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03 March 1999

TEXT: CLINTON REPORTS ON IRAQ'S NON-COMPLIANCE WITH UNSC RESOLUTIONS

(Iraq remains a serious threat to peace and security) (6500)
Washington -- "Iraq remains a serious threat to international peace
and security. I remain determined to see Iraq comply fully with all of
its obligations under Security Council resolutions," President Clinton
said in his March 3 report to Congress on the status of efforts to
obtain Iraq's compliance with United Nations Security Council (UNSC)
resolutions.
The President's last report was transmitted on December 18, 1998.
"As long as Saddam Hussein remains in power, he represents a threat to
the well-being of his people, the peace of the region, and the
security of the world," Clinton said. "We will continue to contain the
threat he poses, but over the long term the best way to address that
threat is through a new government in Baghdad. To that end, we --
working with the Congress -- are deepening our engagement with the
forces for change in Iraq to help make the opposition a more effective
voice for the aspirations of the Iraqi people."
Clinton reported that "since December 18, the Security Council has
discussed next steps on Iraq. It decided on January 30 to establish
three assessment panels to address disarmament issues, humanitarian
issues, and Kuwait-related issues. The panels, under the chairmanship
of the Brazilian Ambassador to the United Nations, are due to complete
their reviews by April 15.
He also made the following points:
-- The United States also continues to support the international
community's efforts to provide for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi
people through the "oil-for-food" program. ... In January, the United
States announced its support for lifting the ceiling on oil sales
under the oil-for-food program so that Iraqi civilian humanitarian
needs can better be met.
-- Saddam's record of aggressive behavior compels us to retain a
highly capable force in the region in order to deter Iraq and deal
with any threat it might pose to its neighbors, the reconstitution of
its WMD program, or movement against the Kurds in northern Iraq. ...
We will continue to maintain a robust posture and have established a
rapid reinforcement capability to supplement our forces in the Gulf,
if needed.
-- The United States and coalition partners continue to enforce the
no-fly zones over Iraq through Operation Northern Watch and Operation
Southern Watch. ... In response to Iraq's increased and repeated
no-fly zone violations, and in coordination with the Secretary of
Defense's advice, our aircrews have been authorized by me to respond
to the increased Iraqi threat.
-- On October 31, I signed into law the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998.
It provides significant new discretionary authorities to assist the
opposition in its struggle against the regime. On January 19, I
submitted to the Congress a notification of my intent to designate
certain groups under the Act; I designated those groups on February 4.
The assessment of additional groups that may qualify for assistance
under the Act is progressing. Also on October 31, Radio Free Iraq
began operations. Its broadcasts are being heard in Iraq and its
message profoundly displeases the regime.
-- On January 21, Secretary of State Albright announced the
appointment of Frank Ricciardone as Special Representative for
Transition in Iraq (SRTI). ... He traveled with the Secretary of State
to London, Riyadh, and Cairo in late January to discuss U.S. policy on
this issue. He outlined U.S. intentions to help Iraq resume its
rightful place in the region -- a goal the United States believes can
only be achieved under new Iraqi leadership. He emphasized U.S. desire
to work with Iraqis -- who alone can make this happen -- inside Iraq
and outside Iraq, as well as with Iraq's neighbors who share the same
objectives.
Following is the text of the President's report:
(Begin text)
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
March 3, 1999
TEXT OF A LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT
TO THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
AND THE PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE OF THE SENATE
March 3, 1999
Dear Mr. Speaker:   (Mr. President:)
Consistent with the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against
Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1) and as part of my effort to keep
the Congress fully informed, I am reporting on the status of efforts
to obtain Iraq's compliance with the resolutions adopted by the United
Nations Security Council (UNSC). My last report, consistent with
Public Law 102-1, was transmitted on December 18, 1998.
Overview
As stated in my December 18 report, on December 16, United States and
British forces launched military strikes on Iraq (Operation Desert
Fox) to degrade Iraq's capacity to develop and deliver weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) and to degrade its ability to threaten its
neighbors. The decision to use force was made after U.N. Special
Commission (UNSCOM) Executive Chairman Richard Butler reported to the
U.N. Secretary General on December 14, that Iraq was not cooperating
fully with the Commission and that it was "not able to conduct the
substantive disarmament work mandated to it by the Security Council."
