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U.S. Department of State

Daily Press Briefing

MR. RUBIN: .......

With respect to the topic of the day - and that is Iraq - let me say that Secretary Albright has had a busy morning. She was at the White House earlier this morning, meeting with the President and other national security advisors. She has been on the phone since then with a number of foreign ministers, including the Foreign Minister of France twice, the Foreign Minister of Russia, the Foreign Minister of Brazil and the Foreign Minister of Costa Rica, British Foreign Secretary Cook, as well as, when I left her, the Swedish Foreign Minister. I would expect her to continue to call foreign ministers from around the world, primarily those that are on the Security Council, to talk about the gravity of the situation that has been created by Iraq's failure to comply with the commitments Iraq itself made at the end of the last crisis.

Let me say on that that it has been more than seven years since Iraq was kicked out of Kuwait, and yet the regime in Baghdad still refuses to meet its obligations under the resolutions which defined the cease-fire from that war - that is Resolution 687. Throughout these many long years, Iraq has managed to block, impede, delay and frustrate efforts to implement that resolution right down to today. There is no end in sight for this pattern of obfuscation, obstruction and outright violation.

We can find no grounds for optimism that the Iraqi leadership, if left to its own devices, will suddenly change course and opt for cooperation in the new year or, if it remains in power, in the new millennium. On the contrary, the latest report from Chairman Butler gives the clearest possible indication that Iraq's cooperation will at best be limited, selective and intermittent. This is simply not good enough.

The resolutions are clear and we've seen over the last year a serious, serious problem; where eight out of the last 12 months, UN inspectors have been unable to do their job. This, in a sense, began last October when Iraq tried to bar inspectors from the country after the Council adopted Resolution 1134. Since then we have witnessed provocation after provocation after provocation.

On November 3 of last year, Iraq threatened to shoot down aircraft performing aerial surveillance. On January 13 of this year, the issue escalated when Iraq blocked an inspection team and expelled weapons inspectors. Then in February, facing the credible threat of force, Iraq signed a memorandum of understanding with the Secretary General and began, at least in the initial phases, to comply; but that compliance ended soon thereafter. In August, Iraq declared that it was not going to allow challenge inspections. And then we've had the most recent crisis in November, which again ended with Iraq promising - promising -- to allow the UNSCOM inspectors immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access. Despite these promises, what the report of Ambassador Butler reveals in clear and stark terms is that Iraq has not fulfilled the promise they made just a few weeks ago. This is a new record in terms of promises made and promises broken.

Ambassador Butler concluded that Iraq did not provide the full cooperation it promised on November 14; that it barred UNSCOM from inspecting a base in eastern Iraq, controlled by the Iranian terrorist group MEK on November 25, even though UNSCOM had been allowed to inspect those facilities in the past. Iraq blocked access to Baath Party offices in Baghdad on December 9, and an Iraqi official said UNSCOM would never be allowed in. There are no exemptions for party offices, and UNSCOM had previously inspected Baath Party offices.

Then Iraq added a further restriction, saying that UNSCOM could not inspect on Fridays, despite seven years of doing so. On a different occasion, Iraq removed virtually all documents, furniture and equipment from a special security organization office which UNSCOM was about to inspect. Then during a December 5 monitoring inspection, Iraq restricted UNSCOM's ability to photograph, and on November 23, an Iraqi helicopter endangered UNSCOM personnel by closely over-flying an UNSCOM helicopter.

So what we're seeing is Iraq trying to create new safe havens, deny access, create new conditions, strip offices clean of any information that might be of value, block photographers, buzz helicopters. This is a pattern of behavior that reinforces the conclusion that Iraq has no intention of meeting its obligation to cooperate fully with UNSCOM.

That is why Secretary Albright and others regard this as a grave matter. She has been, as I said, consulting with foreign ministers during the course of the day. She has made clear to those foreign ministers that Chairman Butler's report is credible, it's based on expert work. We have, as you know, worked very hard in recent months to provide the extra mile for Iraq to prove that it is willing to comply with Security Council resolutions.

