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U.S. Department of State

Daily Press Briefing

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QUESTION: Jim, according to a report prepared by Chairman Butler, in addition to the UNSCOM being turned away from an inspection site yesterday, there were two other instances. I was wondering if you have any comment on the two other times.

MR. FOLEY: I've not seen that report.

QUESTION: It's a brief, three-page report that -

MR. FOLEY: That he delivered to the Security Council?

QUESTION: Yes, detailing UNSCOM's activity from December 3rd to the 9th.

MR. FOLEY: We had quite a discussion yesterday about the question of what kinds of reports Chairman Butler makes to the Security Council and what effect they will have and what debates they will occasion. As I said yesterday, Chairman Butler issues regular reports. I'm told they're weekly interim status reports that are rather dry. I think they're not elaborated upon. He simply reports on facts without, I believe, commenting or characterizing them. I think that the latest interim report was delivered, I think, last night in New York; and perhaps that's what you're referring to.

The really important report that we are awaiting has to do with Security Council Resolution 1194. Chairman Butler and the head of the IAEA will report on the overall level of Iraqi compliance, and that has many components across the board. That's really the big one, and we're going to eagerly await that report. Then we, along with other members of the Security Council, will have an opportunity to assess whether it's right to move forward with a comprehensive review or not, based on those reports.

QUESTION: Okay, but what about your reaction to Iraqi officials saying that if UNSCOM returns to the site that they tried to get into yesterday, that they will be turned down again and again and again; do you have any reaction to that?

MR. FOLEY: Well, UNSCOM continues to exercise its full normal range of inspection activities in accordance with its mandate. We expect Iraq to provide full cooperation to UNSCOM in the course of its inspections. Without full cooperation, there is no basis for a comprehensive review of Iraq's compliance with UN Security Council resolutions. If, as is often the case with Iraq, they are intent on building a record which harms their own case, as they've done so many times in the past, that would not be terribly surprising.

Certainly, these kinds of actions and the failure to produce documents demanded by UNSCOM are not such as to bode well for the achievement of Iraq's stated desires -- namely in the first instance, a comprehensive review; in the second instance, a relief from sanctions. I'm afraid that is not a new story.

But we've been very careful over the last week -- and you won't be surprised if I continue in this vein -- to not make a definitive judgment at this stage because, according to the Security Council resolution, Chairman Butler and the IAEA must make a report on their assessment. We're not going to, at this stage, substitute an American assessment for their assessment. That is very important. That's their job to conduct the inspections, to elicit Iraqi cooperation; and they will report on the success, or lack thereof, of their efforts based on Iraqi cooperation, or non-cooperation as the case may be.

When we get that report, we will judge that report.

QUESTION: But this is not a good sign?

MR. FOLEY: I already said that. It doesn't bode well.

QUESTION: You called just a minute ago for full Iraqi cooperation. What do you mean by full? Is that 100 percent or overall? What is full in this instance?

MR. FOLEY: Full is full. Full is not partial; full is full.

QUESTION: But, if there is not cooperation on three days out of five or even three days out of hundred, is that, in the Administration's view, full or is that overall cooperation? I mean, are you calling for overall cooperation or are you calling for full cooperation?

MR. FOLEY: We're calling for full cooperation. Again, I'm going to resist your efforts to have me make a judgment before we get Chairman Butler's judgment. We'll arrive at our own conclusions, but those conclusions will be significantly informed by Chairman Butler's feelings and assessment as to whether he's gotten the cooperation that he needs, the cooperation that he must receive, according to Security Council resolutions.

QUESTION: Jim, the worst you seem to be threatening at the moment is that this comprehensive review won't go through. Can you go further than that? Are all options open, including the military option?

MR. FOLEY: I think you need to understand that these are not necessarily the same things we're talking about. On the one hand, the questions I've been receiving about Chairman Butler's report and the question -- comprehensive review; on the other hand, the question that you're alluding to, involving other measures. And let's be honest, you're talking, I think, about the potential use of force. Both Secretary Albright in Paris, and I believe Secretary Cohen here, both today have stated emphatically that the use of force remains an option.

Insofar as your questions tend to attempt to draw me out on what might occasion such an option on our part, that's the last thing in the world that I or any other spokesman can talk about in a public forum - for obvious reasons. We're not going to signal our plans in that regard.

QUESTION: How does this case differ from previous cases? In previous cases, you haven't been deferring to Butler and his lengthy report; you've been judging on a prima face basis as events unfold. Why does it differ this time?

MR. FOLEY: It doesn't differ. I very carefully and deliberately, in response to your previous question, made crystal-clear that we're talking about two separate matters. One is Iraqi compliance and how that is determined to affect the willingness of the Security Council to proceed with the comprehensive review. The other is Iraqi compliance and how that might affect US action in the event that Saddam Hussein is not meeting the commitments he solemnly agreed to in November. On that question, I refuse to be drawn out on the US response, except to repeat what Secretaries Albright and Cohen have said today, which is that force remains an option. We're not going to signal our punches. It would be certainly very imprudent of Iraq to test our resolve in that regard.

