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TRANSCRIPT: KUWAIT'S AL-QABAS INTERVIEWS INDYK, RICCIARDONE ON IRAQ

(Changing regime requires partnership of Iraqi people, neighbors, US)
(3410)
Kuwait -- Assistant Secretary of State Martin Indyk and Frank
Ricciardone, US special representative for the transition of Iraq,
were interviewed by Kuwait's Al-Qabas newspaper January 31 on U.S.
policy toward Iraq.
The Iraq Liberation Act, which became law this past fall, has brought
about a change in U.S. policy, Indyk said.
"Our objective is to work for the day when there will be a new
government in Iraq. The Congress is going to work with the
Administration to try to achieve this objective. Now there is a unique
situation," he said. "The Congress and the Administration will be
working hand-in-hand in this effort."
At the same time, Indyk cautioned that the task will be difficult and
require "a partnership between the Iraqi people and the neighboring
governments and the United States."
"We have to have the support of the neighboring states to be
successful. We have to work with the people of Iraq who are inside and
that is a complicated task," he said.
"We have to develop a comprehensive approach that uses diplomatic
pressure to isolate Saddam, political pressure to delegitimize Saddam,
economic pressure to weaken his regime, and military pressure also to
weaken his regime, and support for the Iraqi people so that they can
take advantage of all of this pressure on the regime to finally change
the government there."
Indyk also noted that the United States is working "to rebuild the
consensus in the Security Council." With respect to UNSCOM, the United
Nations weapons inspectors, the U.S. "will try to develop a consensus
within the Permanent Five on how to construct, or reconstruct, an
effective disarmament and inspection and monitoring system for Iraqi
disarmament."
He added that he is "cautiously optimistic that we will succeed in
rebuilding consensus in the Council, a consensus that is built on the
Security Council resolutions, which require Iraq to disarm and to
account for the Kuwaiti POWs (prisoners of war) and to recognize
Kuwait's borders."
Following is the transcript of Indyk and Ricciardone's interview,
provided by USIS Kuwait:
(Begin transcript)
AL-QABAS: My first question is what happened to the duel containment
policy, as you are the inventor of this policy?
INDYK: Duel containment was a strategy that was designed to deal with
threats to American national interests from two hostile regimes, one
in Iraq and one in Iran. But we had different policies to contain each
one. In the case of Iraq, Security Council resolutions, sanctions --
there was an international consensus to contain. In the case of Iran,
there was no such international consensus. We had to put on unilateral
sanctions. We had to try to persuade our allies in Europe, Japan, to
join us in denying Iran credits and the ability to conduct normal
commerce while they were going around threatening our interests. And
so there were different policies for the two different situations. But
both of them were aimed at containing the threat to our interests.
In the case of Iraq, the policy became more aggressive over time. And,
for a while, also in the case of Iran, we took stiffer sanctions. We
prevented American companies from buying oil; we stopped investment by
American companies in the Iranian oil industry, and so on.
Over time the nature of the threats changed. The Iraqis became more of
a problem, more difficult to contain, until last November, we reached
the point where we changed our policy to containment plus regime
change and declared that our objective is not only to contain Saddam
as long as he was around, but also to help the Iraqi people remove him
and set up a different kind of government.
In the case of Iran, we signaled Iran that we were prepared to go the
other way, because the election of Khatami produced what we thought
would be an opportunity for a change in Iranian policy. He reached out
to the West and to the United States, if you remember his CNN
interview, and we responded to that. The Secretary of State basically
sent a signal that we were ready to move from containment to
engagement with Iran, if they were prepared to meet us half-way -- to
walk with us down a new road -- in which each of us would take actions
to deal with the problems that the other side had. We had problems
with their behavior and their support for terrorism. We had problems
with their pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. We had problems
with their opposition to the Middle East peace process. They, of
course, had a lot of problems with us, particularly the sanctions
against them. The Secretary of State said we can design a road map in
which we will take parallel steps -- both sides -- towards a new
relationship. But, unfortunately, the Iranians have not responded to
that. Their response has been to say "be patient; we can't do it now,
whatever." They haven't responded, so in the meantime, we will
continue with containment. But, whereas what we're saying is on the
Iraqi side it's containment plus regime change, we're saying on the
Iranian side it's containment until they are ready for engagement.