But again, what we see is a pattern of obstruction, obfuscation and outright violation. That is the situation that we are in today. The Security Council is meeting and, as I said, Secretary Albright is talking with her foreign minister colleagues around the world.

QUESTION: Is she in touch with people in Congress? There was some question as to whether she could get to, and was trying to, Jesse Helms.

MR. RUBIN: My understanding is that this morning, her calls have been directed towards the foreign ministers and that she hasn't placed calls to members of Congress. I wouldn't rule it out in the future.

QUESTION: Can you characterize, either individually or in a general sense, what these foreign ministers are - how they're responding; specifically if there's anybody this time, apart from Britain, who stands clearly and unqualifiably and in an unfettered way with the United States?

MR. RUBIN: Well, I'd prefer not to characterize any specific phone calls, but let me say this - for the last several weeks when Secretary Albright has traveled abroad or spoke to foreign ministers, uniformly the blame for the current problems between UNSCOM and Iraq have been placed squarely on Iraq's shoulders.

In November, as you know, we saw a case where the Gulf Cooperation Council, and in addition Syria and Egypt, signed a statement and put out a statement making clear that Iraq would be responsible for the consequences of a failure to comply. We've seen no movement from the general mood that has existed for several weeks now. I think that after fully absorbing Butler's report and seeing how short the time has been between Iraq's statements of just a few weeks ago, promising full and complete cooperation, and Chairman Butler's report that makes clear that on the contrary -- that whether it's buzzing helicopters, blocking photographers, cleaning out files before UNSCOM gets there, creating new conditions for inspections or creating new safe havens -- that we've seen anything but the cooperation the Iraq promised just a few weeks ago.

QUESTION: There's never been a question that they all fault Iraq. The question is how united might they be on supporting US and British military action?

MR. RUBIN: Again, with respect to military action - and this may become a refrain if you ask me other additional questions on this - I am not going to get into presidential decision-making on this subject. With respect to the response of other foreign ministers, I'm going to leave it to a general discussion of the clear reality, which was not true a year ago - let's remember how far we've come. A year ago we had a situation where even on the subject of travel sanctions, there was a split in the Security Council that was evidenced by the abstention of two key members. We have come a long way since last year. The Security Council is united in recognizing that Iraq has failed to comply. That is the situation we're in. I can't be more specific on your specific question.

QUESTION: I'm not asking you whether the President is going to take military action. I'm asking you whether there is a consensus or whether there is significant dissent from having all options available. They have not been very supportive, all of them.

MR. RUBIN: I think it depends on who you ask.

QUESTION: Like France, I would ask France -

MR. RUBIN: We fully expect, on the subject of Iraq, that there will be a range of views from those who are fully supportive of whatever action the President chooses, to those who are medium-supportive, to those who are going to oppose anything the United States does. To answer the question of how they would respond to something that I'm not in a position to talk about is hard to answer.

QUESTION: Well, there's a range of -

MR. RUBIN: There's always been a range of views on Iraq, but I think what's fair to say is that the range of views now includes a unified consensus in the Security Council that the failures are Iraq's; that the consequences are Iraq's; and that the international community believes that Saddam Hussein is failing to comply with his required obligations.

QUESTION: Is it still the US position that further authorization by the Security Council is not required for military action?

MR. RUBIN: I think one need go no further than talk to the subject of the cease-fire resolution - Resolution 687 - which set forth the conditions for a cease-fire, in the absence of which, the authority to use force, provided by Resolution 678, was operative. It is clear to us that through this pattern of violation of the Security Council Resolution 687, Iraq is in flagrant violation of that resolution; and therefore, the authority to use military force exists in Security Council resolutions.

QUESTION: I'm not clear why the Secretary is going through the trouble of polling other members of the Security Council if their authorization is not required.

