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21 December 1998

TRANSCRIPT: INDYK DECEMBER 18 TELECONFERENCE ON US POLICY ON IRAQ

(Says Saddam's refusal to cooperate with UNSCOM led to air attacks)
(4820)
Washington -- U.S. Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs Martin
Indyk says Saddam Hussein's refusal to "comply and fully cooperate"
with U.N. weapons inspectors led to the air strikes against Iraq.
"Iraq promised to cooperate fully, they did it in writing --
unconditionally, fully ... and they didn't do that," Indyk said in
teleconference December 18 with the editorial board of the
London-based Arabic newspaper Al Hayat.
Indyk said the objective of the combined U.S.-British operation,
code-named Desert Fox, was to use force "to degrade Iraq's weapons of
mass destruction capability and Iraq's ability to threaten its
neighbors." Adding that "when those objectives are achieved, that's
when the campaign will stop."
Indyk said the air strikes in no way free Iraq from its obligation to
comply with U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) requirements on weapons
inspections, or from economic sanctions.
"Compliance from Iraq is necessary because it's the will of the
international community," Indyk said. "Compliance is something that we
would like to see. If there's no compliance, then of course the
sanctions will continue."
Asked about remarks made by Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz
that UNSCOM Chairman Richard Butler released his December 15 report on
Iraq to U.S. officials before submitting them to the U.N. Secretary
General, Indyk candidly replied:
"We know Tariq Aziz is a big liar, so it's no surprise that he's lying
again. The truth of the matter is Butler consulted with many different
states. He was in Russia. He was in France. The record of Iraq's
cooperation was clear to everybody.
"The idea that this was somehow collusion between the United States
and Butler is something that's being put forward by those who oppose
the use of force, in particular the Russians and the Chinese, and of
course the Iraqis, who would love to shift the focus from their own
refusal to cooperate to Butler," Indyk said.
Indyk said the U.S. would like UNSCOM to resume functioning in Iraq,
because that would be in "everybody's interest, including, believe it
or not, in Iraq's interest."
However, if that's not possible, Indyk said the U.S. will "have to
look to other means" to implement its policy towards Iraq.
That policy, Indyk said, as expressed by President Clinton and other
senior administration officials, is "containment and, over time, an
effort to help the Iraqi people produce a government that is more
representative of their aspirations and more willing to meet Iraq's
obligations to the international community. So it's containment plus
eventual regime change."
In the short term, however, as long as Saddam remains in power, Indyk
said the U.S. will continue to contain him "either through sanctions
and the (U.N.) Security Council efforts, or if necessary through the
use of force."
Indyk also went out of his way to explain the timing of the air
attacks and the manner in which the air strikes were conducted to
guard the Iraqi people from as much harm as possible:
"I want to also make clear -- and I think it should be clear from the
way in which we are conducting this military campaign -- that we are
very sensitive to the fact that the Iraqi people are not responsible
for this situation. We are doing everything we can to avoid civilian
casualties and to focus on the regime and its capabilities. I think
that should already be clear from the pattern of our campaign from the
limited casualties. It will become clearer still when the dust
settles."
Indyk said one example of this was that the air attacks avoided
targeting the Iraqi infrastructure, like power plants and water
systems, because of the U.S. concern "not to inflict further suffering
on the Iraqi people."
Asked what the major difference in U.S. policy is now as compared with
the past eight years, Indyk replied that it is "eventual regime
change."
While containment remains "at the heart" of U.S. policy toward Iraq,
the newest element is "supporting the Iraqi opposition so as to
advance the day when there can be a new regime in Baghdad," Indyk
said.
That change, according to Indyk, will have to come "from within."
"I mean, it's not possible to imagine that the government of Iraq
could be changed as a result of political activity in London, but
political activity in London is an important part of that effort," he
said.
"It's very important that the outside opposition unify their efforts
to present an alternative to this Iraqi regime, to serve, as it were,
as a truth squad to tell the world of what this regime is doing to its
people ... but given the nature of the regime, I think change very
much has to have come from within," he said.
Towards, that end Indyk said the U.S. approach is based on two
fundamental principles:
1. It is up to the Iraqi people to change the government. The U.S.
will help and support the Iraqi people, but will "not impose" itself
on them.
2. The U.S. is always cognizant of the need to maintain the
territorial integrity of Iraq."
Asked if President Clinton's political difficulties and the likely
start of an impeachment proceeding has affected his "moral authority
to wage war" Indyk replied:
"I think you can see in the congressional resolution that was passed
yesterday that when it comes to waging war, the country is united
despite the very real differences and divisions between the
Republicans and Democrats ... and I think that is also manifested in
the public opinion polls that you see now."
