Iraq News by Laurie Mylroie
The central focus of Iraq News is the tension between the considerable, proscribed WMD capabilities that Iraq is holding on to and its increasing stridency that it has complied with UNSCR 687 and it is time to lift sanctions. If you wish to receive Iraq News by email, a service which includes full-text of news reports not archived here, send your request to Laurie Mylroie .
IRAQ NEWS, SATURDAY, MARCH 13, 1999
I. SEN BOB KERREY WELCOMES INC NAT'L ASSEMBLY CONFERENCE, MAR 5
II. JIM HOAGLAND, "VIRTUAL POLICY," WASH POST, MAR 7
III. SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, NEAR EAST SUBCOMMITTEE, IRAQ
HEARING, TRANSCRIPT, MAR 9
Sen Kerrey (D, NE) ranking Democrat on the Senate Intelligence
Committee, Mar 5, wrote INC head, Ahmad Chalabi, welcoming the decision
to convene a plenary session of the INC Nat'l Assembly.
The Wash Post, Mar 9, reporting on the six Iraqi opposition members
imprisoned in Los Angeles [see "Iraq News" Flash, Mar, 4] explained,
"They were beaten up by a group of Chinese detainees in a melee
triggered by a pay phone dispute. The fracas took place in the Mira
Loma Detention Center one day after the six Iraqis, all of whom
participated in CIA-backed efforts to topple Saddam Hussein, were
interviewed by "60 Minutes" about their travails. Their case has
received widespread media attention since former CIA director R. James
Woolsey began representing them last year, calling it a 'stain' on
America's honor to try to deport Iraqi freedom fighters using classified
evidence even he has not been allowed to see. 'It really is just
outrageous that the collective U.S. government would treat people like
this who have fought in common cause with us against someone like
Saddam,' Woolsey said shortly after the Mira Loma incident. . . . .
Francis J. Brooke, Washington representative of the Iraqi National
Congress, a leading opposition group with which three of the six are
affiliated, said the government has informally offered to release the
six on supervised house arrest if they agree to forfeit their procedural
rights before the Board of Immigration Appeals and accept deportation to
any country of the government's choice other than Iraq. The INS declined
comment. 'For the government to tell them to give up their procedural
rights in order for them to get out of jail strikes me as a completely
un-American procedure that smacks of blackmail,' Brooke said."
This issue of "Iraq News" focuses on administration policy on Iraq,
to underscore that it has not changed. The administration pays lip
service to the Iraq Liberation Act, but does not implement it, even as
it tells Congress it is doing so, even as it has no other policy to
address the threat posed by Saddam.
As Jim Hoagland, Mar 7, wrote, "This White House's 10-week old
rhetorical commitment to 'regime change' has bogged down and now comes
across as an effort to triangulate policy on Iraq-to do just enough to
defuse Republican and other criticism, but not enough to risk
fundamental change that would destroy tyranny in Iraq. . . . The CIA
(incorrectly) predicted fierce and effective Iraqi resistance in 1991 in
cautioning George Bush about launching Operation Desert Storm. One
author of those estimates, Kenneth Pollack, has just been hired by the
Clinton national security staff to say what can't be done in Iraq now,
even though Pollack penned a stinging rebuke to Congress for passing the
Iraq Liberation Act in the January issue of Foreign Affairs." ["Iraq
News" will shortly address the issue of Pollack et. al.]
Indeed, Sec Def Cohen, in Qatar, Mar 9, was asked about the Iraq
Liberation Act and whether he had asked the Gulf countries he had
visited for permission to use their territory to train the Iraqi
opposition. Cohen replied, "You inquired about the Congressional
authorization for moneys to help consolidate the opposition. Indeed,
Congress did provide authorization for money to help organize an
opposition to Saddam Hussein. We are in the process of trying to
coordinate those opposition groups to see if they might speak with a
solid voice in providing an opposition to the Iraqi regime right now.
