The Jan 25 UNSCOM Report
Iraq News SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 1999
By Laurie MylroieThe central focus of Iraq News is the tension between the considerable, proscribed WMD capabilities that Iraq is holding on to and its increasing stridency that it has complied with UNSCR 687 and it is time to lift sanctions. If you wish to receive Iraq News by email, a service which includes full-text of news reports not archived here, send your request to Laurie Mylroie .
I. JOHN BOLTON, UNSG'S HOSTILITY TO UNSCOM MISSION, HUMAN EVENTS, FEB 5 II. URIEL DANN, SADDAM'S REVENGE, THE NEW REPUBLIC, JUNE 3, 1991 III. UNSCOM REPORT, JAN 25 IV. IRAQI BW TESTING ON HUMANS, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, JAN 31 Martin Indyk, Asst. Sec State for Near Eastern Affairs, explained US policy toward Iraq on Kuwait TV, Jan 31. Indyk said, "The policy is containment until regime change, and the containment part of the policy is focused in the first instance on reconstituting a consensus (!!) in the Security Council on the disarmament process (!!). . . We have agreement among all the Council on how to begin this process. There will be a panel set up to assess the disarmament of Iraq and make recommendations to the Council on how to proceed on that front. . . . Of course there will be other panels, one . . . to assist the situation with regard to Kuwait's POW's missing in action. The third panel will look at the humanitarian issue." What is the objective of US policy with regard to the threat posed by Iraq's retention of proscribed unconventional capabilities? To maintain a consensus on a process, it would seem. The late Albert Wohlstetter would have characterized that language as "Orwellian.". For all practical purposes, UNSCOM is dead. Amb Butler has announced he will leave in June, when his appointment ends. Would any person of talent and integrity want that job or want to head any reconstituted version of UNSCOM? In addition to all UNSCOM's other problems, the UN secretariat is also hostile to it and its mission, as AEI's John Bolton explained in Human Events, Feb 5. Taking issue with Annan and his aides, Bolton wrote, "UNSCOM's mandate was unprecedented in the history of the United Nations. Coupled with the economic sanctions remaining on Iraq, its goal was ultimately nothing less than to render Iraq incapable of further aggression against its neighbors." What is the need for a UN study group on Iraq's disarmament? It looks like the "comprehensive review" in another guise. That, it will be remembered, was proposed as a sop to Iraq and a way to maintain the appearance of UNSC consensus, in the period after Baghdad's Aug 5 suspension of UNSCOM inspections and before its Oct 31 suspension of UNSCOM monitoring. But Iraq was not interested in a comprehensive review that did not promise to lift sanctions and it is not interested in any UN study groups, as an Iraqi spokesman unambiguously stated, after a Jan 31 meeting of Saddam and the top leadership [see "Iraq News," Feb 1 (2)]. Moreover, there is no need for a UN study group on Iraq's disarmament, because UNSCOM, Jan 25, released a comprehensive 262 page report. The NYT, Jan 27, published excerpts of that report under the headline, "UN Report: 'Confusion Reigns' on Details." But that was an inappropriate title for the catalogue of horrors that constituted the UNSCOM report, distribution of which, even within the UN, Russia tried to block. Yet it is typical of US institutions that do not want to do what is necessary to properly address the Iraqi threat--oust Saddam, whether the NYT or the Clinton administration, to consistently understate the danger. As the UNSCOM report made clear, Iraq's determination to maintain and acquire unconventional weapons, proscribed under UNSCR 687, never stopped. That is contrary to what the vast majority, including "Iraq News," thought in the period immediately after the 1991 cease-fire. Then, it was thought that the problem--Saddam's drive to acquire proscribed weapons-would emerge only after UNSCOM had finished its job and sanctions were lifted. But that is American utilitarian thinking. It is not the way Saddam thinks. One person who understood that very early on was the late Uriel Dann, Professor of History, at Tel Aviv University. While visiting at TWI, then headed by Martin Indyk, Dann warned in Jun 91, about the blunder committed in ending the war with Saddam in power. "Iraq News" has published Dann's piece twice before, but newer readers have not seen it and, with the sad demise of UNSCOM, it seemed appropriate to republish it. In The New Republic, Jun 3, 91, Dann wrote, "Saddam Hussein does not forget and forgive. . . . He