MR. RUBIN: Well, you are jumping to conclusions as to what she is doing in those phone calls. She is consulting with foreign ministers from other countries. This issue is now before the Council; it's to be discussed today. Secretary Albright believes it's very important to try to ensure that all the foreign ministers have the latest and best available information and understand the seriousness with which the United States takes this subject, so that as we proceed and the days unfold, that we can maximize the support from the international community.

QUESTION: Does the United States support another round of negotiations between the UN and Baghdad?

MR. RUBIN: The question of what decision the President would make in the face of this blatant non-compliance by Iraq - that is, diplomacy, force or any other option -- is something I will leave unstated and unanswered at this time.

QUESTION: Well, could you say - the Secretary, I believe, said last week that no more diplomacy would be required, no more warnings. Is that still your position?

MR. RUBIN: Well, we haven't changed our position. Secretary Albright has consulted with several countries in recent weeks directly and many on the telephone, and has made very clear that we do not see a need for further warnings. We have not seen the international support for our position in November erode. On the contrary, we have been quite heartened by the extent to which people understood the reasons for our allowing Iraq another opportunity to show whether it would comply. But we certainly haven't changed our position from the time you identified.

QUESTION: Are you specifically referring to no more diplomacy is required, either?

MR. RUBIN: We haven't changed our position.

QUESTION: One month ago, you were able to announce Egypt, Syria and several of the Gulf states have signed a joint statement supporting the US position. Are all of those states still onboard as far as you know?

MR. RUBIN: It is our view that the statement that was put out at that time and the statements made by countries around the world at that time were statements that reflected the situation at that time. That situation was a wholesale non-compliance by Iraq with UN Security Council resolutions that required UNSCOM Chairman, Richard Butler, to withdraw his inspectors.

Based on this report, which lays out in a quite detailed way, as I made clear to you - namely, Iraq has tried to create new safe havens; they've cleaned out sites before UNSCOM has arrived; they've interfered with photography; they've interfered and put at risk helicopters; and they have engaged in a pattern of non-compliance -- there is no reason to think that the views of just a few short weeks ago will have changed. On the contrary, those countries that want or tend to hope that Iraq will somehow change its ways have now even a shorter time frame with which to see that Iraq has not changed its stripes and it does not intend to comply.

QUESTION: So they are still on board as far as you know - and Syria in particular?

MR. RUBIN: If you want a lay down of the position of Syria and Egypt and the other Gulf States of their current position, I'd recommend you contact their ambassadors.

QUESTION: Is there anything Iraq can do at this late hour to sway the Administration?

MR. RUBIN: Well, Ambassador Butler's report is pretty definitive about Iraq's behavior over the recent weeks. Let's remember, this comes just a few weeks after Iraq promised full, unfettered cooperation. This report demonstrates that Iraq has, across the board, violated its own commitments of just a few weeks ago and the very conditions that the President and the Secretary General talked about at that time.

QUESTION: So is the answer no, then -- that there is nothing that Saddam can do to avert a military strike?

MR. RUBIN: Well, again, as I said, Ambassador Butler's report is quite definitive on Iraq's behavior; and we hope and expect that other Security Council members will see it as grave a matter as we see it. With respect to the President's decision-making on this, I am not prejudging his decision-making one way or another. Prior to you coming in, I made clear that I am not going to comment specifically on military decision-making.

QUESTION: Jamie, there is a domestic situation that is added into this mix, and that is the President's situation on the Hill with Congress seemingly ready to vote on impeachment shortly. Has this been an element in this? Is this going to make any action that's taken more difficult?

MR. RUBIN: Well, the wags will continue to talk about whatever it is we do, and they've been doing it for a month. But when you look at this situation amongst all of the situations, this is a situation that was generated by Iraq's failure to comply with a commitment they made just three weeks ago. UNSCOM set up a series of inspections that just ended yesterday. The timing here is generated by Iraq's failure to comply.

