• Military

• WMD Menu                           

• Introduction
• Systems
• Facilities
• Agencies
• Operations
• Countries
• Hot Documents
• News
• Reports
• Policy
• Budget
• Congress
• Links

• Intelligence
• Homeland Security
• Space

17 December 1998

TRANSCRIPT: SECRETARY OF STATE'S BRIEFING ON IRAQ DEC. 17

(Immediate goal is to degrade Iraq's ability in WMD) (3760)
Washington -- With the military strike against Iraq entering its
second day, Secretary of State Albright detailed US short, medium and
long-term goals in Iraq.
Briefing reporters at the State Department December 17, Albright said
the immediate goal of the military campaign known as "Desert Fox" is
to "degrade" Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein's "ability to develop and
deploy his weapons of mass destruction," thus reducing his ability to
threaten his neighbors.
A medium-term goal, she said, is to force Saddam Hussein to comply
with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions passed
after the 1991 Gulf War that call for destruction of Iraq's weapons of
mass destruction and a full accounting of its weapons programs.
Full cooperation in this area is the only hope Iraq has for lifting
the economic sanctions under which it now suffers, the Secretary said.
But to do that, UNSCOM, the UN commission responsible for inspections
in Iraq, must have "unfettered access to be able to continue to do its
work. She noted that Iraqi authorities in the last year had largely
prevented UNSCOM from doing its work.
Until Iraq cooperates with the UN demands, she said, "we will continue
our policy of containment of Saddam through the economic embargo and
generally in terms of keeping him in his box."
Although the current military campaign is not designed to eliminate
Saddam Hussein, the United States has "come to the determination that
the Iraqi people would benefit if they had a government that really
represented them," Albright said.
"It's very hard to imagine anybody worse" than Saddam Hussein, the
Secretary said. There are not a lot of leaders in the world who have
used chemical weapons against their own people," she noted. "He is
someone who has aggressive designs on his region and he is somebody
who has total disregard for the will of the international community."
The United States has stepped up its efforts to work with various
Iraqi opposition groups with the aim of "trying to help them help
themselves to have a regime that represents them," the Secretary said,
acknowledging that "this is something that cannot be done overnight.
Albright emphasized that US diplomats around the world have been "very
active in explaining our actions in Iraq."
In Washington D.C., she said, every foreign mission is being briefed.
Albright said she has personally contacted more than 20 foreign
leaders as well as the United Nations Secretary General.
"The response has been gratifying," she said.
She noted that in her calls to the Arab leaders, she found "a full
understanding."
The Secretary said that most Arab leaders expressed the view that
Saddam Hussein is entirely responsible for the military strike now
underway due to his refusal to take advantage of the final chance
offered him in November to begin full and unconditional cooperation
with the United Nations weapons inspectors.
"They also understand that we have given diplomacy every possible
chance to work. They know we have resorted to this action because
Saddam Hussein has left us no other choice.
"Like us, they are concerned for the welfare of the Iraqi people.
They, too, strongly support the massive United Nations humanitarian
program in Iraq, of which the United States was one of the chief
authors. They know that we are exercising every effort to avoid
civilian casualties in this operation," Albright said.
She acknowledged that there have been "a few critical public comments,
but the reaction so far serves to underscore how isolated Saddam is in
the Arab world."
Outside of the Arab world, Russia and China have expressed the most
vigorous opposition to military action against Iraq, the Secretary
noted.
"The Russians and Chinese are critical, of course, but over the past
year they have failed to provide any viable alternative," she pointed
out.
Despite Russia's best efforts, Saddam Hussein has refused all
diplomatic overtures, the Secretary said.
"I would say that they (the Russians) are disappointed in the fact
that they have not been able to make it work. They have no better
solutions," Albright said.
"The fault and the problem here is Saddam Hussein," she said.
Following is the State Department transcript:
(begin transcript)
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of the Spokesman
December 17, 1998
REMARKS BY SECRETARY OF STATE MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT
ON MILITARY ATTACK ON IRAQ
Washington, D.C.
SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Good afternoon. We have been very active in
explaining our actions in Iraq and securing support around the world
for the military campaign now underway. In the last 24 hours, our
ambassadors around the world have personally engaged host governments
in clarifying our reasons for resorting to military force. In
Washington, we are briefing every foreign mission on the reasons we've
undertaken this action. Since yesterday I have personally contacted
over 20 foreign leaders and the Secretary General of the United
Nations to discuss the situation. The response has been gratifying.