Following is the transcript of the program:
(Begin transcript)
QUESTION:  Hello. Hello, is that Mr. Indyk?
INDYK:  Yes, speaking. How are you?
QUESTION:  Fine, thanks. Thanks for giving us some of your time.
INDYK:  Oh, it's my pleasure. It's good to talk to you.
QUESTION: Mr. Indyk, my name is Mayer Offman (phonetic), and I have
beside me my colleague, Mr. Sulaam Nahmad (phonetic). Shall we start?
INDYK:  I'm sorry, who is after Sulaam?
QUESTION:  Sulaam Nahmad.
INDYK:  Nahmad. Uh-huh. Go ahead, please.
QUESTION: Yes, Mr. Indyk, good afternoon. We just heard a little while
ago the British defense minister saying that the bombing campaign will
continue until the Iraqi president announces full compliance with the
Security Council resolutions, and we haven't seen any indicating from
Washington, from the defense secretary, or anybody else, of putting a
deadline for the bombing campaign.
Is this an open-ended exercise? Shall we expect the continuation of
the military operation until there is such compliance from the Iraqi
president?
INDYK: President Clinton made clear that our objectives are to, in
using force, to degrade Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capability
and Iraq's ability to threaten its neighbors.
When those objectives have been achieved, that's when the strike will
end. And that's as much as I can say about this. You know, it's
difficult to get into operational issues in the midst of a campaign
like this. But I think it should be clear that the objectives are as
stated, and once they're achieved, the campaign will stop.
QUESTION: So compliance from Iraq is not necessary for ending the
campaign?
INDYK: Compliance from Iraq is necessary, because it's the will of the
international community. Saddam's refusal to comply and refusal to
fully cooperate with UNSCOM has led us to this situation. So, yes,
compliance is something that we would like to see.
If there's no compliance, then, of course, the sanctions will continue
and, you know, the international community will have to see what needs
to be done about that. But our objectives are as stated.
QUESTION: Mr. Indyk, I wonder if you have seen Mr. Tariq Aziz's speech
a little while ago. He said that Iraq will refuse any conditions.
That's in reference to what the defense secretary in Britain said.
He was asked about UNSCOM and Butler, and he said, well,
unfortunately, Butler has caused the end of his mission, because he
gave the Americans his report two days before he gave it to the U.N.
Secretary General. What is your reaction to that?
INDYK: Well, of course, we know Tariq Aziz is a big liar, so it's no
surprise that he's lying again. But the truth of the matter is, Butler
consulted with many different states. He was in Russia. He was in
France. The record of Iraq's cooperation was clear to everybody.
I'm sure you, yourselves, were watching what was happening, where
UNSCOM was blocked from entering the Baath Party headquarters, where
documents were not handed over, where all the other things were
happening, in full view of everybody so there should be no surprise
about Butler's conclusions.
As to whether he shared them with us, I think that it should be clear
that he was talking to a lot of people about what his conclusions
would be, through the three-week period of testing.
The idea that this was somehow collusion between the United States and
Butler is something that's being put forward by those who oppose the
use of force, in particular the Russians and the Chinese, and of
course the Iraqis, who would love to shift the focus from their own
refusal to cooperate fully to Butler. From our point of view, that
approach is just trying to shoot the messenger because they don't like
the message.
But the message is what's important here, and that is that Iraq
promised to cooperate fully, they did it in writing --
unconditionally, fully they would cooperate. And they didn't do that.
QUESTION: That's clear. That's clear. But the question remains, is
UNSCOM out of business now? Or is the campaign going to continue until
the Iraqi's comply and accept the return of UNSCOM?
INDYK: Well, we would like to see UNSCOM back in business. UNSCOM is
the mechanism by which the Security Council can determine whether Iraq
is complying. And it's only when UNSCOM declares that Iraq is disarmed
that the sanctions can be lifted.
So I think that without UNSCOM back functioning in Iraq, and being
able to do its job in an effective way, the Council will be lacking a
mechanism by which it becomes possible to fulfill the resolutions.
So I think it's in everybody's interest, including, believe it or not,
in Iraq's interest, to see an effective UNSCOM back at work, and
that's what we'd like to see.
Of course, if he doesn't cooperate with that, if Saddam doesn't
cooperate with that, if Saddam doesn't allow UNSCOM to come back in in
circumstances where it can do its job, then, you know, we'll have to
look to other means. But, in the first instance, I think it's
important to have UNSCOM back and functioning.