We hope that they will be able to consolidate those voices and those
people. We are making some progress in that, and hopefully, their voice
will be heard by the Iraqi people, who, I believe, would long for the
day when they can have a change in leadership other than that posed by
Saddam Hussein. So we are working with the opposition groups; we are
trying to organize them and provide them with an opportunity to have a
collective voice as an alternative to Saddam Hussein."
Also, Mar 9, the Near East Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee held a hearing on Iraq policy, in which Beth Jones,
principal Asst Sec State for Near East Affairs, testified.
Sen. Brownback (R-KS) opened the hearing, "We meet again to confront
a rather perennial question . . . and that's what to do about Saddam
Hussein. . . . It's been a problem that we just have not solved, and it
doesn't strike me that we're on a path to solving it now. Our problem
is Saddam. In the last several months alone, he and his henchmen have
disposed of a prominent Shi'ite cleric and his son. They've eliminated
some of the top ranks of the military and have brutally suppressed
dissension in the south of Iraq. While these developments have been
faithfully reported, the reaction of much of the international community
has been that Saddam's brutality is a regrettable matter, but no real
action has been taken. The second part of our trouble is what to do.
There appears to be little disagreement that once given the opportunity,
Saddam will attempt to reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction, and
that that effort may take as little as six months. . . . Despite this
obvious fact, we have almost reached the end of the road in effective
long-term monitoring and have almost certainly ended any phase that will
permit intrusive challenge inspections. The United Nations Security
Council is paralyzed by basic disagreements over how to proceed, and the
United States and Great Britain are waging a war of attrition against
Saddam's air defenses, which, while I hope it will help destabilize
Saddam, that appears to be a very long-term project. Indeed, . . . the
only justification to this war of attrition is Saddam's own continued
targeting of US and British overflights. The moment he chooses to stop,
which may well be the moment that these bombings really hurt him, we,
too, will be forced to end our attacks under the current strategy. . .
. Unless we're resigned to the reconstitution of his regime of terror,
Saddam is moving-going to move ahead, fully armed with weapons of mass
destruction. We really must do something. We must do so soon."
Sen. John Ashcroft (R-Mo) said, "Maintaining a US force in the region
to contain Saddam has cost us over $6 billion in real dollars since
1993, with no end in sight. And because policies have not been followed
to address the real threat [Saddam], there is little prospect that the
20,000 troops we keep in the Persian Gulf will return home anytime soon.
. . . Over the last six years, we have taken the path of least
resistance in our policy toward Iraq. We supported the opposition until
Saddam attacked them in 1996. . . . We have condemned Saddam's brutal
repression and used the strongest rhetoric against his weapons of mass
destruction, but we are more than happy to undermine our own diplomacy
to accept new promises of compliance by Saddam last fall. . . .
Aggressors around the world have taken note of our lack of resolve when
it comes to Saddam Hussein. They've taken note that the administration
has not spent a single dollar of the $97 million authorized by the Iraqi
Liberation Act to train and equip the Iraqi opposition. Supporting the
Iraqi opposition certainly has risks, but the alternative is the
resurgence of the most dangerous dictator in the Middle East and a
severe blow to our credibility abroad. . . . The fact that the
administration apparently has no immediate plans to equip or train Iraqi
opposition forces does not lead me to believe that a genuine commitment
to remove Saddam is present, and I think we need a commitment to
changing leadership there. Merely deferring this crisis until the next
administration, while Saddam works to rebuild weapons of mass
destruction and erode international sanctions, that's not the kind of
foreign policy legacy that we need to leave to the American people."
In her testimony, Amb. Jones said, "I think we have a very good, very
coordinated, cohesive strategy for dealing with a very difficult
problem, and very difficult situation, and one that is as of great
concern to us as it is to you. . . . Saddam Hussein failed in his
primary strategy . . . which was to get sanctions lifted and to gain
control of the money that he would like to from the sale of oil and from
the lifting of sanctions."
Yet he achieved another key goal. He succeeded in eliminating
UNSCOM. Jones never addressed that point in her testimony, even as she
failed to explain how the administration intends to address the threat
posed by the proscribed unconventional weapons Iraq retains and those
that it will produce, perhaps is now producing.
