US Policy on Iraq
Iraq News, DECEMBER 10, 1998
By Laurie MylroieThe central focus of Iraq News is the tension between the considerable, proscribed WMD capabilities that Iraq is holding on to and its increasing stridency that it has complied with UNSCR 687 and it is time to lift sanctions. If you wish to receive Iraq News by email, a service which includes full-text of news reports not archived here, send your request to Laurie Mylroie .
I. ALI ALLAWI, WSJ MISREPRESENTED ME ON THE IRAQI OPPOSITION, DEC 7
II. SAUDIS WANT SADDAM OVERTHROWN, ISRAEL LINE, DEC 4
III. A. SIVERS, JUST CAUSE FOR OVERTHROWING SADDAM, WASH TIMES, NOV 25
IV. SANDY BERGER, TEPID US SUPPORT FOR THE IRAQI OPPOSITION, DEC 8
As widely anticipated, Iraq's commitment, Nov 14, to cooperate with
UNSCOM was not worth the paper it was written on. That seemed so
obvious, even then, that on the basis of promises the White House made
the Congressional leadership on the eve of the planned strike on Iraq;
Clinton's statement, Nov 15, suggesting a new policy, when he called off
the strike; and subsequent meetings between the administration and the
Iraqi opposition, "Iraq News," Nov 19, reported that the shift in US
policy--toward the overthrow of Saddam--was for real. That was a
mistake.
"Iraq News" has been down and off-line, somewhat depressed and mopey,
because it all seems like so much spitting in the wind. One reader
cited with incredulity today's Wash Post report on Sec State Madeleine
Albright's response to yesterday's blocked UNSCOM inspection, "Sometimes
what happens is that they refuse the first time and they go back and
they get in." So much for surprise inspections, he suggested. But why
expect anything else?
And it is not only the administration that is the problem. The WSJ,
US version, Dec 2, writing on the new policy, seemingly announced by
Clinton, reported, "Some Iraqi Dissidents, Doubtful of Washington,
Resist US Effort to Help Oust Saddam Hussein." One might think that
such a story would focus on the very real weakness of US policy. But as
a Washington-based Mideast analyst complained, it was a hatchet job on
the leader of the Iraqi Nat'l Congress, Ahmad Chalabi.
One Iraqi interviewed for the story complained to "Iraq News" that
the reporter had been fishing for dirt. Another, Ali Allawi, quoted
extensively in the article, wrote the WSJ a letter, published in
yesterday's al Quds Al Arabi, in which he explained, "It is clear from
the drift of the article that Mr. Pearl [the reporter] was seeking to
demonstrate the existence of disputes within the Iraqi opposition to the
current policy position of the US towards supporting the opposition to
Saddam Hussein. In particular, he may have been trying to establish
that there is serious contention within Iraqi dissident circles
regarding the activities and leadership role of Ahmad Chalabi. Such
quotes, taken out of context, can lead to an erroneous impression as to
what I had really intended."
The NYT, Dec 9, "Pressing for Iraq's Overthrow, US Appeals for Arab
Support," reporting on NSC adviser, Sandy Berger's Dec 8 speech on Iraq,
gave the impression that the US was limited in pursuing that goal, by
lack of Arab support. But that is not so, as Sen. Brownback told AP,
Nov 25 [see "Iraq News," Dec 2]. Also, the Jerusalem Post, Dec 6,
reported on the first visit by an American Jewish delegation to Saudi
Arabia in three years. Abraham Foxman, Nat'l Director of the
Anti-Defamation League, told a Jerusalem press conference that "the
Saudi regime is conducting a 'rapprochement with Iran--their national
security need is to have a relationship with Iran,'" while Israel Line,
Dec 4, citing Ha'aretz, explained why, "Discussing tensions in the Gulf,
the Crown prince [Abdullah] and the Saudi intelligence chief, who also
met with the visiting group, expressed their hope that Iraqi leader
Saddam Hussein will be deposed."
