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U.S. Department of State

Daily Press Briefing

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QUESTION: I want to ask about Iraq - you've seen the response, they've said no to the offer to lift the ceiling on oil sales. I guess it's no surprise, but what next? Where does that leave you with a proposal?

MR. RUBIN: As we have observed in the past, Iraq's leadership often attempts to use the sanctions regime as a tool to try to create sympathy for their people; and they misuse their people in this international game. We are familiar with Iraq's immediate reaction to proposals to improve the plight of their people. We, for many years, have tried to improve the plight of their people. Iraq's response is usually, no, they don't want to improve the plight of their people. So this is a familiar pattern.

As I indicated yesterday, we cannot force or coerce Iraq into accepting these new provisions, but we can provide and avail Iraq of this facility. But it's up to Iraq to decide whether it cares about its people and whether it, therefore, will take action to use these new programs that we're setting forth.

So it's not news that Iraq doesn't care about its people. The initial reaction signaling that they don't care about their people is not a surprise. But we will continue to press for ways to improve the plight of the Iraqi people. In that regard, let me say that we have heard a lot from Iraq about reasons why the program is problematic, whether it's the ceiling, whether it's lack of funds, et cetera. We are trying to improve the program, and it's ironic that their response to our effort to improve the program is, no, we don't want to improve the program

With respect to some of their complaints and some of the concerns that people have expressed about Iraq's capability to export oil, we do expect to remove over half of our holds on oil spare parts. We will begin the prospect by lifting some holds today in New York. We will, of course, continue to monitor all such contracts with respect to the end use.

So we're going to go the extra mile in trying to ensure that we do all we can to improve the plight of the Iraqi people. It would be helpful if the Iraqi response wasn't to simply just say no.

QUESTION: Jamie, you remember yesterday you were asked about holds - how often. Of course, it was in the context of humanitarian - and holds, you said, were frequent, and that's our understanding. So what is the dimension of what you're waving on now?

MR. RUBIN: Okay, there's two kinds of holds. One is with respect to whether a proposed import from Iraq is a humanitarian import - food, medicine and other humanitarian supplies - and whether we have concerns about whether that particular company or the provisions are not spelled out in such a way that we have concerns that it's not been explained adequately to justify allowing the purchase and then provision of that good.

There's a second type of issue, which is on the spare parts for oil equipment. Funds were set aside in the last phase of Oil-for-Food to buy spare parts to increase Iraq's oil exports. This would mean more revenue for Oil-for-Food. Many of the items requested had tenuous links or no links to oil exports - e.g., parts for gas stations in Iraq, for example.

In the current phase of the Oil-for-Food program this set-aside for equipment is continued. So rather than a one-time funding for this equipment, it is now a more regular part of the program. Since more money should be available, we can be more lenient about what is charged to this account. So essentially, in response to many of the questions you asked me yesterday, the program is getting more and more effective. We are learning to use our controls more and more effectively. So that allows for adjustments over time. In this area, we do believe, on the oil spare parts piece, because there's now going to be more revenue available, the set-aside is not so damaging to the purchases of food and medicine that more oil parts can then go forward.

Now that we've examined and been examining some for many days and weeks now, we believe many of these holds can be removed today. We're looking to try to remove some half of the holds in the near future.

QUESTION: Do you know how many holds?

MR. RUBIN: I don't have a specific number on that.

QUESTION: Have you heard about a Russian proposal to send a UN mission to Baghdad to discuss - I believe it's a humanitarian --

MR. RUBIN: Yes, I'm familiar with certain Russian ideas in this area. The French have obviously put their proposal down, to which we indicated there were some serious concerns we had and also some positive elements. I suspect the Russians will also be entering the game, but I wouldn't want to preview any ideas they might have.

QUESTION: So there's a US proposal? And the stand-in ambassador has been commenting on what is wrong with other proposals, but I don't see anything telling the world what's good or what's in the American proposal. This is to get the inspectors back.

MR. RUBIN: Right.

QUESTION: I know you want them to disarm and all, but your back's up against a wall because not a lot of your friends want to help you. What is the US proposing as a mechanism to get inspectors back to Iraq?

