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22 December 1998

TRANSCRIPT: PICKERING BRIEFING ON IRAQ STRIKES DECEMBER 22

(Says Baghdad could face "sanctions in perpetuity") (4980)
Washington -- Under Secretary of State Thomas Pickering says Iraq
could face "sanctions in perpetuity" unless it cooperates with UN
weapons inspectors and demonstrates to their satisfaction that it has
eliminated its capacity to produce or deliver weapons of mass
destruction.
In a December 22 press briefing at the State Department, Pickering
also said the United States would consider a further expansion of the
"oil for food" program governing Iraq's imports of humanitarian
products such as food and medicine.
However, he emphasized that the United States would consider any
effort to circumvent current UN economic sanctions against Iraq to be
a "very serious" matter.
Following is the State Department transcript:
(begin transcript)
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of the Spokesman
December 22, 1998
BRIEFING BY UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS
THOMAS PICKERING ON AFTERMATH OF AIRSTRIKES ON IRAQ
Department of State
Washington, D.C.
UNDER SECRETARY PICKERING: I wanted to make a few opening remarks,
partly in response to questions from you and many others about what is
it we do next in the diplomatic area in particular; and I'd like to
focus briefly on that.
First let me review the objectives of the strike, which as you know
very well were to degrade Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program
and related delivery systems and Iraq's ability to threaten its
neighbors.
Substantial damage, as has been reported, was done to targets,
including Iraq's ballistic missile systems, its command and control
network and its security apparatus. We consider the operation was a
success. I encourage you to look at General Anthony Zinni's briefing
at the DOD yesterday. He's the Commander in Chief of the Central
Command who was responsible for carrying out the strikes. He has given
some excellent information on the details of the effectiveness of the
strike in accomplishing the mission.
While our military action has degraded Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction capabilities, it has not eliminated the threat to regional
peace and security posed by those capabilities. This is an issue that
the United Nations Security Council must continue to address. We will
be working with other Security Council members towards the shared
objective of assuring that Iraq is stripped of its weapons of mass
destruction capabilities and cannot reconstitute them. We will
maintain a robust military presence in the area and a readiness to use
force again. Saddam should already know that we will use force if Iraq
threatens its neighbors, reconstitutes its weapons of mass destruction
or moves against the Kurds.
Iraq faces essentially two options: to refuse to work with the
agencies which the Council has entrusted with the task of eliminating
Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capability, and therefore face the
indefinite continuation of the sanctions regime and our willingness on
a continued basis to use force if Iraq violates those red lines which
I've described above and our continued scrutiny of Iraq's activities
through our intelligence systems; or alternatively, to work with the
United Nations Security Council, the Special Commission and IAEA.
Obviously, it is preferable for Iraq to choose cooperation with the
Council, with the Special Commission and with the IAEA. If Iraq makes
that choice and credibly demonstrates its readiness to cooperate with
the Security Council, UNSCOM and the IAEA, it can anticipate that the
weapons inspectors will be able to return to Iraq, and that after they
report that there is full cooperation, the Council will be able to
undertake a comprehensive review of Iraqi compliance with its
obligations under the resolutions -- a step which is said that Iraq
has long wanted.
That comprehensive review can lead to the transitioning of the
disarmament files if Iraq meets its obligations. It can also lay out a
road map for Iraq to meet its obligations under the Security Council
resolutions, including Security Council Resolution 687. But the burden
is on Iraq to demonstrate its absolute and authoritative commitment to
cooperation.
On the humanitarian side, I want to emphasize that our military
strikes were carefully planned to avoid civilian casualties and damage
to civilian infrastructure. United Nations humanitarian workers are
returning to Iraq today, which will give us a window on the situation
on the ground. Obviously, if they report that there are humanitarian
needs that are unmet, the Security Council will address the issue on
an urgent basis.
