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22 December 1998

TRANSCRIPT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY WELCH ON IRAQ POLICY

(Discusses US goals, sanctions, Kurds, Iraqi opposition) (8180)
Washington -- David Welch, assistant secretary of state for
international organizations and a specialist in Gulf affairs, answered
questions about U.S. policy on Iraq on a WorldNet television question
and answer program December 22.
"The leadership of the United States did not like to take military
action," Welch said in reference to last week's airstrikes on Iraq.
"We would have preferred to have solved this problem using different
means."
"Saddam has endured these sanctions for so many years, and why? It's
because he must place an enormous premium on retaining this capability
for his own sense of his role and power in the country and outside it.
And that is the danger that we must deal with, and deal with
resolutely."
Asked about U.S. policy with respest to the Kurds, Welch said: "The
interests of the Kurdish people, we feel, can be best protected within
a unified Iraq."
Welch noted that he had personally been involved in helping negotiate
a reconciliation between the two principle Kurdish organizations, but
that the U.S. "made no commitment of any material support for the
militia of either side."
"We are not aiming for the breakup of Iraq," he continued. "We believe
in the nation of Iraq. We support its territorial integrity and
unity."
Nonetheless, he said, "I believe that the best thing for the people of
Iraq would be to have different leadership." Recently passed
congressional legislation "provides an ability to support the
opposition in a number of ways. In the first instance we'll focus our
support ... on helping them to organize and project a stronger
political voice. This ranges from support for Radio Free Iraq to
support for the campaign to collect information on the war crimes of
the Iraqi regime."
"The point is," he added, "that there are plenty of people in the
Iraqi opposition inside and outside of Iraq who aspire to a better
future. And we think it's our responsibility and our duty to help
them."
Asked about the future of the United Nations weapons inspectors, Welch
replied: "We support an effective, professional, independent Special
Commission and IAEA role in Iraq. That is essential to achieve the
disarmament of Iraq. We respect the leadership provided to the Special
Commission by Richard Butler ... Among all the suggestions out there
for changes to the inspection and monitoring regime, you will notice
that there is one clear, consistent thread -- that everybody believes
that the disarmament mission remains important, essential and
fundamental to the Security Council's objectives here. We have
continued to engage in these discussions with our partners in the
Security Council, and in the days and weeks ahead I am sure we will
find a way to deal with this mission."
Following is a transcript of Welch's remarks:
(Begin transcript)
WORLDNET "GLOBAL EXCHANGE"
UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
Television and Film Service of Washington, D.C.
GUEST: David Welch, Assistant Secretary of State for International
Organizations, U.S. Department of State
TOPIC:    U.S. Policy Toward Iraq
HOST:     Shameem Rassan (Through Interpreter)
DATE:     December 22, 1998
TIME:     09:00 - 10:00 EST
MS. RASSAN: Hello, and welcome to this special edition of "Global
Exchange." I am your host Shameem Rassan.
Last week the United States and Britain began a joint military
operation against Iraq. These military strikes were in response to
Iraq's ongoing refusal to cooperate with U.N. weapons inspectors who
had been trying to monitor Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capacity
since the Gulf War.
Although this military action has ceased, questions remain regarding
the necessity and the effectiveness of the strikes, with the ultimate
question, Where do we go from here? The question is still looming.
We have here in the studio Mr. David Welch. 
U.S. President Bill Clinton announced an end of military action
against Iraq Saturday night. But he warned that U.S. forces in the
Gulf region are ready to resume this campaign if necessary. Mr.
Clinton said that the joint U.S. and British air campaign which began
Wednesday appears to have achieved its objective of thwarting Iraq's
ability to produce weapons of mass destruction. He added that Saddam
Hussein is a threat to the region, and the world and the U.S.
PRESIDENT CLINTON (from videotape): With our allies we must pursue a
strategy to contain him and restrain his weapons of mass destruction
program.
MS. RASSAN: It appeared the message televised the day after the last
punishing attacks on his nation, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein told
the people they have achieved a great victory against the U.S. and
Britain. U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright called Iraq's
declaration of victory, quote, "sheer propaganda," end of quote.
Speaking on a morning television program Sunday, Secretary Albright
said Iraq's weapons program had been severely degraded as a result of
the attacks. She added that if Iraq rebuilds the destroyed sites and
weapons, inspectors are not allowed to return, the U.S. could strike
again. Iraq's vice president has said weapons inspectors will never be
permitted to return.
With us in our studio here to discuss the Iraqi crisis is David Welch,
assistant secretary of state for international organizations affairs.
Welcome, assistant secretary, to "Global Exchange."
MR. WELCH:  Thank you very much.
