Iraq News by Laurie Mylroie
The central focus of Iraq News is the tension between the considerable, proscribed WMD capabilities that Iraq is holding on to and its increasing stridency that it has complied with UNSCR 687 and it is time to lift sanctions. If you wish to receive Iraq News by email, a service which includes full-text of news reports not archived here, send your request to Laurie Mylroie .
IRAQ NEWS, THURSDAY, MARCH 4, 1999
I. L. MYLROIE, JAN, 93 SHOOTINGS OUTSIDE THE CIA, WASH TIMES, JUN 25 97
II. L. MYLROIE, FEB 93 TRADE CENTER BOMBING, TNI, WINTER 95/96
III. N. MARSOUMI, "BEWARE THE PATIENT MAN'S RAGE," BABIL, JAN 20 94
IV. JIM HOAGLAND, SADDAM WON'T JUST FIGHT THE SAME WAR AGAIN, OCT 12 94
V. F. GAFFNEY, UNSCOM REPORT: IS THE U.S. THE LIKELY TARGET?, APR 11 95
VI. N. MARSOUMI, A U.S. DELUSION, AL IRAQ, APR 11 95
VII. WARNING TO U.S. FORCES IN SAUDI ARABIA, IRAQ RADIO, APR 12 95
VIII. FRANK GAFFNEY, IRAQ LIES ABOUT BW PROGRAM, JUL 7 95
IX. IRAQ SLAMS ARAB SUMMIT, REUTER, JUN 24 96
X. L. MYLROIE, THE 1997 GULF CRISIS, MERIA, JAN 98
Last Fri, President Clinton gave a major foreign policy address
described by NSC adviser, Sandy Berger, in the NYT, Feb 27, as a "state
of the union for foreign policy." In the fifty minute speech, Clinton
mentioned Iraq only once. He said, "Each generation faces the
challenges of not trying to fight the last war. In our case, that means
recognizing that the more likely future threat to our existence is not a
strategic nuclear strike from Russia or China, but the use of weapons of
mass destruction by an outlaw nation or a terrorist group. In the last
six years, fighting that threat has become a central priority of
American foreign policy. Here, too, there is much more to be done. We
are working to stop weapons from spreading at the source, as with
Russia. We are working to keep Iraq in check so that it does not
threaten the rest of the world or its region with weapons of mass
destruction. We are using all the means at our disposal to deny
terrorists safe havens, weapons, and funds. Even if it takes years,
terrorists must know there is no place to hide. Recently, we tracked
down the gunman who killed two of our people outside the CIA six years
ago. . . ."
This issue of "Iraq News" reviews developments since Jan, 93, which
seem to include the gunman outside the CIA. Saddam has been coming back
since that time, carrying out acts of violence and intimidation, aimed
at eroding support for sanctions and otherwise ending the system of
post-Gulf war constraints. But that has been missed, for a variety of
reasons. Among them, Clinton never wanted to deal with the unfinished
business of the Gulf war, while the Rabin/Peres Gov't, elected in the
summer of 92, did not want to either. Its priority was the peace
process and the enemies of the peace process were Iran and the Muslim
extremists who carried out suicide bombings and were backed by Iran.
[Syria was seen to be a partner for peace, while, as Shimon Peres, in
his capacity as Foreign Minister, even pursued negotiations with Iraq,
although that had been tried and failed in the 1980's.]
This review of events since Jan 93 will underscore why the Feb 14
Iraqi leadership statement [see "Iraq News," Feb 14, 22 & 24] should be
taken seriously, while it will highlight the point that Saddam's moves
are thought out and planned well in advance.
THE MENTALITY OF SADDAM HUSSEIN AND THOSE AROUND HIM
Taha Yasin Ramadan, on Iraq Satellite TV, Feb 15 [see "Iraq News,"
Feb 22], said, "I tell the Arab citizens, the organizations, and the
parties and to all the good people that the US and Zionist enemy will
give up its hegemony, control, and its military presence only if it is
harmed."