The build-up to the current crisis began on August 5 when the Iraqi
government suspended cooperation with UNSCOM and the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), except on a limited-range of monitoring
activities. On October 31, Iraq announced that it was ceasing all
cooperation with UNSCOM. In response to this decision, the Security
Council on November 5 unanimously adopted Resolution 1205, which
condemned Iraq's decision as a "flagrant violation" of the Gulf War
cease-fire Resolution 687 and other relevant resolutions. Resolution
1205 also demanded that Iraq immediately rescind both its October 31
decision and its decision of August 5. This came after the passage on
March 3, 1998, of Resolution 1154, warning Iraq that the "severest
consequences" would result from Iraq's failure to cooperate with the
implementation of Resolution 687.
Iraq ignored the Security Council's demands until November 14, when
U.S. and British forces prepared to launch air strikes on Iraq.
Baghdad initially tried to impose unacceptable conditions on its offer
of resumption of cooperation; however, the United States and Great
Britain insisted on strict compliance with all relevant Security
Council resolutions.
Subsequently, Iraq agreed in writing in letters to the U.N. Secretary
General to rescind its August 5 and October 31 decisions and to resume
full cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA in accordance with Security
Council resolutions. Iraq informed the Security Council on November 14
that it was the "clear and unconditional decision of the Iraqi
government to resume cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA."
On November 15, the Security Council issued a statement in which it
stressed that Iraq's commitment "needs to be established by
unconditional and sustained cooperation with the Special Commission
and the IAEA in exercising the full range of their activities provided
for in their mandates."
UNSCOM and the IAEA resumed their full range of activities on November
17, but Iraq repeatedly violated its commitment of cooperation. As
Chairman Butler's report of December 14 details, Iraq has, over the
course of the last 8 years, refused to provide the key documents and
critical explanations about its prohibited weapons programs in
response to UNSCOM's outstanding requests. It refused to allow removal
of missile engine components, denied access to missile test data,
restricted photography of bombs, and endangered the safety of
inspectors by aggressively maneuvering a helicopter near them. Iraq
failed to provide requested access to archives and effectively blocked
UNSCOM from visiting a site on November 25.
On December 4 and again on December 11, Iraq further restricted
UNSCOM's activities by asserting that certain teams could not inspect
on Fridays, the Muslim sabbath, despite 7 years of doing so and the
fact that other inspection teams' activities were not restricted on
Fridays. Iraq blocked access to offices of the ruling Ba'ath Party on
December 9, which UNSCOM held "solid evidence" contained prohibited
materials. Iraq routinely removed documents from facilities prior to
inspection, and initiated new forms of restrictions on UNSCOM's work.
We also have information that Iraq ordered the military to destroy
WMD-related documents in anticipation of the UNSCOM inspections.
Iraq's actions were a material breach of the Gulf War cease-fire
resolution (UNSC Resolution 687), the February 23, 1998, Annan-Aziz
Memorandum of Understanding, and Iraq's November 14 commitment to the
Security Council. The threat to the region posed by Iraq's refusal to
cooperate unconditionally with UNSCOM, and the consequent inability of
UNSCOM to carry out the responsibilities the Security Council
entrusted to it, could not be tolerated. These circumstances led the
United States and the United Kingdom to use military force to degrade
Iraq's capacity to threaten its neighbors through the development of
WMD and long-range delivery systems. During Desert Fox, key WMD sites
and the facilities of the organizations that conceal them, as well as
important missile repair facilities and surface-to-air missile sites,
were attacked. Operation Desert Fox degraded Saddam's ability to
threaten his neighbors militarily.
UNSCOM and IAEA inspectors withdrew from Iraq on December 15 when
Chairman Butler reported that inspectors were not able to conduct the
substantive disarmament work required of UNSCOM by the Security
Council. The United States continues to support UNSCOM and the IAEA as
the agreed mechanisms for Iraq to demonstrate its compliance with UNSC
resolutions concerning disarmament.
Since December 18, the Security Council has discussed next steps on
Iraq. It decided on January 30 to establish three assessment panels to
address disarmament issues, humanitarian issues, and Kuwait-related
issues. The panels, under the chairmanship of the Brazilian Ambassador
to the United Nations, are due to complete their reviews by April 15.
