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1. Iraq has decided in October 31, 1998 to suspend its cooperation with UNSCOM with the exception of the operation and the maintenance of the cameras and the sensors. That decision was meant to complement Iraq's decision in August 5, 1998 which suspended cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA as an expression of bitterness toward the dubious and skewed approach of UNSCOM and its Chairman, Richard Butler, who intends to maintain the sanctions and thereby prolong the suffering of the Iraqi people. He has been procrastinating by indulging into the most trivial, arbitrary and marginal details, and by ignoring the basic fact that Iraq has complied with all its commitments according to section C of resolution 687. Iraq's compliance with resolution 687 means that it no longer has any prohibited weapons or the means to produce and develop them and that all the scientific or industrial factories are under rigid and intrusive ongoing monitoring system in spite of the fact that these factories have no relevance to weapons.

2. As soon as Iraq has taken its new decision, a new propaganda campaign was put to work in order to misinform the public and mix the cards so as to question the legitimacy of the Iraqi decision, and to prepare the stage for a new military aggression against the people of Iraq. Within the context of this campaign, many parties wonder why Iraq has taken its latest decision at the time when the Security Council was set to begin the comprehensive review. Now let us see which party has reneged on the comprehensive review.

3. In August 5, 1998, Secretary-General Kofi Annan presented his initiative about the review in a letter to the president of the Security Council. That letter contained, among other things, recognition of the fact that it is impossible to achieve 100 per cent verification of Iraq's disarmament. He also invited the Scrutiny Council to consult with experts outside the realm of UNSCOM and the IAEA about the truthfulness of Iraq's reports and those of UNSCOM and the IAEA.

4. As soon as that initiative was declared, Iraq accepted it and pledged its cooperation with the Secretary-General for its implementation. Several contacts and meetings were conducted between Iraqi officials and the secretary-general.

5. In view of those meetings and contacts, the Secretary-General presented on October 10, 1998 a position paper in which he divided the process of the review into two stages: the first to focus on what has been achieved by Iraq within the framework of Section C of resolution 687 and the second to focus on what Iraq has complied with from all other relevant Security Council resolutions. Paragraph 3 of that paper stated the following:" The immediate purpose of the first phase of the comprehensive review would be to define an agreed course of action and a timetable, which if followed would lead to the earliest possible satisfaction of the disarmament-related requirements described in Section C of resolution 687. It would be designed so as to make it possible for the Security Council to satisfy itself whether all necessary conditions for lifting the oil embargo have been fulfilled in accordance with paragraph 22 of resolution 687. In particular, the first review would:

A. clearly determine if Iraq still possesses weapons of mass destruction or any equipment for its production;

B. clarify if Iraq is still undertaking attempts to restart the proscribed military programs of production of any kind of proscribed weapons;

C. Confirm on the basis of existing evidence the validity of any allegations of non-compliance by Iraq with regard to section C of resolution 687;

D. Establish a reasonable timetable for the investigation of all remaining issues of the Iraqi proscribed military programs; and

F. answer the question whether Iraq still constitutes a military threat to the region.
 
6. Obviously, the Secretary-General has focused in his paper on the basic elements of the review which are connected to the implementation of para 22 of resolution 687; that was to say the review should aim at easing or lifting the sanctions. And if it was decided, as a result of the review, that there were more commitments to be implemented by Iraq, they have to be dealt with according to a specified timeframe.

7. Iraq has presented a counter position paper which included the following elements:

A. UNSCOM, the IAEA and Iraq would submit simultaneously succinct reports in a compatible and tabulated format which would cover the disposal of weapons of mass destruction and the establishment of the OMV as required by paragraphs 8 to 13 of SCR 687. The reports should include the achievements reached in: first, the disposal of weapons of mass destruction; second, the disposal of the equipment used for the production of the said weapons; and third, the status of the OMV established in Iraq in terms of its nature and needs, bearing in mind that Iraq has expressly recognized since 1993 the right of UNSCOM and IAEA after the implementation of para 22 of SCR 687 to undertake immediate on-site inspection on the basis of reliable new information related to prohibited activities. In this connection, all the parties concerned shall strictly observe the letter and the spirit of the MOU of 23 February 1998. This will enable the Security Council to have a clear view of the results achieved until now in the process of implementation of the provisions of section C of SCR 687;

B. The Council will, on the basis of the above, be able to draw the necessary conclusions on the completion by Iraq of all actions contemplated in paragraphs 8 to 13 of SCR 687 and consequently apply paragraph 22 thereof;

C. Independent experts in the field of disarmament, drawn by the Secretary-General, would assist the Council in assessing the differences emerging from the reports through technical and scientific means. In this regard, the IAEA and UNSCOM would be called upon to present verifiable evidence to substantiate any views they might have contrary to what is indicated in the report submitted by Iraq.