MR. RUBIN: We have put forward yesterday a humanitarian initiative, I described to you in some detail. We have not put forward a proposal on inspection and monitoring issue. Our preference, of course, is for Iraq to allow the UN inspection teams that were there to return and do their work. We are willing to discuss other's ideas, and we've begun that discussion. At this point, we are talking to others and trying to get the lay of the land in the Security Council. That's how we think we ought to do business.

But in discussing these new suggestions, we have to remember that this is taking place in a new context. Prior to December, the context did not include disarmament by military force. Having degraded Iraq's weapons of mass destruction through the use of force in December and having made clear that we are prepared to act with military force again if they reconstitute, we have a new and very effective overlay to deal with the disarmament problem. In that context and in the context of Iraq refusing to let UNSCOM back in, we are prepared to discuss with others various ideas. We have not put forward a US proposal to my knowledge.

QUESTION: What does reconstitute mean? Aren't they constituted enough to cause enough problems? Do they have to build up or they just say strongest --

MR. RUBIN: There are two problems. One is, what weaponry and capability they may have hidden from the inspectors.

QUESTION: Exactly.

MR. RUBIN: There's another problem, which is a much worse problem, which is to take all the dual-use factories, that are either producing, say, missiles that were permitted below 150 kilometers or various pharmaceutical and other factories that could, if converted and changed, quickly produce very large quantities of chemical and biological weapons.

So there's two problems: one, the existing missing weapons of mass destruction; and a much larger - much larger, in our view - problem, which is the prospect of them taking existing facilities and converting them quickly and reconstituting a large militarily significant operational weapons of mass destruction program.

What we're talking about in the missing category is unexplained absences of materials that we think could well be chemical and biological weapons programs. What I'm suggesting to you, that is one thing; and it is a problem.

There is another thing which is a bigger problem, which is a wholesale effort to build a militarily significant operational program using long-range missiles and weaponizing them with warheads that can carry biological weaponry or chemical weaponry. That is the reconstitution problem. But that doesn't mean there isn't a problem of what may be hidden and never revealed by the Iraqis.

QUESTION: If force isn't an option in both categories, then the United States has veered toward the French position, which basically seems to be, let's watch what they do and let's not worry so much about what they may have done and hidden. Now, is force an option in both categories?

MR. RUBIN: I think you think you've found a secret flaw here.

QUESTION: No, you're stressing the second thing as more worrisome. I'm asking about the first thing, which was a reason for the United States to hit them at least twice.

MR. RUBIN: Right. Since the President acted, he said in the aftermath of that that if they were to reconstitute their weapons of mass destruction, we would be prepared to act. He didn't say what we would be prepared to do on issues that weren't defined. We have said we're not ruling out action in a number of cases. There's a difference between not ruling something out and specifying in advance what you will do.

When the President used the word "reconstitute," I am merely defining a word for you. I am not ruling in or out other actions on other issues.

QUESTION: Has there been some decisions made on the Patriot missiles overnight to Turkey?

MR. RUBIN: I'm glad you asked that question.

QUESTION: It's a righteous question.

MR. RUBIN: It's a righteous question and you're a righteous reporter. Let it be said that today is today and yesterday was yesterday.

On the subject of Patriot missiles, let me say that we have agreed in principle to send a Patriot battery to Turkey in response to a formal Turkish Government request. We have agreed in principle to provide them with Patriots for the duration of the current crisis with Iraq. The actual operational details of this military-to-military program would have to be spelled out from the Pentagon. I would urge you to contact officials at the Pentagon.

QUESTION: You said for the duration of the crisis. Do you mean, then, you're just sort of lending them these Patriots?

MR. RUBIN: As I just indicated, the operational details of how this military-to-military program will work will have to be spelled out from the Pentagon.

We see no immediate threat to Turkey right now; but obviously, there are a lot of hostile statements from Baghdad, and we think it's prudent to consider these kind of precautionary measures.

QUESTION: Do you think, though, that - I mean, the new leadership in Turkey has criticized the US policy on Iraq. Do you feel that - I mean, by giving them these missiles you'll somehow diffuse that criticism as well?

MR. RUBIN: I think you need to not put the cart before the horse. A program like transferring Patriot missiles to Turkey is not something one does overnight. As you know, the government's Prime Minister has just arrived on the scene. So I think what this indicates is the extent to which we and Turkey are in sync on our Iraq policy and remain in sync on our Iraq policy. Turkey is a vital NATO ally that has provided critical support for international efforts to ensure that Iraq complies with UN resolutions.