The Saudis see Saddam and the unconventional weapons he retains as a
threat and they will support a coherent program for his overthrow. As a
senior Saudi official told "Iraq News," already in Feb 96, referring to
the possibility that Saddam might actually think to use the proscribed
weapons that he retained, as learned following Hussein Kamil's Aug, 95
defection, "After all we've been through, don't tell me there's anything
that that man wouldn't do."
Yet the Wash Post, Dec 9, "US Committed to Change in Baghdad, Berger
Says," reported that in his Iraq speech, Berger "did not use the term
'overthrow,' which could bring the administration into conflict with
international law." Why? If US officials do not use the term and
publicly commit themselves to that goal, how can anyone be sure that it
really is the policy? Saddam is the defeated party in a war of
aggression and by retaining unconventional weapons capabilities, he is
in flagrant violation of the cease-fire. Also, if it is a violation of
international law for the US to openly seek Saddam's overthrow, is the
"Iraq Liberation Act," which Clinton signed, a violation of
international law?
Anthony Sivers, a visiting scholar in Wash DC, explained in the Wash
Times, Nov 25, the basis in just war principles for overthrowing Saddam,
"Just Cause: The first just cause is the anticipatory self-defense of
the international community from the threat of use entailed in Saddam
Hussein's possession of weapons of mass destruction . . . Saddam Hussein
is an enemy of mankind, first and foremost of the Iraqi people. Their
liberation is the second just cause. Legitimate Authority: Iraqi
noncompliance with UN Res. 687, requiring WMD disarmament, and 678,
which 'Authorizes Member States . . . to use all necessary means to
restore international peace and security in the area,' provide
continuing legitimization for action to ensure compliance. Uprisings in
Iraq in 1991 and subsequently show that there is no legitimate authority
in Iraq. Rather, there is misrule by what St. Augustine termed 'a band
of robbers.' . . ."
As for Berger's Dec 8 speech, it was difficult to understand. It
seemed that he meant to say that "containment" had worked so far, but
would not work so well in the future and, therefore, the US had to
prepare the way for the long-term overthrow of Saddam.
As Berger explained, "America's most vital national interest in
dealing with Iraq is straightforward: to prevent Saddam from rebuilding
his military capability, including weapons of mass destruction, and from
using that arsenal to move against his neighbors or his own people. But
we must also keep in mind that Saddam's continued reign of terror inside
Iraq and intimidation outside Iraq have broader implication for all our
interests in the region. The future of Iraq will affect the way in
which the Middle East and the Arab world in particular evolve in the
next decade and beyond-and our policy must take that into account."
Berger noted, "Even a contained Saddam is harmful to stability and to
positive change in the region. . . . By manipulating the suffering he
himself has inflicted on Iraqis, and invoking the rhetoric of Arab
solidarity, he has remained a convenient symbol for those who seek to
exploit the sense of aggrievement, frustration and defeat that is still
so powerful in much of the Arab world. Fundamentalists like Osama Bin
Laden may be utterly different from Saddam, yet they can still take
advantage of his conflict with the world to win recruits for their
cause." And how about a little help, from Sunni, Arab Iraq in blowing
up two embassies as well?
Still, containment "has essentially held Saddam in check. We have
prevented him from aggression against his neighbors and forced him to
back down whenever he has tried to cripple or expel UNSCOM . . . This
August for the third time in a year, Iraq severely restricted the
activities of the UN weapons inspectors. The UN Security Council voted
unanimously to condemn Iraq's actions and demand compliance. . . .
Although we had left considerable strength in the Gulf after a similar
crisis in February, we chose to augment those forces somewhat. During
that period, we solidified support among our allies and among the
nations of the Middle East. On November 12, eight Arab nations:
Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and the
UAE--issued a statement making clear that Iraq alone would bear
responsibility for the consequences of defying the UN. On the morning
of November 15, Saddam capitulated. . . The issue now is whether Saddam
will, in fact, cooperate with UNSCOM as he said he would. If he does
not, the whole world will be able to see that a forceful reaction is
justified . . . Through constant confrontation, our policy of
containing Iraq has been successful." So, why adopt a new policy?