will strive to exact revenge as long as there is life in his body. . . . The day will come when he will hit. . . He may, by the grace of God, miscalculate as he has miscalculated in the past. But even so the innocent will pay by the millions. This must never be put out of mind. Saddam Hussein, from now on lives for revenge." "Iraq News" first understood that in the late spring of 1993. Iraq experts, "Iraq News" included, had been warning the new Clinton administration to beware of Saddam's charm campaign. Clinton had indicated, in a mid-Jan NYT interview, that if Saddam complied with the terms of UNSCR 687, he would agree to lift sanctions. Therefore, the problem seemed to be that Saddam would comply minimally with UNSCOM, get a positive report, which would trigger the lifting of sanctions, and he would be back in business. But when Massoud Barzani visited Wash DC in Apr 93, as part of an INC delegation that met senior administration officials, he told "Iraq News" that Saddam was concealing proscribed activities from UNSCOM, including the production of BW agents. Barzani was his father's intelligence chief and he is very good with information. Barzani's account of Iraq's ongoing BW production sounded credible and indeed, after Hussein Kamil's defection, it was learned that Iraq had, in fact, continued BW production. And, on the basis of that, as well as another widely misunderstood issue [see L. Mylroie, "The World Trade Center Bomb: Who is Ramzi Yousef? Why it Matters, TNI, Winter 95/96, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/iraq/956-tni.htm ] "Iraq News" understood there was no charm campaign. Rather, there was revenge and Saddam had to go. At the Heritage Foundation, I said that, precipitating a May 13, 1993, Wash Times report, "White House seen ignoring Iraqi threat." Martin Indyk, then NSC adviser on the Middle East, who had brought me out of academics to Wash DC and for whom I had worked at TWI, called me into his office. He, and his assistant for the Persian Gulf, Bruce Reidell, both reacted with concern, as I explained the reasons for my concern. However, when Indyk took it to those above him, it seems they dismissed it, because nothing was ever done. And as the evidence mounted and became clearer in subsequent years that, despite the Gulf war, Saddam remained dangerous, unrepentant, and vengeful, the White House was never prepared to acknowledge and deal effectively with the Saddam threat. And that remains so today. As UNSCOM's Jan 25 report made clear, Saddam's drive to retain and acquire weapons of mass destruction did not end with the war. Rather, as the report explained, "Immediately following the Gulf war, the Iraqi Presidency collected reports on weapons remaining with Iraq's Armed Forces after the war, including its weapons prohibited by recently adopted resolution 687. . . A decision was taken by a high-level committee (one of whose members was Deputy Prime Minister Mr. Tariq Aziz) to provide to the Commission only a portion of its proscribed weapons. . . The policy . . . was based on the following Iraqi actions: --provide a portion of their extant weapons stocks with an emphasis on those which were least modern --retain production capability and the "know-how" documentation necessary to revive programs when possible --conceal the full extent of chemical weapons programs, including its VX project, and retain production equipment and raw materials. --conceal the number and type of BW and CW warheads for proscribed missiles --conceal indigenous long-range missile production, and retain production capabilities, specifically with respect to guidance systems and missile engines --conceal the very existence of its offensive biological weapons program and retain all production capabilities. "Iraq had initial success in much of its concealment efforts, but, based, presumably on early experience with the IAEA and the Special Commission in inspection activities, Iraq took a subsequent decision in late June of 1991 to eliminate some of these retained prescribed materials, on its own, and in secret, and in such a way that precise knowledge about what and how much had been destroyed would not be achievable. . . It was taken following an incident in June 1991 when IAEA inspectors, following an inspection that turned confrontational at Abu Ghraib, obtained photographic evidence of retained nuclear weapons production components." That was the inspection, led by David Kay, in which Iraqis were filmed sneaking calutrons out of the back of the facility. As Kay explained to "Iraq News," it was the first no-notice inspection and he put three inspectors on top of a water tower inside the fence that