If you like, I would go through, over the last year, the list of occasions on which Iraq has generated crises. We have responded to those crises that Iraq has generated, based on the circumstances created by Iraq and no other circumstances. There's no reason why that would change now.

QUESTION: But the circumstance is there; it is very real whether it's --

MR. RUBIN: Well, as I said, you're going to ask me questions and commentators will commentate; that's what they do. All we can do is point to you the fact that if you look at the time lines for the last year as to what Iraq has done, when it's done it, when it's not done it, when it's provoked crises, how the United States has responded, I think you will see a clear pattern of the United States responding to Iraq's non-compliance with different actions and being prepared as recently as three weeks ago to use military force. We were just hours away. Iraq capitulated at the last minute and said it would comply.

Now, today, last night, UNSCOM Chairman Butler has prepared his report and presented us with a situation that makes clear Iraq has failed to cooperate across the board. That is the reality; everything else is speculation.

QUESTION: Can you say whether other countries have brought up this situation in conversations?

MR. RUBIN: Well, over the recent weeks and months, every time one of you has asked us a question we have tried to answer it as honestly and carefully as we can. It is not a subject that comes up from other countries, except to say a certain puzzlement. You're all familiar with that, and I don't care to add to it.

QUESTION: Jamie, when the last crisis happened a month ago, three weeks ago, the US issued not a travel warning, an advisory and you allowed for the voluntary departure or authorized departure of certain US Embassy personnel and family members. A, is that still in force; b, have you updated it; c, can you tell us how many people, if any, have left or are planning to leave?

MR. RUBIN: Yes. That was issued last month. Embassies Tel Aviv and Kuwait, as well as the Consulate in Jerusalem provided authorized departure status on November 11, 1998, due to increased tensions with Iraq. The Department of State has extended the authorized departure of non-essential employees and family members into next year until January 9, 1999.

To date, approximately 43 family members have left Tel Aviv and Kuwait. No one has left Jerusalem, and no employees have left the three posts. The three posts remain fully staffed and operational.

QUESTION: Is there any Administration official that is still in contact with an Iraqi official, or are we beyond the point of listening to words from Iraq? I'm not sure I understand when you were asked is there anything Iraq can still do - are we still even listening to Iraq, or are we beyond mere words?

MR. RUBIN: We have not had direct contact with the Iraqi Government much at all. I'm familiar with a couple of occasions where the US Ambassador to the United Nations would issue a formal demarche to the Iraqi Government on some subject or another. We haven't been in contact with Iraq on this subject for some weeks now, and I don't expect we would change that policy in the current circumstances.

QUESTION: The UN Secretary General is saying that perhaps one of the ways to proceed now might be with a comprehensive review. Does the US see any point in that, or are we beyond that?

MR. RUBIN: Well, the comprehensive review is premised on full cooperation. The comprehensive review was designed to review the status of Iraq's compliance with the various resolutions, provided it was cooperating. I can't imagine any member of the Security Council would endorse going to a comprehensive review when UNSCOM has declared as unequivocally as possible that across the board - whether it's documents, whether it's cleaning out facilities, whether it's creating new safe havens, blocking inspections or interfering directly with the work of UNSCOM - that they have failed every test.

So I can't imagine why any country would want to now review the progress, when what's clear is that the cooperation that was a prerequisite to the comprehensive review has, on its face, not happened.

QUESTION: So are you upset that the UN Secretary General is even considering this?

MR. RUBIN: No, I believe I read the letter and he pointed out these are options; he didn't advocate that option.

QUESTION: What happens next?

MR. RUBIN: What happens next? Stay tuned.

QUESTION: Something that hasn't happened, as far as I've heard, is the US going through the good offices of the Russians or going to the Chinese to use those two governments as leverage as we have in the past. Is this something that will be attempted, or is this pretty much - I mean, it seems pretty much from the questions that we might be just about at a dead end on options for Iraq besides force.