In my calls to the Arab leaders, I found a full understanding of why
we have undertaken military action. Most expressed the view that
Saddam Hussein is entirely responsible for the military strike now
underway, due to his refusal to take advantage of the final chance
offered him in November to begin full and unconditional cooperation
with the United Nations weapons inspectors.
They also understand that we have given diplomacy every possible
chance to work. They know we have resorted to this action because
Saddam Hussein has left us no other choice. Like us, they are
concerned for the welfare of the Iraqi people. They, too, strongly
support the massive United Nations humanitarian program in Iraq, of
which the United States was one of the chief authors. They know that
we are exercising every effort to avoid civilian casualties in this
operation. There have been a few critical public comments, but the
reaction so far serves to underscore how isolated Saddam is in the
Arab world.
Among our allies, we have been pleased by the strong expressions of
support we have received from Canada and the EU, Japan, Korea,
Australia and New Zealand. They point out that Saddam Hussein bears
the responsibility for the military action now underway as a result of
his defiance of the Security Council and his obstinate refusal to
honor his obligations under binding Security Council resolutions.
Among members of the Security Council, we have encountered some
expressions of regret that a peaceful solution couldn't be found,
despite all our best efforts. There is also a general sense that the
behavior of Saddam Hussein has brought us to this pass. This is the
French position. The Russians and Chinese are critical, of course, but
over the past year they have failed to provide any viable alternative.
Our efforts to build support for the joint US-UK action in Iraq will
continue. But one thing is clear -- the international community is
firm in its determination that the way forward is for Iraq to comply
fully with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council. The
actions of Saddam Hussein himself have led us to the point we are at
today.
I'll now be happy to take your questions.
QUESTION: Madame Secretary, does the lack of unanimity hurt the US
cause in any measurable way? And I must say -- these anonymous
references -- but I must say, comparisons are being made to the Gulf
Coalition in '91 suggesting that the Bush Administration got more
Arabs onboard visibly and got the French onboard. That raises the
question what looks like mostly an Anglo-American mission can be as
successful?
SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, first of all, let me say, I do think we are
being successful in terms of our goals here. But also -- I think we've
had this discussion before -- the situation in '91 was quite
different. What you had was a cross-border aggression and something
that is very visible and aggression into an Arab country. Also, as you
remember, it took a long time to put the coalition together.
One of the problems that we have had is that the sanctions regime has
been in place a long time. As I've described to you a number of times,
basically we have held onto the Security Council Coalition to keep the
sanctions in place. As you know, there are these regular reviews; and
while there's a lot of discussion during them, there never has been a
decision to end the sanctions.
We are now dealing with a threat, I think, that is probably harder for
some to understand because it is a threat of the future rather than a
present threat or a present act, such as a border crossing, a border
aggression. Here, as the President described in his statement
yesterday, we are concerned about the threat posed by Saddam Hussein's
ability to have, develop, deploy weapons of mass destruction and the
threat that that poses to the neighbors, to the stability of the
Middle East and, therefore, ultimately to ourselves. So it's the same
country, but a different situation.
Q: Madame Secretary, looking down the road toward a possible end to
this crisis, supposing Saddam Hussein does write another letter saying
that he will agree to cooperate fully without exception, why would you
believe him, given his track record?
SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, first of all, it would be hard to believe
him, I must say. I think that, again, we would have to get proof of
his cooperation. Let me say that this military campaign is going to
continue. We are sensitive to the beginnings of Ramadan, but this
campaign will continue to its completion. Saddam Hussein can, in fact,
say that he will let UNSCOM back in -- a functioning UNSCOM -- and he
can cooperate. Again, the proof will be as to whether he does
cooperate with them. But we will not stand for an UNSCOM that is not
fully capable of doing its work.
I think that one of the things we have to remember is that UNSCOM has
not been able to do its work for the last eight months. So we would
have to have an UNSCOM that is able to function under strong
leadership.
Q: Madame Secretary, were you all surprised at the tone of the Russian
remarks in the Security Council? They seemed much harsher than they
have been for some time.
SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, I think I wasn't surprised because I've had
a number of conversations with Foreign Minister Ivanov. I think that
they have tried to find some way to persuade Saddam Hussein to live up
to his obligations. The interesting part is they do not deny the fact
that he has to live up to this obligations. They have, in the past,
tried to persuade him and sent a variety of envoys and tried to make
it work.