D. the Council determines, on the basis of the indications given by the independent experts, the acceptable degree of uncertainty in the work done.

E. The Council determines on the above mentioned basis whether work on certain precisely defined issues remain to be done before transferring the files from the disarmament phase to the OMV stage within the shortest possible timetable. In this connection, the letter and the spirt of the MOU of 23 Feb. 1998 will observe strictly by all the parties concerned.

F. The full participation of Iraq in the deliberations of the comprehensive review is a necessary element to enable the Council to gain the earliest possible picture of the status of implementation, ensure the objectivity of assessment and fairness of the outcome.

G. It is necessary that the format of the comprehensive review ensures transparency and the need for recording the deliberations so as to be a reference for any future action.

H. In view of the impact of the embargo on Iraq, it is preferable to have a reasonably short timetable for completing the comprehensive review relating to Section C of SCR 687.

The Secretary General would render assistance and advice to the Council during all phases of the comprehensive review.

J. Subsequently, a comprehensive review would be conducted, with the full participation of Iraq, on the results achieved in the implementation process of all other provisions of SCR 687 including para 14 thereof.

8. The Iraqi paper thus stressed certain elements that would have made the comprehensive review a process based on clear pillars that would have distinguished it from the simply being the forty-first carbon copy of the formal previous reviews done by the Council every two months whereby the President of the Security Council came out with a brief statement saying that there was nothing new to prompt the Council to change the regime of sanctions.

9. Among all other members of the Security Council, the U.S. alone and by itself decided to present a paper containing its views on the comprehensive review. That paper was filled with conditions that clearly reflected the mentality of arrogance, totalitarianism and the desire for domination and hegemony. Let's see what were the elements of the American paper:

A. as UNSCR 1194 states, before a comprehensive review can take place, Iraq must rescind its August  5 decision and resume full cooperation;
B.
B. we are willing to hold the review as soon as it is clear that Iraq has fulfilled these obligations. We should solicit UNSCOM and IAEA's views of how long it will take to establish the resumption of full cooperation, but six to eight weeks would be a reasonable period. The length of time depends on the quality of cooperation;

C. the review must be comprehensive in nature. As a practical matter, the review could begin with a consideration of Iraq's record of compliance with Section C of UNSCR 687, provided other issues of concern are also addressed;

D. The purpose of the review, according to 1194 is to examine Iraq's record of compliance with all of its obligations, not just those Iraq wishes to discuss;

E. The review of disarmament issues, as of other issues, should be technical in nature;

F. After hearing from the technical experts, the Council may decide to draw up a list of outstanding issues. These conclusions should be drawn up after evaluating all the facts presented;

G. Under no circumstances will we accept a predetermined outcome. No promises should be made to Iraq with respect to outcome of the review. It is not the prerogative to judge compliance with resolutions-not Iraq's and not the SG's;

H. this in no way should be a negotiation with Baghdad. The resolutions are clear, and must be followed.

10.  Judging by the content of the American paper, it is clear that the U.S. does not want the review to move in the direction specified by the Secretary General's initiative dated August 8, 1998 or his letter to the Security Council in March 3, 1998. The American paper serves as a clear example about the predetermined and adopted position of the U.S. to be taken during the review to impede and prejudge that process in a way to render it as simply the 41ist formal review of the sanctions which has been conducted during the seven and a half years ago.

11. In the middle of October 1998, the Iraqi Government presented a request to the secretariat of the UN to clarify nine points concerning the comprehensive review. These nine points are as follows:

A. What would be the precise time lag between Iraq's rescission of the 5 August decision and confirmation to the Council of Iraq's resumption of full cooperation and, subsequently, how much time would lapse after such confirmation before the Council commence the comprehensive review?