MS. RASSAN: Before we invite our viewers to participate in this
program, we would like to invite you to please call in. If you call in
English, call collect at -- the number is on the screen. And if you
are calling in Arabic, call 202-205-9066. Here is the number again: If
you are calling collect, the number is 202-205-9023 for those calling
in English.
Before we invite the international broadcasters to participate, I
would like to address my first question to you, Mr. Welch. Reactions
have been different after the strikes against Iraq. They were -- some
reactions as we know it -- we have been following from the
international media coverage. There was an approval of the strikes
from some countries, but there were some refusals on the part of some
countries, as we have seen from China, Russia and France. The Arabs of
course refused by and large. There were some demonstrations -- burning
American flags and the so like.
Now, was this -- all of this considered in the calculations of
Americans and the British authorities before they launched the
strikes?
MR. WELCH: Thank you for having me here this morning. I welcome the
chance to answer your questions and those of your colleagues.
This is a good opening question, because there have been many
reactions to the situation in Iraq. Let me say two things in that
regard. First, there is I think a fairly uniform international
reaction that the situation in Iraq is principally the responsibility
of the regime of Saddam Hussein. Second, with respect to the reaction
to the military action, the most immediate phase of this crisis, which
has been going on a number of years, I don't think you can say that
there is a uniform reaction internationally. There are many different
reactions. Even in the Arab world, even in the region near Iraq --
Turkey, Iran -- the reactions are distinct. Now, I don't want to
generalize about all of them, and we can go into the specifics later
on.
I would like to say this, however: Almost no one likes a military
action. Even the leadership of the United States did not like to take
military action. We would have preferred to have solved this problem
using different means. Unfortunately it came to this place and we had
to act.
MS. RASSAN: And a follow-up to the same question. We have heard a
report on the wires, the international wires, that there is a drive to
create, let us assume, a union of some nations in order to have a
counter policy to the United States in order not to let the United
States be the only superpower in the world, and how things will
develop from that point.
MR. WELCH: Well, this is an unusual idea I think. The fact is that the
United States does have a leading role in international affairs. This
is a role that America has accepted. It's a role we believe we
discharge responsibly. We do it in a number of ways. I will answer
your question in a general sense. One aspect of it that is related to
my job is to work through international organizations, principally the
United Nations, to promote the interests of the world community, but
especially the interests of the United States -- that is, after all,
our job. There are those who have an opinion that is consistent with
ours on some international issues, and it is no surprise that
sometimes there are differences.
I think the challenge represented by Iraq is so critical to the
international community -- it should be no shock to all of us that
there are quite a bit of range of views on how to deal with it. And
everybody is entitled to their own. We of course have ours. We think
that most people share our view, and I would be pleased to explain
that to you as we get into the questioning.
MS. RASSAN: We have -- (inaudible) -- from Istanbul, Turkey, a
colleague, Mr. Kofina (sp). We welcome you, and welcome your TV
broadcasters. Hello?
Q: Hello. So I could go ahead with my questions? This operation, Mr.
Welch, was to make Saddam Hussein to comply with U.N. resolutions.
However, Britain and the United States also -- they don't need to hide
that they are keen on seeing Saddam Hussein toppled sometime. How
would this be possible?
MR. WELCH: If your question is about the aims of the military
operation, I think they were very straightforward and simple: first to
degrade the weapons of mass destruction capability of the regime in
Iraq; second, to also degrade the ability of the Iraqi regime to
threaten its neighbors. These aims we believe were accomplished in
this operation.
Q: If I may go ahead with a follow-up question, yesterday we heard --
or the day before -- we heard Britain's prime minister saying that it
would be wonderful to see Saddam Hussein being toppled. Is the United
States also sharing this view? And if yes, what should be the proper
way to go towards that direction?
MR. WELCH: In the immediate term the object of the action by the
United States and the United Kingdom was as I described in the first
question. In the medium term we need to restore a situation in which
Iraq is observing the requirements of the Security Council
resolutions. In the long term the best solution to this problem, in
our view, is that there should be a different government in Baghdad.
Now, that is a long-term proposition. We are not suggesting that our
action was designed to achieve that. Indeed the contrary is the case:
it had more limited objectives. But as far as the view of the United
States and the United Kingdom are concerned, as expressed by the
president and as expressed by the prime minister our position is
really quite clear: it would be a far more healthy situation for Iraq
and for the region -- indeed for the world -- were Saddam Hussein not
to be in office.
Q: Well, yesterday the leader of INC (Iraqi National Congress), Dr.
Ahmed Chalibi, told us they were now expecting the United States to
give them first military training, second weapons, in order to start
movements in order to topple Saddam Hussein. And he also said that the
U.S. Congress had also passed a bill like that. And so he said we are
waiting for it. What is the U.S. position vis-a-vis the expectation of
the Iraqi National Congress?