The United States also continues to support the international
community's efforts to provide for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi
people through the "oil-for-food" program. On November 24, 1998, the
Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1210 establishing a
new 6-month phase (phase five) of the oil-for-food program (phase four
ended November 25). In January, the United States announced its
support for lifting the ceiling on oil sales under the oil-for-food
program so that Iraqi civilian humanitarian needs can better be met.
As long as Saddam Hussein remains in power, he represents a threat to
the well-being of his people, the peace of the region, and the
security of the world. We will continue to contain the threat he
poses, but over the long term the best way to address that threat is
through a new government in Baghdad. To that end, we -- working with
the Congress -- are deepening our engagement with the forces for
change in Iraq to help make the opposition a more effective voice for
the aspirations of the Iraqi people. Our efforts are discussed in more
detail below.
U.S. and Coalition Force Levels in the Gulf Region
Saddam's record of aggressive behavior compels us to retain a highly
capable force in the region in order to deter Iraq and deal with any
threat it might pose to its neighbors, the reconstitution of its WMD
program, or movement against the Kurds in northern Iraq. We
demonstrated our resolve in mid-December when forces in the region
carried out Operation Desert Fox to degrade Iraq's ability to develop
and deliver weapons of mass destruction and its ability to threaten
its neighbors. We will continue to maintain a robust posture and have
established a rapid reinforcement capability to supplement our forces
in the Gulf, if needed.
Our forces in the region include land and carrier-based aircraft,
surface warships, a Marine Expeditionary unit, a Patriot missile
battalion, a mechanized battalion task force, and a mix of special
operations forces deployed in support of U.S. Central Command. To
enhance force protection throughout the region, additional military
security personnel are also deployed. Because of the increased
air-defense threat to coalition aircraft, we have also added a robust
personnel recovery capability.
Operation Northern Watch and Operation Southern Watch
The United States and coalition partners continue to enforce the
no-fly zones over Iraq through Operation Northern Watch and Operation
Southern Watch. Since December 23, following the conclusion of Desert
Fox, we have seen a significant increase in the frequency, intensity,
and coordination of the Iraqi air defense system to counter
enforcement of the no-fly zones. Since that date, U.S. and coalition
aircraft enforcing the no-fly zones have been subject to multiple
anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) firings, radar illuminations, and over
20 surface-to-air missile attacks. Subsequent to Desert Fox, Iraq
significantly increased its air defense presence in both the north and
south, but it has since returned to pre-Desert Fox levels. Despite the
decrease, however, Iraq has not ceased threatening coalition aircraft.
In response to Iraq's increased and repeated no-fly zone violations,
and in coordination with the Secretary of Defense's advice, our
aircrews have been authorized by me to respond to the increased Iraqi
threat. United States and coalition forces can defend themselves
against any Iraqi threat in carrying out their no-fly zone enforcement
mission. On over 50 occasions since December, U.S. and coalition
forces have engaged the Iraqi integrated air defense system. As a
consequence, the Iraqi air defense system has been degraded
substantially further since December.
The Maritime Interception Force
The multinational Maritime Interception Force (MIF), operating in
accordance with Resolution 665 and other relevant resolutions,
enforces U.N. sanctions in the Gulf. The U.S. Navy is the single
largest component of the MIF, but it is frequently augmented by ships,
aircraft, and other support from Australia, Belgium, Canada, Kuwait,
The Netherlands, New Zealand, the UAE, and the United Kingdom. Member
states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) provide logistical
support and shipriders to the MIF and accept vessels diverted for
violating U.N. sanctions against Iraq. Kuwait was especially helpful
providing significant naval and coast guard assistance. Additionally,
they accepted over 15 diverted sanctions violators.
Although refined petroleum products leaving Iraq comprise most of the
prohibited traffic, the MIF has intercepted a growing number of ships
smuggling prohibited items into Iraq in violation of U.N. sanctions
and outside the parameters of the humanitarian oil-for-food program.
In early December, the MIF conducted the latest in a series of
periodic surge operations in the far northern Gulf near the major
Iraqi waterways. These operations disrupted smuggling in the region.
Kuwait and the UAE have stepped up their own enforcement efforts.
Although partially repaired and back on line, damage to the Basra
refinery inflicted during Desert Fox had a significant impact on
Iraq's gas and oil smuggling operations in the Gulf.