MR. RUBIN: Perhaps before you arrived, I made clear to the others that I was not going to get into the question of the President's options at this time. As I said, Secretary Albright met with the President this morning and other members of the National Security team. She also spent an enormous amount of time with him on the Middle East and this subject over the last three days on the trip.

So this is now in the hands of the President to make a decision, and I don't intend to preview one way or another the President's decision-making on this subject. Therefore, it's impossible to talk about options.

QUESTION: Well, specifically about going to the Russians and the Chinese.

MR. RUBIN: Again, that would be options.

QUESTION: Jamie, is it the US position that UNSCOM is not capable of ever capable of carrying out unhindered inspections in Iraq, or do you still foresee a day when UNSCOM might be able to go to Iraq and do its job?

MR. RUBIN: That's up to Iraq. We believe that UNSCOM inspections, UN inspections, the work that the UN inspectors have done in uncovering thousands and thousands of tons of material and missiles and weapons of mass destruction has provided an invaluable service to the world. We've said that considering the threat that Iraq poses of having weapons of mass destruction and reconstituting those weapons of mass destruction, the best way to confront that threat is to have an effective, capable UN inspection team operating in Iraq; that's still our view.

The problem is Iraq is not letting the UN inspectors be capable, be effective and be able to go where they need to go when they need to go; and in fact, is going through a clear pattern of obstruction, obfuscation and outright violation of Security Council resolutions.

QUESTION: If the US Government were to get another letter like the one it got last month from the Iraqi Government, saying that the inspectors can come back in, that they can have full, unhindered access, what would the US response be?

MR. RUBIN: I'm not going to preview a hypothetical like that. Let me make clear that obviously the letter we received last month turned out to be worthless.

QUESTION: Jamie, this decision that's being made on the comprehensive review or other options is coming on the eve of something political here in Washington. Can you assure us that there was no speeding up, let us say, of the process such that it came to a head two days ago?

MR. RUBIN: I answered this, I think, extensively in response to Betsy's question. The time table for the grave situation we're in today was generated first by Iraq refusing challenge inspections in August and then refusing any inspections in November. In mid-November, in the face of the prospect of overwhelming military force, Iraq decided to say it would comply. We wanted to make clear that UNSCOM had to test this promise, and test it fully and as completely as possible.

UNSCOM, on its own judgment, on its own professional basis, then set forth a work plan to test Iraqi cooperation. That work plan terminated in the last couple of days, based on Iraqi behavior - Iraq's failure to allow them into the Baath party headquarters; Iraq's declaration they can't inspect on Friday's Iraq's interference with the helicopter flight; Iraq's interference with cameras; Iraq's stripping relevant materials from rooms before UNSCOM got there. Those were Iraqi actions that took place in the last three weeks that led Chairman Butler to come to the conclusions he came to last night.

I don't think the timing could be any more clear than that.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) - whether they had advice to terminate the work plan at this time from the United States. I mean, can you assure us that there was no encouragement to speed up --

MR. RUBIN: What I can tell you, Roy, is that we have great confidence in the independence, professionalism and judgment of Chairman Butler. There has been wildly exaggerated reporting in recent months about the ability of the United States to affect their timing, affect their decisions.

Of course we consult with Chairman Butler. We consult before, during and after inspections. But the time table, the sites, the methodology are determined by professionals. That's why it's so important to have a professional organization.

QUESTION: What have they done differently in the last three weeks that they hadn't done before, which is another way of asking Roy's question but not asking if there's any political motive here.

MR. RUBIN: What has who done differently?

QUESTION: Iraq. You're making a case for why this situation is grave. Wasn't Iraq misbehaving exactly the same way before November 14, when Sandy Berger said the other night, that having had a promise from them, we would lose the high moral ground, he said, if we then followed through with an attack after they gave us a promise.