MR. WELCH: First we believe that there are a lot of people in Iraq and
outside Iraq of Iraqi origin who would like to see a different future
for themselves. I think this is a very basic thing. Let's not forget
what kind of regime we are dealing with here. It is one of the most
authoritarian in the world.
Second, we would like to work with the opposition wherever it is, and
we have been for some time. We intend to step up that effort, as the
president and the secretary of state have said. We have various tools
at our disposal. But perhaps the most important of those is the voice
of the United States, a voice that I think should speak with respect
to the aspirations of the Iraqi people for a better future.
The third thing is the Congress has given us some additional
authoritative, legislative ability, if you will, to work with the
opposition. We will implement that legislation. There are various
views on how it might be done. We have to do it in a prudent and
effective way -- not to gratuitously risk people's lives in an
endeavor that is very dangerous. After all, if you are a member of the
opposition inside Iraq, your future can be very troubled indeed if
Saddam Hussein finds out about you.
Q: Yes, but on what is this expectation of the Iraqi National Congress
based? Is it based on something which will be discussed in the
Congress? Or is it just an imaginary expectation of the Iraqi National
Congress that one day they are going to be supported with such kind of
aid?
MR. WELCH: Well, you should ask them. I am not here to represent any
party or individual in the Iraqi opposition movement.
I think what they are noticing -- they and other members of those --
the groups that oppose Saddam Hussein are noticing is that the
international community has begun to realize that the real source of
the problem here is not the Iraqi nation, it is not the Iraqi people.
It is the regime in Baghdad headed by Saddam Hussein. And all we have
to do is not look at just the most recent events in the last months
and year, but also the period of his political leadership in Iraq,
which I don't have to remind you is not the first crisis provoked by
the Saddam regime.
Q: Yes, there was an interesting information in the Washington Post,
if I am not wrong, about a military academy in the north of Iraq,
where the peshmerga from Barzani, KDP, are trained. They are also
trained at the moment. It's also said that they are -- they have sort
of U.S. support. What is the role of the U.S. supporting this academy,
and what is expected to happen in the north of Iraq in the following
days?
MR. WELCH: As you may know -- and this perhaps lies behind your
question -- I personally have had some involvement in negotiating the
reconciliation arrangements between the KDP and the PUK. In doing so
the United States made no commitment of any material support for the
militia of either side. We don't involve ourselves with that, either
with the KDP or the PUK, or for that matter any others in northern
Iraq. We are not associated with that academy.
Of course the leadership of the KDP and the PUK do maintain armed
organizations. They do that for their own reasons, among which is to
protect their people from the regime, which has had a history of
repression in northern Iraq that really boggles the imagination.
Q: Of course the Turkish government is watching all developments in
the north very carefully, and there is a scenario which is usually
being discussed. If Saddam Hussein would be toppled, or if any
political troubles, rebels, would happen in Iraq, a federal Kurdish
state would be established in the north. Do you see any basis for such
kind of a scenario there? What is -- if a federal state -- what will
be the limits of this state?
MR. WELCH: Well, I think the principle that we applied to this
question is really very simple: our nation is a democracy. We respect
the right of people to choose their own future. We think that that
right should be afforded to all Iraqis, whether they are of Kurdish
origin, Syrian origin, Sunni, Shi'a -- whatever. We believe in the
nation of Iraq. We support its territorial integrity and unity. We are
not aiming for the breakup of Iraq.
I think unfortunately people have taken the view that the United
States is somehow interested in seeing Iraq reduced and even broken
apart. That's not the case. We respect the country of Iraq as a people
with a proud history, a long history that goes back many, many years
more than our own. Unfortunately it is their situation that they have
been saddled with one of the most difficult regimes in modern Arab
history. That isn't their fault. We would like to see them have a real
choice.
In the interim, those who do have some protection and safety from the
regime, such as in the north, we think should be given the opportunity
to live freely on their own. They see their future as within that
united Iraq.
Q: Yes. Barzani, the leader of KDP, talks about the dream of getting
independence. But the dream of the Kurdish people -- that has been the
dream of the Kurdish people he says. And at the same time he says that
they will do the best they can within the geographical limitations
condition -- so what the condition will allow them. He is also aware
of the position of the neighboring states.
Do you believe that this kind of approach towards independence could
get some more strength in the future when we would have another sort
of Iraq without Saddam Hussein but with a federal Kurdish state?
MR. WELCH: Look, this is up to the Iraqi people, including the Kurdish
people. It's for them to decide their own future. I'm from California.