In early 1996, a Kuwaiti professor of political science told "Iraq
News" that there was something very important that must be understood
about Saddam and those around him. He then related an exchange between
Tariq Aziz and several members of the Arab Political Science Association
that occurred during the latter stages of the Iraq-Iran war. The APSA
members asked Aziz why Baghdad attacked oil tankers even from countries
which were friendly to Iraq that were carrying oil from Iran. Aziz
replied that Iraq wanted more international pressure on Iran to end the
war and "the way to get people to do want you want is to hurt them."
Whatever Saddam Hussein has achieved in his life, it has been through
violence and force. That is what he knows and what he trusts.
Moreover, Saddam believes that Americans cannot take casualties. As he
told Joe Wilson, number two at the US embassy in Baghdad, shortly after
Iraq invaded Kuwait, "Yours is a society that cannot accept 10,000 dead
in one battle." The Gulf war did not disabuse Saddam of that notion.
It demonstrated only that America's high-tech weaponry could force Iraq
to withdraw from Kuwait without America's suffering significant
casualties. Indeed, according to Reuters, Feb 28, Iraqi Oil Minister,
Gen. Amir Rashid "warned that Iraq would soon teach patrolling Western
warplanes a 'good lesson.' . . . 'We are hoping in the near future that
they are taught . . . a lesson. . . What is good about the Americans is
that when they are taught a good lesson they will withdraw quickly,'
Rashid said."
In the spring of 1991, the late, distinguished professor of political
philosophy, Allan Bloom, following a talk "Iraq News" gave at the
University of Chicago, complained, "You make Saddam seem boring." He
took issue with the notion that Saddam had invaded Kuwait in large part
because he was apprehensive about discontent inside Iraq, following the
end of the Iran-Iraq war. Bloom said, "You have forgotten your Greeks.
A man does not become a tyrant to survive."
Indeed, in Aristotle's very famous words, "Men do not become tyrants
in order to avoid exposure to the cold." [Book II, ch vii, para 13]
The view of tyranny in Plato/Aristotle is usefully applied to Saddam.
Tyrants are moved by insatiable desires, rather than necessity, and
seek, in their fashion, glory. [see L. Mylroie, "Why Saddam Hussein
Invaded Kuwait," Orbis, Winter, 1993.]
Taking together the advice of Allan Bloom and that of the Kuwaiti
professor: Saddam seeks glory, while he believes that the way to get
people to do what you want is to hurt them. It may even be said that
Saddam prefers to achieve a goal through violent means, rather than
peaceful means, because, in violence there lies a kind of glory. Also,
there is revenge.
Saddam and those around him do not expect the Arabs, or the UNSC, to
support the lifting of sanctions out of sympathy for the Iraqi people.
Rather, their mentality is to seek an end to sanctions, and the
post-war constraints generally, through violence and intimidation.
1991 GULF WAR THREATS
During the Gulf war, Iraq's media and officials threatened revenge in
the form of assassinations and bombings. On Jan 30, 1991, INA warned,
"The American arena will not be excluded from the operations and
explosions of the Arab and Muslim mujhadin and all the honest strugglers
in the world." On Feb 9, Baghdad Radio read a cable from the chief of
Iraqi intelligence to Saddam, "We will chase them to every corner at all
times. No high tower or house of steel will protect them against the
fire of truth." On Feb 15, Baghdad Domestic Service, Ramadan threatened
the assassination of "Bush, Major, Mitterand and the rest of the dirty
dwarfs like agent Husni and traitor Fahd. Every Iraqi child, woman, and
old man knows how to take revenge on these scoundrels . . . They will
avenge the pure blood that has been shed no matter how long it takes."
Of course, Iraqi terrorism during the war was very limited. Perhaps
the int'l focus on Iraq made it difficult for Iraqi intelligence to
operate. The head of military intelligence then, who has since
defected, Gen. Wafiq Samarai, suggested to "Iraq News" that the war
ended too quickly for Baghdad to carry out what it intended. And,
possibly, Saddam saved his most ambitious terrorism for later. Neil
Gallagher, chief of the FBI's counter-terrorism section during the Gulf
war anticipated just that. "There is a saying in the Middle East that
revenge is best served on a cold plate . . . They don't have time
pressure. It could be on an anniversary date. You can't say it's over
with." (Ronald Kessler, The FBI, Pocket Star Books, 1993, p.45).