QUESTION: Why aren't you signaling your punches? I mean, you've done so in the past.

MR. FOLEY: Because you're asking questions - no, we have not; we've never signaled that the timing or even the decision concerning the use of force. That's not something you want an adversary to have advance knowledge of.

QUESTION: You have said that if Saddam Hussein doesn't comply, there will be military strikes, there will be air strikes.

MR. FOLEY: I stand - I was asked this question yesterday, and I addressed it yesterday - that it's even in extant Security Council resolutions that Iraq will face severest consequences if it does not comply with UN Security Council resolutions.

I would point you also to a statement yesterday that was put out by the GCC states that indicated that Saddam Hussein alone was responsible for the plight that his people are going through. He's responsible by failing to comply fully with Security Council resolutions and demands. And he alone will bear the consequences - or bears the responsibility for any consequences that may ensue from his failure to comply.

QUESTION: Can you explain, because it seems fairly cut and dry that either Saddam Hussein lets inspectors into the sites that they want to get into or he doesn't. Yesterday he didn't.

MR. FOLEY: What's your question?

QUESTION: My question is, either he is allowing them in or he isn't allowing them in. And isn't that part of what the UN Security Council resolution and, actually, more recently in November, what the United States was saying that either Saddam Hussein allows inspectors to do their job or else? So they're not able to do their job.

MR. FOLEY: I agree with your premise 100 percent and I would add to it that either Iraq is providing documents requested and demanded by UNSCOM or it is not. We've not seen that, yes. But if you're asking me what are we going to do and when are we going to do it, I am, for obvious reasons, not going to answer that question.

QUESTION: All right, you were yesterday after the Iraqis prevented access to the Bath Party headquarters --

MR. FOLEY: However, let me add, it would be a severe mistake, as I said a few minutes ago, for Saddam Hussein to underestimate our intentions in this regard and our capabilities and our resolve to follow through on the President's statement in mid-November. Secretary Cohen, Secretary Albright were very clear on this earlier today.

QUESTION: Well, I still - a lot of us, obviously, think that the State Department's posture has changed.

MR. FOLEY: How is that; explain yourself.

QUESTION: Sure, it's very simple - 24 hours ago when the Iraqis refused to allow the inspectors into Bath Party headquarters, instead of being denounced by Secretary of State Albright, Albright said, hey, sometimes on the first attempt, they don't let them in; we've got to see what happens; you never know, it's a little early --

MR. FOLEY: Barry, I have to - I'm sorry, I can't --

QUESTION: That's what she said.

MR. FOLEY: No, I can't let you go forward.

QUESTION: That's what she said -- we cannot make a judgment based on a first attempt because sometimes you have to wait and see what will happen.

MR. FOLEY: Barry, I'm going to interrupt you here.

QUESTION: Want me to go get the words?

MR. FOLEY: Yes, go get the words; I've seen them. She said that she was not aware, as often happens when we're standing - Jamie and I are standing here at the podium. We get a report. She said spontaneously - "I hadn't heard that; of course, sometimes they let them in the second time." She wasn't in a position to give a definitive answer not having heard - not having knowledge of the report.

QUESTION: Yes, what I'm emphasizing is not whether she had a full report; you're right. What we're discussing is --

MR. FOLEY: She wasn't in a position to -

QUESTION: What we're discussing is her position -- which I found unusually different -- that one doesn't make a judgment about that compliance based on a first attempt; that frequently or often you find out later on that they are cooperating. Similarly, the President called off a missile attack based on a promise there would be full cooperation from Iraq. Do you need to get a report from Butler to figure out whether Iraq is fully cooperating? When they say you can't come in, does that sound like full cooperation to you?

MR. FOLEY: No, it does not.

QUESTION: Then what do you need to know? What do you need to know to know that Iraq is not fully cooperating? What else do you have to know? We're asking why the US position has changed, and you're saying it hasn't; we have to hear from Mr. Butler. When Iraq says you can't come in here, is that full cooperation?

MR. FOLEY: Concerning the comprehensive review and whether the Security Council will agree to do that, we are going to await Chairman Butler's report. That's what's in the Security Council resolution. A second separate - I repeat for the third time - issue is what the US is going to do potentially unilaterally --

QUESTION: (Inaudible) -- Iraq is doing?

MR. FOLEY: And I've already said that -

QUESTION: I don't expect you to say that we're going to hit him.

MR. FOLEY: -- we expect full cooperation. In answer to Andrea's question, I said that refusal to allow access to sites is not full cooperation. Refusal to provide all documents is not full cooperation. We've been very clear on that.

[end of document]