That doesn't make me any less of an American. There are people from
Texas who will laugh with you and say that the Union -- that is, the
rest of America -- joined Texas -- Texas didn't join the rest of
America. Still, all Americans believe in our country as a whole. I am
sure that most Iraqis believe in Iraq as a whole -- unified. I think
also that most of them would like to see it under different
leadership.
The interests of the Kurdish people, we feel, can be best protected
within a unified Iraq. The United States promotes that concept. It has
not discussed any other issue or concept with the Kurdish leadership.
We think that that ought to be the position of all Iraqis. And we
ourselves will push that in any way we can.
Q: There is also talk about a no-drive zone in the South. Let's say
the Iraqi opposition hopes that such kind of no-drive zone would be
declared after an operation like Desert Fox in Iraq. Could it come
into question?
MR. WELCH: Well, let's distinguish carefully between the situation
that obtains now and the wishes of some of the parties. Right now
there are no-fly zones in the north and south of Iraq, which are
implemented by the United States and its coalition allies to enforce
the resolutions against the repression of the Iraqi people -- 688 in
particular. There is also a resolution passed in the fall of -- in the
late part of '94, number 949. This resolution is designed to prevent
the reinforcement of Iraqi military positions in the south of Iraq, so
that they don't threaten Kuwait again. You may remember that that
happened in late '94. So in a sense while there is not a no-drive zone
in either place, there are restrictions in the north and south that
constrain the ability of the Iraqi regime either to threaten its own
people in those areas or to present a military threat to its
neighbors.
MS. RASSAN: Thank you, Istanbul TV. We are here continuing with you
this special edition of "Global Exchange," talking about Iraq with Mr.
David Welch, assistant secretary of the United States Department of
State.
Now we move to MBC in Beirut and our colleague Merle Hassab (sp).
Welcome, Merle (sp). Go ahead.
Q: Mr. Welch, now that the Desert Fox operation came to an end, what
is the next step? Could one assume that air raids will continue, or
you are going to resort to a policy of wait and see?
MR. WELCH: I'm sorry, I didn't understand. Can we assume that what
will continue?
Q:  Wait and see, sir.
MR. WELCH: No, it's not sufficient to wait and see. The requirements
in the Security Council resolutions are very clear and
straightforward: Iraq should never again present a threat to regional
peace and security; and because it should not it must not possess any
weapons of mass destruction. Unfortunately the disarmament of Iraq is
still incomplete. Certainly our own military action did not achieve
the total disarmament of Iraq. It affected their weapons of mass
destruction capability we think in a significant way, but it has not
achieved it totally.
The best way to disarm Iraq is for them to comply with the
resolutions. It is up to Iraq to decide whether it will act
responsibly and follow those instructions from the Security Council.
Q: So far Saddam Hussein did not indicate in any way that he is going
to respond positively. Let us assume that he prohibits UNSCOM from
continuing with their work. What the United Nations -- or for that
matter the United States -- can do?
MR. WELCH: Well, under those circumstances there are two answers.
First, we should remember that the only path to compliance is by
allowing the work of the Special Commission and the IAEA to accomplish
the disarmament of Iraq. If that path is blocked because the Iraqis
choose to block it themselves, then it is their responsibility and
they must deal with the consequences. The principal of those
consequences is that nothing will change with respect to the sanctions
regime imposed on Iraq.
The second point is this: if UNSCOM and IAEA cannot -- the Special
Commission and IAEA cannot operate effectively inside Iraq to do their
job, then we must remain vigilant outside Iraq to make sure that it
does not possess those weapons and does not seek to use them against
any of its neighbors. And that is what we are prepared to do. We
remain ready and poised with our military capability in the region.
Q: Mr. Welch, the United States announced together with England that
Desert Fox managed to destroy the total military infrastructure of
Iraq, whereas Iraq declares that they destroyed only civil posts. So
what is the truth here?
MR. WELCH: Well, we announced we had attacked weapons of mass
destruction targets and the ability of the Iraqi regime to conceal
those targets. We achieved our aims. We degraded significantly their
capability in this area and their ability to threaten their neighbors.
And I know the claims of the Iraqi regime, that on the one hand we
didn't do much damage to their military and on the other hand, oh,
yes, the Americans and British hit a lot of innocent people.
Regrettably I don't know that we will find out the truth on this. Let
me remind you that during the Gulf War itself the Iraqi leadership
never told the truth to its people about what the situation was.
During the Iran-Iraq war they never told the truth to their people
about the enormous casualties suffered by the Iraqi military in the
fight against Iran.
I don't expect they would be any more honest right now, frankly. It's
curious -- their whole public presentation on this, because you wonder
why if they say there was no damage to their military they aren't
taking some of the many journalists who are in Baghdad today to view
all of these military facilities that are supposedly still intact.