1993
With George Bush's defeat in the Nov 92 presidential elections, the
final green light was given for a campaign of revenge. Bush had taught
Saddam a measure of respect for him personally, but it did not extend to
Clinton.
Only the first two acts in that campaign were planned well in
advance. They were the Jan 25 shootings outside the CIA, five days into
Clinton's term, and the bombing of New York's World Trade Center a month
later. The man responsible for the CIA shootings, Mir Aimal Kansi, fled
to Quetta Pakistan. A month later, the WTC mastermind, Ramzi Yousef,
also fled to Quetta. It is hard to believe that was just coincidence.
That is particularly so, as neither man was a Muslim fundamentalist and
it is otherwise difficult to understand why a Pasthun nationalist
(Kansi) and a Baluch (Yousef) would have carried out such acts.
Probably, the flight of Kansi, an insignificant figure, was meant to
test the security of the escape route that Yousef, a highly skilled
intelligence agent and trained chemist, would use a month later, as I
wrote in an article about Kansi in the Wash Times, Jun 25 97 and an
article about Ramzi Yousef in The National Interest, Winter 1995/96.
The WTC bomb was meant to topple NYC's tallest tower on to its twin.
It was run as a false flag operation, with the Muslim fundamentalists
meant to be arrested. Had the tower fallen, tens of thousands, would
have died. With authorities arresting the likes of fundamentalists like
Mohammad Salameh, it would have been easy to jump to the conclusion that
Iran was behind the bombing. Then, perhaps, the argument would have
been made that it was time to lift sanctions on Iraq, to deal with the
new strategic threat from Iran and Muslim extremists. That, at least,
is what Saddam might have hoped.
But the tower didn't fall; there was no real panic; and New York FBI
believed that Iraq, not Iran, was behind the bomb. So Saddam took
advantage of ad hoc opportunities, as they arose. When Bush visited
Kuwait in April, he tried to kill him and his entourage.
And following the WTC bombing, NY FBI launched an undercover
operation aimed at the local fundamentalists. A Sudanese immigrant took
up the bait to make jihad. He wanted to bomb a Manhattan armory, but he
had two "friends" at Sudan's UN mission, intelligence agents, who
changed the targets to the UN and other sites. The Clinton
administration knew Sudanese intelligence had become involved, because
the Gov't was running the plot. It also recognized that Sudan alone
didn't make sense. It thought Sudan was fronting for Iran. It didn't
realize that Iran had no reason to blow up the UN; Iraq had close ties
with Sudan; and Iraq made more sense as Sudan's hidden partner.
When Clinton hit Iraqi intelligence headquarters on Jun 26, saying
that it was for the attempt to kill Bush, he thought it would take care
of all the terrorism. It would teach Saddam a lesson and serve as
caution to Sudan and Iran [see "Iraq News, Jan 27]. But the strike only
stopped Saddam temporarily.
Indeed, on Jun 27, Iraq's intelligence chief cabled Saddam, pledging
"to pursue anyone who dares to attack our dear Iraq and severely punish
the evil insects," while Al Jumhuriyah, Jul 3, wrote, "It is therefore a
wrong conclusion on Clinton's part that striking the intelligence
headquarters will ease the Iraqis' anger [i.e. end terrorism]. This
also confirms Clinton's weakness and naivete."
1994
In his Jan 16 speech marking the third anniversary of the Gulf war's
start, Saddam threatened the Gulf states directly and America
indirectly, "For all evildoers, masters and slaves, we reiterate that
they must not be deluded once again or miscalculate things. . . The
punishment of the criminals is an eye for an eye and a tooth for a
tooth. . . For all those concerned among the Arab rulers, we say: All
that you have done against the people of Iraq is something that angers
God. . . I also say that there is still some way out of this. I tell
the wise believers: Will you do so? I have conveyed the message, and
may God be my witness."