AL-QABAS: May I interrupt? One of the basis of, it was thought, when
duel containment was introduced, that one of the basis of duel
containment was to postpone the Iraqi fight until the peace settlement
had progressed. It seems that now both fights are open at the same
time. Do you feel that this is de facto or it has sort of complicated
things?
INDYK: It's a good point. And you're right that our strategy for the
whole region was based on pursuing a comprehensive Middle East peace
at the same time as containing Iraq and Iran. And we argued that the
more we succeeded with making peace, the easier it would be to contain
these two regimes that were threatening our interests. The more we
succeeded in containing them, the easier it would be to pursue peace
-- comprehensive peace. And I think that that still holds. If we had
achieved, as we tried very hard to achieve a comprehensive peace,
particularly peace between Israel and Syria, that would have had
strategic consequences for Iraq. And instead, because we weren't able
to complete it -- we came very close but we were not able to complete
it before Rabin was assassinated, and we have not been able to resume
those negotiations now for two-and-a-half years -- Syria has started
to play with Iraq. So we can see the way in which the inability to
conclude the peace with Syria has impacted on our ability to contain
Saddam.
AL-QABAS: Yes, the mechanism of the Iraq Liberation Act adopted
recently is facing some objection and criticism, and some question the
seriousness of this mechanism...
INDYK: Do you want Frank to answer that question? I mean, does it
complicate things?
AL-QABAS: Yes, well the mechanism of the Iraq Liberation Act adopted
recently is facing some problems. There are lots of objections from
maybe within or outside of the United States. There are some
criticisms and some questions about the seriousness of this mechanism.
AL-QABAS: May I add to this as well? Today, one of the Arab newspapers
in one of its reporting reported that you've criticized the Iraq
Liberation Act...
RICCIARDONE:  Absolutely not.
AL-QABAS: Or at least one of the Iraqi opposition leaders has reported
that you weren't happy...
AL-QABAS:  He's talking about the law.
RICCIARDONE: Yes... Well, I welcome the opportunity to respond to
that. First of all, it is the law. I am an American foreign service
officer and I will uphold it fully, and with enthusiasm. The law
provides a tool -- several tools -- of support for the Iraqi people,
and it is my mission to use them as fully as we possibly can. Now, I
did say to the Iraqi opposition, I did acknowledge that the law has
been misunderstood, it has been misreported. And, as I explained over
dinner, people misunderstand this designation of groups under the law,
according to the five criteria, as some kind of offer of support or
aid. I did say that to the Iraqi opposition because it is not an offer
of aid, it is not an offer of cash. It's not an offer of military
equipment. Such an offer may materialize at the President's
discretionary authority when the time is right, when all kinds of
practical questions are answered, such as to whom, when, how would
they be used, how to deliver them, what for, all those obvious
questions. So, sure, there are all kinds of issues to be resolved
still. And people who have been designated under the law, I said to
the Iraqi opposition, ought to feel very proud, I should think, of
being confirmed by the United States as upholding these five
principals that we believe all Iraqis uphold, and all Iraq's neighbors
should uphold. Because there are certainly American objectives and
American hopes for a future Iraq. And if you want me to go over those
for you on the record once again, I can, but I've been doing it all
day. You have all those written down, don't you? So that I did clarify
to the Iraqi opposition. And then I did go also on the record with the
Arab media and Arab press on the same points.
AL-QABAS: Is there any consensus in the United States and within the
administration concerning the political (sic) toward Iraq?
INDYK: Yes. I think it's very important to understand that whereas
Iraq policy has up until now always been controversial, there is now
consensus across the spectrum -- both parties in Congress and in the
administration. There is a consensus and support of changing the
regime in Iraq by supporting the Iraqi people. And for some time the
Congress had its own idea about how to do this, and the administration
had not yet embraced this as an objective. Now that the administration
has embraced it as an objective and the President last November
declared that our objective is to work for the day when there will be
a new government in Iraq, the Congress is going to work with the
administration to try to achieve this objective. Now there is a unique
situation which is very important for the success of this policy, that
the Congress and the administration will be working hand-in-hand in
this effort, which means that the Congress will be prepared to provide
the resources for the administration's efforts. And it makes us much
more effective when we have such a situation than if we are pulling
against each other.