Q: Why President Clinton stopped the operation of Desert Fox? Is it
because he reached his objectives, or because of the Arab anger that
swept to Damascus, Nablus, Beirut -- (inaudible) -- Beirut and other
Palestinian areas, or due to the fact of the month of Ramadan, or at
the lack of Arab support?
MR. WELCH: The president called a suspension to the military
operations because in the estimation of his military advisers the
mission had been accomplished. He consulted with the prime minister of
the United Kingdom in making that decision, and Mr. Blair had reached
the same conclusion.
One factor in this military operation was our sensitivity to the holy
month of Ramadan, and I am sure the president -- that entered his
calculations as well.
In terms of the reaction in the Arab world, I think the reaction is
much more mixed than you suggest. While no one -- and that includes
the United States and the United Kingdom -- relishes or likes a
military action, we have a responsibility under the circumstances. And
all the Arab leaders with whom we consulted in advance and during this
operation had agreed with us that the responsibility for this
situation rested entirely with the regime of Saddam Hussein, who was
given repeated opportunities to cooperate over the last year.
Let me say in that regard -- let's take the alternative. If the Iraqis
had merely cooperated just for three or four weeks we are talking
about here -- they would have this comprehensive review, the mother of
all reviews that they had been seeking. Instead they chose to try and
confront in many different ways the work of the Special Commission and
the IAEA. Why did they make that choice? Because I think fundamentally
they have no intention of cooperating. They wish to retain their
weapons of mass destruction and have the sanctions lifted despite
that.
Q: Some observers, Mr. Welch, claim that Clinton lost on all three
fronts. Number one, he could not topple Saddam or even force him to
implement international decisions. Second, he could not convince Mr.
Netanyahu to implement the Wye River accords. And, third, he could not
even compromise any acceptable resolution in the Congress. Where would
you put or position President Clinton now as a president and the
pillar of this new world order?
MR. WELCH: President Clinton is the president of the United States. He
is able to conduct America's foreign policy in a way that secures the
interests of the American people without impediment. I think the
record of the recent crisis indicates that very clearly. He did not
make any decisions with respect to Iraq on the basis of his own
personal political fortunes. That's not the way American presidents do
business.
I think Prime Minister Blair's words in this respect were very clear
in his interview with CNN yesterday. You need to ask the people who
have been involved with the president of the United States in the
region and outside it if they really honestly believe that these
decisions are made by our country, our government and our leader on
the basis of personal politics.
Toppling Saddam was not an objective -- I have said that in an answer
to an earlier question. The military objectives were very
straightforward: weapons of mass destruction and degrading the ability
of Iraq to threaten its neighbors.
With respect to the peace process, we continue to pursue the peace
process aggressively. Had it not been for President Clinton's own
personal effort it would not have advanced to where it is today. He
will continue that effort, because we continue to see that as a
central American national interest.
Third, with respect to the president's dialogue with Congress, I
didn't come here to discuss that, but I can say this: As an American,
you know, I am not happy that we are having this debate at home, but
actually in one respect I am proud of it, because people here in the
United States can stand up and take their opinions, whatever those may
be, and have the freedom to express them. I wish the same could be
said for other places, especially Iraq.
Q: My last question to you. In your personal opinion, do you believe
the Senate is going to depose Mr. Clinton and throw him out of office
next month?
MR. WELCH: Look, I'm a foreign policy person, and I'm not dodging
question -- I think it's only fair to tell you that I didn't come here
to address that. You perhaps need some of the participants in that
debate.
I will say again it's an American debate. It's our right to have it.
You know, we don't consider this a pretty picture, but it's an aspect
of American democracy, and we will go forward.
MS. RASSAN: I would like to thank our colleague -- (inaudible) -- of
MBC Beirut.
And now we will move forward in this segment of "Global Exchange" to
London, where Elias Hafoush (sp) from El Magella (sp) is standing by.
Hello, Hafoush (sp).
Q: This is Hafoush Elias (sp) from El Magella (sp) in London. I would
like to ask Mr. Welch first about the justification the American
administration has been given to the airstrikes against Iraq, stating
that this is legitimately international, and based on the
international legitimacy. You did not do this in last November because
you, the United States, warned Iraq of falling short to cooperate with
UNSCOM. But they did say or state verbally that they would not be
attacked, the Iraqis.
So the British as well as the American administration warned Iraq
verbally. But there was no such thing as an international decision to
support that. So how could the American administration claim that this
decision to strike Iraq enjoys international legitimacy?
MR. WELCH: Well, the consensus of the international community, as
symbolized by the actions of the Security Council, could not be more
clear. Let's not look at just the last few days. Let's look at this
situation going back to last year. There -- out of the last let's say
12, 14 months Iraq has been in conflict with the Special Commission
and the IAEA to such an extent that for at least eight of those months
the Commission has not been able to do its work inside Iraq. It has
been rendered ineffective.
