Tariq Aziz, PT 3, Iraq Radio, Jan 13
Iraq News, Wed, 13 Jan 1999
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Tariq Aziz, PT 3, Iraq Radio, Jan 13 Baghdad Republic of Iraq Radio Network in Arabic 1145 GMT 13 Jan 99 [FBIS Translated Text] [Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister] Tariq 'Aziz wrote episode three of an article in al-Thawrah newspaper entitled "Who Should Apologize to Whom," in which he says: What was the position of the Kuwait rulers following the warning by President Saddam Husayn on 16 July 1990, and following the memorandum I submitted to the secretary general of the Arab League on 15 July? What kind of role did those rulers in Saudi Arabia and Egypt play being accomplices to the US scheme? The rulers of Saudi Arabia were kept informed of all the details regarding the conduct of the Kuwaiti rulers. Following the memorandum I sent to the Arab League secretary general and following the speech by President Saddam Husayn on 16 July, Saudi Foreign Minister Sa'ud al-Faysal visited Iraq on 21 July 1990 and met with President Saddam Husayn. He pretended that Fahd [Saudi King] is undertaking offices of some kind to resolve the crisis to alleviate the harm clamped on Iraq. So, President Saddam Husayn welcomed this quest and Sa'ud al-Faysal left Baghdad. When I visited Cairo on 22 July 1990, which I mentioned in a previous article published in Al-Thawrah newspaper on 4 January 1999, President Mubarak asked me to stay in Cairo for the following day. I told him that I had to go to Amman to convey a message from President Saddam Husayn to King Husayn. Mubarak said to me: King Husayn is coming to Alexandria tomorrow and you can meet with him here. While I was in his office, he telephoned President Saddam Husayn and told him that he wants to keep me in Egypt until the following day. President Saddam Husayn agreed. That evening, Dr. Usamah al-Baz [President Mubarak's political adviser] came to me at the hotel where I was staying and asked me: Do you think that President Mubarak should try to make some efforts in this issue? To tell you the truth, I was deeply embarrassed by this question. It would not have been appropriate to say no. At the same time, I felt that Mubarak's interference in the matter might complicate the case; not because I doubted his intentions -- for I have to admit that the entire leadership of Iraq, led by President Saddam Husayn, would never even imagine at the time that President Mubarak would stab Iraq in the back as he did afterward -- but because during my meeting with Mubarak that very day, as I said in the above mentioned article, I found out that he is ignorant of the background of the matter. I estimated that his interference in the matter, being so ignorant of the issue, would not be of any use. So I said to Dr. Usamah al-Baz: Sa'ud al-Faysal was in Baghdad and he promised to return again; so let us wait what Sa'ud will come up with and then we will see what you can do. But Sa'ud al-Faysal never did return to Baghdad. After that meeting, I went with Dr. Usamah al-Baz to Alexandria. No Egyptian official was there to receive (?me). I stayed alone with Ambassador Nabil Najm. The following day, I went to al-Tin Palace and found that King Husayn had already arrived. I met with him and conveyed President Saddam Husayn's message to him. Then, President Mubarak and the Egyptian delegation joined us. We had lunch together and went to the airport and bid farewell to King Husayn. I did not quite understand why President Mubarak kept me for another day in Egypt as he did not say anything new to me that day. After I greeted him before flying to Baghdad, President Mubarak said to me jokingly: "You may find me in Baghdad when you arrive there." Mubarak came to Baghdad on the following day, 24 July, and held a private meeting with President Saddam Husayn. While the two presidents were holding the meeting, we, the members of Iraq's delegation, met with the members of Egypt's delegation, particularly Dr. 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid, Dr. Usamah al-Baz, and 'Azmi Zakariyya, head of the Presidential Office in Egypt. During the meeting, we explained to the members of the Egyptian delegation all the aspects of the crisis with Kuwait and also answered all their questions and inquiries. During the talks, our delegation used an angry tone to reflect the warning President Saddam Husayn made in his speech on 16 July. The two presidents then came out of their closed meeting, and in order not to keep the content of his private meeting with President Mubarak a secret, President Saddam Husayn said before the Iraqi and the Egyptian delegations: "I explained to my brother Abu-'Ala' [Husni Mubarak] the whole situation and I asked him not to reassure the rulers of Kuwait." By asking Mubarak not to reassure the rulers of Kuwait, President Saddam Husayn wanted Mubarak to warn the rulers of Kuwait of the consequences of their behavior toward Iraq when he meet with them following his visit to Iraq. By this, President Saddam hoped that the [Kuwaitis] would listen to President Mubarak and go back on their injustice and that we could find a suitable solution to the crisis. Following his visit to Kuwait, Mubarak told the Egyptian journalists accompanying him that the issue was just a summer cloud. Mubarak then phoned President Saddam Husayn to inform him that he had agreed with the Kuwaitis to hold a high-level meeting between Iraq and Kuwait in Jeddah, as proposed during talks between the two presidents in Baghdad. The meeting was held in Jeddah on 30 July 1990. It was attended on our side by 'Izzat Ibrahim