Jones also described "what we are doing in order to fill out the
administration's policy of containment and regime change." She said,
"Frank Ricciardone, who has been named as the Special Representative for
Transition in Iraq, was in London last week, talking with many of the
opposition groups, in particular those designated for receipt of
equipment under the ILA. He is working to try to put together an
executive-committee meeting of the leadership, to try to get the Iraqi
groups to work together in a way that is more credible, in a way that
actually can effect a regime change."
Actually, many in the opposition suspect that the administration is
trying to use that meeting to thwart the INC Nat'l Assembly conference,
publicly welcomed by Sens. Lott and Kerrey and Rep. Gilman.
Jones also said, "We have quite a number of other tools that we very
fortunately have been given by Congress to shore up the resistance
inside Iraq. . . . We have been able to move about a half-million
dollars to INDICT."
INDICT, the campaign to indict Saddam and his top henchmen for war
crimes and crimes against humanity, was founded in late 1996, following
the Iraqi assault on the INC in Irbil. It was active, long before any
US funding was proposed. In Apr 98, Congress first appropriated money
to back the indictment of Iraqi officials for war crimes, part of a $5
million appropriation for the democratic opposition, which included the
language, "The managers expect that a significant portion of the support
for the democratic opposition should go to the Iraqi National Congress,
a group that has demonstrated the capacity to effectively challenge the
Saddam Hussein regime with representation from Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish
elements of Iraq."
Indeed, in Clinton's Jun 24 report to Congress on Iraq, he said, "On
May 1, I signed into law the 1998 Supplemental Appropriations and
Recissions Act. This legislation provides funding for . . . efforts to
support the democratic Iraq opposition in presenting a credible
alternative to the present Iraqi regime and compiling information to
support the indictment of Iraqi officials for war crimes. These new
programs will enable us to redouble our work with the Iraqi opposition
to support their efforts to build a pluralistic, peaceful Iraq that
observes the international rule of law and respects basic human rights."
But the administration did not spend any of that money, and in the
Foreign Operations bill for the fiscal year ending Sept 30, 1999,
Congress specifically allocated $2 million for INDICT.
Toward the end of Sept, the State Dept called members of INDICT,
including British Labor MP, Ann Clwyd, to a hurriedly-arranged meeting
in Wash DC, the purpose of which they were told, would be to arrange the
funding of INDICT before the end of the 1998 fiscal year. They paid the
travel expenses themselves, under the impression they would be
reimbursed, when the funding came through imminently. But sometime
after their visit, communications with the State Dept suddenly stopped.
In Feb, INDICT was equally suddenly offered a $500,000 contract,
which it signed. But no money has been paid. In fact, INDICT members
have yet to be reimbursed for last fall's travel expenses.
Moreover, INDICT, among its proposals, wanted to open an office in
Halabja. It wanted to be inside Iraq. But the State Dept nixed that,
so INDICT is limited to London, although it wanted to open offices in
New York and Paris as well.
In his questioning, Sen. Brownback also pressed Amb. Jones on the
utility of present US military action aimed at Iraq's air defense
system. Brownback said, "The military bombing that we are doing, the
targeting of the bombing, is mostly targeted towards sites that fix on
our aircraft. There have been some writers that have suggested that we
would be better off to respond to more sensitive targets, that our
attacks should help facilitate Saddam's overthrow."
Jones replied, "For now, the mission, as I said, is to maintain the
no-fly zones and to protect the pilots who are challenged. . . "
Brownback then asked, "Why not add . . . politically sensitive
targets as well? If our effort is not only containment of this regime,
it is also removal of this regime, why not use probably the greatest
force capacity that we have-- . . . the Iraq Liberation Act, that's to
work with outside groups or Iraq radio, why not use this military force
that is in place, that is authorized, that is capable of attacking these
politically sensitive targets that would lead more to the potential
overthrow of Saddam? It seems that we're wasting a tremendous
opportunity here."