What reaction did the Council take to that? It took a number of
reactions. These were in Security Council Resolution 1154, 1194 and
1205. Now, these all seem like numbers, but in them they contain
international law which Iraq is obliged to observe, the first
principle of which they must cooperate to achieve the disarmament of
Iraq. In 1154, the resolution passed after the Secretary General's
mission to Baghdad -- that resolution said if they did not cooperate
there would be the severest consequences. So there was a period of
sort of cooperation for a couple of months. And then all of a sudden
the Special Commission goes to Baghdad, and Mr. Tariq Aziz demands the
following: declare us disarmed or we will no longer cooperate with
you. And Chairman Butler said, "I cannot do that -- the facts do not
support such a conclusion." So they expel the Special Commission
again. That interrupts the cooperation for another period of time.
The Council again took a decision, 1194, that said that if Iraq
cooperated things could go back -- they could even have perhaps a
comprehensive review. And they reaffirmed that decision in 1205 after
Iraq had severed all cooperation with the Special Commission and IAEA.
And in that resolution they label that a flagrant violation.
We think the accumulation of these resolutions -- three important ones
in the last year -- is adequate international legal basis for our
action. Others agree.
The difference of view here is not on whether our action was
appropriately authorized or not. It is about the best course of
action. Let me remind you of this: among those different views in the
Security Council you have a great range. Most people we feel agree
with us. There are some who would not agree to the use of force under
any circumstance -- for example, China. During the Gulf War the
invasion of Kuwait was not a sufficient reason for the government of
China to vote yes on the resolution that authorized the use of force.
I would not expect therefore a Chinese yes on any vote authorizing the
use of force.
That there are different views on this matter, it can be expected.
Q: Mr. Welch, does this mean that in the absence of a consensus inside
the Security Council that England and the United States will have now
the right to act single-handedly and unilaterally? You are talking
about China, but there is also France and Russia, and these are
permanent members of the Security Council, apart from other members
who clearly and openly were opposed to the military strikes. So if you
think that you are claiming that this was supported internationally,
how come you did not take it to a vote inside the Security Council?
MR. WELCH: Because we felt we had the authority under existing
resolutions. Let me remind you of another point. Even among the
countries that you cited there is agreement with us on two things
which you didn't mention. First, Iraq should be disarmed. No one
disagrees about that. Second, no one is claiming that Iraq is disarmed
now.
Q: There are some observers here in England who observe and state that
the British-American joint military operation resulted practically to
opposite consequences of what you had expected. First of all, it
didn't strike the coalition that you had vis-a-vis Iraq before the
strikes; and so it ended once and for all the operations of UNSCOM
that were the real effective presence for you to observe and monitor
the actions of Saddam Hussein on the level of mass destruction
weaponry. Particularly, even President Clinton personally said that
what UNSCOM reached in the last several years outweighs what the
military operations in Gulf ever could achieve. So from your analysis
how could one put in perspective these negative consequences? And then
you still claim that it was a successful operation.
MR. WELCH: Well, we would prefer that the Special Commission and the
IAEA be able to do its work. And, as I said, it hasn't been able to do
that for eight out of the last twelve months. If it is not able to
operate effectively, then we have to look at other ways to deal with
this situation. The international community followed a path of trying
to encourage Iraqi cooperation. We followed that path, too. We thought
that that was the best way to build a consensus for action. And at the
end of the day when Iraq did not cooperate we made a judgment about
what would be necessary to bring it to its senses.
Now, I don't think any of the other critics or governments that you
cite have presented a better alternative or a more real alternative
for how to achieve the basic objective that everybody agrees on, which
is that Iraq should be disarmed of these weapons and should never have
them again.
Q: My last question to you, Mr. Welch, deals with the bill that was
approved in the American Congress to support the Iraqi oppositions.
Don't you think that paying money and advancing the money for opposing
political forces is the best way to bring about a new government to a
country that has been going through all these sufferings?
MR. WELCH: Well, I think I believe that the best thing for the people
of Iraq would be to have a different leadership. I mean, that is
clear. In terms of the legislation passed by the American Congress, it
has several parts. We will implement that legislation. I think we will
do so in a prudent and effective way. It provides an ability to
support the opposition in a number of ways. In the first instance
we'll focus our support on organizing -- on helping them to organize
and project a stronger political voice. This ranges from support for
Radio Free Iraq to support for the campaign to collect information on
the war crimes of the Iraqi regime. I think these are quite legitimate
objectives, and ones that would enjoy a lot of understanding
internationally. Again, there is no dispute about the nature of the
regime that we are dealing with here.