In December 1998, Iraq relocated surface-to-surface missile batteries
to the coastal area of the Al Faw Peninsula. The missiles in question,
with a range of nearly 60 nautical miles, could reach far into the
North Arabian Gulf and posed a serious threat to the MIF. The
deployment of these missiles to a position from which they could
engage coalition naval forces was carried out in concert with the
increased attempts to shoot down aircraft enforcing the no-fly zones
and constituted an enhancement of Iraq's military capability in
southern Iraq. Coalition aircraft responded with air strikes to the
threat posed by these missiles and are authorized to continue to do so
as necessary.
Chemical Weapons
After Iraq's November 15, 1998, pledge of unconditional cooperation
with weapons inspectors, UNSCOM began to test the Iraqi promise. In a
November 25 letter, Iraq continued to deny that it ever weaponized VX
nerve agent or produced stabilized VX, despite UNSCOM's publicly
stated confidence in the Edgewood Arsenal Laboratory finding of
stabilized VX components in fragments of Iraqi SCUD missile warheads.
Iraq alleges that the presence of VX was a deliberate act of tampering
with the samples examined in the United States.
On November 26, Iraq agreed to cooperate with UNSCOM efforts to
determine the disposition of 155mm shells filled with mustard chemical
agent, and UNSCOM agreed to proceed with such an effort when
logistically possible. Iraq also agreed to cooperate in verifying the
tail assemblies of R-400 bombs, and in determining the precise
locations of pits that had been used for the field storage of special
warheads at Fallujah Forest and the Tigris Canal.
On November 30, the Iraqis failed to meet a deadline to provide
various documents Chairman Butler requested pertaining to Iraq's
chemical weapons program. Included in this request was the Iraqi Air
Force file of documents found previously by UNSCOM inspectors that
details chemical weapons expended during the Iran-Iraq war. We
understand that UNSCOM believes the file indicates that Iraq?s
official declarations to UNSCOM have greatly overstated the quantities
of chemical weapons expended, which means that at least 6,000 chemical
weapons are unaccounted.
In a January 25, 1999, report to the U.N. Security Council President,
UNSCOM identified as a priority chemical weapons disarmament issues:
VX, the 155mm mustard shells; the Iraqi Air Force file of chemical
weapons documents; R-400 bombs filled with CBW (field inspections
needed); and chemical weapons production equipment (field verification
is needed for 18 of 20 shipping containers UNSCOM knows were moved
together). On monitoring, the report identified as priorities the
ability to verify Iraqi compliance at listed facilities and to detect
construction of new dual-use facilities.
Biological Weapons
Iraq has failed to provide a credible explanation for UNSCOM tests
that found anthrax in fragments of seven SCUD missile warheads. Iraq
has been claiming since 1995 that it put anthrax in only five such
warheads, and had previously denied weaponizing anthrax at all. Iraq's
explanations to date are far from satisfactory, although it now
acknowledges putting both anthrax and botulinum toxin into some number
of warheads.
Iraq's biological weapons (BW) program -- including SCUD missile BW
warheads, R-400 BW bombs, drop-tanks to be filled with BW, spray
devices for BW, production of BW agents (anthrax, botulinum toxin,
aflatoxin, and wheat cover smut), and BW agent growth media -- remains
the "black hole" described by Chairman Butler. Iraq has consistently
failed to provide a credible account of its efforts to produce and
weaponize its BW agents.
During the period November 17 to December 2, 1998, an undeclared Class
II Biosafety Cabinet and some filter presses were discovered; these
items are subject to declarations by Iraq and biological monitoring.
On November 18 and 20, Chairman Butler again asked Iraq's Deputy Prime
Minister for information concerning Iraq's biological weapons
programs. Iraq has supplied none of the information requested.
In the January 25, 1999, report to the U.N. Security Council
President, UNSCOM identified as a priority biological weapons
disarmament issue Iraq's incomplete declarations on "the whole scope
of the BW program." The declarations are important because "Iraq
possesses an industrial capability and knowledge base, through which
biological warfare agents could be produced quickly and in volume."
The report also identified the importance of monitoring dual-use
biological items, equipment, facilities, research, and acquisition at
250 listed sites. The effectiveness of monitoring is "proportional to
Iraq's cooperation and transparency, to the number of monitored sites,
and to the number of inspectors."