I would say that they're disappointed in the fact that they have not
been able to make it work. They have no better solutions. While I
regret their attack on Chairman Butler, it's like as I've said,
they're trying to shoot the messenger here. The fault and the problem
here is Saddam Hussein; there is no other problem here beyond the fact
of Saddam Hussein's non-compliance.
The Russian relationship is one that we consider very important, and
we will cooperate where we can on a whole host of issues, and we will
manage our disagreements where we must. As I said, I had a number of
conversations with Foreign Minister Ivanov yesterday. I haven't talked
to him yet today, but I probably will. I think that they are very
frustrated with the fact that they have been unable to persuade Saddam
Hussein to live up to his obligations.
Q: Madame Secretary, I'm trying to understand the sort of larger
strategy, because on the one hand we say we want Iraq to comply fully
with all relevant UN resolutions, which would have to include UNSCOM,
in order to get sanctions lifted. On the other hand, we say actually
we want regime change, we want Saddam Hussein out -- that's the real
goal -- and we don't believe UNSCOM will ever be allowed back in in a
functioning way. Can you try to square the circle for us, please?
SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, first of all, I think there are kind of
longer, medium and shorter term goals here. Obviously, the short-term
goal at the moment through this military campaign is to degrade his
ability to develop and deploy his weapons of mass destruction, to
degrade his command and control of some of his security areas in order
to degrade his ability to threaten his neighbors. That is the
short-term goal of what we are doing.
A medium-term goal is, in fact, to have him comply with the Security
Council resolutions. And I believe that he can't have two
contradictory things, which is to have sanctions lifted and retain his
weapons of mass destruction. So the medium-term goal is to -- he's the
one who we can't square that circle. The only way here is for UNSCOM,
a strong, professional, functioning UNSCOM with unfettered access to
be able to continue to do its work; and, again -- parenthesis here --
just keep in mind that it has not been able to do that. So if we can
get a functioning UNSCOM back in, that is a plus. We will continue our
policy of containment of Saddam through the economic embargo and,
generally, in terms of keeping him in his box.
Longer term, we have come to the determination that the Iraqi people
would benefit if they had a government that really represented them.
So we know that this is something that cannot be done overnight, and
we are working with the various opposition groups on a longer range
way of trying to help them help themselves to have a regime that
represents them.
Q: Madame Secretary, some of us had a meeting with a Senator Biden
this morning, and he was commenting on the fact that in all the years
he's been in Washington, he couldn't remember a controversial foreign
policy or national security action in which members of Congress
sharply criticized the President, even on a decision they agreed with.
There are plenty of occasions, such as the invasion of Cambodia, where
they disagreed with the basic decision. What does that tell us now
about the conduct of foreign policy?
SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, I have spoken a lot about the importance of
having bipartisan support for foreign policy and the fact that that is
the best kind of foreign policy -- when you're able to get that kind
of support. The truth is there has been bipartisan support for this
action. There have been some very strong statements by Chairman Helms
and Senator Lugar and Senator Hagel and Senator McCain -- to mention a
few -- and Senator Warner, some Republicans, some support on the House
side. I spoke with Chairman Gilman; he said he was supportive. I saw
Congressman Buyer last night on television saying that he was
supportive.
So there has been bipartisan support. It is not complete support,
obviously. I think that one would hope very much that there would be
support for the President's action and for our troops. I think that is
very important.
But I do believe that some of the kind of rules of the game that had
existed for so long about criticism when the President's out of the
country and various kinds of criticisms at the water's edge, I wish
that those kind of came back into style.
Q: (Inaudible) -- again Senator Biden this morning was saying he
thought that really anybody would be better in the leadership position
in Iraq than Saddam Hussein. Do you agree, and is this really the aim
of US policy -- just to replace him, to oust him?
SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, it's very hard to imagine anybody worse. I
think that he is somebody who has no respect for his own people. There
are not a lot of leaders in the world who have used chemical weapons
against their own people. I will not make the obvious comparison. But
I think that he is someone who has aggressive designs on his region
and he is somebody who has total disregard for the will of the
international community. So it's very hard to imagine somebody worse.