Q: Don't you believe that just announcing that you are going to
advance some money to these people -- it would stamp them right away
of being agents for you?
MR. WELCH: Well, it sounds like you may stamp them right away in that
manner. We're not trying to have a Made in America solution here. I
don't think that that would necessarily be the most productive thing.
The point is that there are plenty of people in the Iraqi opposition
inside and outside of Iraq who aspire to a better future. And we think
it's our responsibility and our duty to help them.
MS. RASSAN: I would like to thank Elias Hafoush (sp) in London for his
questions.
We continue and follow up now with this edition of "Global Exchange."
In our studios here in Washington we have Mr. David Welch, assistant
secretary of the U.S. State Department for international
organizations. I am going back now to Istanbul. Istanbul, go ahead
please.
Q: Yes, there are news of 7,500 peshmerga from which some were taken
to the United States or to other places from northern Iraq are now
back in the north of Iraq. Is it true? The second thing combined to
this issue is there was a recent visit of Mr. Sharif Ali bin Hussein
(sp) to Washington. What is the role of this person in the Iraqi
opposition?
MR. WELCH: After the Iraqi military moved into the city of Irbil in
September 1996 we had a grave concern for the safety of humanitarian
workers and others in northern Iraq who had been associated with our
relief programs for the program there. In order to protect against the
potential dangers to them from the Iraqi regime, some of these people
were evacuated to the United States in an operation that you know in
Turkey is called Quick Transit. These people I believe are throughout
the United States. Their number was around 6,000 or 7,000 total, but
they were -- many of them were women and children and civilians and
their families. They were not peshmerga. I know nothing of any return
of peshmerga from this group to northern Iraq. If anyone is returning
to northern Iraq, they are doing it of their own desire and free will.
With respect to Sharif Ali (sp), he is a known figure in Iraqi
politics. I personally did not even know he was in the United States.
And he has -- we've had dialogue with him for many, many years. He's a
respected gentleman. But I would ascribe no special political
significance to that one way or the other. We are in touch with him,
as we are with many members of the Iraqi opposition, be they in the
United Kingdom, in Europe generally, or even in the region -- and I
might add in Iraq itself.
Q: The leading figure among these gentlemen I would say -- they are,
most of them are men I believe, or all of them -- is there any leading
figure among them? For example, there is a gentleman from Saddam
Hussein's family in London. There is continuously news about having
such figures who are coming closer and closer to be a candidate for
leadership in Iraq.
MR. WELCH: Well, that's up to the Iraqi opposition, and then
ultimately up to the Iraqi people. I -- we don't make these choices.
Q: Mr. Welch, do you believe that further cooperation with UNSCOM or
any other sort of organization will be possible in Iraq? Some members
of the U.N. Security Council are going ahead with other sort of
suggestions, like a non-governmental outcome, and especially without
Richard Butler, who is so much supported by your administration.
MR. WELCH: We support an effective, professional, independent Special
Commission and IAEA role in Iraq. That is essential to achieve the
disarmament of Iraq. We respect the leadership provided to the Special
Commission by Richard Butler, who has done an excellent job under
extremely difficult circumstances. He personally has been the subject
of a lot of I would say irrational attack. I would remind you that
from the minute that he took office in the Special Commission he was
under assault by the Iraqi regime. This goes back to the summer of
'97. And from then on the Iraqi regime made a deliberate effort to
undermine the role of the Special Commission and IAEA, to turn it into
a neutered organization that would basically do nothing except salute
when Tariq Aziz said that you will now declare us disarmed. The irony
in this is of course not only can they not do so on the basis of the
facts, but they will not do so on the basis of the facts they have,
because the facts they have point very clearly in the direction of
Iraq having retained a weapons of mass destruction capability. And
among all the suggestions out there for changes to the inspection and
monitoring regime, you will notice that there is one clear, consistent
thread -- that everybody believes that the disarmament mission remains
important, essential and fundamental to the Security Council's
objectives here. We have continued to engage in these discussions with
our partners in the Security Council, and in the days and weeks ahead
I am sure we will find a way to deal with this mission.
Q:   Well, thank you.  That was my last question actually.
MS. RASSAN: Listeners and viewers, if you would like to throw in any
questions to us here -- if you speak in Arabic, call us collect, and
here is the number: 202-205-9066. If you will call in English the
number is 202-205-9023.
Mr. Welch, I have a lot of questions here, and I hope the time will
allow us to continue. But there is a question to you here. When we say
that one of the objectives of the airstrikes to Iraq was degrading of
Iraqi capability to possess weapons of mass destruction, and you said
the timeframe would be one year, who and what would stop Iraqis from
continuing in the way of recompensating for what they have lost
already during this period, and how the international organizations
manage to stop Iraq or any other country for that matter, to prevent
such countries from acquisitions of weapons of mass destruction?
