FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
FCO PRESS RELEASE: Wednesday 4 February 1998
FOREIGN OFFICE PAPER ON IRAQI THREAT AND WORK OF UNSCOM
Foreign Secretary today released to Parliament an FCO paper on the
work done by the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the continuing
threat from Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).
The Foreign Office have produced the paper in response to the strong
Parliamentary and public interest in Iraq's existing WMD capability
and the efforts of the international community to destroy Saddam
Hussein's stocks and prevent him from developing his weapons
programmes further.
Copies of the paper are being placed in the Libraries of both Houses
and are being sent individually to all Members of Parliament.
On leaving for Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, Robin Cook said:
"We are facing a grave situation. The authority of the United
Nations is at stake. It is important that we make the fullest
information available to Parliament and the public. Iraq has built
up an appalling stock of weapons. We must be certain that they are
totally eradicated and cannot be rebuilt."
UN SPECIAL COMMISSION (UNSCOM)
The Mandate
Under UN Security Council Resolution (SCR) 687 (April 1991), which
set out the cease-fire terms for ending the Gulf War, Iraq is
obliged to:
(a) accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless of all
its
- nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and ballistic missiles
with a range over 150 kilometres; and
- research, development, and manufacturing facilities associated
with the above; and
(b) undertake not to develop such weapons in the future.
The Secretary-General was instructed to establish a Special
Commission (UNSCOM) to oversee these processes. Iraq must give full
cooperation, in particular immediate, unrestricted access to any
site UNSCOM needs to inspect.
What has UNSCOM achieved?
Despite constant Iraqi deceit, concealment, harassment and
obstruction, UNSCOM has succeeded in destroying:
- 38,000 chemical weapons
- 480,000 litres of live chemical weapon agents
- 48 operational missiles
- Six missile launchers
- 30 special missile warheads for chemical and biological weapons.
- hundreds of items of CW production equipment. Iraq originally
claimed much of it was for peaceful use but later admitted its real
purpose.
- Iraq claimed that the VX nerve gas project was a failure. UNSCOM
has discovered Iraq had the capability to produce VX on an
industrial scale, and produced four tonnes. Work was also going on
into numerous other agents: sarin, tabun and mustard gas.
- the A1 Hakam BW factory (3kms by 6kms) which was able to produce
50,000 litres of anthrax and botulinum. Iraq claimed it was for
animal feed.
One hundred kilograms of anthrax released from the top of a tall
building in a densely populated area could kill up to three million
people.
UNSCOM has also discovered that Iraq produced 19,000 litres of
botulinum, 8,400 litres of anthrax, 2,000 litres of aflatoxin
(produces liver cancer) and clostridium (gas gangrene). Iraq has
admitted filling ballistic missile warheads and bombs with the first
three of these agents. These weapons were subsequently destroyed.
Iraq denied the existence of all of these biological agents until
August 1995.
UNSCOM has also put into place a systematic monitoring system to
watch facilities suspected of producing WMD.
Why is UNSCOM still concerned?
Iraq has consistently tried to evade its responsibilities. Its
required full disclosure document on missiles was not produced until
July 1996, five years after it was demanded. It has so far produced
three versions on chemical weapons and four on biological weapons,
all shown to be seriously inaccurate.
In particular, UNSCOM is concerned that:
- Iraq may still have operational SCUD-type missiles with chemical
and biological warheads. Critical missile components, warheads, and
propellant are not accounted for. Nor are 17 tonnes of growth media
for BW agents - enough to produce more than three times the amount
of anthrax Iraq admits it had. Key items of CW production equipment
are also missing.
- UNSCOM strongly suspects that admitted Iraqi figures for
production of BW agent are still too low.
- Iraq's CW programme was on an enormous scale. 4,000 tonnes of CW
precursors are not accounted for. These could have produced several
hundred tonnes of CW agents, enough to fill several thousand
munitions. Over 31,000 CW munitions are not accounted for.
- Over 600 tonnes of VX precursors are also not accounted for.
These could make 200 tonnes of VX. One drop is enough to kill. 200
tonnes could wipe out the world's population.
Iraq's obstructionism
- Iraq has consistently denied UNSCOM inspectors the access they
need to follow up these and other concerns and locate both WMD
capabilities and documentation which might reveal more about Iraq's
WMD programmes. Documents and material have been removed from and
destroyed inside sites while UNSCOM inspectors have been held
outside prevented from entering. The pattern of defiance has got
worse over time. Throughout most of 1997 Iraq made difficulties
over access to an arbitrary and self-advised category of supposed
"sensitive" sites. Iraq has now put an absolute ban on visits by
UNSCOM to so called "Presidential" sites, and has imposed a
unilateral deadline of 20 May for the lifting of sanctions. It has
tried to claim that UNSCOM inspection teams contain a
disproportionate number of UK and US inspectors.
- Hostile demonstrations against UNSCOM have been organised. Iraqi
"minders" have even endangered lives by trying to take control of
UNSCOM helicopters in mid-air.
Why continued monitoring is important
UNSCOM needs to continue to monitor Iraqi WMD facilities because:
- UNSCOM has evidence of a deliberate government-controlled
mechanism of concealment to continue developing WMD and procuring
materials. Given the chance, Iraq would undoubtedly resume WMD
production.
- Iraq has four plants which have been used to produce CW munitions,
and 30 which could be converted to produce CW materials. It has
numerous personnel with the required expertise. These factories
cannot be destroyed because they have legitimate alternative
civilian uses. But it is important that they are monitored closely.
- Without monitoring, Iraq could produce CW and BW in weeks, a
long-range missile in a year, and a nuclear weapon in five years.
- Iraq could produce up to 350 litres of weapons grade anthrax per
week - enough to fill two missile warheads. It could produce
mustard CW agent within weeks.
- Iraq has continued trying to acquire banned WMD technology. In
late 1995 Jordan intercepted a shipment of advanced missile guidance
parts on the way to Iraq.
The former Chairman of UNSCOM, Ambassador Rolf Ekeus stated publicly
in 1993 that he believed Iraq fully intends to restore its military
industrial base. "The capabilities are there, the supply system
including banks and payments is there. The day the oil embargo is
lifted, Iraq will get all the cash. With the cash, the suppliers,
and the skills they will be able to re-establish all the weapons ...
It may grow up like mushrooms after the rain."
That remains true today.
The present Chairman of UNSCOM, Ambassador Richard Butler told the
Security Council on 23 January 1998 that
"If Iraq ... avoids answering questions ... and prevents UNSCOM
from finding the answers, it is gravely to be doubted that we would
be able to verify Iraq's claims that it has met its disarmament
obligations established by the Security Council".
"Iraq appears determined to withhold any further information, and to
prevent UNSCOM from finding it itself."
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