"But that does not mean that by itself it is sustainable over the long
run. It is, first of all, a costly policy, in economic and strategic
terms. The pattern we have seen over the last few years, of Iraqi
defiance, followed by force mobilization on our part, followed by Iraqi
capitulation, leaves the international community vulnerable to
manipulation by Saddam. . . . The longer this standoff continues, the
harder it will be to maintain the international support we have built
for our policy. Even this toughest of all sanctions regimes in history
becomes harder to sustain over time. In the meantime, the Iraqi people
will live in a murderous and corrupt police state, with no prospect for
a normal life, as long as their country is Saddam's preserve. . . .
"We will continue to contain the threat Iraq poses to its region and
the world. But for all the reasons I have mentioned, President Clinton
has said that over the long-term, the best way to address the challenge
Iraq poses is 'through a government in Baghdad-a new government-that is
committed to represent and respect its people, not repress them; that is
committed to peace in the region." Our policy toward Iraq today is to
contain Saddam, but also to oppose him."
What does that mean, operationally? "What we can and will do is to
strengthen the Iraqi opposition and support the Iraqi people, to work
with them step by step, in a practical and effective way, to
delegitimize Saddam, and then when the time is right, to help them
achieve a new leadership in Iraq. Already, we have deepened our
engagement with the forces of change in Iraq. We have reconciled the
two largest Kurdish groups. We have begun broadcasts of a Radio Free
Iraq throughout the country. We will intensify that effort, working
with Congress to strengthen our political support to make the opposition
a more effective voice for the aspirations of the Iraqi people."
Whatever this might prove to be, it does not sound like the
implementation of the Iraq Liberation Act.
I. ALI ALLAWI, WSJ MISREPRESENTED MY STATEMENTS ON INC
December 7, 1998
Dear Sirs,
I refer to the article on Iraqi dissidents written by your
correspondent, Daniel Pearl, which appeared in the European edition of
the Wall Street Journal on Friday, December 4, 1998. As the article
quoted me in several instances, I would like to clarify the inferences
that one can reasonably draw from my remarks to your correspondent.
It is clear from the drift of the article that Mr. Pearl was seeking
to demonstrate the existence of disputes within the Iraqi opposition to
the current policy position of the US towards supporting the opposition
to Saddam Hussein. In particular, he may have been trying to establish
that there is serious contention within Iraqi dissident circles
regarding the activities and leadership role of Ahmad Chalabi.
However, I believe Mr. Pearl may have erred by selectively quoting
from my phone interview with him to bolster the story of confusion and
dissension within Iraqi circles as to the leadership potential of Ahmad
Chalabi. Such quotes, taken out of context, can lead to an erroneous
impression as to what I had really intended.
Clearly, I emphasized to Mr. Pearl that Ahmad Chalabi, possibly
single-handedly among Iraqi opposition figures maintained the pressure
to keep alive the issue of Iraq in front of the U.S. Congress. He ought
to be given full credit for his herculean efforts to lobby Congress and
which ultimately led to the successful passage of the Iraqi Liberation
Act of 1998. When I noted that his style was not right, I continued by
saying that the ways needed to build a case with Congress are not the
same as those required to successfully construct winning coalitions
within the Iraqi opposition.
Secondly, at no pint did I state, claim or hint that there was
evidence of malfeasance or misappropriation of funds during Ahmad
Chalabi's tenure as head of the Iraq National Congress (INC). What I
said was that the issue of lack of financial accountability and
transparency in the INC as one that has concerned many people and has
become, rightly or wrongly, a stick with which people have used to beat
the INC. I called for more open and rigorous control over any funds
given to the Iraqi opposition, not because of any suspicion as to the
integrity of individuals in the Iraqi opposition, but simply as a matter
of good practice and procedure.