surrounded the facility, which the base commander permitted, even as he would not allow inspectors into the base. As the inspectors videotaped the calutrons being moved from the base, Iraqis fired shots over their heads. It was later reported that the base commander was shot the following day. MISSILES Among the programs Iraq retained after the Gulf war and continued to work on, in violation of UNSCR 687, was its missile program. That included "Project 1728," its al-Hussein [extended SCUD] missile program, bizarrely named after the date that the Ba'th seized power, Jul 17, and Saddam's birthday, Apr 28. As the UNSCOM report explained, "For years, Iraq insisted that the main purpose of Project 1728 had not been missile production, but the development of welding and other technologies for manufacturing agricultural pumps. In its first FFCD [Full, Final, and Complete Disclosure] in May 1992, Iraq declared that all Project 1728 machines and equipment had been totally destroyed during the Gulf war. Following an intense effort to identify equipment procured for Project 1728, the Commission determined that Iraq's declared purpose for this programme was incorrect. . . . The Commission took the decision, in February, 1995, on the disposal of Project 1728 equipment still available in Iraq. . . . Iraq protested the Commission's decision of February 1995. It agreed to implement it only in July 1995. In its November 1995 FFCD [ED: after Hussein Kamil's Aug 8 defection] Iraq finally acknowledged that the main purpose for Project 1728 had been the reverse-engineering and production of proscribed missile engines, and that the equipment, identified by the Commission, had been used or acquired for use in proscribed activities. . . . "In November 1995, Iraq provided inventory lists to account for the unilateral destruction of components in 1991. Iraq was unable to produce credible explanations of discrepancies between its official declarations and the data contained in the documents it provided. In 1996, Iraq admitted that most important components and tools for its missile engine production had been diverted from the declared unilateral destruction in 1991. Iraq stated that items thus concealed had been retained until March-May 1992, at which time they were secretly destroyed despite the fact that Iraq had already disclosed unilateral destruction of some other items from its proscribed missile activities. In July 1998, Iraq acknowledged that declarations provided to the Commission were not complete and that hiding of missile engine components prior to their unilateral destruction had occurred at an additional site undeclared until that time. . . It has not been possible to establish, to a satisfactory level, material balances of major missile engine components. "At the end of 1994 or the beginning of 1995, an order was issued to design a multi-stage Space Launch Vehicle capable of placing a small satellite into a very low orbit. Such a missile system would be capable of carrying weapon payloads far beyond permitted ranges. . . . The report on this study was prepared in February 1995, concluding that the idea was not feasible given the capabilities available to Iraq. Allegedly, the project was stopped shortly thereafter. This project was declared to the Commission in August 1995. . . . "In January 1996, a Commission inspection team discovered, during an on-site inspection of a missile facility, computer files with a missile simulation program. They contained evidence that in July 1992, a flight simulation of a 3-stage missile had been executed. The simulated missile was based on proscribed SCUD-B missiles. Iraq described the product of the simulation as a "Space Launch Vehicle" that was an effort of an unidentified engineer working on his own. The inspection team later determined that the input/output data, as well as the simulation program itself, had been copied to floppy diskettes in September 1992. Forensic examination also revealed that the diskettes obtained by the team were part of a larger collection of computer disks that were not found by the team nor provided by Iraq. . . . "After the adoption of resolution 687 (1991), Iraq operated in secrecy a facility for the production of liquid propellant missile engines. The facility [was] known as the Sadiq factory . . . The facility's activity was not declared to the Commission until December 1995. Iraq stated that the work on liquid propulsion missile engines began in early 1992. This effort was declared as directed at the reverse-engineering and production of the Volga/SA2 missile engines as well as the manufacture of certain components such as missile engine shut-off valves, which