Long-Range Missiles
Iraq's past practices of (1) refusing to discuss further its system
for concealment of longer range missiles and their components, (2)
refusing to provide credible evidence of its disposition of large
quantities of the unique fuel required for the long-range SCUD
missile, and (3) continuing to test modifications to SA-2 VOLGA
surface-to-air missile components appear intended to enhance Iraq's
capability to produce a surface-to-surface missile of range greater
than its permitted range of 150 km.
While UNSCOM believes it can account for 817 of 819 imported
Soviet-made SCUD missiles, Iraq has refused to give UNSCOM a credible
accounting of the indigenous program that produced complete SCUD
missiles that were both successfully test-flown and delivered to the
Iraqi Army.
In its January 25, 1999, report to the U.N. Security Council
President, UNSCOM identified the following as priority missile
disarmament issues: 50 unaccounted SCUD conventional warheads; 500
tons of SCUD propellants, the destruction of which has not been
verified; 7 Iraqi-produced SCUDs given to the army, the destruction of
which cannot be verified; truckloads of major components for SCUD
production that are missing; the concealment of BW warheads; and the
lack of accounting for VX-filled war-heads. The report identified as
priorities the capability to monitor declared activities, leaps in
missile technology, and changes to declared operational missiles.
There are 80 listed missile sites.
Nuclear Weapons
After Iraq unconditionally rescinded its declarations of
non-cooperation on November 15, the IAEA began to test the Iraqi
pledge of full cooperation. The IAEA Director General Mohammed
El-Baradei's December 14 report on Iraqi cooperation stated: "The
Iraqi counterpart has provided the necessary level of cooperation to
enable the above-enumerated activities [ongoing monitoring] to be
completed efficiently and effectively." In its 6-month report to the
Security Council on October 7, the IAEA stated that it had a
"technically coherent" view of the Iraqi nuclear program. At that
time, the IAEA also stated its remaining questions about Iraq's
nuclear program can be dealt with within IAEA's ongoing monitoring and
verification (OMV) effort. In the IAEA's February 8 report to the U.N.
Security Council it reiterated this position.
Nonetheless, Iraq has not yet supplied information in response to the
Security Council's May 14 Presidential Statement. This statement noted
that the IAEA continues to have questions and concerns regarding
foreign assistance, abandonment of the program, and the extent of
Iraqi progress in weapons design. Iraq has also not passed penal
legislation prohibiting nuclear-related activities contrary to
Resolution 687.
In a February 8, 1999, report to the U.N. Secretary Council President,
IAEA Director General Mohammed El-Baradei summarized previous IAEA
assessments of Iraq's compliance with its nuclear disarmament and
monitoring obligations. The report restates that "Iraq has not
fulfilled its obligation to adopt measures and enact penal laws, to
implement and enforce compliance with Iraq's obligations under
Resolutions 687 and 707, other relevant Security Council resolutions
and the IAEA OMV plan, as required under paragraph 34 of that plan."
The IAEA states that the three areas where questions on Iraq's nuclear
disarmament remain (lack of technical documentation, lack of
information on external assistance to Iraq's clandestine nuclear
weapons program, and lack of information on Iraq's abandonment of its
nuclear weapons program) would not prevent the full implementation of
its OMV plan.
The IAEA continues to plan for long-term monitoring and verification
under Resolution 715. In its February 8 report, the IAEA restated that
monitoring must be "intrusive" and estimated annual monitoring costs
would total nearly $10 million.
Dual-Use Imports
Resolution 1051 established a joint UNSCOM/IAEA unit to monitor Iraq's
imports of allowed dual-use items. Iraq must notify the unit before it
imports specific items that can be used in both weapons of mass
destruction and civilian applications. Similarly, U.N. members must
provide timely notification of exports to Iraq of such dual-use items.
Following the withdrawal of UNSCOM and IAEA monitors, there is no
monitoring of dual-use items inside Iraq. This factor has presented
new challenges for the U.N. Sanctions Committee and is taken into
consideration in the approval process.
The U.N.'s "Oil-for-Food" Program
We continue to support the international community's efforts to
provide for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people through the
oil-for-food program. Transition from phase four to phase five
(authorized by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1210) was smooth. As
in phase four, Iraq is again authorized to sell up to $5.2 billion
worth of oil every 180 days. However, because of a drop in world oil
prices, Iraq was only able to pump and sell approximately $3.1 billion
worth of oil during phase four. Since the first deliveries under
oil-for-food began in March 1997, food worth $2.75 billion, and over
$497 million worth of medicine and health supplies have been delivered
to Iraq.