However, as far as our information on the issue of food availability
is concerned, the supply was unaffected by the attacks. Power and
water supplies are also unaffected. Low Iraqi medicine orders under
the United Nations' oil-for-food program also suggest that adequate
stocks of medicine are now also available in Iraq. And Iraqi oil
exports under the oil-for-food program remain, as you know,
uninterrupted. But we will take a hard look at what the experts will
report to the United Nations in the coming days. Now, I'd be very
happy to address your questions.
QUESTION: Could I get, possibly, the US position on a couple of things
-- a policy position? The Russians are proposing a multinational
review of UNSCOM. I don't know what the United States thinks of this.
The French are proposing an easing of the oil embargo. Obviously both
France and Russia have business interests at stake here. Could you
address that? And I guess a subsidiary question would be -- because I
couldn't get an answer here last week -- if there's a move to
sacrifice Butler, would the United States fight that move, or would it
simply say, thank you, good job and wish you the best?
PICKERING: Let me begin, Barry, with your last question. The answer to
that is that, as the Secretary has said on numerous occasions, we
believe Mr. Butler has done an outstanding job and we will continue to
support him.
With respect to the question on the review of UNSCOM, I spoke
yesterday with the Russians in New York. We had a good discussion of
this particular issue. What I believe they had in mind was a broader
review of the situation. I told them in New York that we would give
that, and their proposals in that regard, a very careful look.
The Russians made the point that the Security Council needs a kind of
updated assessment of where the situation is as it moves ahead to
consider what steps it will be taking. You know what steps we believe
it might consider taking from my brief remarks this morning.
On the question of the oil embargo and the idea that you've raised, we
are looking very much at the question of oil-for-food, which is a
little different from the oil embargo. But oil-for- food, in our view,
plays a very, very important role, and it would be the one area where
we could see, perhaps, the possibility of more forward movement,
particularly if the humanitarian report indicated there was a greater
need for food. The present oil-for-food program is based on a report
by the Secretary General last year that Iraq needed to move about $5.2
billion worth of oil in each six-month period in order to provide for
an adequate dietary level for Iraqis -- a dietary level equivalent to
American and West European dietary levels. We're prepared, given the
leadership that the President wished us to take in that particular
effort last year, to continue to look very carefully at that and see
it move ahead.
I'm not sure what the rest of the question might apply to, but that's
certainly our answer on the oil question.
Q: When you say move ahead, do you mean move ahead as is, or the
possibility of expanding?
PICKERING: Well, I think there is a possibility out there of expanding
it if the Secretary General and his experts believe there is a need
for expansion.
As you know, oil prices have declined; so the amount of food that one
can exchange for oil has changed. We want to keep up to date with that
situation, listen to expert advice and continue to do all that we can
to support the food and medical and related humanitarian needs of the
Iraqi people.
Q: What about the broader question on sanctions? There have been some
comments in Europe about a larger review of the sanctions. What is
your response to that?
PICKERING: Our response to that is as I've laid out this morning. If,
on the one hand, Iraq chooses to end its cooperation with UNSCOM, then
it has literally chosen for sanctions in perpetuity; because it is
only through disarmament -- the common objective of the United Nations
Security Council -- and UNSCOM's verification of disarmament that one
can achieve the possibility of dealing with the issue of sanctions.
On the other hand, if Iraq is prepared -- and I believe that the
Security Council and its membership are leaning in this direction --
to move ahead toward the comprehensive review, the comprehensive
review will analyze the situation and hopefully provide a road map so
that files can be transitioned (inaudible), and then the question of
sanctions be addressed under Resolution 687 -- which, as you know, we
believe if the Iraqis comply fully with the UN resolutions, then the
issue of sanctions needs to be addressed and the issue of sanctions
lifting needs to be addressed in that context.
Q: There are voices being heard in Russia and some quieter voices in
France saying that their governments should circumvent the sanctions;
that if the United States can choose to bomb Iraq, then their
governments should choose to violate the sanctions and support the
Iraqi regime. Can you address those kinds of voices?
