02 February 1999
TRANSCRIPT: INDYK INTERVIEW WITH KUWAIT TELEVISION, JAN. 31
("Containment plus regime change" is US policy on Iraq) (1700)
Kuwait City -- Martin S. Indyk, Assistant Secretary of State for Near
Eastern Affairs, said January 31 in an interview with Kuwait
Television (KTV) that the United States is now working toward the day
when "the Iraqi people could enjoy a different government in Iraq. One
that was more representative of their aspirations. A government that
we could work with to reintegrate Iraq into the international
community."
The Clinton Administration has developed a new approach to Iraq, which
Indyk called "containment plus regime change." This policy, he said,
follows two basic principles: the change must come from the Iraqi
people themselves and from inside Iraq and the U.S. will maintain its
commitment to the territorial integrity of Iraq.
The basic mechanism of containment, he explained, is: "maintaining
sanctions, focusing on disarmament, and establishing a new inspection
monitoring regime under UNSCOM that will conduct that disarmament
process; humanitarian initiative that provides for the needs of the
Iraqi people because sanctions will remain on as long as Saddam
Hussein is not complying with Security Council resolutions, and there
is no reason to believe he will."
The Assistant Secretary identified "four red lines which if Saddam
crosses them we would use force. The first is if he threatens his
neighbors, particularly Kuwait. The second is if he reconstitutes his
weapons of mass destruction or deploys them, we will destroy them if
we can detect them. The third is if he moves north against the Kurds.
And the fourth is to enforce the no-fly zones. At the moment he is
challenging the no-fly zones and we are using force because he has
crossed the red line there in terms of confronting us in the no-fly
zones."
"So that is the overall policy as containment until regime change, and
we work for both at the same time," Indyk stated.
Following is the transcript of the interview, provided by USIS Kuwait:
(Begin transcript)
Public Affairs Office
Embassy of the United States of America
Kuwait City, State of Kuwait
February 2, 1999
Official Transcript of Assistant Secretary of State for Near East
Affairs
Martin S. Indyk's Interview with Kuwait Television (KTV),
at the Radisson SAS Hotel,
Kuwait City, State of Kuwait
January 31, 1999
KTV: Dr. Martin Indyk, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near
Eastern Affairs, thank you for joining us on Kuwait Television and
welcome to Kuwait. INDYK: Thank you, it is my pleasure. I am glad to
be here.
KTV: Sir, you have been to a few of the Gulf countries recently. Could
you elaborate on the purpose of your visit and what you have
accomplished so far?
INDYK: Certainly, the situation in Iraq has developed over the last
few months as a result of Saddam Hussein's refusal to cooperate with
UNSCOM and implement Security Council Resolutions. Our bombing
campaign, Desert Fox, against Saddam Hussein and his subsequent call
for the overthrow of the Arab governments, this situation requires us
to develop new approaches and we are consulting with our allies in the
GCC, and also in Egypt. And Secretary of State and myself also have
been talking to the Russians and the French and the British over the
last week to consult and to develop an approach to deal with the
threat of Saddam Hussein's poses.
KTV: Among this approach, could you elaborate on the approach of the
United States to attempt to unseat the current Iraqi regime?
INDYK: Yes. In November, President Clinton declared a change in
American policy. Up until November our policy was containment. In
November President Clinton announced that we would now work for the
day when the Iraqi people could enjoy a different government in Iraq.
One that was more representative of their aspirations. A government
that we could work with to reintegrate Iraq into the international
community. And that policy of containment plus regime change is a new
development in the Administration's approach. The President of the
United States has now committed himself to support the Iraqi people in
their efforts to rid themselves of the Saddam Hussein regime and to
affect a new government in Iraq that can bring Iraq back into the
community of nations where it belongs. And now what we are doing is
consulting with Iraq's neighbors on how we can more effectively
support the Iraqi people in this effort. We do so following two basic
principles. Number one, the change must come from the Iraqi people
themselves and from inside Iraq. That we will not impose a leadership
on Iraq. It is up to the Iraqi people. But we will support them, and
those who wish to change regime will have our support. The second
principle is, that whatever is done, we will not support the breakup
of Iraq. We will maintain our commitment to territorial integrity of
Iraq.