Patience is a key virtue for "the believer" in the Koran and it ran
through the Iraqi statements culminating in the Oct 94 lunge at Kuwait.
In Babil, Jan 20, "Beware of the Patient Man's Rage," Nuri Najm
al-Marsoumi, First Undersecretary in the Information Ministry,
elaborated on Saddam's speech. Marsoumi wrote, "The Iraqis will not say
more than what leader Saddam Husayn said on the third anniversary of the
aggression . . . If we become certain--despite our patience and good
offices exerted by our friends to end the abnormal situation resulting
from the blockade and the violations of Iraqi sovereignty in the north
and south--we are capable of bringing the game back to the beginning. .
. We will not allow the agents, lowly people, or covetors to encroach on
what we own, on our rights, and on our dignity. As the leader said, the
punishment of the criminal will be an eye for an eye and a tooth for a
tooth. The Arabs say: 'Beware of the patient man's rage.'"
On Mar 13, in advance of a visit to NYC by Tariq Aziz to lobby the
UNSC on sanctions, Saddam issued a vague warning, broadcast on Iraq
Radio. Saddam said, "The blockade has been continuing for four years.
. . . Despite Iraq's offers and responses, . . . there is nothing being
given in return. Everyday one commission comes and another one goes.
They have destroyed the weapons, the plants, and the factories they
wanted to destroy. . . How long will the Iraqi people wait, and how can
they accept the diplomacy of the fox of the jungle [Ekeus]? . . . It is
their right to choose alternatives if they discover that this way will
not lead to a positive result that can save them from this injustice. .
. If comrade Tariq Aziz returns without obtaining the Security
Council's agreement to meet its obligations and if there is no hope that
the injustice will be lifted from the Iraqi people, then the Iraqi
people and their leadership can no nothing else but decide what they
believe will give them hope, God willing, in the direction they believe
is sound."
A press campaign followed, elaborating on Saddam's statement. INA,
Mar 15, reported, "Al Thawrah and Al Qadisiyah write that President
Saddam Husayn's speech to the Cabinet on Mar 13 has ended a period of
wily procrastination and prevarcation and put the onus on the UN
Security Council to discharge its clear and pressing obligations . . .
Al Thawrah said that what is at stake now is the integrity and
reputation of the Security Council. The paper stressed that the council
should uphold justice and fairness and fulfill its obligations by ending
injustice and lifting the sanctions, or else Iraq and its leadership
will legitimately choose a new road, a road different from the one it
has followed for the past four years. . ."
What does choosing "a new road" mean? On Jul 17, in a speech marking
the 26th anniversary of the Baathist coup, Saddam again threatened the
Gulf states, "We reiterate that we offer peace and security to whomever
needs them, including rulers who harmed us. . . We have offered what is
satisfactory to God and freed ourselves from blame. . . God be my
witness that I have delivered the message."
Blame for what? And what is the message? Some two months later, an
Iraqi press campaign began in advance of the Oct 10 UNSCOM report. The
Iraqi threats were violent, sustained, and ominous. On Sept 26 Gen.
Amir Rashid, then director of Iraq's Military Industrial Organization,
who had been part of an Iraqi delegation lobbying the UNSC, returned to
Baghdad, leaving the rest of the delegation, including Tariq Aziz,
behind.
As an UNSCOM official explained to "Iraq News" then, Gen. Amir was
displeased by what UNSCOM had told him and, presumably, reported that in
Baghdad. The next day, Sept 27, Saddam gave a speech, broadcast on
Iraqi TV. Saddam said, "When your patience or the patience of the
Iraqis comes to an end, because of this embargo, with our own arms, we
can open the storehouses of the universe and feed you until you are full
of rice, flour and sugar and you know what I mean. When the patience of
the Iraqis comes to an end because of this embargo and they begin to
murmur and they are hungry, then, by God, we will open to all the
storehouses of the universe and anyone who hears this should say that
Saddam Husayn said this."