PICKERING: Yes, I will, because I think that for two countries that
are members of the Security Council and have permanent membership in
the Security Council, the notion that mandatory resolutions of the
Security Council applying sanctions to Iraq can be freely or lightly
violated at any time that they should choose is a very serious one;
not only because of the immediate effects in terms of the threat that
Saddam poses to the region and to the world community and what that
would mean for that particular threat -- the failure to disarm him, in
particular -- but secondly, what it would mean for the effectiveness
and the capacity of the Security Council to address threats to
international peace and security, which is precisely what it is
designed to achieve.
Now, we reject the underlying thesis, if you like, from those
particular people -- that the United States acted contrary to Security
Council resolutions in using force. Quite the opposite -- we believe
the original use of force resolution from November 1990 -- 678 --
provided for the use of force to enforce Security Council resolutions.
Those happen to include many of the sanctions resolutions, but also
that the cease-fire resolution which succeeded it temporarily stopped
the use of force only so far as Iraq kept its obligations under the
cease-fire resolution.
You know very well that in March of 1998, following the Secretary
General's memorandum, the Security Council once again, on the third of
March in Resolution 1154, warned Iraq that there would be severest
consequences for any violation of the memorandum or the Security
Council resolutions. And in early November -- on the fifth of November
in Resolution 1205, the Council told Iraq that it had flagrantly
violated those resolutions. As a result there was both a general
underlying case in the law of the United Nations in the Security
Council mandatory resolutions, and a particular and specific case with
respect to Iraq's then current and continuing actions in
November-December, which we felt more than justified in a legal basis
the actions which the President took.
Q: So you are essentially warning those governments, do not consider
circumventing the UN?
PICKERING: I believe mandatory resolutions of the Security Council are
extremely important. They have to do not only with the maintenance of
international peace and security, which is a special obligation of
every permanent member, but they have to do with the long-term role
and health and capacity of the Security Council to carry out the
decisions which it has made.
Q: Mr. Secretary, did you discuss with the Russian representatives
yesterday the possibility of an UNSCOM meeting in January; and what's
your view of that? And can you also give us your opinion of the French
idea of apparently steering some kind of a middle course between the
intrusive inspections that Butler has been conducting up until now and
a more passive IAEA approach, which the French seem to favor for
UNSCOM?
PICKERING: The Russian question had to do with the issue of an UNSCOM
meeting of some kind. We discussed with the Russians the idea that
they had of trying to establish, if you like, what was the current
situation with respect to Iraq, to disarmament and to the need for
verification and the future role, if you like, of UNSCOM and the
Security Council in that regard. One of the suggestions they made was
such a meeting.
We are looking carefully at those particular issues. Obviously, much
will depend upon whether there can be Iraqi cooperation in such a
process -- cooperation not only in UNSCOM's return, but also
cooperation of the type that we haven't seen in terms of UNSCOM
effectiveness. I would just like to leave it there. That's an ongoing
subject of discussion between the United States and Russia and,
indeed, between the United States and the other members -- including
the permanent members of the Security Council. The Secretary spoke
this morning with the Russian Foreign Minister. She'll be in touch
with the French and British Foreign Ministers. She continues to do
that. We're very happy that the Russian Ambassador will be returning
here in a few days, and we can continue conversations with him.
With respect to the French idea of changing inspections, it is my
view, having worked on the original resolutions when I was in New
York, that it was the decision of the Security Council in Resolution
687 to appoint the best possible technical experts that we could find
all around the world from many nationalities, and to appoint an
executive chairman to lead that work and to allow them to decide how
best to carry out their responsibilities of verifying that Iraq was
disarming or disarmed. That remains our view -- that it is a technical
problem; it is not an issue for the Security Council to become the
chief inspectors of the international organization or of the world
community but to rely on the technical and professional expertise of a
multi-national staff led by someone with the background, expertise,
skill and professional experience of Richard Butler.