As of January 19, under phase four of the oil-for-food program,
contracts for the purchase of over $2.3 billion worth of humanitarian
goods for the Iraqi people have been presented to the U.N. Office of
the Iraq Program for review by the Sanctions Committee; of these,
contracts worth over $1.6 billion have been approved; most of the
remaining contracts are being processed by the Office of the Iraq
Program. As of February 4, the United States had approved 584
contracts in phase four and had placed 28 on hold pending
clarification of questions about the proposed contracts.
With regard to funds set aside for imports of parts and equipment to
increase oil exports, as of February 4, 333 contracts with a total
value of nearly $178 million have been approved; 94 contracts are on
hold. In January, the United States released a number of holds on oil
spare parts contracts. Up to $300 million had been set aside in phase
four of the oil-for-food program to pay for spare parts and equipment
to increase Iraqi oil exports and thus increase available humanitarian
funding. The United States had requested holds on contracts that did
not directly boost oil exports. As the current phase of oil-for-food
again sets aside $300 million for this purpose, the United States
decided to remove holds on lower priority contracts.
The Security Council met in January to discuss the humanitarian
situation in Iraq. The United States supported an examination of the
current situation and exploration of ways to improve the humanitarian
situation, particularly with regard to vulnerable groups such as
children under age five, and pregnant and nursing women. The United
States has expressed its support for lifting the cap on Iraqi oil
exports under the oil-for-food program, and has suggested some
streamlining of approval of food and medicine contracts in the U.N.
Sanctions Committee.
Three assessment panels are being formed to look at Iraqi disarmament,
the humanitarian situation in Iraq, and Iraq's obligations regarding
Kuwait. The panels are expected to complete their work by the middle
of April.
Resolution 1210 maintains a separate oil-for-food program for northern
Iraq, administered directly by the United Nations in consultation with
the local population. This program, which the United States strongly
supports, receives 13 to 15 percent of the funds generated under the
oil-for-food program. The separate northern program was established
because of the Baghdad regime's proven disregard for the humanitarian
needs of the Kurdish, Assyrian, and Turkomen minorities of northern
Iraq, and its readiness to apply the most brutal forms of repression
against them. In northern Iraq, where Baghdad does not exercise
control, the oil-for-food program has been able to operate relatively
effectively. The Kurdish factions are setting aside their differences
to work together so that Resolution 1210 is implemented as efficiently
as possible.
The United Nations is required to monitor carefully implementation of
all aspects of the oil-for-food program. The current phase marked by
Resolution 1210 anticipates infrastructure repairs in areas such as
oil export capacity, generation of electricity, and water
purification. The U.N. monitoring regime is presented with increasing
challenges, as UNSCOM monitors are no longer in Iraq.
Humanitarian programs such as oil-for-food have steadily improved the
life of the average Iraqi living under sanctions (who, for example,
now receives a ration basket providing over 2,000 calories per day, a
significant improvement in nutrition since the program began) while
denying Saddam Hussein control over oil revenues. We will continue to
work with the U.N. Secretariat, the Security Council, and others in
the international community to ensure that the humanitarian needs of
the Iraqi people are met while denying any political or economic
benefits to the Baghdad regime.
Northern Iraq:  Kurdish Reconciliation
Since their ground-breaking meeting with Secretary Albright in
September, Massoud Barzani, President of the Kurdistan Democratic
Party (KDP), and Jalal Talabani, Chairman of the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan (PUK), have met three times to continue their work towards
full reconciliation. Both parties have condemned internal fighting,
pledged to refrain from violence in settling their differences, and
resolved to eliminate terrorism by establishing stronger safeguards
for Iraq's borders. Our deep concern for the safety, security, and
economic well-being of Iraqi Kurds, Shias, Sunnis, and others who have
been subject to brutal attacks by the Baghdad regime remains a primary
focus of our Iraq policy.
On November 4, the Governments of Turkey and the United Kingdom joined
us in recognizing and welcoming the cooperative achievement of Mr.