But, in terms of our own use of force, as I said at the outset, and I
want to be clear on it, it is to achieve the objectives that the
President declared.
QUESTION: Yes. And the question then is the strategy. What is the U.S.
strategy, with Iraq now declaring that it will no longer have to
cooperate with UNSCOM, and that they will continue to defy the U.S.
and British position and they are not going to basically change their
stand?
Is there a strategy there, knowing that there's a long-term plan to,
or is there a long-term plan to undermine the Iraqi regime? We've
heard the short-term goals of this campaign, but we don't know whether
there's a timetable or a strategy to carry out a program in
undermining the Iraqi regime. So what is the policy?
INDYK: Yes. The policy, as expressed by the President and the
secretary of state and others, is containment and, over time, an
effort to produce -- to help the Iraqi people produce a government
that is more representative of their aspirations and more willing to
meet Iraq's obligations to the international community. So it's
containment plus eventual regime change.
We say containment, because we recognize that regime change is a
process that may take time, and we recognize that it's a process that
has to come from the Iraqi people themselves. We are not going to
impose a change of leadership, but we will support those who seek a
change of leadership.
So, in the meantime, as long as Saddam Hussein and his regime is still
in place, containment is essential, because of the threat he would
otherwise pose. That is why, in the short term, we will continue to
contain him, either through the sanctions and the Security Council
efforts or, if necessary, through the use of force.
QUESTION: Mr. Indyk, the Arab world feels generally that the -- the
U.S. has launched this latest attack immediately after the failure of
Mr. Clinton in persuading the Israeli government to implement the Wye
agreement. It looks again that the U.S. is applying a double standard
-- one to the Arabs and one to Israel.
INDYK:  My favorite question.
QUESTION:  Sorry?
INDYK:  I said, it's my favorite question. Go ahead.
QUESTION: Now, Israel is in breech of several U.N. Security Council
resolutions. One of them concerns the south of Lebanon; one is 242 --
to withdraw from the Golan Heights and from the West Bank; and also it
is now in breech of the Wye River agreement in which Mr. Clinton
invested so much time and effort. Now, why is Israel not being, you
know, put pressure on? And why Iraq is being hit?
INDYK: Well, first of all, I thank you for acknowledging that the
President has put a tremendous amount of effort into seeing the
implementation of U.N. resolutions when it comes to the Arab- Israeli
peace process.
The Wye River agreement, he spent nine days devoting himself entirely
to that issue and his recent trip to Israel and to Gaza were all in an
effort to see the implementation of Resolution 242, 338, and the
principle of land for peace, as enshrined in the Wye River agreement
for further re-deployments in the West Bank which would give the
Palestinians control over more territory.
I'm sure that people in the Arab world were watching the President
when he spoke to the PNC and other Palestinian organizations and saw
the sincerity with which he identified with legitimate Palestinian
aspirations and saw his genuine and heart-felt commitment to the peace
process.
I think that his visit to Gaza was welcomed by the Palestinians with
open hearts, and I believe that they are still glowing from that
encounter and the kind of impact it had for the Palestinians. I hope
that people bear that in mind, that it is a testimony to America's
commitment to achieving a comprehensive peace in the Middle East.
Now, in terms of getting Israel to live up to its commitments, that
was very much part of the President's efforts on his trip, just as he
was seeking the implementation of commitments on the Palestinian side.
Soon after he left, the Israeli government went into crisis. We are
waiting to see -- and we will know in the next few days, I think --
what will happen there.
But we are also making it clear in our public statements that the Wye
River agreement was endorsed by the Israeli cabinet and by a large
majority in the Israeli Knesset. It is an agreement that the
government of Israel has -- has made, and we need to see
implementation, just as we need to see implementation of the
commitments made on the Palestinian side. That will continue to be our
policy and we will seek implementation with the same vigor that we
have been seeking it all along.
We are determined to see the implementation of U.N. Resolution 242,
just as we are determined to see Saddam Hussein live up to his
commitments.
But I think that it's important to understand that there's a
fundamental difference between those resolutions, and 242 required
negotiations on the basis of principles laid out in those resolutions.
That's that we've been engaged in doing. Now, we've got to see it
implemented, and we've got to see the final status negotiations move
forward. There are bumps on the road. There are problems involved when
you have a government that is unable to function and the change has to
take place. We will hope that that process does not take long and that
the Israeli government will get on with implementation.