MR. RUBIN: You're asking to review the rationale for the decision last month -

QUESTION: No, no, I'm not -

MR. RUBIN: and I think we reviewed that at great length, but I'd be happy to do it again for you.

QUESTION: No, I'm not; I'm not asking that. The question on the table now that I'm trying to put is, what is Iraq doing currently or in the last three weeks that's any worse or any more provocative - bad as it was, of course - that forces the United States or provokes and prompts the United States to make the kinds of statements you've been making today? Isn't this same old cat and mouse game?

MR. RUBIN: I think if you go back and look at Iraq's behavior and its statements, you see that they change over time. In August, they said inspectors can't do challenge inspections. In October/November, they said no inspections can take place except the IAEA. Then, in November, in the face of military force, they changed their tune, reversed themselves, capitulated and said yes, you can do what you need to do; you can have full cooperation. That was Iraq's decision to make that announcement.

We've tested that announcement. We've now had UNSCOM go through a testing period, and it is clear that Iraq has failed that test. So the differences in events depend on the differences in circumstance.

What we've now seen is even after promising full cooperation, they have in myriad ways across the board stopped that cooperation, interfered with that cooperation. That is the current circumstance. If you want to go back to last month and talk about what they said they were going to do last month and what they did last month, we can do that. But each circumstance, they have different words and different actions on describing the current circumstance.

QUESTION: Yes, we're trying to ask why now? But you say because they've been bad, and you give us these examples. So the only way I can come at it is ask if any of these - did they not try to intimidate helicopters before November 14? Did they not strip rooms? If you read Scott Ritter's accounts, they've done everything - well, I don't know about the helicopters - but it was a whole indictment against them.

MR. RUBIN: Right.

QUESTION: You have the same indictment -

MR. RUBIN: Right.

QUESTION: -- three or four weeks ago. But the Administration -

MR. RUBIN: I think we've explained this before, but if you'd like me to repeat it, I'll be happy to.

QUESTION: I just want to know if they've done anything in the last three weeks that's new and newly disruptive, newly non-cooperative?

MR. RUBIN: You're approaching this like a check list, and that if they did this or they didn't do that -

QUESTION: Well, I don't know how else to approach it.

MR. RUBIN: The way to think about this is to go back to last year when the Security Council was divided, when Russia and France abstained on a resolution applying targeted travel sanctions. That was unfortunate. We thought that was a major problem. Perhaps it gave Iraq the perception that it could drive a wedge through the unity of the Security Council. What we have been doing , step by step, day by day in our diplomacy is rebuilding that consensus over the last year.

We've responded to Iraq's provocations at different times in different ways based on our judgment on how to both protect UNSCOM's inspection regime, protect the sanctions regime and protect the support of the international community for those two policies. That is a judgment call; that's why diplomats and presidents have to make judgment calls. It's not simply a matter of taking out a check list and saying, I got this today, I didn't get that tomorrow.

What we see now - and I'm pointing out that's a little different -- is the speed with which Iraq has promised to cooperate and so quickly violated its promise. If you go back to the Kofi Annan agreement, you see a time when in February/March they made a commitment to Kofi Annan through the memorandum of understanding; and many months went by where it was deemed to be cooperation. Now we've seen it shrunk down to weeks before they broke their promise.

QUESTION: That answers that, but on technical question. There was always a distinction between nuclear inspections and the chemical/biological -- where they were slightly less uncooperative in nuclear. What's the case today?

MR. RUBIN: Well, the IAEA has made its judgment; I'd be happy to get you the report.

QUESTION: Is it as bad as UNSCOM's?

MR. RUBIN: No, they've said they have - I rather not misuse these very highly refined words, but I'd be happy to get you a report. But the focus of our concerns have been on UNSCOM because it's UNSCOM that has been the focus of Iraq's refusal to cooperate for some time now.