I do think that there are -- there's been a lot of discussion about
the Iraqi people and who cares about them and how they suffer. I think
that in my conversations with mostly the Arab leaders -- but this is
true of the other leaders I've spoken with -- there is genuine concern
about the Iraqi people and that they have suffered under this cruel
dictator for decades now, and that they really ought to have the
possibility of a choice of their leadership. They clearly are better
people, potentially, than the leader that they have now who is
imposing his will on them.
Q: Madame Secretary, in your conversation with these 20 foreign
leaders, have the comments, have they reacted to the comments that
they saw on CNN and other places of Senator Lott and Congressman
Solomon; and especially your predecessor, Mr. Eagleburger, who said
the timing smelled. Did that raise questions among those leaders to
you?
SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Frankly, it didn't. They did not; they did not ask
those questions. I did actually speak to my predecessor, Secretary
Eagleburger, last night. I'm very sorry that I didn't speak to him
before he made those comments because I was very -- a little secret
about me, I always wake up to the radio; and I woke up to Larry
Eagleberger's voice this morning basically saying that having spoken
to me last night and that I had assured him that there was no
connection of the timing to the current domestic issues; that he took
me at my word and therefore he believed that that did not play a role
in the decision.
Q: Could you please comment on the Russian parliament's decision,
statement that this act could make it more difficult to ratify START
II?
SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, I have heard that; but the truth is that the
only reason that the Russians would ratify START II is that it's in
their national interest.
There have also been statements by various Russian leaders who are
concerned about the fact that if START II is not ratified, that they
will have to use scarce defense funds for the problem of maintaining
missiles that they don't need, rather than on some of their other
force needs.
So we hope very much that the ratification of START II will go
forward, because it's in our national interest and because it's in
Russia's national interest; otherwise they wouldn't have signed on.
Q: Madame Secretary, on a related question, can you comment on
temporary closures of US embassies in Africa and whether it's related
in any way to the action in Iraq?
SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: We have temporarily closed our embassies and done
some ordered departures in Kuwait and in Israel because we are
concerned about general threats and the heightened situation, yes.
Q: Madame Secretary, the support that you say you are hearing from the
foreign leaders you speak to, who are also expressing concern for the
Iraqi people, do they say that they are basing their support in the
belief that your strategy will bring relief to the Iraqi people --
your short, medium and long-term strategy for Iraq?
SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: I think that they -- that isn't quite the way the
question has worked. But let me do something first and explain -- I
have tried, being a professor, to group my answers in some kind of a
way as to how these calls have gone. I think they're kind of in four
groups. The first is of those who are strongly supportive of what we
have done -- the list I have read; and I think in addition to that
list, there's also Denmark and Norway. They are those who are strongly
supportive of what we are doing.
Then there are the Arab countries, who are supportive and are giving
us the support that we need to carry on this mission. They are the
ones, I think, that are primarily voicing the problems of the Iraqi
people. I think the others have mentioned it, but clearly it's the
Arab countries that are the most concerned about it.
The third group are those who I would say the kind of key word for
their comments is they regret this; and they regret it because Saddam
Hussein led us into this situation.
Oh, and let me just say -- back on the Arabs -- they also are very
clear about the fact that it was Saddam Hussein's responsibility that
this happened, as they made clear in their GCC statement and as they
have repeated to me on the phone.
But the regret group are basically regretful of the fact that we have
come to this and that a diplomatic solution has not been found. Then
there's the fourth group, which are really the Russians and the
Chinese. But the main concern about the Iraqi people, I think, clearly
comes from the Arab group. And I think that I would read into what
they're saying that basically, they are concerned about civilian
casualties. I told them that we are doing everything we can to avoid
that. But they are concerned about the long-term situation of the
Iraqi people. I've talked about the fact that the oil-for-food program
needs to be in place and that we think -- and they agree -- that some
other form of government, some other leader would be of help to the
Iraqi people. These are general discussions.
Q: Can I just follow up -- and they support this long-term strategy?
SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: It depends, frankly. I think it's inappropriate
for me to really go into it.
Q: In your discussions with Arab leaders, have you found that they
would regard continuing bombing during Ramadan as less offensive than
initiating bombing during Ramadan?
SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Specifically, we have not talked about that; but I
have expressed the fact that we are sensitive to the fact that Ramadan
is about to be upon us. But frankly, they have not talked about it. I
am the one that has initiated the fact that -- just the way the
President did in his statement -- that we are sensitive to Ramadan.
Thank you.
(end transcript)