QUESTION: Yes, if we may go back to Iraq. Do we understand that the
objective of this campaign of bombardment is going to continue until
-- even if it goes into Ramadan, the holy month of Ramadan? And that
there is no deadline set for ending this campaign of bombing?
INDYK: Well, again, I'm not going to get into operational details. But
we are sensitive to Ramadan. We have taken that into our calculations.
As I've think you've probably seen other administration officials
saying that it was one of the reasons why we decided to act to so
quickly, and we will take it into account.
I want to also make clear -- and I think it should be clear from the
way in which we are conducting this military campaign -- that we are
very sensitive to the fact that the Iraqi people are not responsible
for this situation. We are doing everything we can to avoid civilian
casualties and to focus on the regime and its capabilities. I think
that should already be clear from the pattern of our campaign from the
limited casualties. It will become clearer still when the dust
settles.
QUESTION: In this campaign against Iraq, do you have any parallel
support for this campaign from within the Iraqi territories? Do you
have any support from within the Iraqi military? Any parallel effort
on the inside that could help trigger an uprising against the central
government in Baghdad?
INDYK: I think that you know very well that Saddam Hussein's ability
to suppress internal opposition is still quite formidable. Therefore,
we did not put into our calculations or our strategy an expectation
that there would be an uprising. So it's not part of our overall
strategy for this military campaign.
QUESTION: Mr. Indyk, the President is about to witness the beginning
of the impeachment proceedings. Do you think a president in this state
is able at the same time -- does he have the moral ability --
authority, really, to wage war?
INDYK: Well, I think that you can see in the congressional resolution
that was passed yesterday that when it comes to waging war, the
country is united despite the very real differences and divisions
between the Republicans and the Democrats that are manifesting
themselves in this whole impeachment mess.
I think that there is a basic principle there that when the nation
goes to war it's very important that the home front be united behind
the troops and that was manifested yesterday. And I think it is also
manifested in the public opinion polls that you see now.
Now, it's obviously a problem when the President is facing this kind
of assault at home. But he has been determined to compartmentalize and
to make sure that he has the ability to make peace or make war while
confronting these domestic challenges. It did not stop him from trying
to achieve peace through the Wye River process and has not stopped him
from prosecuting an effort to hold Saddam Hussein to account.
QUESTION: Yes, Mr. Indyk, this is the fourth military campaign against
Iraq and Iraq has been under sanctions for the last eight years. Now,
in '91, the United States decided not to go all the way towards
bringing down the Iraq regime because of certain considerations at the
time.
Now, does the United States still have the same considerations which
would prevent it from bringing down the Iraqi regime now? Has there
been any change between the situation in '91, vis-a-vis, the question
of undermining the Iraqi regime?
INDYK: Well, I think that there are two important differences here.
First of all, we have made it clear that we will work towards the day
in which the Iraqi people can have a government there that is more
representative of their aspirations.
But we are also making clear -- and I think I have already said it to
you -- that we do not see this campaign as something that is going to
lead immediately to his overthrow. That is going to take time. If this
campaign helps that process, that will be a bonus, but the objectives
are as stated: To degrade his weapons of mass destruction and deal
with the threat that he poses to his neighbors.
QUESTION: Mr. Indyk, I'm sorry to butt in, but this will take time, as
the President said, and effort, which means really it is not going to
help the Iraqi people.
You say you want to help the effort to bring a new Iraqi government
which is more representative to the people. Now, representation,
really, I don't think is the top priority for the Iraqi ordinary
people. It is their life, their infrastructure, their hospitals, their
education, et cetera. And when you say it takes time and you want to
rely on the Iraqi opposition, this might take to the end of the 2050.
INDYK: Well, it could take time. I hope it won't take that long, but
if your point is that in the meantime what happens to the Iraqi
people? I think that we are cognizant of that and that is why we see
the oil-for-food mechanism as a way to take care of the needs of the
Iraqi people.
In the first instance, it was to make sure that they had enough food
and medicines. And, now, as the program picks up steam and you have
Iraq exporting 1.5 million barrels of oil a day, there will be in a
fairly short time, an ability to fund other things that are important
to the Iraqi people. Already there is talk about using the funds for
certain types of infrastructure like the electricity grid and so on.
By the way I want to take an opportunity to clarify one point that
Tariq Aziz made that he tried to suggest that we were destroying
things that are dear to the Iraqi people, I think were his words
today. We did not go after Iraqi infrastructure, again, because of our
concern not to inflict further suffering on the Iraqi people.