That should be in no way read, even in the oblique way that I have
said it, that we lack any confidence in Richard Butler. It's designed
to be a ratification of Richard's skills and leadership and
activities.
Q: After what I thought were the quite forthright statements by
Secretary Albright, Secretary Cohen and Mr. Berger on Sunday, I
thought we had reached a certain clarity as to the future here; but I
fear that was premature.
PICKERING:  Thank you for your vote of confidence.
Q: Well, perhaps I misunderstood what I heard. But it was a very clear
impression that the American Government felt that sending UNSCOM
inspectors back in, in whatever guise, under whatever rubric, would be
an invitation to Saddam Hussein to resume a game that we had decided
we didn't want to play anymore; and therefore, we didn't want to do
that. Do we, in fact, want to do that?
PICKERING: I think, Tom, that you ought to look very carefully -- and
I'll give you my text -- because it is very carefully stated that
really Iraq now has two choices; that it will either permit UNSCOM to
come back or not permit UNSCOM to come back. If it doesn't permit
UNSCOM to come back, then it has selected sanctions in perpetuity and
that the United States will enforce its red lines: no moves against
the Kurds, no threats against its neighbors, no reconstitution of
weapons of mass destruction, and we will rely on our intelligence to
do that.
If it is prepared to have UNSCOM come back and if the Security Council
wants to do that, the United States has said very clearly, we will not
stand in the way of that. If it is prepared to move to disarmament in
order to deal with the question of continued sanctions against it, we
are prepared to go back to that formula, which was a formula that
pre-existed. But that Iraq will have to demonstrate very clearly that
not only is it in verbal terms, in oral terms, in linguistic terms
prepared to let them come back, but we would like to see it make very
clear that in terms of action, it is prepared to work with UNSCOM to
achieve those objectives.
So that is, I think, a clear expression of United States views. We are
not, obviously, rejecting the notion that there can be still an
effective Iraqi cooperation with UNSCOM. We are not suggesting that we
are going to be able to make that happen and so on. We're merely
suggesting that if that is the case, and if that's what the Security
Council wants, we are prepared only to enter into that particular
effort if Iraq can make clear by its actions that it is prepared,
really, to carry out those responsibilities.
Q: Wouldn't that be setting Lucy up to snatch the football away yet
again?
PICKERING: I don't believe it will; because Iraq knows what the
consequences are.
Q: One point of clarification -- is the policy that sanctions will
remain in place until Saddam Hussein is no longer in power; is that
still the policy?
PICKERING: Our policy is that, at this stage, there is a choice.
Sanctions will remain in effect if there is no disarmament; and if
there is no disarmament, we need UNSCOM, obviously, to ensure that
there's disarmament.
If there is disarmament -- if Iraq fulfills its obligations under the
Security Council resolutions -- then, as we have always said, the
issue of sanctions will be addressed by the Security Council in the
context of those resolutions.
Q:  It's not -- (inaudible) -- whether he's in power or not?
PICKERING:  It is not.
Q: Mr. Ambassador, prior to the bombing, US policy had seemed to be
that we would not agree to a comprehensive review of sanctions within
the Security Council until Iraq had complied with weapons inspectors
and had disarmed. Are we re-evaluating that position?
PICKERING: No. I said very clearly in my carefully prepared statement,
Andrea, that's precisely what we're saying. Not only that, we're
saying before UNSCOM can go back and go to work, we would like to see
some evidence of his cooperation. So it is, in a sense, a double test.
Q: Looking at these French and Russian statements, it seems in many
ways the differences between their positions and yours is very
superficial. In fact, they seem to be proposing some kind of
superficial change to the structure or designation of UNSCOM to
provide the Iraqis with an excuse for letting them back. If such a
change is made, would you be happy to go along with it, or --
PICKERING: Well, I think that we believe, as I stated very clearly,
that it is up to UNSCOM to decide how it can be most effective, and
that intervention by the Security Council in dictating the work, role,
personnel system and activities of UNSCOM, which are now clearly set
in United Nations Security Council resolutions, would not be wise,
would not be effective and would not be acceptable.