AL-QABAS: We see now that the Security Council is not in session, and
I think it's because of what's happening in Iraq now. And I think this
is an American demand at least for the time being. Are you working on
a new resolution, or working with members of the Security Council for
something in Iraq? Is Butler going back? Are you going to change
Butler just to accommodate some of the Security members? Is UNSCOM
going back?
INDYK: One of our objectives in this current phase is to rebuild the
consensus in the Security Council, and we are already making progress
on that objective. Yesterday, the Security Council reached agreement
on a way forward by agreeing to establish three panels, which will
look at and assess the situation in three areas. One, Kuwaiti
prisoners, the situation with the Kuwaiti POWs. The second panel will
deal with the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people. And the third
panel will deal with the disarmament issue and UNSCOM will participate
in that panel together with the IAEA. And UNSCOM will provide the
Security Council, though the panel, with the information that it has
on the disarmament tasks that still need to be completed. In this way,
the Council will have a baseline for determining how to proceed in
seeking the fulfillment of Security Council resolutions, which require
Iraq's disarmament. And so we will build from there. This week the
Secretary of State was in Moscow and, in London; she met with the
French foreign minister and the British foreign minister. So she has
consulted with her counterparts on the Council. And next week we will
sit down with the French and discuss their ideas for how to move
forward. We have our own ideas and the British have ideas. We will try
to develop a consensus within the Permanent Five on how to construct,
or reconstruct, an effective disarmament and inspection and monitoring
system for Iraqi disarmament. So I'm cautiously optimistic that we
will succeed in rebuilding the consensus in the Council, a consensus
that is built on the Security Council resolutions, which require Iraq
to disarm and to account for the Kuwaiti POWs and to recognize
Kuwait's borders, and a consensus that will again insist that Iraq
fully comply with Security Council resolutions.
AL-QABAS: This morning you were quoted as saying it will take a very
long time to change...
INDYK:  Long time...
AL-QABAS: ...Not very long time to change the regime in Iraq.
INDYK:  May take a long time.
AL-QABAS:  May take a long time. Can you be more specific?
INDYK:  Yes. Look, I hope it happens tomorrow.
AL-QABAS:  So do I.
INDYK: But we have to be realistic. On the one side, Saddam has been
weakened by Desert Fox, the bombing campaign. And he is isolated in
the Arab World where the Arab World is now identifying with the Iraqi
people, but does not support the Iraqi regime, and important Arab
governments are calling for Saddam's overthrow, which they never did
before.
AL-QABAS:  He's working for you.
INDYK: And we have changed our policy and said we will support the
Iraqi people in changing the regime. So we have now a much better
opportunity to achieve this objective than I believe at any time since
the Gulf War, when we had the best chance and, unfortunately, did not
take it. That said, on the other side, the task is complicated,
because we have to have the support of neighboring states to be
successful. We have to work with the people of Iraq who are inside and
that is a complicated task.
We have to support the efforts of the outside Iraqi groups to
delegitimize Saddam, to help them make the case for prosecuting Saddam
as a war criminal, to help them unite and present an alternative voice
that speaks the truth about what is happening in Iraq. And we have to
develop a comprehensive approach that uses diplomatic pressure to
isolate Saddam, political pressure to delegitimize Saddam, economic
pressure to weaken his regime, and military pressure also to weaken
his regime, and support for the Iraqi people so that they can take
advantage of all of this pressure on the regime to finally change the
government there. So it's going to require commitment and a sustained
effort, and it's going to require a partnership between the Iraqi
people and the neighboring governments and the United States. We are
not going to impose anything on Iraq. This can only be done by the
Iraqi people. But they should know now that there is a commitment to
support them and to stand by them when the time is right for them to
change the regime.
