PT 1/2, Saudi Arabia, Egypt: Overthrow Saddam
Iraq News, WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 13, 1999
By Laurie MylroieThe central focus of Iraq News is the tension between the considerable, proscribed WMD capabilities that Iraq is holding on to and its increasing stridency that it has complied with UNSCR 687 and it is time to lift sanctions. If you wish to receive Iraq News by email, a service which includes full-text of news reports not archived here, send your request to Laurie Mylroie .
I. TARIQ AZIZ, SAUDI ARABIA, EGYPT SEEK OUR OVERTHROW, IRAQ RADIO, JAN 5 II. AL JAZIRAH, WAR CRIMES TRIALS FOR SADDAM, JAN 7 III. SAUDI PRESS AGENCY, OVERTHROW SADDAM, JAN 10 IV. EGYPT'S UPPER HOUSE, SADDAM IS TO BLAME, MENA, JAN 10 V. AL AKHBAR, SADDAM, THE DESTROYER, MENA, JAN 10 At the Carnegie Institute's Non-Proliferation conference yesterday, NSC Adviser, Sandy Berger, described the administration's Iraq policy, "On Iraq, the administration will use all means -- including, if necessary, additional military force -- to obtain Saddam's compliance with Iraq's commitments regarding weapons of mass destruction and with the relevant Security Council resolutions. We will adhere to our position that disarmament under these resolutions is the only pathway to sanctions relief. And we continue to believe that UNSCOM is the appropriate entity to verify and monitor Iraq's disarmament. It is up to Saddam to decide whether he wants sanctions relief by giving up his weapons of mass destruction. In the meantime, we will be ready to act again if we see Iraq rebuilding a WMD capability We will also continue to offer humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people, and, most importantly, work toward the day when Iraq has a government that respects its people and lives in peace with its neighbors. It is clear that real disarmament in Iraq will come only when there is a new government in Baghdad." The vaguely worded "work toward the day when Iraq has a government that respects its people and lives in peace with its neighbors" is Clinton administration-speak for a refusal to implement the "Iraq Liberation Act." One excuse, sometimes offered, is that there is no regional support for such a policy. Yet as one Arab reader remarked, in response to "Iraq News," Jan 6, "I really do not think Saddam has support in the so-called Arab street. People are reacting because they believe US bombing hurts Iraqis and is not hurting Saddam. They are not given the choice of getting rid of him. On the whole, I believe Saddam is now universally despised in the Arab street. This is particularly the case in countries whose people were direct victims, like Egypt, Kuwait and Iran." He also noted a report in al-Nahar (Beirut), Jan 6, "The Egyptian parliament entrusted the Committee for Arab Affairs, in a demand presented by two deputies, Fathi Bayyumi, from the ruling National Party, and al-Badri Farghali, from the opposition leftist coalition party, with investigating the killing of some 5,600 Egyptians in Iraq at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s." Indeed, Arabs, far more than Americans, are apt to recognize Saddam's vicious and vengeful nature, and the need to get rid of him. As Paul Wolfowitz, Bush Undersec Def, told a Middle East Institute conference in May 97, referring to the immediate aftermath of the Gulf war, "Whatever the risks of an Iraq without Saddam Husayn, the leaders of most of our Arab coalition partners made clear than any alternative was better than Saddam's continuation in power. The Saudi leadership in particular expressed this conviction, although there were some erroneous news reports at the time claiming the opposite. In retrospect, the United States would have benefitted from having paid more attention to Saudi concerns about the consequences of Saddam Husayn's continuation in power." ["The United States and Iraq" in The Future of Iraq, MEI, 1997] Events over the past two weeks have brought that Arab view, at times latent, strongly to the fore. "Iraq News" thought it might be useful to review the exchanges, between, on the one hand, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and, on the other hand, Iraq. The US has regional support for a policy to overthrow Saddam. As "Iraq News," Jan 6, noted, the vituperative exchanges between Saudi Arabia/Egypt and Iraq were precipitated by the Dec 28 Arab League decision to postpone an Arab Foreign Minister's meeting on Iraq. Among the notable aspects of this, Jan 5, the same day Qatar's space TV broadcast excerpts from Saddam's bellicose "Army day" speech, Tariq Aziz charged in al-Jumhuriyah, as broadcast on Iraq Radio, that Egypt and Saudi Arabia were seeking to overthrow the Iraqi regime. Aziz wrote, "To understand the true position of the Egyptian and Saudi regimes today, we must consider the difference between the position which these two regimes, and