Q: If Iraq says no to UNSCOM, you're saying that the sanctions are in
place in perpetuity. Is there any sympathy for arguments to review the
shape of the sanctions? Some in Europe are saying that the policy
cannot be to diminish the level of health in an entire country; in
other words, that they need to be redirected. Is there any sympathy
for a review of the sanctions that are in place and how they may be
reshaped?
PICKERING: I believe that we have taken into account, over the past
year, directly and very specifically, the particular point that you
have made. First, as you know, the sanctions were never on food and
medicine. So it was, in fact, Iraq and Saddam's own decision not to
import a sufficient amount of food and medicine that affected the
health and the safety and the medical situation of his own population.
Secondly, after five years, when he agreed to accept the opening which
was made in the original resolutions to be able to use his oil, under
UN supervision, to provide that food and medicine, he resisted for
five years and then negotiated for two years the details of that. Now
that that is in place and the Secretary General, as I said last year,
reported a need for more oil to be pumped to provide for food and
medicine, and the United States, with others, took the lead -- under
the direction of the President and the Secretary -- to move that
ahead. As I said here this morning, we're prepared to deal with that
particular problem in an effective way. It was never part of the
sanctions regime.
I don't believe that I see any real appetite in the Security Council
for changing the sanctions regime, in the absence of Iraqi
disarmament.
Q: Can I follow up on that? Specifically on oil-for-food, it's my
understanding that the Iraqis are still not pumping all the oil that
they are allowed to under the program and, therefore, not importing
sufficient quantities of food and medicine for their population. Is
that correct? And is there any contemplation of some sort of coercive
effort to get them to feed their population?
PICKERING: I'll need to get you an answer for that, whether that is
correct factually. Habitually it has been true. I don't know whether,
as of this moment, it is true. But habitually, the Iraqis have been
slow in pumping oil and slow in exporting it. And at the end of the
regular periods for which pumping of oil is allowed, they have a
hangover, if you like, of unpumped oil. So that generally is the
problem. I think that that does make an impact on the issue of food
availability, which is one of the reasons why we want to examine now,
again, that particular issue.
Q:  But what can you do about it?
PICKERING: Well, I think that there's only so much that we can do
about it. The Security Council, in 1991, could not force Iraq to
accept the oil-for-food program; it took seven years. Now that they
have accepted it, we can only ask them in the interests of their own
people, ask them, if you like, in the interests of the propaganda
which they continually generate, that it is the Security Council and
the United States that are responsible for the health of their own
people; when the truth is, as you have stated, that they either
haven't bought on to the program or are very, very negligent in
implementing it; that they bear the responsibility -- that we could
use that kind of pressure, I think, as we have, but it's taken a long
time to get them to do more for their own people. We can open the door
but we cannot force them to walk through it.
Q: How sharp are the differences between you and Russia and China and
France?
PICKERING: Well, I think that, at any particular one time, it has been
a mistake to exaggerate those differences. We have worked very hard in
the Security Council over the last two months on a strongly unanimous
basis to deal with the question of Iraq. I believe that we have a
strong common commitment to the same objectives -- disarmament --
finding a way to avoid having this man, once again, become a huge
threat to the neighborhood and the world community through weapons of
mass destruction. I believe at each stage where he clearly has
continued to wish to violate resolutions, that we've had a strong
degree of support.
We have differed, clearly, on the issue of the use of force, but we
have not differed on other aspects of how to do things, including the
oil-for-food program and including other steps that might be taken.
They have exercised active diplomacy to try to change his mind. They
have been unsuccessful in this, as you can see. We, of course, would
love to see him change his mind, come back into compliance, go through
the disarmament process.
