that will now
prepare the way for an Iraqi opposition conference that will have as
broad participation as possible.
We have also made progress working with the two major Kurdish
factions in the North, the PUK and the KDP, to help them reconcile their
differences and better provide for all the people of northern Iraq.
Finally, there is the Iraq Liberation Act, which provides
discretionary authority to the President to direct up to $97 million in
Defense Department draw down and training for designated Iraqi
opposition groups. Many have called on the President to use this
authority to arm the Iraqi opposition and support military action
against Saddam Hussein. We believe such action is premature. There are a
host of issues that must be resolved before such equipment and training
could be provided with confidence that it would advance our objectives
of promoting a change of regime and not just lead to more Iraqis being
killed unnecessarily. One requirement is a credible, broad-based, Iraqi
political umbrella movement, based on consensus, that can
authoritatively articulate a future vision for those Iraqis who now lack
a voice in their own fate. Through such a movement, it will become
possible to channel substantial assistance to those resisting
Saddam's oppression inside Iraq.
We also need the cooperation of Iraq's Arab neighbors and Turkey if
we are to provide effective support to the internal Iraqi opposition.
Although they would all prefer Saddam gone, they have strong views
about a post-Saddam Iraq which have to be taken into account. We are
working closely with them to achieve our common objective of an Iraq
that can assume its rightful place in the region as a constructive and
stabilizing power.
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