09 March 1999
TEXT: SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE HEARS STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL ON IRAQ
(US working with UN, Arab world, Iraqis to influence events) (1980)
Washington -- Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Beth Jones appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Middle East and South Asia Subcommittee March 9 to discuss the Administration's Iraq policy.
"We continue to contain Saddam (Hussein)," Jones said, "working with the U.N. to reestablish disarmament and monitoring activities while at the same time ensuring that the basic needs of the Iraqi people are met. Second, we are helping isolate Saddam diplomatically, where the Arab world, in particular, is incensed by his behavior and threats. Third, we are working with Iraqis who want to see Iraq restored to its rightful place in the region, with Iraqis who, like us, believe such a future is possible only under a new regime."
Jones noted that Frank Ricciardone, the Special Coordinator for Transition in Iraq, has been meeting with a "wide range of Iraqis" in London. Among these is Ahmed Chalabi, chairman of the Iraqi National Congress, with whom Ricciardone is working "to lay the groundwork for a successful meeting" of the INC this spring.
The U.S. is also working with group called INDICT to ensure that it "can become a major focal point of Iraqi war crimes accountability activity."
Subcommittee chairman Sam Brownback (Republican, Kansas) expressed his dissatisfaction several times at the slow speed with which the Administration appears to be implementing the Iraq Liberation Act. President Clinton signed the ILA into law last October.
Jones stressed that building cohesiveness among the various Iraqi opposition groups takes time, but once that is accomplished, the possibility of replacing Saddam Hussein would be much greater.
Do you think it will be possible that the regime could be changed during the Clinton Administration, Brownback asked? Jones replied that she indeed thought it possible.
Brownback then urged the Administration to use the U.S. military forces now in the Gulf region more aggressively, targeting more Iraqi installations and thus hastening the day when Saddam Hussein could be replaced.
Following is DAS Beth Jones' text, as prepared for delivery:
(Begin text)
Mr. Chairman:
I appreciate this opportunity to update you on events inside Iraq and the steps the Administration is taking to try to influence them.
We believe Operation "Desert Fox" accomplished its goal of degrading Saddam's capacity to develop and deliver weapons of mass destruction and his ability to threaten his neighbors.
It also appears that the regime has been weakened.
Saddam's January Army Day speech calling for the overthrow of Arab governments, the walk-out by his Foreign Minister from the January Arab League meeting, repeated Iraqi threats to Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Turkey and repeated allusions by Iraqi officials to the illegitimacy of the Kuwait border underscore Saddam's weakness and isolation.
Anecdotally, we have heard that over half the civilian government offices in Baghdad were dispersed to residential areas during the December air strikes and have not yet returned to their original locations. Moreover, long-term dispersal of Republican Guard units to the field is reported to be taking a toll on morale among the RG officer corps, which no longer enjoys a privileged lifestyle in Baghdad.
Perhaps just as important, Saddam has been unable to achieve what he announced as his chief goal for 1998: the lifting of sanctions and restoration of his control over Iraq's billions of dollars in oil revenue. Instead, his defiance of the international community has prolonged sanctions even further and compelled the coalition to respond militarily in December. Sanctions remain in place. The UN controls his oil revenue and provides for the Iraqi people and it is clear that there can be no short cut to lifting sanctions.
Since the end of Desert Fox, Saddam has chosen to challenge the No-Fly zones in both the north and south on an almost daily basis. The coalition response has been to strike at his integrated air defense system. The net effect of his challenges has been to degrade his weapons capability further and frustrate his efforts to achieve even a pyrrhic victory.
One recent strike appears to have affected communication for the oil pipeline to Turkey. Fortunately, repairs were made within 48 hours with no serious effect on oil flow essential to maintaining the humanitarian program. We will continue to make every effort to avoid hitting such dual-use targets.
Internally, there have been signs of strain and unrest since Desert Fox. On February 19, Ayatollah Muhammed al-Sadr, the senior Shi'a cleric appointed by Saddam, was assassinated. Al-Sadr is the third senior cleric killed in less than a year. Over the past several months, he reportedly had been warned against leading Friday prayers and was interrogated and threatened by security forces. He was shot, along with his two sons, after attending Friday prayers at the shrine of the Imam Ali in Najaf. The Government refused to allow a funeral ceremony.
Al-Sadr's assassination came at a time when Saddam appears to be having increasing difficulty maintaining control over security in southern Iraq. In an effort to repress unrest in the south, Saddam last fall named Ali Hasan al-Majid as Commander for the Southern Region; an appointment that probably was meant to intimidate the local population. Ali Hasan is known as "Chemical Ali" for his use of chemical weapons against Kurdish civilians when he was in charge of security in northern Iraq.
Demonstrations erupted in several of Baghdad's predominantly Shi'a neighborhoods shortly after news of the killing got out. The regime moved quickly to quell the unrest. All roads leading into Baghdad were reportedly cut off and, according to opposition sources, 25 demonstrators were killed, 50 injured, and 250 arrested, including 15 religious scholars. Others reported even higher numbers.