Brownback also said, "I've traveled in the region. Late last year I
met with a number of leaders of adjacent countries. And what they
sought more than anything was a comprehensive US strategy that would
lead to the removal of Saddam Hussein, and not just the potential of his
removal or kind of trying to set the circumstances and hope that the
removal occurs, but the actual removal of Saddam Hussein from power."
Brownback concluded, "It looks like what we've got in place today, it
may take several years, it may take 10 years, we'll wait him out is kind
of the strategy today. And I don't know that the coalition will hold
that long. I don't know that the Arab countries will wait in the
region. I don't know that the United Nations Security Council will
wait, will keep the sanctions on that period of time. I mean we've
really got a moment now where he is weaker, the internal dissent
starting up, where you have the neighboring countries willing to help
remove this regime, and we're kind of standing back, saying well let's
see if something comes forward out of this stew. . . But we are not
putting forward comprehensive leadership in this region at a time when
perhaps, just some could really move us aggressively forward on the
removal of this regime."
Finally, the Center for Security Policy, Mar 12, noted, "The Senate
Foreign Relations and Energy Committees will hold a hearing on 17 March
on the United Nations' Oil-for-Food program in Iraq. At issue will be
whether to expand the Iraqi Oil-for Food program--in response to
pressure to ease sanctions arising from the low-intensity air war
against Iraqi air defense forces and the general failure of US policy to
date--and the implications of doing so. The Senate should instead use
the occasion to demand anew the adoption of the only approach that can
work: Removing Saddam from power."
I. SEN BOB KERREY WELCOMES INC NAT'L ASSEMBLY CONFERENCE
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510-2704
March 5, 1999
Dr. Ahmad Chalabi
President of the Executive Council
Iraqi National Congress
124 128 Barlby Road
London W10 6BL, United Kingdom
Dear Dr. Chalabi,
I am writing to express my support for the recent decision to convene
a plenary session of the Iraqi National Congress (INC) National
Assembly.
I remain very optimistic about the future of Iraq. The Iraqi people
are closer to their goal of establishing a democratic government than at
any time in the recent past. However, we must be prepared to act in
support of those who would oppose the Iraqi dictatorship. By convening a
National Assembly meeting, you are taking the first step in helping to
assure the Iraqi opposition will be unified in its actions.
The overwhelming support for the Iraq Liberation Act in both the U.S.
House of Representatives and the Senate is a demonstration of the
Congressional commitment to promote the development of a democratic
government in Iraq. You may be assured that I will continue to work in
Congress and with the Administration to further our common goal of
bringing self-government to the Iraqi people.
Once again, I would like to congratulate you on the decision to
convene a meeting of the National Assembly and wish you great success.
Sincerely,
J. Robert Kerrey
II. JIM HOAGLAND, "VIRTUAL POLICY"
Virtual Policy
By Jim Hoagland
Sunday, March 7, 1999; Page B07
While American pilots conduct a war of attrition against Iraq with
audacity and skill, their president and his advisers have done little to
construct a political strategy to justify the risks the flyers take and
the destruction they inflict on a traumatized and suffering nation.
America's television viewers wallowed in details of Clinton's virtual
sex with Monica Lewinsky the other night. They should be paying more
attention to Clinton's virtual foreign policy in Iraq and elsewhere.
This White House's 10-week-old rhetorical commitment to "regime
change" has bogged down and now comes across as an effort to triangulate
policy on Iraq -- to do just enough to defuse Republican and other
criticism but not enough to risk fundamental change that would destroy
tyranny in Iraq. The dministration's senior policymakers seem to have
lost sight of the centrality of the Iraqi people in this continuing
tragedy.
In their majority, Iraq's civilians are the hostages of a criminal
gang of murderers in charge of the state apparatus. President Clinton
needs to hold that one thought in his mind as he makes decisions on
Iraq. He should not let the din of "expert" opinion on ethnic divisions
in Iraqi society or the importance of territorial integrity drive from
his consciousness this grim reality: Each decision he makes either
hastens or delays an end to the enslavement of Iraqis who are at mortal
risk.