KTV: Do you think there is a danger for a civil war though visible?
Are there any guarantees to prevent civil war from happening in Iraq?
INDYK: I do not think that it is likely. I think that there are a lot
of myths about in terms of what could happen. The notion that Saddam
Hussein is the only thing that keeps Iraq together is a fanciful one.
It is perpetrated by those who would like to keep Saddam in power,
some kind of rationalization for maintaining Saddam in power. We do
not accept that. We believe that it is possible to promote change in
an orderly way that will ensure a better life for the Iraqi people.
KTV: Is there also a mechanism to look into containing weapons of mass
destruction in the long run?
INDYK: Certainly, as I explained to you, the policy is containment
until regime change, and the containment part of the policy is focused
in the first instance on reconstituting a consensus in the Security
Council on the disarmament process. That is what the Security Council
resolutions require. Now the process is already under way. We have
agreement among all the Council members on how to begin this process.
There will be a panel set up to assess the disarmament of Iraq and
make recommendations to the Council on how to proceed on that front,
and UNSCOM will be involved in that assessment of Iraq's disarmament.
It has the expertise to provide to the Council on that issue. Of
course there will be other panels, one very important one to assist
the situation with regard to Kuwait's POW's missing in action. The
third panel will look at the humanitarian issue because I think there
is a growing acceptance, particularly in the Arab world, that there is
a distinction -- an important distinction -- to be made between the
Iraqi people and the Iraqi regime, and that the sanctions are not
aimed at the people, they are aimed at the regime. And so there are
things that can be done under the oil-for-food arrangement to provide
for the basic needs of the Iraqi people, to insure that the oil
revenues are used to meet the basic needs of the Iraqi people, and to
prevent those oil revenues from being used to buy tanks. It is
oil-for-food, not oil for tanks. So, this is the basic mechanism of
containment: maintaining sanctions, focusing on disarmament, and
establishing a new inspection monitoring regime under UNSCOM that will
conduct that disarmament process; humanitarian initiative that
provides for the needs of the Iraqi people because sanctions will
remain on as long as Saddam Hussein is not complying with Security
Council resolutions, and there is no reason to believe he will. A
panel that looks at the issue of Kuwaiti POWs and MIAs. And behind all
of this is our own ability to enforce the containment with military
power. And we have said very clearly that there are four red lines
which if Saddam crosses them we would use force. The first is if he
threatens his neighbors, particularly Kuwait. The second is if he
reconstitutes his weapons of mass destruction or deploys them, we will
destroy them if we can detect them. The third is if he moves north
against the Kurds. And the fourth is to enforce the no-fly zones. At
the moment he is challenging the no-fly zones and we are using force
because he has crossed the red line there in terms of confronting us
in the no-fly zones. So that is the overall policy as containment
until regime change, and we work for both at the same time.
KTV: My final question to you, sir, after nine years of lies and
deception and broken promises, why does the world community continue
to give the Iraqi leader a chance or hope for exoneration? That is if
he does comply with UN resolutions that he will be accepted as a
leader of Iraq and his past record is systematic and speaks for
itself?
INDYK: Well, the Security Council resolutions are comprehensive in
their requirements. They would require a different kind of Saddam
Hussein. Were he to accept them he would be in a different kind of
Iraqi leader. The fact that he has not accepted them for seven years
shows that he is not going to accept them, that he is not going to
accept Iraq's international obligations. And we see already having
accepted one on recognition of Kuwait. Now, his people are raising
questions about that again. So, we know that he is not undergone a
fundamental change. If he were to give up his weapons of mass
destruction, completely disarm, then the oil embargo under the
resolutions will be lifted, but he won't do that. That is why the
sanctions remain on because he will not accept the requirements of the
Security Council. If he were to accept them, if he were to be somebody
different then the circumstances will change. But we do not expect
that to happen anytime soon because he is Saddam Hussein.
KTV: Thank you very much for being with us this evening. We wish you
all the best.
INDYK: Thank you.
(End transcript)
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