Two days later, Babil explained, "The great leader Saddam Husayn has
said, 'When we feel that the Iraqis might starve, by God, we will open
for them the storehouses of the universe.' The United States must
understand that there is a limit to the patience of the Iraqis. They
must not imagine that the destruction of Iraqi missiles and other
weapons will strip the Iraqi people of their ability to influence
matters and change the course of history. The will of people who want
to live in dignity is the strongest and most effective missile. Does
the United States realize the meaning of opening the storehouses of the
universe with the will of the Iraqi people? . . . Does it realize the
meaning of every Iraqi becoming a missile that can cross to countries
and cities?"
Similar threats appeared almost daily. Al Jumhuriyah, Oct 4, wrote,
"History says that when peoples reach the verge of collective death,
they will be able to spread death to all." Al Jumhuriyah, Oct 8, wrote,
"We seek to tell the United States and its agents that the Iraqi
patience has run out and that the perpetuation of the crime of
annihilating the Iraqis will trigger crises, whose nature and
consequences are known only to God."
Iraq, it seemed was warning that it was prepared for a risky and
desperate campaign of terrorism, if sanctions were not lifted soon. But
that is not what happened. Suddenly, on Oct 7, Clinton announced that
30,000 Republican Guards were on Kuwait's border, with more coming.
"Iraq News" believes that if the US had not sent forces to Kuwait, Iraq
would have crossed the border. But "Iraq News" also believes that
Saddam expected the US to respond and did not really expect to invade
Kuwait then.
As Jim Hoagland, Oct 12, "Saddam Won't Just Fight the Same War Over
Again," wrote with great prescience, "It is not true that Saddam is
completely irrational or unpredictable. . . Do not be surprised or
deceived, if Saddam now indicates that he will lower the tensions he has
created and recognize Kuwait's frontier, the major hurdle he was to
clear to get sanctions lifted." And that is precisely what he did.
Following his lunge at Kuwait, Saddam turned around, and, under
Russian mediation, recognized Kuwait. Substantial pressure built to
lift sanctions, as UNSCOM believed it had destroyed Iraq's proscribed
weapons and it was close to writing the report that would give Iraq a
clean bill of health.
1995/1996
Indeed, in late 94/early 95, Amb. Ekeus told his staff that he was
moving to declare that UNSCOM had destroyed Iraq's proscribed weapons,
as required by UNSCR 687. At that time, Iraq claimed it had no BW
program and UNSCOM had not come up with hard evidence to prove
otherwise. Ekeus told his staff that those who believed Iraq had an
undeclared BW program, would have to come up with the goods soon.
And they did. The Israelis, among others, provided UNSCOM
documentation detailing Iraq's import of large quantities of biological
growth material. Over the following months, UNSCOM pressed Iraq as to
what it had done with the material and Iraq could provide no coherent
answer.
So, in its Apr 10, 1995 report, UNSCOM stated, for the first time,
that Iraq had an undeclared BW program. That report blocked the
momentum that had been building to lift sanctions, as there was now an
entire proscribed program to deal with. Moreover, since, as it would
appear, Saddam had already determined that he would not give up any of
his BW stockpile, perhaps, in his mind, the report even raised the
possibility that Iraq would never get a clean bill of health from UNSCOM
and that sanctions would never be lifted, at least as envisaged in UNSCR
687. Saddam's problem was only compounded, though very seriously so, by
the Aug, 8 1995 defection of Hussein Kamil.
But when UNSCOM reported, Apr 10, that Iraq had an undeclared BW
program, few paid attention. Following the Oct 94 Jordan-Israeli peace
treaty, Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin began to say ever more
regularly and stridently that Iraq was no problem while sanctions were
on, the problem was Iran. But as a Kuwaiti reader recently asked, how
could Rabin say that Iraq was no problem, if he knew that Saddam had a
large, hidden BW program and retained the capability to kill millions of
people?
"Iraq News" believes that Rabin was moved by the peace process. He
wanted very much reach an agreement with Syria before the 1996 elections
in Israel and the US. Towards that end, it seems, he wanted to maximally
isolate Syria's closest ally, Iran, while pressuring Iran to end its
support for Islamic terrorism [see "Iraq News," Mar 20 98].