His own policymaking bureaucracy will do its best to help the
president avoid seeing so starkly his responsibility and America's
national responsibility to rescue a people on whom the world's only
superpower has waged intermittent war for nearly a decade. Clinton
campaigned on his ability to feel people's pain. But as president he
seems to avoid looking closely at the consequences his actions and
statements have on real people abroad. He now clearly identifies with
the practitioners of policy rather than with the people who bear the
brunt of his decisions. (For evidence see not only Iraq but also China,
Congo, Russia and for a long time Bosnia and Kosovo.)
His diplomacy too often exalts the instant gratification of
appearance and spin over the frequently uncomfortable realities and hard
choices every administration confronts abroad. Clinton seems to be
hoping to leave office with these crises stroked but unconsummated.
Clinton is too often abetted in this virtual policymaking by an
over-stimulated media, which play out foreign challenges as being about
the mettle or brilliance of Clinton, or Madeleine Albright, or some
other national security worthy, rather than about the underlying issues
that cause people to fight, die or sink into poverty.
In Iraq this virtual foreign policy risks leaving Clinton stranded
between self-defeating options, as this winter's war of attrition and
the simultaneous death of U.N. arms inspections in Iraq illustrate.
U.S. warplanes have hit some 200 Iraqi targets since mid-December.
Saddam Hussein and his army are clearly rattled by this war of
attrition, which was touched off by Saddam's continuing refusal to
cooperate with U.N. arms inspectors.
But the air raids make certain that Saddam will not permit a
resumption of the international hunt for atomic, biological or chemical
weapons. So do disclosures by U.S. officials to The Post and other news
organizations that the CIA used the inspections for its own narrow,
reckless and unsuccessful coup efforts. There has been no monitoring of
any kind in Iraq since November, a fact the falling U.S. bombs help
obscure if not mitigate.
The war of attrition is a justified and useful tactic in itself. But
with the arms inspections now a dead issue, the raids have limited
durability as an isolated method of dealing with Iraq. A lucky Iraqi
anti-aircraft shot, or a spectacular accident that results in U.S.
losses, would cause many Americans to question the costs and benefits of
the open-ended raids on a country held hostage internally by Saddam's
forces and externally by punitive sanctions. Foreign opinion is already
hostile to the raids.
The air campaign concentrates on blowing up Iraq's air defense
installations. Such narrowly targeted raids make sense militarily to
prepare the ground for a wider attack.
But in its statements and actions the Clinton administration shows it
is not mounting wider, consistent action. It blames the Iraqi opposition
and the American public for being too divided to permit a more
aggressive policy.
The White House permits its military commander for the gulf region,
Gen. Anthony Zinni, to publicly undercut its promises of action by
proclaiming that a victory by the Iraqi opposition is not only unlikely
but undesirable. Zinni echoes the "expert" view that only the Sunni Arab
minority can hold Iraq together after Saddam. Such experts discount the
importance of resistance groups that draw on the country's persecuted
Shiite majority and the Kurds of the north.
Can't be done was an expert opinion long held about Bosnia until it
was done. The CIA (incorrectly) predicted fierce and effective Iraqi
resistance in 1991 in cautioning George Bush about launching
Operation Desert Storm. One author of those estimates, Kenneth Pollack,
has just been hired by the Clinton national security staff to say what
can't be done in Iraq now, even though Pollack penned a stinging rebuke
to Congress for passing the Iraq Liberation Act in the January issue of
Foreign Affairs.
Zinni and Pollack are straws in the wind that could be easily
dismissed -- if Clinton himself had demonstrated a clear, consistent and
compassionate commitment to freeing Iraqi's 22 million endangered
hostages. Instead, he continues to offer a virtual policy that can bring
only confusion and incoherence.
III. SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, NEAR EAST SUBCOMMITTEE, HEARING
ON IRAQ, TRANSCRIPT
http://www.inc.org.uk/
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