Similar, short-lived protests reportedly occurred in many other cities. The regime allegedly responded to demonstrators who occupied the town hall in Nassiriyah by shelling the town and killing 18 people. There were light arms clashes in Karbala. The opposition also reported that disturbances took place in areas with a large Sunni population. For example, in predominantly Sunni Ramadi province, nine people, including a former governor, were said to have been executed following unrest.
The situation appears to have calmed for now. However, the traditional 40 days of mourning for the assassinated cleric will end in late March, near the Islamic Feast of the Sacrifice which marks the end of the Pilgrimage. We will be paying particular attention to popular demonstrations that might mark the end of the mourning period and to regime tactics either to forestall or quell them.
In an incident that may have been unrelated to the popular unrest, the second in command in the southern Iraq security district and two staff officers reportedly were executed sometime in late January or February. Staff Lt. General Kamil Sachet al-Janabi, a former Corps commander, Gulf War hero and the senior deputy in the south to Ali Hassan al-Majid was accused of plotting to overthrow the regime. Whatever the real reason for his execution, the regime evidently intends it as a warning to others while at the same time alerting Iraqis to high-level fear of coups and overthrow.
What is the U.S. doing to influence events?
First, we continue to contain Saddam, working with the UN to reestablish disarmament and monitoring activities while at the same time ensuring that the basic needs of the Iraqi people are met. Second, we are helping to isolate Saddam diplomatically, where the Arab world, in particular, is incensed by his behavior and threats. Third, we are working with Iraqis who want to see Iraq restored to its rightful place in the region, with Iraqis who, like us, believe such a future is possible only under a new regime.
Frank Ricciardone, the new Special Coordinator for Transition in Iraq, took up his activities full-time on March 1. He was in London last week for another round of meetings with a wide range of Iraqis there. Among other influential Iraqis, he met with Ahmed Chalabi, chairman of the Executive Committee of the Iraqi National Congress. Dr. Chalabi, as you know, has called for a meeting of the INC this spring. We are working with him and other INC leaders to lay the groundwork for a successful meeting, through close consultation with constituent groups and careful planning. Ricciardone is encouraging the INC Executive Committee members to hold an informal meeting next week and to follow it with a formal meeting of the INC Executive Committee that could pave the way for a productive General Assembly meeting.
This week, Assistant Secretary Martin Indyk will travel to Turkey, Jordan and Syria to continue our consultations with regional governments regarding our policy. After joining Martin in Ankara, Ricciardone, will stop again in London to continue his important consultations with key Iraqi exiles. As soon as he is back in Washington, he will resume his close consultations with members and staff regarding our shared goals and ways to work more closely together to achieve them.
We are also very sensitive to the need to get information to and from Iraqis inside Iraq. We are pleased that Radio Free Iraq, which is an independent station, has been heard inside Iraq since October. We are also stepping up coordination with USIA, looking at ways to make other media outreach more effective.
In early February, the President formally designated seven opposition groups under the Iraq Liberation Act as eligible to receive assistance under the Act. We are intensifying our contacts with Iraqi groups and will consider how we can help them more effectively oppose Saddam's rule and help Iraqis to achieve the kind of government they deserve and desire. We will evaluate carefully the capabilities of these groups, their strengths and their weaknesses, giving due consideration to any proposals they may wish to present regarding possible receipt of assistance under the Act. We will also try to resolve other practical issues, such as securing still more support from neighboring countries, as would be needed in such scenarios.
We have also taken concrete steps to ensure that funding reaches groups and initiatives that meet our common goals. For example, we have worked over the past several months with the chairman and board of the INDICT organization to ensure that INDICT can become a major focal point of Iraqi war crimes accountability activity. The board has agreed to an initial grant of $500,000, and has welcomed our suggestion that funding be made available also for developing effective management and accounting expertise and for program development. We expect to receive a program plan and follow-on grant requests in the near future.
We are also working with Dr. Christine Gosden to provide a grant for a field study of the effects of Saddam's 1988 attacks on the people of Halabja.
As you know, I am personally involved in our efforts to help reconcile the Kurdish parties in northern Iraq. I traveled to the region in January to encourage them in their efforts to unify the regional government apparatus and to care more equitably for the needs of the people in the region. As part of this process, we are exploring ways for NGOs to provide election process training and assistance prior to elections in northern Iraq that could be held late this year.
We are also looking at ways to provide assistance to:
-- leadership confidence building seminars and organizational meetings;
-- Iraqis who will make their case before international organizations such as UN agencies;
-- and seminars that explore "the day after" and such topics as constitutional modeling, debt restructuring and rebuilding a health care network.
A more detailed report on this activity is in clearance. We look forward to working with Congress as we pursue these efforts at strengthening the ability of Iraqis to work for a better future.
(End text)
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