others, adopted in the February 1998 crises, and the position which both of them adopted before and during the US-British aggression in December 1998. In February . . . the Egyptian and Saudi regimes, as well as others, declared a position which rejected what they termed the military option. In the November crisis, however, the Egyptian and Saudi regimes actually gave the green light to the United States to carry out the aggression. . . . What happened between February and December? . . . "During the February crisis . . . they found themselves compelled to criticize what they termed the 'military option' and even embarked on moves to avoid it because it does not solve the 'problem' and 'complicates matters.' In fact, by 'problem' they did not mean the problem of the continued aggression and embargo against Iraq. Instead they meant the problem of the continuation of the regime in Iraq. . . . During the November crisis, Clinton assured his agents and henchmen in the region, particularly in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and others, that what he is preparing this time is different from anything in the past, and that the principal objective of the military aggression was to change the regime." [see "Iraq News," Nov 9, for the Saudi position, as expressed to Sec Def Cohen, that a US strike had to be the first step in an effort to overthrow the regime.] Notably, Aziz also said that in 1990/91, Saudi Arabia and Egypt counted on the Gulf war to bring about the overthrow of the Iraqi regime. No senior Saudi official has responded publicly to the Iraqi campaign. That has been left to the press. Among many examples, Al-Jazirah, Jan 7, wrote, "The international community's consensus that Iraq's rulers have lost the prerogative to remain in power is not an unfair charge leveled against them. . . . Saddam Husayn and his clique . . . deserve to be swept away by the international community's will from ruling Iraq and to be tried by a special international court on the basis of the same prerogatives that the international community had when the Nuremberg Court was formed in Germany to try the Nazi war criminals. Saddam Husayn personally shoulders the same measure of responsibility that Adolf Hitler bore for his crimes against humanity. . . We reiterate our belief that it is disgraceful for the international community to stand aside and watch this noble Arab Muslim people [Iraqis] dying a thousand deaths a day from their suffering anguish, repression, and despair. It is also shameful for the international community to be incapable of taking legitimate action in the name of international law and humanity to save Iraq and its people from this tyrant whose spite, megalomania, and destruction mania make him sick." On Jan 10, the political affairs editor of the Saudi Press Agency wrote, "Since Saddam Husayn assumed power in Iraq in 1979, the fraternal Iraqi people have been suffering under the yoke of his tyrannical rule. . . . Perhaps the most atrocious of Saddam Husayn's crimes against his people was the crime he committed in the town of Halabjah, which he bombarded with chemical weapons, leaving more than 5,000 people dead and double that number of wounded and disabled people, in addition to his destruction of thousands of villages in northern Iraq and the forcible repatriation of tens of thousands of Iraqi citizens to Iran and Turkey. The international embargo imposed on the ruling Iraqi regime, whose price the Iraqi people are paying, is yet more evidence of this regime's domination and despotism against its people. . . . The Iraqi people are the ones who deserve and need a revolution at a time when Saddam Husayn is celebrating the establishment of the army. The tyrant of Baghdad has killed the best of this army's people inside Iraq and pursued them abroad, killing a larger number of them than those who died in military confrontations into the furnaces of which he threw them to satisfy his desires, whims, perversion and falsity. . . We call on God Almighty in this blessed month to guide us along the correct path and return security, stability, prosperity and affluence to the brotherly Iraqi people." In Egypt, al-Masa (Cairo), Jan 9, reported, Pres "Mubarak stressed in his statements to the newspaper's chief editors that Saddam Husayn has caught an illness called 'the Arab street'. He imagines that people are demonstrating in support for him, ignoring the fact that they are only expressing sympathy for their Iraqi brethren, who have been suffering all kind of torture he and his aides caused. He said Saddam is inciting the United States and Britain to attack his country, absolutely unconcerned about what is happening to his fellow countrymen." AP, Jan 10, reported that Egyptian Foreign Minister, Amr Moussa, had, like the Saudi Press Agency, called for Saddam's overthrow, "saying that Saddam is 'shaming the entire Arab region