That was also suggested by Jim Hoagland, when he wrote, May 28, 1995
"What's eating Warren Christopher? The normally laconic, deeply
reserved secretary of state has recently lashed out again and again at
Iran. . . . On Iran, and Iran alone, Christopher has dropped the evil
of banality. Some administration insiders attribute it to the
frustrations Christopher experienced in negotiating fruitlessly to free
the US hostages in Tehran as Jimmy Carter's deputy secretary of state.
Christopher's own answer is more complex and more interesting. . . . A
Syrian-Israeli deal has become Christopher's most important personal and
professional preoccupation. 'I feel very protective about the peace
process,' the secretary acknowledged in an interview. The Iranians--
allies of Syria's President Hafez Assad--have sworn to derail all peace
efforts. 'They are the most blatant international enemy of the peace
process,' Christopher snapped, pointing to Iran's financial support for
extremist Palestinian groups."
And such was the optimism, even euphoria, surrounding the peace
process that many did not pay attention to the April 10 UNSCOM report
and its significance. Israel's authoritative Middle East Contemporary
Survey, 1995, (Dayan Center, TAU), for example, did not even mention the
report.
But Frank Gaffney took note. In an Apr 11 Decision Brief, "If Saddam
Hussein is Building Biological Weapons, Is the United States the Likely
Target?," Gaffney wrote, "A report released yesterday appears to confirm
the worst: Saddam Hussein has secreted away at least 17 tons of material
that can be used to breed bacteria which can, in turn, be used in
biological weapons. If the sheer volume of this concealed activity is
any guide to the size of the Iraqi BW program, it suggests that Saddam
is contemplating the murder of large numbers-perhaps millions of people.
If so, the question occurs: who is the likely target of such a
genocidal campaign? . . . Long before Desert Storm, the Center for
Security Policy was among those who believed that the removal of Saddam
Hussein and his ruling clique from power must be an urgent priority. . .
. The Ekeus report makes clear that the risk of Saddam's continued rule
in Iraq is a mortal danger to American lives and interests."
Also, the day after the UNSCOM report, Nuri al-Marsoumi, "A US
Misunderstanding Which Must be Removed," Al-Iraq, Apr 11, wrote, "The US
administration has based many of its calculations on [a] delusion. . . .
This delusion says Iraqis, as a people, are satisfied with their
government's measures in accepting the UN Security Council resolutions
that were issued before and after the 30-state military aggression . . .
The impact of this delusion on US calculations has been enhanced by the
Iraqi Government's desire to avoid any military confrontation . . . As
long as the United States entertains this delusion and builds all its
calculations on it, the policy of harming Iraq will continue.
Therefore, it has become essential to straighten out the situation one
more time. . . . In this context, publishing the facts on a wide basis
. . . is essential . . .
"First: Although Iraq has officially recognized Kuwait as a state,
there is a broad popular current which does not approve of this and is
bitter about severing part of its precious land. . . .
"Second: The government's performance and method of dealing with the
UN Security Council and Special Commission are unacceptable to
considerable number of Iraqis, who may be right. One opinion which
deserves respect says Iraq's unilateral implementation of resolution 687
and the subsequent destruction of the long-range missiles and chemical
weapons and abandonment of the programs to develop these weapons may
have been somewhat premature, since it has deprived Iraq of an effective
means of pressure in the conflict. . . .
"Fourth: Iraq's abandonment of part of its weapons-the long-range
missiles and chemical weapons-under resolution 687 and its acceptance of
the other Security Council resolutions does not mean it has lost
everything. The Iraqi people consist of 18 million people . . . Should
it be necessary, the people can become a huge potent force in defense of
their interests . . .
"The members of the Security Council are called upon to comprehend
these facts, put an end to the exposed US game in the Security Council
before the world, and deal positively with what Iraq has offered.
Otherwise, Iraq itself will have the right to put an end to the game,
exactly as it has acted conscientiously and out of its free will when
abiding by the Security Council's resolutions and the Special
Commission's measures."