 B. Iraq would wish to be assured that there is a clear separation between the two phases of the review; and that the second phase would commence only after the completion of the first phase which is exclusively concerned with Section C of SCR 687;

 C. In Iraq's view, it needs to be recognized that some degree of uncertainty will be acceptable with regard to the fulfillment of the requirements of Section C of SCR 687; and, to the extent possible, Iraq would wish such a margin of reasonable uncertainty to be quantified in advance;

D. It was envisaged by Iraq that there would be a need for the SC to involve experts in the review, in addition to those available from UNSCOM and the IAEA. Iraq would like the role of such experts to be defined;

 E. Iraq would wish to receive confirmation that the "military threat" mentioned at the end of para 3 of the SG's proposed concept, refers to a military threat posed by proscribed weapons only and not by such conventional weapons Iraq is allowed to possess;

 F. What would be the SG's role in the review?

 G. In which manner would Iraq be invited to participate in the review?

 H. Iraq is concerned about the final sub-paragraph of paragraph 4 in the SG concept, which would exempt UNSCOM and the IAEA from disclosing the source of evidence. Iraq's concern stem from its assessment that the Council could not assess the credibility of evidence in the absence of an indication of the source;

I. Finally, Iraq believes that the Council may conclude, on the basis of the comprehensive review, that all requirements for the implementation of para 22 have been fulfilled; and that this eventuality of not anticipating a list of requirements to be fulfilled need to be recognized in the concept.
 
12. The SG transferred all the clarifications sought by Iraq to the Security Council where long consultations were conducted about them. The U.S. representative declared during those consultation that his Government reject any reference to para 21 of SCR 687 which stipulates that the Council should conduct a review every two months to easing of the sanctions. He also rejected any reference to para 22 of the same resolution, which stipulates the lifting of sanctions as soon as Iraq complies with the disarmament requirements. Further, he stressed in a statement that his Government does not want to see any relationship between the comprehensive review and the lifting of sanctions.
13. The consultation at the Security Council were concluded with a letter from the President of the Security Council to the SG, which practically reflected the pressures of the U.S. Government whereby the idea of comprehensive review was merely turned into a distorted copy of the previous forty one routine reviews.

14. That was how the Security Council reneged on the main principles which would have made the comprehensive review an opportunity to rectify the skewed approaches which have so far been followed to implement SCR 687, which in turn lead to the sustaining of the unjust and brutal economic sanctions against the people of Iraq for more than eight years.

15. The U.S. has also been claiming that Iraq is not complying with terms of the Memorandum of Understanding signed between Kofi Annan and Tariq Aziz. But if we look at elements of the MOU, we will find that it contained obligations to be complied with by both Iraq and the United Nations. Iraq has done its part of the deal by allowing UNSCOM and the IAEA to carry out their activities all over Iraq, but the UN did not.  For example, para 6 of the MOU states: noting the progress achieved by UNSCOM in various disarmament areas, and the need to intensify efforts to complete its mandate, the United Nations and the Government of Iraq agree to improve cooperation, and efficiency, effectiveness and transparency of work, so as to enable UNSCOM to report to the Council expeditiously under para 22 of resolution 687.

16.  Also, para 7 of the MOU states that the lifting of sanctions is obviously of paramount importance to the people and Government of Iraq and the Secretary-General undertook to bring this matter to the full attention of the members of the Security.

17.  In complying with the terms of the MOU, Iraq allowed the inspectors to visit the presidential sites and all other sites requested for inspection by UNSCOM. From the signing of the MOU until October 31st, 31 inspection teams consisted of 473 inspectors visited 318 sites as well as 23 teams of monitors consisted of 245 inspectors visited 1765 sites.

18.  All the allegations of UNSCOM concerning presidential sites proved to be untruthful. But the Security Council did not hold UNSCOM accountable to its false allegations, which almost had lead to a full-scale war at the time. Furthermore, the Security Council turned a blind eye vis a vis the continuous violations, by the U.S. and Britain, to Iraq's space and territorial integrity in clear violation of the charter of the UN and the MOU which pledged the respect of the international community to Iraq's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

19.   UNSCOM's chairman also pledged on June 1998 that he would review Iraq's compliance in preparation to its October 1988 report to the Security Council.  He promised to inform the Security Council that Iraq has met all his obligations in accordance with Section C of SCR 687 so as to enable the Council to implement para 22 of the resolution, which, of course, would have lead to the lifting of the oil embargo. But neither UNSCOM's Chairman nor the Security Council fulfilled their promises.