the original Volga/SA2 engine did not have, but which are required for a surface-to-surface ballistic missile. . . A series of static tests under this project was conducted by Iraq in 1992 and 1993. The first five tests were not declared to the Commission and were thus not monitored by inspection teams. . . . Little documentary evidence has been made available by Iraq to support its declarations regarding the nature of missile engine production activities at the Sadiq factory." The UNSCOM report also explained, "A fuller explanation of Iraq's action to retain mobile launchers after the adoption of resolution 697 (1991) and to conceal the events and timing of their unilateral destruction was requested. In September 1997, the Commission asked Iraq to explain the operational requirements for the retained proscribed missile assets that Iraq had concealed after April 1991. In response, the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq gave an explicit order in the presence of the Executive Chairman, to the Iraqi experts not to discuss such issues with the Commission. . . "Iraq declared that it acquired missile propellants together with imported long-range missiles in quantities required for the proper operation of these missiles. Two of these propellants (main fuel and oxidizer) are unique for use with proscribed missiles of SCUD/Al-Hussein class." An accompanying table explained that Iraq maintained that it had unilaterally destroyed 137 tons of main fuel, but had provided no supporting documentation. Iraq also declared that it had unilaterally destroyed 407 tons of oxidizer, but had provided no supporting documentation. CHEMICAL WEAPONS Regarding chemical weapons, the report explained, "When UNSCOM began its verification activities in 1991, only part of Iraq's previous CW stocks, their components and production facilities remained in Iraq. According to Iraq, more than 50% of its CW stocks were consumed in the 1980s. About 70% of the CW key precursors obtained by Iraq were used, according to Iraq, for the manufacture of CW agents, both consumed and those remaining in 1991. "Iraq also declared that the majority of its CW production facilities were destroyed during the 1991 Gulf war by the aerial bombardment, as well as certain quantities of CW and their precursors. The Commission's verification of the proscribed materials remaining after the Gulf war was further complicated due to the unilateral destruction of significant quantities of special munitions and precursor chemicals carried out by Iraq. Iraq conducted this unilateral destruction in the summer of 1991, in direct contravention of the Security Council' s resolutions. . . "Iraq declared the overall production of 3,859 tons of CW agents during the entire period of the implementation of its CW programme. According to Iraq's declarations, mustard, tabun and sarin were produced in large quantities. Not withstanding the admitted production of 3.9 tonnes of VX, Iraq states that attempts to produce VX had failed. "It was not possible to verify the full extent of several R&D projects carried out by Iraq. . . Those include the research on new chemical warfare agents, BZ and Soman. These also include Iraq's efforts to develop new delivery means for CW-agents, such as special warheads other than for Al-Hussein missiles, ie Frog missile and real binary artillery munitions and aerial bombs. Evidence of such studies was found in the documents from the Haider farm. . . . "The Commission has a certain degree of confidence in the accounting for proscribed items declared by Iraq as having been destroyed during the 1991 Gulf war. . . The Commission has a lesser degree of confidence in accounting for proscribed items declared by Iraq as having been destroyed unilaterally. These include 15,900 unfilled and 100 filled special [CBW] munitions, the CW agent VX and 50 tons of a precursor for the production of VX. . . . BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS "Iraq's offensive BW program was among the most secretive of its programs of weapons of mass destruction. Its existence was not acknowledged until July 1995. During the period from 1991 to 1995, Iraq categorically denied it had a biological weapons program and it took active steps to conceal the program from the Special Commission. . . . In 1995, when Iraq was confronted with evidence collected by the Commission of imports of bacterial growth media in quantities that had no civilian utility within Iraq's limited biotechnology industry, it eventually, on 1 July 1995, acknowledged that it used this growth media to produce two BW agents in bulk, botulinum toxin and Bacillus anthracis spores . . . It was not until August