Also, on Apr 11, Al Quds Al Arabi, a London-based Palestinian paper,
close to Baghdad, published a threat from a previously unknown (ie.
nonexistent) group, the Islamic Change Movement, demanding that US/UK
forces leave Saudi Arabia by Jun 28. Iraq Radio broadcast the threat
the next day. Although Jun 28 passed without incident, the threat was
repeated in Al Quds Al Arabi, Jul 3.
Meanwhile, UNSCOM continued to pursue Iraq's BW program. In early
Jul, Ekeus visited Baghdad and the Iraqis finally acknowledged having
had an offensive BW program. But they claimed to have destroyed it in
Oct 90, fearing that the coming war could cause the general dispersal of
BW agents, as Frank Gaffney, Jul 7 explained. Gaffney cited ominous
articles in the Iraqi press, including al-Marsoumi, in Al Iraq, Jul 4,
who wrote, "The last few days of the embargo may be full of events and
conflict because the US aggressors and their lackeys will not accept
defeat as easily as some people think." And Gaffney again warned, "The
criminal malevolence of which Saddam's regime is capable dictates that
it be brought to an end before he makes use of whatever biological or
other weapons of mass destruction are still at his disposal."
On Jul 16, Saddam met US envoy, Rep Bill Richardson (D NM) to turn
over two Americans imprisoned for straying into Iraq from Kuwait. In
that meeting, one imagines, Richardson, a close confidante of Clinton,
also conveyed the US position on Iraq, including sanctions. That
evening, Baghdad announced a change of defense ministers. Saddam's
cousin, the notorious Ali Hassan al-Majid, was replaced by Gen. Sultan
Ahmed, a professional soldier, who led the Iraqi delegation at the
Safwan cease-fire talks. Only once before did Saddam have a competent
soldier who was not related to him as defense minister-from Dec 90 to
Apr 91.
In early Aug, Iraq's UN envoy, Nizar Hamdoon, told Amb Ekeus that
Baghdad wanted a positive report from UNSCOM by month's end and that
Iraq was serious. It looked like Saddam intended to do something. But
on Aug 8, Hussein Kamil defected to Jordan, claiming that Saddam
intended to invade Kuwait, while the US again rushed forces to the Gulf,
amid suspicious Iraqi troop movements.
Kamil's defection shook the regime, both because of who Kamil was, and
what he knew about Iraq's retained, proscribed unconventional
capabilities. Saddam responded by recalling Ekeus to Baghdad and
pre-empting the revelations Kamil might make, while, over the next two
years, he turned to repairing his authority internally, even as he
continued with acts of violence, intended to take revenge, while also
undermining the anti-Iraq coalition.
On Nov 13, a bomb exploded in Riyadh at the US training mission for
the Saudi Nat'l Guard, killing seven people. The Islamic Change
Movement and several other unknown groups took credit. As a senior
Saudi official told "Iraq News," in Feb 96, "Of course that was Iraq.
It was a professional bomb. It was not built by a bunch of Saudis
sitting in a tent in the middle of the desert."
And as Jerusalem Post columnists, Uri Dan and Dennis Eisenberg, wrote
in "Sly Snake of Baghdad," Nov 23 95, "Signs are Saddam Hussein is
making an all-out effort to topple the royal family of Saudi Arabia . .
. The Saudi intelligence chief, General Turki, a prince of the royal
house, told American Ambassador Raymond Mabus: 'The explosive device was
far too sophisticated to be assembled locally. We believe it was
brought into the country.' . . . The view that Saddam Hussein
masterminded the attack is held by General Hussein Kamil's entourage,
now in hiding in Jordan. A source close to Kamil told US experts still
debriefing him that Saddam is 'as cunning as a serpent. He's determined
to beat the US and topple the White House into the dust,' Kamal said.
'That's one of his favorite expressions. You can judge how sly he is:
He wants everybody to think it's the Iranians behind the attack. He is
using them as a smoke screen, hoping to fool the world. He will go on
trying to seek revenge against his enemies. Top of his list are Saudi
Arabia and the US.'"
