The Boston Globe
12/21/98
WASHINGTON - One question has emerged in the aftermath of President Clinton's four-day bombing campaign against Iraq: What was that all about?
If his aim was to put a dent in Saddam Hussein's ability to produce chemical, nuclear, and biological weapons, the dent was not a large one.
If, as some of the air war's targets suggested, Clinton was trying to destabilize Hussein's regime, he did not hit its foundations hard enough.
Speaking of the Pentagon's estimates of damage, John Pike, a specialist with the Federation of American Scientists, said Saturday night, ''It doesn't look like they did anything on what they said they were going to do, and not enough on what they were actually doing.''
According to the Pentagon's most recent figures, the attacks hit a total of 97 targets over the four days. The strikes damaged beyond repair only a few of the targets - the weapons sites, military headquarters, and industrial facilities that Pentagon planners thought had to be hit to accomplish the mission.
''I'm mystified why they stopped the campaign just as they had amassed sufficient force to complete the job,'' Pike added.
More forces, including another aircraft-carrier battle-group and more than 70 additional combat planes, had just arrived Friday.
''You don't deploy 70 aircraft halfway around the world just so they can fly one combat sortie,'' Pike said.
Iraq's nuclear and chemical materials were not attacked.
Part of the reason might have been that nobody knew where these materials were.
Andrew Cockburn, co-author of the forthcoming book ''Out of the Ashes: The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein,'' noted that the UN inspectors themselves ''couldn't find the stuff because Saddam kept moving it.'' So, Cockburn asked, ''If a bunch of people on the ground couldn't find it, how could some generals target it from the air?''
There are some well-known, immovable sites where chemical weapons could be built, but these are ''dual-use'' facilities - places with civilian functions as well, such as a chlorine plant vital to Baghdad's drinking water.
Defense Secretary William S. Cohen said the campaign was avoiding these targets so Iraqi people would not be hurt. The concern was laudable, but, given these limitations, it again raises the question: What did Clinton expect the bombing would accomplish?
Cruise missiles and laser-guided bombs did strike some factories involved in producing missiles that could theoretically deliver chemical or nuclear weapons. The Pentagon said that 11 such targets were attacked. None were destroyed, one was damaged severely, five moderately, and four lightly. The damage to one target had not yet been assessed.
From a purely military standpoint, it is hard to imagine that the commanders would not have wanted to go back and take another shot.
General Henry Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said Saturday that even these attacks had set back Iraq's ability to produce long-range missiles ''by at least a year.''
However, General Thomas Wilson, the Joint Staff's director of intelligence, said that even without the strikes, Iraq was a couple of years away from acquiring this ability. So, the upshot of the bombing appears to have put off this prospect from two years to three - not trivial, but hardly critical, either.
Missiles were also fired at facilities for the security forces that have guarded and hidden Hussein's weapons. These were the people who obstructed the UN inspectors. However, if the inspectors are no longer in Iraq - and it is doubtful that Hussein will let them back in soon - then their functions are no longer so vital.
Furthermore, just because their facilities - barracks, headquarters, and so forth - were bombed does not mean the guards themselves were killed. Everyone agrees Hussein has become resourceful at moving his assets around on short notice.
William M. Arkin, a military historian and former US Army intelligence officer, said of the strikes, ''I think we're hitting a lot of empty buildings.''
Strikes were also aimed at Hussein's command and control, TV and radio transmitters, Republican Guard facilities, private security forces - in other words, the apparatus that keeps him in power and maintains his links with the Iraqi army.
These attacks, too, seemed fairly light. Of 20 command-control targets hit, seven were destroyed, four damaged severely, four moderately. Of nine Republican Guard targets hit, none were destroyed, three damaged severely, five moderately. Of 18 security targets hit, two were destroyed, five damaged severely, six moderately.
Bombing rarely has much effect on these sorts of targets, no matter how heavy. During the 1991 Gulf war, American-led air forces mounted 500 strikes on command-control and 260 strikes on Iraq's leaders.
Yet, ''despite the lethality and precision of the attacks,'' concluded the US Air Force's official five-volume ''Gulf War Air Power Survey,'' Hussein's ability to command his forces ''had not collapsed... The system turned out to be more redundant and more able to reconstitute itself.''
Perhaps Operation Desert Fox was called off for diplomatic reasons. British Prime Minister Tony Blair said Saturday night that he and Clinton ''always envisaged it would last four days ... because such a campaign is the right and proportionate response to Saddam's breach of UN obligations and also because of our sensitivity to the holy month of Ramadan.''
This claim is confusing, however, because the bombing continued into Ramadan, and it leaves unexplained the costly deployment of vast additional forces that did not arrive until the third and fourth days.
In any event, yesterday morning, Hussein, who lived through it all once again, claimed victory - which, from his point of view, might outweigh Clinton's claim that the Iraqi leader stands ''degraded'' and ''diminished.''
This story ran on page A01 of the Boston Globe on 12/21/98.
© Copyright 1998 Globe Newspaper Company.
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