through his politics,'" in remarks to be published the next day in a German newspaper. But according to Xinhua, Jan 12, Moussa denied having made such remarks. The Egyptian Upper House, the Consultative Council, in a Jan 10 statement, reported by MENA, "held the Iraqi leadership responsible for the maintenance of sanctions on Iraq until now and for giving international powers the opportunity to strike it more than once. . . . The statement added that the Iraqi leadership is primarily responsible for the Iraqi people's hardships and for inflicting huge financial and human losses on several other Arab countries as a result of its miscalculated, hostile decisions. It is also responsible for the foreign presence in the Gulf as a result of its reckless actions and the exhaustion of the Arab nation's resources in wars and conflicts instead of economic development." Typical of the Egyptian press, was an editorial by the chief editor of Al-Akhbar, Jan 10 and summarized by MENA, which asked, "Will Arab solidarity and the closing of Arab ranks remain hostage to Saddam Husayn's recklessness, insanity, bloodthirstiness, and indifference to the interests of the fraternal Iraqi nation? . . . It has become evident that Iraq's haddam [word play on Saddam's name, meaning destroyer of Iraq] is not qualified to govern, that he is unaware of his responsibilities toward his own people and nation. . . Iraq's destroyer miscalculates and believes he can terrorize the entire Arab world in the same way in which he exercised bloody terrorism against the fraternal Iraqi people, humiliating and impoverishing them and causing them to lose their dignity and sovereignty over their land." I. TARIQ AZIZ, SAUDI ARABIA, EGYPT SEEK OUR OVERTHROW Baghdad Republic of Iraq Radio Network in Arabic 1200 GMT 5 Jan 99 Article by Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq 'Aziz published in Baghdad al-Jumhuriyah on 5 January under the headline: "When the Americans Implicate Their Agents and Henchmen" [FBIS Translated Text] In order to understand the true position of the Egyptian and Saudi regimes today, we must consider the difference between the position which these two regimes, and others, adopted in the February 1998 crisis, and the position which both of them adopted before and during the US-British aggression in December 1998. In February -- during the false crisis which the Special Commission had provoked with the support of the United States over the presidential sites -- the United States massed a huge military buildup for aggression against Iraq. Clinton and his henchmen made repeated statements about their determination to commit the aggression. At that time, the Egyptian and Saudi regimes, as well as others, declared a position which rejected what they termed the military option. They said that this option would only complicate the situation rather than solve the problem. In the November crisis, however, the Egyptian and Saudi regimes actually gave the green light to the United States to carry out the aggression through the statement released by the Doha meeting and the separate statements made by these two regimes, holding the Iraqi leadership responsible for any aggression. The United States exploited this position openly before and during the aggression. It considered that as Arab support for the aggression against Iraq. The Egyptian and Saudi rulers did not issue any statements denying these US assumptions. In fact, they remained silent on them, which confirmed the veracity of what the United States and Britain said. What happened between February and December? The Egyptian and Saudi regimes, as well as others, did not adopt in February a stand against what they termed the military option on the basis of a principled pan-Arab position which rejects aggression against any Arab country. They only adopted that position because a US military aggression against Iraq for the mere purpose of hurting that country would not, in their opinion, solve the problem and complicate the situation. What is the problem, and what is the complication of the situation? The Egyptian ruler and the Saudi regime, who played a prominent role in foiling the plans and proposals for an Arab solution in 1990 and who sided with the US decision to wage the aggression against Iraq, took part in the political and military preparation for the aggression, and then played a direct role in it, thought at the time that the aggression would completely eliminate the nationalist regime in Iraq. Thus, they would get rid of the consequences of the crime which they committed against Iraq and the Arab nation. The Egyptian ruler and the Saudi regime in particular, as well as others, suffered a big shock when the 30-state aggression failed to achieve the aim they wished and planned with George Bush. Nevertheless, they did not give up hope. They thought that the huge material losses sustained