So we share a very, very broad area of view and my conversations --
and I know the Secretary's -- have, over the last couple of days, seen
a kind of, if you like, the beginnings of the re-emergence of even a
fuller consensus on this particular issue.
Q: What has been the cost to the relations between the United States
and Russia, of these continuing crises with Iraq and especially the
action we just took? And secondly, I would ask, sir, what is the
relationship between the Russian Government or Russian industries in
helping -- selling arms and helping the Iraqis? Is there not still a
strong relationship and a strong business incentive for a depressed
Russia to deal with Iraq?
PICKERING: Well, let me say first, on the broad question of US-Russian
relations. We have a relationship built now on six years of
post-Communist cooperation, which is very broad and very important to
both countries. And, despite the differences that we have had on Iraq
from time to time, we have managed, I believe, to build and increase
the broad nature of that set of relationships on many areas --
everything from arms control to further work together on other crisis
situations around the world. You will see it on a daily basis at some
place like the Security Council. We have differences, and there is no
question that we have differences. We have learned to work to manage
those differences and to build from those differences toward a greater
degree of cooperation.
And on Iraq, in response to the earlier question, I just went through
a number of areas where we share very, very important common
objectives and principles. We may differ on the tactics from time to
time, and that's not insignificant. But it has not, in my view, worked
to undermine the basic broad area of cooperation and common view that
we have with a very, very important country like Russia.
Repeat for me your second question.
Q: The second question was the nature of the relationship, militarily
speaking, the exchange militarily between Russia and Iraq; and aren't
they beholden to Russia, the Iraqis?
PICKERING: Since the second of August 1990, in response to Security
Council resolutions, there's been no arms relationship between any
foreign country and Iraq to the best of my knowledge, with the
exception of an occasional report that some kind of clandestine
shipment may be arriving in Iraq from one or a number of destinations.
Occasionally Russia is mentioned, but others are as well. I do not
believe that we have seen such activities go ahead. We watch it very
carefully, as we must watch, obviously, our own implementation of the
arms embargo against Iraq.
Q: Mr. Ambassador, much earlier you said that there were these Russian
proposals for some meeting potential. My understanding is the Russians
are floating two ideas -- one is sort of a post-bombing assessment of
the status of Iraqi weapons programs; and also a broader discussion
that could perhaps take place with UNSCOM at the table or not at the
table about the shape and future of UNSCOM and the way it would work.
You seemed to suggest earlier that the US was at least willing to
listen to this sort of discussion, the Russian idea, perhaps, with
some sort of a meeting. Does that mean that the US is going to accept
not only an assessment of the status of the weapons program, but also
a discussion about reshaping UNSCOM?
PICKERING: No, as I made very, very clear, the question of an
assessment of the situation in respect of Iraq and the resolutions and
the role of the Security Council and the possibilities of UNSCOM's
work might be germane and useful. We're looking at that.
As I said earlier, it is up to UNSCOM to decide how it can be most
effective in the pursuit of the mission which the Security Council has
given it under the resolutions. That is our vision of how UNSCOM
should perform. It should be professional; it should be authoritative;
it should be expert; it should be not guided by political direction,
but it should be guided by a serious and honest effort to carry out
the verification mission which the Council has assigned it. That's
why, in fact, it was designed that way. That's why we, in the original
resolutions, set it up that way. I for one, and I believe my
government, would feel it would be a serious mistake to politicize
UNSCOM, to organize UNSCOM along different lines -- one that was not
either professional, expert, authoritative or responsible.
Q: But UNSCOM responds to the Security Council, and if there is a
meeting that is supported by the Security Council in which the
question is raised about the shape and function of UNSCOM, isn't that
opening the door for neutering of UNSCOM?
PICKERING:  I said that we were not supportive of that effort.
Q:  Thank you.
(end transcript)