of 1995, however that Iraq acknowledged that it had weaponized BW agents . . . This admission only occurred after Lt. Gen. Hussein Kamel Hassan departed. Shortly afterwards, Iraq released a considerable quantity of documents concerned with its weapons of mass destruction programs. The documents relating to biology represented just 200 documents with some pages [sic] out of a total of more than a million pages. Many of the biological documents were scientific reprints from foreign journals. Clearly, they represent only a minor portion of a BW program that ran from 1973 until at least 1991. "Since July, 1995, the Commission has concluded 35 biological inspections. . . The past program investigations have concentrated on issues that are directly related to disarmament and have attempted to validate these aspects of Iraq's Full Final and Complete Disclosure (FFCD), generally without success. This considerable effort has been negated by Iraq's intransigence and failure to provide cooperation concerning its biological weapons since January 1996. . . . "The FFCD presents a limited account that deals with some components of the program uncovered during the Commission's investigations. Iraq states that it 'obliterated' the BW program in 1991, claiming that this involved the destruction of all its BW weapons and associated records and balances. . . . [But] the statement that the program was 'obliterated' in 1991 is contradicted by later evidence of deception and concealment. This activity continued until 1995, at least . . ." Regarding BW delivery systems, the report explained, "In September 1995, Iraq declared the existence of two projects concerning the use of aircraft drop tanks to disseminate BW agents. One employed a Mirage F-1 aircraft, the other a MIG-21. . . . The drop-tank project appears to have been pursued with the utmost vigor by Iraq. It seems to have been the only BW weapon system that continued in development after the start of the Gulf war. Two mobile tanks for bulk BW agents, each with a capacity of 1000 litres, were found buried. . . . This raises question about the state of readiness of this weapons system. Iraq will not discuss the details of concepts of use and flatly refuses to acknowledge the plan for this project. . . . The letter offered as evidence that the project terminated provides no such confirmation. . . Regarding a second aerial BW delivery system, pilotless aircraft, the report explained, "The concept was to produce a MIG-21 aircraft that could take off and fly on a preset flight path without a pilot on board. The plane would carry a drop-tank containing BW agent. After a preset time the valves on the tank would open and disseminate the agent. The aircraft would continue to fly until it ran out of fuel. . . . "There is no clear evidence of the termination of the development of pilotless aircraft for BW dispersal. It is known that such work continues, although for a different stated purpose (targets for anti-aircraft artillery). Regarding aerosol generators and a helicopter spray system, the report explained, "An aerosol generator for the dispersal of biological warfare agents or toxins was developed by the Technical Research Center at Salman Pak by modification of helicopter-borne commercial chemical insecticide disseminators. These modified aerosol generators are assessed as suitable for the dissemination of BW agents from helicopters or slow moving fixed-wing aircraft and are referred to as Zubaidy devices. . . . The absence of a comprehensive account of the Zubaidy devices, including their disposition and supporting evidence is an example of the incompleteness of the current biological FFCD . . . "The Commission has evidence of a parallel development by the Technical Research Center of a similar device, probably for delivery by drones. Iraq officially denies all knowledge about this second device, but this denial is inconsistent with indications from interviews. It is unknown whether development of this second device continued to deployment, but the possibility exists that it did and that such a weapon system still exists in Iraq." This sounds similar to the "anthrax air force," described by the UK Sec Def, Dec 19, and targeted by US/UK forces during "Operation Desert Fox" [see "Iraq News," Dec 21]. Moreover, Iraq's BW program included a genetic engineering program, which started in Mar, 1990. As the report explained, "The objectives for the genetic engineering unit are not elaborated upon, although testimony of Dr. Rihab Taha has indicated initially antibiotic resistant strains of Bacillus anthracis spores were to have been derived." Also, "It is not possible to determine if bacterial or