by Iraq as a result of that aggression were bound, with time, to achieve this aim in one way or another. This expectation continued for months and then years, while Iraq and its leader remained lofty before the Arab nation, exposing, by its mere existence and not necessarily by words, the crime which they committed against Iraq and the Arab nation. At that time, that is in 1991, they used the political settlement game, which the Bush administration had prepared after the 30-state aggression, to cover up this embarrassment and the crime which they committed by claiming that striking at Iraq and weakening it as a counter-balance for Israel did not harm the nation but opened a real prospect for the establishment of comprehensive peace in the region. Therefore, there was no need for a counter-balance for Israel. So, God had spared the faithful any fighting. The Egyptian and Saudi rulers considered the Madrid Conference a victory for them and the policy which they pursued against Iraq. Their news media published analyses and theories speaking about the dawn of peace, stability, and development, and that the Iraqi obstacle has been removed and that the pressure must continue so as to remove it completely from the picture. This game continued several years during which they succeeded in creating a serious state of deception in the Arab arena. Impudent voices, which mock pan-Arabism and socialism, began to be heard. They began hailing the new US era. We warned from the very beginning that the United States is not seeking to establish a stable peace in the region, even at the expense of the Arabs, their interests and rights. This is because a stable peace in the region, regardless of its shape and content, will eliminate the pretexts for US military presence in the Gulf which, after the 30-state aggression, turned into a state of permanent military occupation. We also warned that those who advocate political settlement are overlooking the nature of the Zionist entity itself as an expansionist, aggressive entity. Any kind of peace, even if reached at the expense of Arab territory and rights, will detonate the internal contradictions of this entity that are covered by the conflict with the Arab nation. In the long run, that entity will lose the conflict and rivalry with the Arab nation, which is scores of times larger in terms of land area and population. However, the regimes that advocate political settlement turned a deaf ear and ridiculed our political arguments and continued a large-scale and expensive deception process on the world level that provided this process with a good opportunity to continue. In all those years, the Saudi rulers and the ruler of Egypt, and those who support them, thought that the game of political settlement will succeed and that that the conditions of Iraq will continue to deteriorate and Iraq will not cause them any embarrassment or crisis. The truth about the game of political settlement, however, began to emerge gradually, especially after the Likud and Netanyahu came to power in Israel. In October 1991, the United States tried to cover the crime of its agents and henchmen who supported its aggression against Iraq by providing a cover to the Madrid Conference because it and they needed such a cover at that time. Several years later, the United States discovered that there is no pressing need to cover those agents and henchmen, especially since such a cover requires decisive positions and measures against the Zionist entity. Such position and measures would conflict with the substance of the US strategy in the region that considers this entity its basic backbone in the effort to control the resources of the region. What is even worse, after Clinton came to power, and especially during his second term in office, the United States allowed the American Jews to directly control the political settlement files. This was in contrast with the indirect way the Zionist lobby used to run the US policy in the region in the past and during Bush's term in office in particular. The American Jews occupied all the posts, which are of concern to the region. Albright became secretary of state, Cohen became secretary of defense, Sandy Berger became head of the National Security Council, Martin Indyk went to the State Department to follow up the US policy from the State Department headquarters, while Dennis Ross was sent to follow up this policy in the field with the Palestinians, the Israeli rulers, and others. Facts about the intentions of the Zionist entity and the US positions then began to emerge in such a flagrant way that cannot be covered at all. Once again, voices of resentment against this situation began to be heard loud in Egypt, the Gulf, Palestine, and other Arab areas. Voices were also raised against the double-standard policy pursued by the United States toward Israel and Iraq. On the other hand, Iraq continued