He said that one oil refinery was hit. If that is, in fact, the case,
it was the oil refinery used for smuggling of gas oil which goes
directly -- money that goes directly to the regime rather than to the
Iraqi people.
But, yes, if it takes time, we have to take care of the Iraqi people
in the meantime and that's what the oil-for-food arrangement is all
about.
QUESTION: Will the oil-for-food continue if Iraq says, we won't have
UNSCOM back?
INDYK: Yes. From our point of view, absolutely, because, as I said,
the logic is that the Iraqi people should not be made to pay for the
sins of the regime. So we would want to see the oil-for-food
arrangements continue indefinitely.
QUESTION: Mr. Indyk, I don't know if you answered my question
regarding what has changed in terms of the U.S. strategy, vis-a-vis,
Iraq compared to the last three -- Indyk. Yeah. I didn't finish on
that, you're right. You want to ask it again?
QUESTION: Yes. I need to know what is the difference in the U.S.
strategy this time around compared to what has been going on for the
past eight years? Why should we think that this time it's different?
INDYK: Yes, and as I pointed out, one big difference is that we have
articulated as our policy eventual regime change. In terms of the
rest, the objective is still clear: it's containment, and containment
includes preventing Saddam Hussein from reconstituting his weapons of
mass destruction or threatening his neighbors.
Now, there was a Security Council-imposed regime designed to do that
and designed, in particular, to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass
destruction. That regime wasn't working because Saddam Hussein refused
to cooperate with it. So, we had to resort to force in order to
achieve what the Security Council resolutions were not able to
achieve.
Of course, it is impossible to merely by the use of force to eliminate
this problem, and therefore it will still be necessary for the
Security Council -- through UNSCOM -- to be able to get on with that
process of disarmament. So in terms of the overall strategy, the
containment is still there at the heart of the approach. What's added
to it is this interest in supporting the Iraqi opposition so as to
advance the day when there can be a new regime in Baghdad.
QUESTION: Are you convinced that the change of the regime in Baghdad
would take place by a force from outside Iraq or would you say that
there would have to be some kind of parallel effort from within Iraq
and from within the Iraqi military forces?
INDYK: Change will have to come from within. I mean, it's not possible
to imagine that the government of Iraq could be changed as a result of
political activity in London, but political activity in London is an
important part of that effort.
It's very important that the outside opposition unify their efforts to
present an alternative to this Iraqi regime, to serve, as it were, as
a truth squad to tell the world of what this regime is doing to its
people, to work on the effort to indict Saddam Hussein as a war
criminal. All of those things on the political level are an important
part of the effort, but given the nature of the regime, I think change
very much has to have come from within.
I want to be very clear about this. Our approach is predicated on two
fundamental principles. The first is that it's up to the Iraqi people
to change the government. We will help them, but we're going to
support them. We're not going to impose ourselves on them. Secondly,
in this effort, we are always cognizant of the need to maintain the
territorial integrity of Iraq.
QUESTION: But isn't there a contradiction there? You know, change has
to come from within, you are supporting opposition groups outside Iraq
and we know because of the nature of the regime and the oppression
that it exercises there on the people there is no way that someone on
the outside can cooperate with those on the inside. How is it going to
work?
INDYK: Well, there are some on the inside who we are already working
with, so not all of Iraq is under Saddam's control. As you know, in
the north, we have the KDP and the PUK. We've already worked to
reconcile them and they are part of the opposition.
In the south, you have Shiite resistance going on that Saddam Hussein
has been unable to suppress all these years and we would also look to
work with them. Then, of course, it's a question of whether there are
others in Iraq who will be prepared to stand up and resist and we
would look to support them as well over time.
I'm afraid that my minders are telling me that I have to go to my next
meeting. Can we take just one last question?
QUESTION: Do you think Iran would help any opposition to Saddam in the
south and would the United States be interested in Iranian cooperation
in that regard?
INDYK: Well, you know, we are looking to do what is most effective. I
think the Iranians have a bit of a hang-up about the United States,
which is part of the broader issue of our relationship with Iran, but
let me just focus on the people in the south, the Shia, who are
showing tremendous courage and have done so for a long time and are
getting very little support, including from Iran. And they're the
people that we think also need support; not the only ones, obviously
we want to support all opposition groups that have that common
objective of seeking regime change, but our focus in the south is not
only Iran, it's on the Shia.
QUESTION:  Mr. Indyk, thank you very much indeed for your time.
INDYK:  Thank you. I hope we can do it again.
QUESTION:  All right. Thanks.
(The interview was concluded at 1:10 p.m. EST)
(End transcript)