vice chairman of the Iraqi Revolution Command Council, and Dr. Sa'dun Hammadi, the deputy prime minister. On the Kuwaiti side, it was attended by Sa'd al-'Abdallah. During the meeting, Sa'd al-'Abdallah behaved obstinately and impertinently and did not agree to any fair solution to Iraq's main grievances. The only issue he admitted was [Kuwait's] plunder of al-Rumaylah oil but objected to Iraq's assessment that the price of the plundered oil was $2.4 billion, saying that the figure was exaggerated. So, the situation reached a deadlock, and Iraq had no choice but to defend itself against the conspiracy and the conspirators, who imprudently insisted on their crime. This background points to two basic realities. The first was that Iraq honestly wanted to find a solution to the dispute with the rulers of Kuwait within an Arab framework. This was clarified by the speech President Saddam Husayn delivered at the Baghdad summit in May 1990, by Iraq's call for holding a four-way summit meeting to find a solution to the issue, as we have said, and by President Saddam's welcome of a Saudi mediation through a visit by Sa'ud al-Faysal and of President Mubarak's mediation. The second was that the ruler of Egypt and the rulers of Saudi Arabia, who held the final meeting in Jeddah, did not make any serious and effective effort to pressure the Kuwaitis and make them go back on their position. The following events shed more light on the true position of the ruler of Egypt and the rulers of Saudi Arabia. On 2 August 1990, King Husayn visited us in Baghdad and informed us that he had spoken to Mubarak in Alexandria and to [King] Fahd by phone and that he agreed with them to hold a summit meeting in Jeddah of President Saddam Husayn and King Fahd. President Saddam Husayn proposed that President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih join the meeting. King Husayn left Baghdad in the hope that the meeting would be held on Sunday 5 August. At that time, Jordanian Foreign Minister Marwan al-Qasim exerted efforts with the Egyptian delegation during a meeting of the foreign ministers of the Organization of Islamic Conference in Cairo in order dissuade the meeting from issuing a statement and blocking King Husayn's efforts with Mubarak and Fahd. But Sa'ud al-Faysal and 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid insisted that the meeting issue a statement condemning Iraq. The Jeddah meeting, which was scheduled for 5 August, was not held, although it was agreed on by King Husayn, Mubarak, and Fahd. Later on, US Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, arrived in Saudi Arabia on Sunday evening 5 August and obtained Fahd's official agreement to invite the US forces, which had, in fact, started leaving the United States by planes for Saudi Arabia before the obtaining of the official Saudi approval. This proves that the issue was arranged in advance. These facts show that the Saudi rulers had opted for the aggressive US military option before exploring the possibilities of the Arab solution. It should be recalled here that when the Kuwaiti foreign minister replied to my memorandum, which I presented to the Arab League secretary general on 15 July 1990, in a memorandum to the secretary general, he sent a similar memorandum to the Security Council president. This shows that there was advance intention and preparations to internationalize the dispute instead of reaching an Arab solution to it. The Cairo summit was then held on 10 August 1990, which was the first Arab summit to be called for by Egypt after its return to the Arab League. It is strange that the Egyptian ruler, who emphasizes now the importance of good preparation for the summit, called for by Yemen to discuss the US-British aggression on Iraq, did not make any preparation for the summit he called for at that time. He announced the invitation for that summit on 8 August, and the summit was held on 10 August. The Iraqi delegation arrived in Cairo at night on 9 August 1990, and we noticed that our delegation's residence was at the guest house. When we asked where are the other delegations were staying, we learned that all other delegations were at staying at a hotel. Then, we wondered if we were staying at the guest house as a special treatment for our delegation, which was headed by Taha Yasin Ramadan, who was the first deputy prime minister at that time, or whether this was to isolate the Iraqi delegation in order not to meet easily with other delegations. Ramadan met with President Mubarak at that night. During that meeting, President Mubarak did not reveal his intentions for which he convened the summit. The summit began the following day. After the first inaugural session in which some delegations delivered speeches, President Mubarak ended the meeting and invited the delegations for lunch. During the lunch, a number of Arab heads of state held talks with Ramadan who told them that Iraq is prepared to reach an Arab solution. The idea of sending a delegation comprising a number of heads of state to meet with President Saddam Husayn in Baghdad was discussed. We were surprised after the lunch, however, and after we returned to our seats at the conference hall by a draft resolution that was distributed on the desks of the member states. When we read the draft resolution quickly, we realized that it provides a very clear justification for seeking the assistance of the US forces, which had already arrived in Saudi Arabia. When we carefully read the text of the draft resolution we realized -- and the ministers and diplomats who master English agreed with us -- that the operative paragraphs