to stand lofty and steadfast. Its political speech exposed directly at times, and indirectly at others, the position of the feeble rulers who beg the United States to exert pressure against Israel, to no avail. The Arab masses began to notice this situation and reach serious conclusions, and not only as regards the existing conditions. The masses began to understand more and more the features and dimensions of the crime that was committed against Iraq. The finger of accusation began to be leveled against the absent advocates of political settlement whom Netanyahu was ridiculing and embarrassing everyday, while the United States, their guardian and ally, was standing idly by. In 1997 and 1998, this situation reached a dangerous point for the ruler of Egypt and the Saudi rulers and those who support them as their crime against Iraq in 1991 began to be exposed. They helped destroy Iraq's power at that time, and then continued to play the same role in collusion with the United States. In the meantime, they did not achieve peace with Israel, and they failed to persuade their peoples that they are capable of replacing the Iraqi power, which was made absent from the balance of power by themselves and in collusion with the United States, with any similar power. Their diplomatic power, which they claimed is the alternative to the Iraqi military power, was ineffective and became a source of ridicule and contempt. In such suffocating circumstances for these regimes, the Iraq crisis developed this year and the conflict between Iraq and the United States grew. The ruler of Egypt and the Saudi rulers found themselves face to face with a serious crisis and began to wonder how to handle it. Any flagrant support for the aggression, which was scheduled to take place in February, and any public participation in it will bring about the wrath of the masses, and may even bring about a sweeping revolution that may constitute a threat to their positions in power, especially after the despicable state they reached as a result of the political settlement "game." During the February crisis, the United States did not give any consideration to the fate of these people. They, therefore, found themselves compelled to criticize what they termed "the military option" and even embarked on moves to avoid it because it does not solve the "problem" and "complicates matters." In fact, by "problem" they did not mean the problem of the continued aggression and embargo against Iraq. Instead, they meant the problem of the continuation of the regime in Iraq and its steadfastness, determination, and the loud voice, which exposes their spineless positions. In their view, the "complication" was not in the relationship between Iraq and the UN Special Commission, because the relationship was already complicated. The "complication" they meant was related to their own situation and position in the face of their angry people, who were critical of, hostile to, and appalled by their policies and the fact that these leaders did not achieve any result on the path of settlement that can cover their miserable conditions. I believe that the conversations they had with the Americans during and after the February crisis were falling in the following direction: Any new military aggression against Iraq that does not bring about a change of the regime will be a catastrophe for us. Therefore, you must not launch the aggression unless you have made all the necessary requirements to change the regime. The United States understood the logic of these people and acted accordingly. The US schemes followed, starting with the Congress endorsing the so-called "Iraq Liberation Act," the allocation of huge sums of money to finance the so-called "Iraqi opposition," the drafting of plans and scenarios to change the regime, and using UNSCOM as a ready instrument to fabricate a crisis and then employing this crisis as a pretext to stage a military aggression and start the failed plan for change. This US strategic analysis coincided with the Clinton's conditions and private problems. When there is a connection, even a small one, between the US strategic objectives and the interests of the US President and the US Administration officials, then the United States can do anything and commit any crime. This is a fact that has been recorded by the US contemporary history in the post-World War II era. The US strategy in the region, which is formulated by Zionists and which is now directly executed by Zionists, aims to attack Iraq and destroy its steadfast nationalist regime to enable the United States to impose its complete control over the region. Clinton's private interests directed that he must show himself as the commander in chief of the US Armed Forces and a strong president who can manage a crisis and exhibit the United States' superiority, and not a president who is drowned in his disgraceful