We are very appreciative of being able to use Incerlik for the purposes of Operation Northern Watch. We understand that there has been no change in Turkish resolve in this regard. Obviously, we always take into consideration Turkish sensitivities about how events in Iraq may affect Turkey. But I think the fact that we are continuing with a close ally a military-to-military program directly related to the Iraq crisis is a pretty sure sign that we are in sync on the main elements.

QUESTION: I take it that's your response to what Ecevit told The Washington Post, right?

MR. RUBIN: Yes. We didn't find anything particularly new in his comments, and he's had views like that for some time. We are aware of Turkish sensitivities about the subject of Iraq. But the basic situation is that we are in sync with Turkey. They came out, as you may recall, immediately after the commencement of Desert Fox, with a statement calling on Iraq to comply fully with Security Council resolutions, which we regarded as a supportive action. We're now moving forward on the Patriot issue. But to the extent that any concern has been expressed in Turkey about our views, let me reiterate our long-standing view is that we believe strongly in the territorial integrity of Iraq.

QUESTION: Does Saddam have the ability to threaten Turkey in some way, with a missile or -

MR. RUBIN: Certainly, any neighbor of Saddam Hussein is under some level of threat because he has invaded his neighbors. Yesterday, as you know, there was some intemperate remarks about Kuwait from the Deputy Prime Minister. So I think as long as that regime is in violation of Security Council resolutions and remains operating in the way that it's been operating, there is some existential threat to the region and the world. We believe it's prudent, as a precautionary measure, to assist Turkey in this regard.

QUESTION: Just a detail - are these Patriot missiles will be owned and operated by the United States?

MR. RUBIN: That again would be an operational detail. I've told you that we have agreed in principle to provide Patriot missiles to Turkey, as a precautionary measure and a prudent precautionary measure. But the operation of that program and that transfer is something that the Pentagon would have to address in detail.

QUESTION: Still on Iraq - I understand that the US may soon name a coordinator for the Iraqi opposition groups and start identifying which groups should get money. Can you tell us about that in time line? Also, to follow up to that, does the US believe these groups truly can destabilize Saddam Hussein?

MR. RUBIN: On the subject you raised, let me say that we are in the process of transmitting the proposed notification of Iraqi democratic opposition groups to the Congress. These criteria are spelled out in the Iraq Liberation Act, which involved not only a commitment to democracy and a commitment to the territorial integrity of Iraq, but also a sense that the groups are willing to work cooperatively with others in this effort. There are other specific criteria commitment to protect human rights.

We are in the process of notifying the Hill of our intentions. The way the process will work is that we will then consult with Capitol Hill about our decisions as to who fits the criteria. Then a final report will be presented by January 30. We are committed to fulfilling the specifications of this act in a serious and expeditious manner, but we are not prepared to announce which groups have been designated until we have notified it and discussed it with Capitol Hill.

On the coordinator question, I do know that Secretary Albright has been discussing this subject intensively. No final decisions have been made and when they are, we will alert you to them. But I would expect it to be very, very soon.

QUESTION: Was there a senior US official in Turkey trying to talk to the Iraqi-Kurdish leaders?

MR. RUBIN: Northern Iraq, yes. Beth Jones, our principle Deputy Assistant Secretary, for the region is traveling to Northern Iraq this week at the invitation of the two Kurdish leaders, Talibani and Barzani. It's part of our ongoing consultations with the Kurdish leaders there. As you know, David Welch, her predecessor, visited the region in December; and the very important action that took place when the two Kurdish leaders were here in Washington to sign the joint statement on reconciliation.

The purpose of this kind of a visit is to work with the parties in Northern Iraq to further advance reconciliation. She will be discussing issues like governance and regional elections with the two Kurdish leaders. As you know, they took some very important steps forward in recent days in the area of sharing revenues so that they can be better coordinated and have less issues of concern between them. Hopefully, we can keep them on that path.

QUESTION: Regional elections by a certain date?

MR. RUBIN: I will have to check the specifics, but I think this would be something that they would be proposing. We would obviously want to make sure that the process was done in a way that maximized the chance that the cooperation that we've seen would continue.

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(The briefing concluded at 1:40 P.M.)

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