QUESTION: Can I just follow up - two questions ago - it's all the same thing, but -

MR. RUBIN: You don't think I've managed to answer every angle?

QUESTION: Well, we'll give you one more shot, please. Is it the opinion of the United States that the political situation here is driving them to do what they've been doing?

MR. RUBIN: I know that speculation is part of everybody's job, but it's not part of my work at the podium. Trying to divine the motivations of Saddam Hussein, going back to his invasion of Kuwait and every step he's taken since then, I think is a no-growth industry.

QUESTION: Jamie, I realize the Secretary has been busy with meetings today and phone calls overseas, but could you talk a little about the contact that she and other members of the Administration have had with Congress in the last month, say, about Iraq in their briefings?

MR. RUBIN: I know that at least on two occasions, Secretary Albright participated and led a briefing of members of the House and members of the Senate subsequent to the last Iraqi climb down. She and Secretary Cohen consulted with and about our policy, talked to them about the words the President used with respect to regime change and our efforts to create a more effective Iraqi opposition.

As far as actual talks with members of Congress in recent days, I don't have a breakdown for you, but I can try to get that.

QUESTION: Is there a feeling, though, on that issue that perhaps the leadership of both Houses -

MR. RUBIN: On which issue?

QUESTION: On the consultation with Congress -- that the leadership of both Houses have sort of made up its mind to be non-cooperative anyway; and therefore, it's not such a high priority as it might ordinarily be to have them in on the take off of this particular event?

MR. RUBIN: No, we believe it's extremely important on a matter like this to consult with Congress, and we've been doing so all along despite other events that have gone on.

QUESTION: As you know, Jamie, on Friday, the Islamic holy month of Ramadan begins. Has this factored in at all as a consideration in a US decision to react; and how concerned are you of a potential backlash in the Arab world?

MR. RUBIN: Well, I'm not at all going to be able to address the question of Ramadan and its timing and its implications thereto. Let me say this, however -- I think since the Wye agreement was signed, it's evident to us that members of the Arab world and members of the Muslim world understand that we have worked very, very hard to help create peace in the Middle East. And we succeeded at Wye in bringing to an end 18 months of stalemate.

Since that time, obviously, the process has gone through a number of hurdles - or rather, bumps in the road that Secretary Albright is trying to prevent from becoming hurdles, and we recognize that. But I think members of the Arab world were probably quite pleased, and she spoke to many of them about the efforts we made to pursue the Wye agreement. I think that is further compounded by the speech and the action the President took in Gaza, where he spoke to the Palestinian people in Gaza, where he helped them to make the choice that they decided to make to revoke once and for all the offending provisions of their charter. I think everyone regards it as a historic day in the history of US-Palestinian relations, and that will also redound to the disadvantage of those who would always try to present America's actions in the Gulf as somehow anti-Arab or anti-Muslim when they are so clearly not.

QUESTION: Have you all had any signals from the Arab nations that in light of how the Wye Accord isn't going as smoothly as you predicted or as you hoped, that the Wye Accord is maybe a distraction to the Iraqi situation - that maybe you don't have their full support?

MR. RUBIN: On the contrary, I think what I was trying to communicate was that we believe that the efforts Secretary Albright made and the President made to pursue the Wye accord and to keep at it -- to keep working, to try to be creative, for the President to spend nine days at Wye on the Middle East peace process, for him to travel to Gaza, for the Secretary to organize trilateral meetings between the leaders, to send Dennis Ross out to the region - the enormous diplomatic and presidential energies we've placed on the Middle East peace process has improved the situation.

Anyone who looks at it a year ago and looks at it today knows that the concrete situation is better. The Palestinians are fighting terrorism; more land was provided to the Palestinians in both partial control and full control. We're hoping that in the coming days, the second phase of the further redeployment will take place.

So we're working the problem; we're putting our shoulder to the wheel. We hope and expect and believe that Arab governments and other governments concerned recognize that.

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