AL-QABAS: Having said that, I know what you mentioned during our
dinner was off the record, but maybe you could evaluate this. The
targets you hit in Iraq, why don't you speak about them? Maybe, if
it's off the record, I'm not going to publish it. But I think people
should know what are the targets that you hit in Iraq. Nobody really
mentioned the targets. Nobody knows what have you hit in Iraq.
INDYK: One of the reasons that people don't know is because, despite
the fact that every newspaper and television station around the world
was represented in Iraq during the campaign, Saddam would not allow
them to see the damage that was done in four nights of bombing. And he
would not do that because he knows how much damage was done. The
targets were picked under the following criteria: the objective was to
degrade his weapons of mass destruction and the threat he poses to his
neighbors. That means that sites like missile production factories
were hit. But it also means that the command and control system for
producing weapons of mass destruction, for concealing weapons of mass
destruction and for mounting threats against Iraq's neighbors were
also hit, which means the Special Security Organization, the Special
Republican Guard, the Republican Guard, command and control ...
AL-QABAS:  Can I interrupt here?
INDYK: ... Communications ...
AL-QABAS: I heard Prime Minister Blair, only one time for maybe three
minutes or two minutes on television, saying we have sent a clear
message to Saddam that we are going to hit their Republican Guards.
That was the fourth thing. This gave the impression to us that you
didn't touch the Republican Guard.
INDYK: We touched the Republican Guard. We didn't just touch the
Republican Guard; we hammered the Republican Guard.
AL-QABAS: Two quick questions, one regarding the Turks and the Kurds
especially. Apparently, they're not as optimistic or as enthusiastic
to the policy of change in Iraq as the others; especially Barazani is
not as cooperative as you wanted him to be. How do you -- until they
see something on the ground, they're still suspicious. I think it's
Mr. Ricciardione.
RICCIARDONE: I'm not sure of the question. If you're asking me to
evaluate Mr. Barazani's optimism about the future, you really need to
ask Mr. Barazani.
AL-QABAS: No, what I'm asking is how do you evaluate the importance of
the Turks and the Kurds?
RICCIARDONE: Very, very important. Turkey, not only is it an important
neighbor of Iraq, Iraq was Turkey's major trading partner, and
probably vice-versa was also true. Turkey has a traditional
association with Iraqis which gives them lots of common points of
reference politically, culturally, religiously, historically. And
Turkey is America's only NATO ally on the border with an American air
base right nearby. And I heard someone over dinner mention that you
were only doing these campaigns out of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. In
fact, I can tell you we're flying every day -- almost every day -- out
of Incerlik as well over northern Iraq with very careful Turkish
control. They follow very carefully what we do and we couldn't do it
without the permission of the government of Turkey. They care about
the people in the north. They want to protect them.
AL-QABAS: Do you anticipate obstacles dealing with the Kurds
especially in your mission?
RICCIARDONE:  Obstacles? From Turkey?
AL-QABAS:  From the Kurds.
RICCIARDONE: I guess I don't understand. We have a very good dialogue
with the Kurds. We cooperate. The government of Turkey cooperates now
with both parties. The Kurds, of all the people in Iraq who have so
many troubles, the Kurds in a way are the most fortunate to have a
degree of prosperity and freedom. And it's largely thanks to Turkey.
If Turkey didn't keep a border open with them and help Operation
Northern Watch keep flying, it's hard to imagine that they would enjoy
that. So things are not wonderful for the Kurds, but they're certainly
not as bad as for the other poor captive Iraqis.
INDYK: There is one other point to add here, it's that people like to
say that the Iraqi opposition is divided, ineffective. But we have
made considerable progress in uniting the Kurds, and the agreement
that was signed in Washington between Barazani and Talibani, which is
being implemented by them now, is a very important development in
terms of building a coherent opposition to Saddam.
AL-QABAS:  Thank you very much. I appreciate it.
INDYK:  OK. It was a pleasure.
RICCIARDONE: I have an extra copy of the legislation if you want it,
the actual text.
AL-QABAS:  Thank you. We really appreciate it, Mr. Indyk.
RICCIARDONE: There is a letter with it which is the President's letter
reporting to the Congress on the seven groups.
(End transcript)