to H.E. Mr. Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations, on November 14, 1998
H.E. Mr. Kofi A. Annan
The Secretary General of The United Nations
New York
Excellency,
Your letter dated 13/11/98 addressed to President Saddam
Hussein was presented to a joint meeting of the Revolutionary
Command Council and the National Command of the Arab
Ba'ath Socialist Party presided over by His Excellency the
President. I was entrusted with the task of conveying to you
the following:
The goal sought by Iraq from its decisions of 5 August and
31 October was not to sever the relationship with UNSCOM
and the IAEA and to cease the implementation of its
obligations under section C of SCR 687. The objective of Iraq
is to end the suffering of its embargoed people and to see the
implementation of paragraph 22 of SCR 687 as a first step for
lifting the other sanctions.
Due to its trust in you and your good faith, the Government
of Iraq has dealt with your initiative regarding the
comprehensive review . But unfortunately, the deliberations of
the Council on the procedures for carrying out the review did
not result in a clear picture which ensures fairness and
objectivity in reaching the implementation of paragraph (22) of
resolution 687, which represents the declared objective of the
comprehensive review according to your proposal. It is well
known that the main reason for that was the American
position, which does not represent the prevailing opinion of the
Council. That position, contrary to your initiative, objected
continuously to the presentation of any clarity in regard to the
objective of the comprehensive review.
Despite the assurances that we have received from you
and from many members of the Council that supported the
main objective of the comprehensive review, and despite the
confidence we have in you and in the majority of the Council
members and our belief in your good faith and sincerity, these
assurances were not satisfactory because they did not meet
the basics from our point of view.
On the basis of what was stated in your letter, and in
appreciation of the content of the letter of President Boris
Yeltsin the President of the Russian Federation and Mr.
Yevginy Brymakov, the Prime Minister of the Russian
Federation, and the positive positions expressed and conveyed
to us by China, France, Brazil and other States, and in order to
give a further chance to achieve justice by lifting sanctions
commencing with the implementation of paragraph (22) of
resolution 687 (1991), the Leadership of Iraq decided to
resume working with the Special Commission and the IAEA
and to allow them to perform their normal duties in accordance
with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and on the
basis of the principles which were agreed upon in the
Memorandum of Understanding signed with you on 23
February 1998.
We offer this chance not out of fear of the aggressive
American campaign and the threat to commit a new
aggression against Iraq, but as an expression of our feeling of
responsibility, and in response to your appeal and those of our
friends. We affirm that the people of Iraq would not relinquish
their legitimate right in having the iniquitous embargo lifted and
to live normally like other nations of the world. We will be
looking forward to seeing the outcome of your efforts and the
review.
Excellency
We rightly believe that if the comprehensive review were
not to be a mere formality and to be free from the influences
of the tendentious purposes, the adoption of the points we
conveyed yesterday, 13/11/1998, to the Ambassadors of
Russia, France and China, a copy of which I enclose herewith,
will render the review serious, fair and fruitful.
We expect that you will continue with your efforts to lay
down the bases and the correct procedures for the review and
so as to commence with as soon as possible.
Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest
consideration.
Tariq Aziz
Baghdad, 14, November 1998
Addendum to letter:
First, the goal sought by Iraq from its decisions of 5 August
and 31 October was not to sever the relationship with
UNSCOM and the IAEA and to cease the implementations of
its obligations under section C of SCR's 687 and 715.
Second, the objective of Iraq is to end the suffering of its
embargoed people and to see the implementation of paragraph
(22) of SCR 687 as a first step for lifting the other sanctions.
Third, Iraq expressed its readiness to engage in the
comprehensive review which had been proposed by the
Secretary General. But, as a result of American pressure, the
results brought about by the consultations of the Council do not
ensure an honest and objective review with the aim of
implementing paragraph (22).
Fourth, the position of Iraq on the comprehensive review is:
1. The comprehensive review be carried out within a
very short time, (seven days for example), after the resumption
of UNSCOM and the IAEA of their normal duties. This is to
be without conditions, (like those mentioned formerly in regard
to what is called the confirmation of Iraq's cooperation).
2. The comprehensive review fundamentally
concentrates on paragraph (3) of the concept paper of the
Secretary General of 5 October (the three Iraqi questions of 3
August) and emphasizes the question of evidence.
3. The Council be ready to implement paragraph (22) if
the fulfillment of the requirements of section C of SCR 687 is
established.
4. If the Council sees, through an objective study, that
there are matters which need to be done, a short period be
determined for their completion. Until that completion is
reached, the Council implements measures for lifting or
reducing sanctions in proportion to what has been fulfilled of
the requirements of paragraph (22). Thereafter, the
commencement with the implementation of paragraph (22)
immediately upon the completion of the required worked.
5. The Council assures the legal interpretation of section
C of SCR 687 and that none of its members should impose
additional conditions or restrictions on the implementation of
paragraph (22).
Fifth, the second phase of the review commence after
completing the conclusions of the first phase.
Sixth, the second phase of the review only encompasses
the obligations determined by clear provisions of the resolutions
and no matters be raised contrary to the legal interpretation of
the resolutions.
Seventh, the members of the Council and specially the
permanent members abide by international law and the
relevant resolutions of the Council in respect of all matters
pertaining to Iraq.
Eighth, the question of Butler and the structure of
UNSCOM and its practices are important matters. The
Council is to consider them seriously in order to ensure a good
relationship in the future. We hope that this will be done as
soon as possible.
Ninth, it is necessary that these assurances be
communicated directly to the leadership in Baghdad either by
the Secretary General or by a delegation from the Council.
13 Nov. 1998
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