in that resolutions were in fact a translation from English. President Mubarak, who is the one who calls for preparation, and his aides who now speak about frank talks before reconciliation, did not allow any discussion of the draft resolution. In a dictatorial and nervous manner, President Mubarak asked the conferees to vote on the resolution and he did not give the presidents and King Husayn who wanted to speak the chance to address the conference. An artificial voting was carried out, and at the end he said that the resolution won the majority of votes. He ended the meeting and went out of the hall quickly in a manner that conflicts with the manners for dealing with the presidents and with the rules of action in Arab meetings. By this, he killed the plans for an Arab solution to the crisis, and the command was handed over to George Bush. In the period between the Cairo summit in August 1990 and until the start of the aggression on Iraq on 16/17 January 1991, the Saudi rulers and the ruler of Egypt aborted all the attempts, initiatives, and ideas submitted by Arab officials to find a solution within an Arab framework. These attempts, initiatives, and ideas were submitted by King Husayn, King Hassan II, President Zine El Abidine Ben-Ali, President Chadli Bendjedid, President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih, and President Yasir 'Arafat. This is in addition to scores of initiatives that were undertaken by Arab and Islamic figures. The Saudi rulers and the ruler of Egypt insisted on handing over the matter to Bush and the western alliance. The ruler of Egypt and the rulers of Saudi Arabia rejected the 12 August 1990 initiative that was launched by President Saddam Husayn. In this initiative, the president linked the situation that was prevailing at the time and the Palestinian people's rights and called for an Arab and international solution to all the problems in the region in a manner that will achieve justice and the faithful implementation of the resolutions of the so-called international legitimacy. With this stand, the ruler of Egypt, the Saudi rulers, and those with them intentionally wasted a historical chance to correct all the unjust state of affairs in the Arab homeland and to seriously bring pressure to bear to regain the Palestinian people's rights. This was at a time the Arabs used to have military and political pressure force that enabled them to counterbalance the Zionist force; but they chose the Madrid course that was planned by Bush after destroying Iraq and depriving the Arabs of the force that counterbalances Israel's force. We now see where the Madrid course has led them. On many occasions, the ruler of Egypt said he had sent letters to President Saddam Husayn during that time, but that President Saddam Husayn did not pay attention to them. This is another of his falsehoods. All the letters Mubarak sent to President Saddam Husayn did not contain any proposals or ideas for a fair Arab solution to the crisis. All these letters asked Iraq to implement the resolutions that were imposed by the United States on the UN Security Council without any condition. This was a US demand. President Saddam Husayn answered all these letters and it would be appropriate for the sake of truth and the records to publish all of Mubarak's letters and President Saddam Husayn's replies to them. We must note here the maneuvering used to prepare for the aggression against Iraq at that time. In the first stage, the US military preparations in which Egypt and other countries took part were justified by the claim of the need to protect Saudi Arabia from the so-called Iraqi threat. The operation was code-named Desert Shield. After they prepared the political and military arena for the aggression, they announced that the objective was to liberate Kuwait. The operation was code-named Desert Storm. The Arab rulers participating in the operation used to affirm that their objective is to liberate Kuwait only; but when the aggression began on 16/17 January 1991 in which the Egyptian and Saudi rulers participated, it became clear from the very first day of the aggression that it was targeting all of Iraq in terms of industry, basic services, electricity networks, refineries, water projects, telecommunications means, transportation routes, and foodstuff warehouses located in the remotest areas in the north or the south, and the killing of thousands of the sons of Iraq, including the crime of the al-'Amiriyah shelter. All this used to be screened on television. Those who are now shedding crocodile tears on the people of Iraq, did not lift a finger at the time to stop their participation in the aggression when it became clear that the aggression sought to destroy all of Iraq. They did not criticize George Bush for departing from the declared target but continued their participation in the all-out aggression on Iraq until the last day. Who should apologize to whom? Iraq? Which tried through dialogue, warnings, and good deeds to have the Kuwaiti rulers desist from their aggressive and treacherous behavior toward Iraq? Iraq? Which tried after 2 August to interact with the ideas, proposals, and draft resolutions that were submitted to seek an Arab solution? Iraq? Which the Egyptian and Saudi rulers participated in killing its sons and destroying it, or those who committed all these crimes against Iraq, the Arab nation, the Palestinian cause, and those who turned the Arabian Peninsula into a US-British occupation camp to pursue the aggression against Iraq until these days? Who should apologize to whom?
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