Barzani and Mr. Talabani. The three states reiterated the importance
of preserving the unity and territorial integrity of Iraq and noted,
with pleasure, the prominence the KDP and PUK have accorded this
principle. We also welcomed the commitment by the KDP and PUK to deny
sanctuary to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), to eliminate all PKK
bases from the region, and to safeguard the Turkish border. The
parties believe that key decisions on Iraq's future should be made by
all the Iraqi people together at an appropriate time and in a regular
political process. Their work to achieve the principles embodied in
the Ankara Statements are thus meant to implement a framework of
regional administration until a united, pluralistic, and democratic
Iraq is achieved.
On January 8, the two leaders met without recourse to U.S., U.K., or
Turkish interlocutors, in Salahidin in northern Iraq. They reiterated
their determination to implement the September agreement, made
concrete progress on key issues of revenue sharing and closing down
PKK bases, and agreed to stay in close contact.
The United States is committed to ensuring that international aid
continues to reach the north, that the human rights of the Kurds and
northern Iraq minority groups, such as the Turkomen, Assyrians,
Yezedis, and others are respected, and that the no-fly-zone enforced
by Operation Northern Watch is observed. The United States will decide
how and when to respond should Baghdad's actions pose an increased
threat to Iraq's neighbors, to regional security, to vital U.S.
interests, and to the Iraqi people, including those in the north.
The Human Rights Situation in Iraq
The human rights situation throughout Iraq continues to be a cause for
grave concern. As I reported November 5, the Iraqi army has stepped up
repressive operations against the Shia in the south. In mid-November,
we received unconfirmed reports from the Iraqi opposition that 150
persons had been executed at Amara, with three bodies left hanging on
the city's main bridge over the Tigris River as a warning to those who
oppose the regime. An additional 172 persons, some detained since
1991, were reported to have been summarily executed in Abu Gharaib and
Radwaniya prisons; as in prior waves of summary prison killings,
bodies showing clear signs of torture were reportedly returned to
their families. Reports reached us in December that a mass grave
containing at least 25 bodies was found near the Khoraisan River in
Diyala province, east of Baghdad.
The Iraqi government continues to work toward the destruction of the
Marsh Arabs' way of life and the unique ecology of the southern
marshes. In the past 2 months, 7 more villages were reportedly
destroyed on the margins of the marshes, with irrigation water cut off
and the vegetation cut down and burned. Those who could not flee to
the interior of the marshes -- particularly the old, infirm, women,
and children -- were said to have been taken hostage by regime forces.
On February 19, the Shia Grand Ayatollah Mohammed al-Sadr was murdered
in Iraq along with several of his relatives. Opposition sources
indicate this murder was the work of the Saddam regime. The regime
also violently suppressed demonstrations that followed in Baghdad and
other cities opposing the murder.
In the north, outside the Kurdish-controlled areas, the government
continues the forced expulsion of ethnic Kurds and Turkomen from
Kirkuk and other cities. In recent months, hundreds of families have
reportedly been expelled from Kirkuk with seven new Arab settlements
created on land seized from the Kurds. Reports from the
Kurdish-controlled areas where the displaced persons are received
indicate that they are forced to leave behind almost all of their
personal property. Due to a shortage of housing, they are still living
in temporary shelters.
A conference on the research and treatment of victims of chemical and
biological weapons attacks in northern Iraq, organized by the
Washington Kurdish Institute and sponsored by the Department of State
was held on November 18-19, 1998. The conference focused on the
long-range effects of the Iraqi chemical attack on the village of
Halabja, where nearly 5,000 persons were killed in 1988. According to
panelists, the hideous combination of mustard gas, tabun, sarin, VX,
tear gas, and possibly aflatoxin that the Iraqi military used in the
attack has resulted in dramatically increased rates of cancer,
respiratory problems, heart failure, infertility, miscarriages, and
possibly genetic damage in the surviving population.
On December 1, the London-based INDICT organization announced that 12
senior Iraqi officials -- including Saddam Hussein, his sons Uday and
Qusay, his half-brother Barzan al-Tikriti, Vice President Taha Yasin
Ramadan, and Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz -- would be the focus of
its campaign for prosecution by an international tribunal.
The Iraqi government continues to stall and obfuscate attempts to
account for more than 600 Kuwaitis and third-country nationals who
disappeared at the hands of Iraqi authorities during or after the
occupation of Kuwait, despite a Security Council resolution requiring
it to do so. Baghdad still refuses to allow independent human rights
monitors to enter Iraq, despite repeated requests by U.N. Special
Rapporteur for Iraq, Max Van der Stoel. The U.N. Human Rights
Commission has issued a strong condemnation of the "all-pervasive
repression and oppression" of the Iraqi government.