MR. WELCH: Well, it's a very good question. Let me try to answer it. I
think that there's a clear view internationally that it's important to
enforce the sanctions on the Iraqi regime in such a manner in
particular to prevent its acquisition of weapons of mass destruction.
As you know, in the Security Council resolutions it spells out very
clearly that Iraq should not have certain kinds of weapons, and
certain what we call dual-use items, so that it does not rebuild a
capability. And I -- my own experience is that almost all countries in
the world observe these rules of the Security Council, and that it has
become more difficult for Iraq to rearm itself.
But that is also a statement about how important such weapons are to
the regime of Saddam Hussein. The really remarkable fact here is that
let's consider what has happened. Saddam has endured these sanctions
for so many years, and why? It's because he must place an enormous
premium on retaining this capability for his own sense of his role and
power in the country and outside it. And that is the danger that we
must deal with, and deal with resolutely.
MS. RASSAN: You talked about containment of Iraq. And if we go again
to what President Clinton talked about this operation, he talked about
continuation of a containment policy on Iraq and the return of UNSCOM.
Now, you talked about the containment. If Iraq would not allow UNSCOM
to continue their activities, in Iraq what would happen to the program
oil for food? Everyone says that the containment did not bring about
any positive results and the government is still there, whereas people
are suffering by and large with the continuation of the containment
policy.
MR. WELCH: I agree with you. I think that the people of Iraq have
suffered from their situation, and I also agree that they are not
responsible. I mean, I find it -- I know that each and every Iraqi
probably has a sense of himself and his country that is really quite
different than that most people outside think of it. And I would wish
for a better situation for them.
Because of the regime's lack of attention to the people, we supported
the oil-for-food resolution that you mentioned, going back a number of
years. At first Saddam did not accept it. Then over time I think the
regime changed its calculation and decided that perhaps they better
protect their people a bit better and accept. And they finally did.
Today that resolution -- we have gone along with its expansion so that
it can provide up to around $10 billion a year in food, medicine and
other humanitarian goods for the people, and do so in a manner that
the regime can't get its hands on it. And this is really the important
thing. This program has worked very effectively. It has been resumed
in recent days and the north was never really interrupted during the
recent crisis. I think the United Nations has done a very effective
job in administering this program.
Q: Probably the first part of the question -- that we hope that the
food for -- oil for food would not be touched and will continue even
though Iraq is not going to continue cooperation with UNSCOM. Looking
into the future, how do we see the coming year?
MR. WELCH: Well, we would like this program to continue. I think there
is a consensus on that within the Security Council and internationally
generally. Of course at the end of the day the Iraqi regime could
always stop it. They could interrupt it on the ground. But then again
that would be their responsibility and the blame would clearly be on
them for doing something that is not, I don't believe, in any Iraqi's
interest.
I think the oil-for-food program will carry on despite the present
situation. That's our hope and expectation. And President Clinton has
issued instructions to that effect for us.
On the sanctions point that you raised, sanctions are an important
part of containing the ambitions of the regime -- but not the only
part. Another important part is the willingness on the part of the
United States and its principal allies to defend its interests
militarily if necessary, to cope with the threat presented by the
Iraqi government. And we remain ready in that respect. Again, my hope
is that we never -- we don't have to use that tool, but it's important
that people understand that it is there, because otherwise if Saddam
gets the idea that it is not, I think our challenge will simply be
postponed and worse when it does come.
MS. RASSAN: A question was directed to you from one of the journalists
about Iraq's refusal to continue cooperation with UNSCOM -- and Yassir
Ramadan, deputy prime minister in Iraq, declared. If I remember
correctly you said that if UNSCOM members are not going to be allowed
to go back to Iraq there would be a sort of cooperation between
regional organizations to monitor what's going to happen. What role
would the United Nations organization have under such a circumstance?
MR. WELCH: Well, first of all, I don't put much faith in the
individual statements of individual members of the Iraqi government.
I've seen all these statements before, ranging from "We will never
allow you into a palace" to "You must declare us disarmed," to "You
will never return." The only one that has proven consistently to be
correct is that they intend to retain their weapons of mass
destruction ambitions. We will deal with that in the ways that we have
available.
MS. RASSAN: I am afraid that we are out of time for this program. And
I would like to use these few remaining moments to thank David Welch,
assistant secretary at the United States Department of State. And I
hope you will come back, Mr. Welch, to this program. I would like also
to thank all the broadcasters and journalists who participated in this
important discussion. This is Shameem Rassan thanking you all here in
Washington signing off.
(End transcript)