scandal. People in the United States and the world knew of this scandal from the report by Independent Counsel Starr. During the November crisis, Clinton assured his agents and henchmen in the region, particularly in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and others, that what he is preparing this time is different from anything in the past, and that the principal objective of the military aggression was to change the regime. If we observe the US statements before and during the aggression, we can notice that the US officials were stating this objective at times, and denying it at others. They, however, continued to speak an ambiguous language that may agree with both possibilities; the possibility of a successful end to the objective they were planning to achieve, and the possibility that this objective may fail. The Americans were, therefore, smarter than their agents. The agents were certain that the United States would achieve this objective and resolve the "problem" because these people seriously think that the United States can do anything. If the United States told them it would achieve that objective, then they think that such a result is inevitable for one simple reason; the United States can do whatever it wants with them, so why can it not do the same with Iraq? Consequently, we saw the Saudi pressure at the Doha meeting [of the Damascus Declaration member states] to issue the ill-reputed statement, which holds the Iraqi leadership responsible if the aggression takes place. We also saw the pressures put by [Saudi Crown Prince] 'Abdallah against the Gulf Cooperation Council summit to issue a similar statement. And, hence, we saw the endorsement of this position by the ruler of Egypt. But, what happened was a great disappointment for them. Thus, the aggression took place. The aggression was indeed directed against the centers of the national regime in Iraq. The aggressors concentrated their missile strikes in particular on establishments and sites that are connected with national security, such as the Republican Guard, the Special Guard, the special security, the public security, the intelligence, and the means of communications. Since the first day, the aggressors attacked strategically important points in the south in order to isolate it from the central authority and use it subsequently as a theater for their operations to change the regime in Baghdad and thus solve the "problem." In Iraq, the leader and the leadership were fully aware of this plan. This was not because someone informed us about it, but because the leader and the leadership, who foiled with great competence and ability all enemy attempts and plots since 1990, were in a position to make the right and precise conclusions. Thus, all the necessary measures were taken to also foil this enemy plan. They were backed in this by a great, steadfast, and brave people, who are known for their legendary experience in resistance and confrontation; an army which is trained in fighting, maneuverability, and circumvention; and a vanguard, organized, and experienced party which is capable of facing all possibilities. The aggression began. And an hour later, the masses came out in Egypt first, and later in all Arab arenas, to condemn and denounce the aggression, and express their strong indignation. The masses placed their rulers in a dilemma. Three days passed. Then leader Saddam Husayn began appearing every day, steady, lofty, solid, and conscious. His presence on television spread fear in the hearts of the agents and those who were implicated in the crime. Along with Saddam Husayn, every member of the Iraqi leadership played the role that was set for him. So, instead of the regime collapsing, as the aggressors had planned and expected, Iraq came out stronger and loftier, and it began to exert its influence on the Arab masses and put more pressure on those implicated in the crime. This is where we can understand the meaning of Mubarak's statement to the Egyptian paper al-Jumhuriyah in which he said: "On the fourth day, I sent a letter to Clinton telling him that the situation has become serious." But, since Mubarak is known for rushing things, he exposed himself. Had he been really against the aggression, why did he wait until the fourth day to ask Clinton to stop it. A man with a principled position assumes his position from the very first moment. But, the Egyptian ruler was correct when he told Clinton that the situation was getting serious, because this seriousness was outside Iraq, and in Egypt in particular. For the aggression did not achieve its premeditated aims. On the contrary, it produced the opposite results. Hence the great disaster which the US agents had feared; namely, the reaction of the masses, the nationalist forces, and all the righteous in Egypt and the Arab homeland. (cont'd in PT 2)
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