The Iraqi Opposition
We are deepening our engagement with the forces of change in Iraq,
helping Iraqis inside and outside Iraq become a more effective voice
for the aspirations of the people. We will work toward the day when
Iraq has a government worthy of its people -- a government prepared to
live in peace with its neighbors, a government that respects the
rights of its citizens, rather than represses them. On October 31, I
signed into law the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998. It provides
significant new discretionary authorities to assist the opposition in
its struggle against the regime. On January 19, I submitted to the
Congress a notification of my intent to designate certain groups under
the Act; I designated those groups on February 4. The assessment of
additional groups that may qualify for assistance under the Act is
progressing. Also on October 31, Radio Free Iraq began operations. Its
broadcasts are being heard in Iraq and its message profoundly
displeases the regime.
On November 17, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs,
Martin Indyk, met with 17 London-based representatives of the Iraqi
opposition. He heard the full range of views of the parties present,
and outlined the new U.S. policy toward the opposition. Indyk urged
them to work together toward the common purpose of a new government in
Baghdad; the United States will help, but the opposition itself must
take the lead. He urged them to do all they could to get a message to
the people of Iraq that there is an alternative to Saddam Hussein,
adding that the United States will support the campaign to indict
Saddam as a war criminal.
Former Iraqi Foreign Minister Adnan Pachachi outlined a number of
agreed points to Indyk. The group: 1) welcomed the new U.S. policy
toward the opposition; 2) will work to create a democratic government
in Iraq; 3) will redouble efforts to get all groups to work together;
4) wants the opposition to serve as an interlocutor for the Iraqi
people with the international community; and 5) expressed thanks for
the U.S. role in the recent Kurdish reconciliation.
On January 21, Secretary of State Albright announced the appointment
of Frank Ricciardone as Special Representative for Transition in Iraq
(SRTI). He will abbreviate his current tour as Deputy Chief of Mission
in Ankara, and take up his new responsibilities in early March. He
traveled with the Secretary of State to London, Riyadh, and Cairo in
late January to discuss U.S. policy on this issue. He outlined U.S.
intentions to help Iraq resume its rightful place in the region -- a
goal the United States believes can only be achieved under new Iraqi
leadership. He emphasized U.S. desire to work with Iraqis -- who alone
can make this happen -- inside Iraq and outside Iraq, as well as with
Iraq's neighbors who share the same objectives.
There are, of course, other important elements of U.S. policy. These
include the maintenance of Security Council support for efforts to
eliminate Iraq's prohibited weapons and missile programs, and economic
sanctions that continue to deny the regime the means to reconstitute
those threats to international peace and security. United States
support for the Iraqi opposition will be carried out consistent with
those policy objectives as well. Similarly, U.S. support must be
attuned to what Iraqis can effectively make use of as it develops over
time.
The United Nations Compensation Commission
The United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC), established
pursuant to Resolutions 687, 692, and 1210, continues to resolve
claims against Iraq arising from Iraq's unlawful invasion and
occupation of Kuwait. The UNCC has issued over 1.3 million awards
worth approximately $7 billion. Thirty percent of the proceeds from
the oil sales permitted by Security Council resolutions have been
allocated to the Compensation Fund to pay awards and to finance
operations of the UNCC. Pursuant to decisions of the UNCC Governing
Council, certain small claims are to receive initial payments of
$2,500 toward the amounts approved on those claims before large claims
of individuals and claims of corporations and governments may share in
the funds available for claims payments. As money from Iraqi oil sales
is deposited in the Compensation Fund the UNCC makes these initial
$2,500 payments on eligible claims in the order in which those claims
were approved by the UNCC. To date, the United States Government has
received funds from the UNCC for initial installment payments on
approximately 1435 claims of U.S. claimants.
Conclusion
Iraq remains a serious threat to international peace and security. I
remain determined to see Iraq comply fully with all of its obligations
under Security Council resolutions. The United States looks forward to
the day when Iraq rejoins the family of nations as a responsible and
law-abiding member. I appreciate the support of the Congress for our
efforts and shall continue to keep the Congress informed about this
important issue.
Sincerely,
WILLIAM J. CLINTON
(End text)