On Jun 22 and 23, Arab leaders met in Cairo for the only summit they
have held since the Gulf war. Iraq was the only country not invited and
the summit took a hard line against Iraq, calling for continued
sanctions, while blaming the suffering of the Iraqi people on the
regime's refusal to comply with the UNSC resolutions. The Iraqi press
immediately lashed out at the US, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, as Reuter,
Jun 24 reported. As Reuter explained, "Iraqi newspapers on Monday
harshly attacked the final statement of the weekend Arab summit in
Cairo, saying that it was anti-Iraq and dictated by the United States,
Israel and their Arab allies. '[The] Cairo summit has adopted a
statement which is worse than the hostile stands against [the] Iraqi
people by Israel, the US, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, the government
newspaper al-Jumhuriya said in a front page editorial written by its
editor Salah al-Mukhtar. 'Instead of calling for lifting the trade
sanctions on [the] Iraqi people causing the death of more than one
million Iraqis since its inception five years ago, [the] Cairo summit
urges Iraq not to follow aggressive policies which provoke its Arab
neighbors, ' Mukhtar said. . . . The paper said Iraq should not remain
idle about what it called provocations of some Arab leaders against
Iraq."
The next day, Jun 25, a bomb ten times the size of the Riyadh bomb
exploded at the base that housed the US pilots who enforced the no-fly
zone in southern Iraq, killing 19 US servicemen. As Uriel Dan and
Dennis Eisenberg wrote in "Saddam's Sly Revenge," Jersualem Post, Jun
27, "Israeli counter-intelligence people who have been analyzing the
subject of Middle Eastern terror closely . . . point a finger directly
at Saddam Hussein, who is still seeking revenge for the humiliation he
suffered when US forces crushed his army and destroyed his ambition--a
temporary setback, in his view--to topple the Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian
regimes five years ago."
Also, as part of recovering his internal position, in Jul 96, Saddam
arrested those involved in the CIA-backed coup plot, as detailed by
David Wurmser, "Tyranny's Ally: America's failure to Defeat Saddam
Hussein," (AEI, 1999, p. 25). Then, a month later, on Aug 31, over the
Labor Day weekend, the Clinton administration allowed Saddam to attack
the INC in Irbil.
And for the rest of the year, Saddam essentially waited--for the US
presidential elections and the next US administration and then for
changes in UNSCOM's leadership.
1997/1998
The first indications of the crises that would emerge in the fall of
1997 appeared with a Mar 16 cabinet meeting, in which Foreign Minister
al-Sahhaf reported on the results of meetings he had held with UNSCOM
and the IAEA, as I explained in MERIA, Jan 98. But Saddam waited for
Richard Butler to replace Ekeus and then for Butler's first report.
When that report, issued Oct 10, proved no different than the UNSCOM
reports issued by Ekeus, the crises began.
Through these crises, Baghdad has achieved certain things. It
demonstrated that the US has no real policy on Iraq, beyond maintaining
sanctions and occasionally bombing the country. It succeeded in lifting
any practical restriction on its oil imports. And, most significantly,
it brought an end to UNSCOM and the prospect of the imposition of any
serious arms control regime on Iraq.
And, in between the second crisis, which ended with the Feb 23 98
Annan accord, and the third, the RCC/Bath party leadership, May 1,
issued a strongly-worded, ominous, threatening letter to the UNSC [see
"Iraq News," May 5]. The statement was reiterated subsequently in the
Iraqi press [see "Iraq News," May 12]. And it was repeated by the
RCC/Ba'th party leadership Jun 23, following a Wash Post report that
UNSCOM had found VX on Iraq warheads [see "Iraq News," Jun 26]. On Jul
17, in his Nat'l Day speech, Saddam repeated the statement [see "Iraq
News," Jul 20]. And on Aug 5, when the RCC announced the suspension of
UNSCOM inspections, it again reiterated the May 1 statement [see "Iraq
News," Aug 6]. Two days later, the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania
were bombed simultaneously and the May 1 letter has not been mentioned
since.
All this is why "Iraq News" believes that the Feb 14 leadership
statement is serious. The regime does not speak idly, while Saddam has
long been working, through acts of violence and intimidation, to
undermine the anti-Iraq coalition, even if, for a variety of reasons,
that may not have been generally recognized.
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