toxin agents other than those stated [by Iraq] were produced. Seed stocks of other agents were actively sought for and obtained by Iraq's BW program." And there is the issue of "special warheads," i.e. those meant to carry CBW agents. The bottom line is that there is no accurate accounting of them, while VX degradation products were found on the remnants of some that the Iraqis had unilaterally destroyed, as the Oct 98 meeting of international experts, convened by UNSCOM, confirmed. A well-informed reader suggested that Iraq now, in the absence of UNSCOM, is probably working to improve its CBW munitions and delivery systems, including carrying out work on the separation of warheads for the Al-Hussein missile. That would include adding a parachute and a barometric fuze to make it far more deadly as a CBW weapon. That would not be very difficult, even as the Iraqis have acknowledged they were working on such a project. If this is the threat Saddam Hussein poses, how can it be addressed? Shai Feldman, head of Tel Aviv University's Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, in a Feb 1 Wash DC seminar, described the Iraqi threat. One person in attendance remarked that it was a welcome change from an earlier tendency among many Israelis to stress the Iranian threat to the exclusion of the Iraq threat. Still, Feldman's recommendation about what to do--nothing, as he endorsed Gen. Zinni's deprecatory comments about the Iraq Liberation Act--did not seem to follow from his description of the threat. This was so, even as in one version of the ILA, among the regions to be turned over to the Iraqi opposition is the Western Desert. That would put Israel out of range of Iraq's missiles. Therefore, one would think the ILA would be very attractive to Israelis. "Iraq News" hopes to explain shortly how vastly exaggerated expectations regarding the peace process under Rabin/Peres dulled the sensibilities of the Israeli center-left to security threats from secular Arab states, including Iraq, while it was accompanied by an exaggerated embrace of and deference to the Clinton administration. Or as SAIS's Eliot Cohen wrote in his lyrical description of Israel at 50, Foreign Affairs, Nov/Dec 98, quoting a former paratrooper and one-time chief psychologist of the IDF, "Israel may not be at peace . . . but Israelis have decided that they are at peace." [Posted at www.sais-jhu.edu/depts/strategic/cohencorner.htm ] And that sentiment is facilitated by the perhaps, sometimes willful, belief that the affection of the US president is tantamount to effective US action to insure the security of Israel and other US allies in the region, when it is not. Finally, the Chicago Tribune, Jan 31, reported UNSCOM's suspicion that Iraq tested BW agents on humans. UNSCOM had discovered "two human sized 'inhalation' chambers. Iraq has said it tested animals, such as donkeys in the chambers, but inspectors note that they are primate-shaped and that Iraq did not use monkeys to test germ or nerve weapons." In 1997, a "defector working with the Israeli intelligence suggested that elements of the Special Security Office had been involved in the testing of political prisoners. The defector supplied basic information of Iraqi officers involved in the testing and their postings, which the inspectors verified. The accuracy of that intelligence led UNSCOM to request more information from other defectors. The CIA delivered a summary of an interview with one defector. . . . In 1995, the summary delivered to UNSCOM states, Shiite political prisoners held at Abu Ghraib [prison], were taken from their cells and transported to [a military post] at Al Haditha [115 miles to the northwest]. 'The prisoners were delivered to Unit 2100 between 01 July and 15 August 1995,' the intelligence statement says. 'All came from the Closed Department of Abu Ghraib. This special department was made up almost exclusively of Southern Shiite political prisoners. Officers on duty selected prisoners who were to be delivered to the unit. These prisoners were then transported by General Security personnel to an unknown location near Al-Haditha, GEOCORD 3408N0422E.'" "The defector's account and the accuracy of his past information had all but convinced the inspectors that Iraq had used the political prisoners to advance their most heinous weapons in 1994 and 1995. The inspectors hoped to find prison records to confirm that story. But once inside the prison [in Jan 98], they found that the records for 1994 and 1995 were missing." III. UNSCOM REPORT [posted by FAS] http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/s/990125/index.html
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