Lastly, I am quoted as saying that Mr. Chalabi's undoubted energy is
not a sufficient reason for people to rally around him. What I said was
that people will not rally around him, in spite of his energy, if he
does not involve himself with the tedious but necessary task of building
alliances amongst exile figures from an incredibly broad background.
The call was for him to crystallize his leadership claims by actually
building the broadest possible coalition, a task which was actually done
in the first incarnation of the INC in 1992.
The issue of forming an effective coalition amongst Iraqis in exile
against the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein is a vital task if any
serious efforts are to be made to destroy his awful regime. Iraqis must
be united by both a clear program of action as well as a policy platform
that is emphatic about the nature of a future democratic and pluralistic
Iraq. Above all, legitimacy for the institutions of the united Iraqi
opposition must be rekindled, preferably in the form of a major
conference, grouping all the leading partners, factions and figures. If
this can take the form of a rejuvenation and restructuring of the INC,
then so much the better. In such a conclave, it is inconceivable that
the person who led the INC in Northern Iraq, and who was instrumental in
keeping the case of the Iraqi opposition alive in front of key world
policy makers, would not achieve, democratically, a critical leadership
role in the fight against Saddam.
Yours truly,
[Signed] Ali A. Allawi
II. SAUDIS WANT SADDAM OVERTHROWN
Israel Line, December 4, 1998
AMERICAN JEWISH LEADERS TO CONVEY SAUDI MESSAGE TO ISRAEL
A group of American Jewish leaders, including Anti-Defamation League
President Abraham Foxman, met with Saudi Crown Prince Abdallah during a
visit to Riyadh, HA'ARETZ reported.
Abdallah asked Foxman to deliver a message to Israel. "We have come
to the conclusion that Israel is part of reality," the Crown Prince told
Foxman. "You can inform Israel that we are committed to the peace
process. We are doubtful [of Israel's intentions], but hope the process
will proceed."
Foxman told Abdallah that the Wye Memorandum proves that Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Foreign Minister Ariel Sharon are
serious regarding peace, saying that the Crown Prince should meet with
them. Foxman appealed to Saudi Arabia to take part in the multilateral
regional cooperation, to promote trade relations with Israel, and to
allow Israeli aircraft to fly through Saudi airspace. Abdallah did not
respond to these requests.
Discussing tensions in the Gulf, the Crown Prince and the Saudi
intelligence chief, who also met with the visiting group, expressed
their hope that Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein will be deposed.
III. ANTHONY SIVERS, JUST CAUSE FOR OVERTHROWING SADDAM
The Washington Times
November 25, 1998
Just cause on Iraq
By Anthony Sivers
Saddam Hussein's bad faith, as evidenced in his defiance of U.N.
resolutions, finally reveals the necessity for policy adequate to the
scope of the problems his regime threatens. Through UNSCOM and IAEA
inspections, Iraq was offered the opportunity to comply with its 1991
U.N. commitments to abandon weapons of mass destruction. Such
compliance would have spared Iraq's population the sufferings inflicted
by economic sanctions. It was always doubtful whether Saddam Hussein
would surrender his weapons. The choice was his to make, and he
revealed it in August 1998, terminating new weapons sites inspections
(having previously attempted to deceive the inspectors) and, in October,
all UNSCOM activities including passive monitoring of previously
inspected locations. Now, not withstanding his mid-November
"acceptance" of renewed UNSCOM activity, any reliance on Iraqi
compliance with U.N. resolutions is self-deception, and action is
necessary to remove Saddam Hussein's regime before he can make fully
operational his WMD potential.
As there is a proper reluctance to initiate, as distinct from
responding to, the use of force, it is important to recognize that the
Just War principles, which limit and focus military action and do not
simply endorse it, require a situation of necessity, such as presently
exists, for preemptive action to meet the moral criteria. An
application of the Just War principles to the confrontation with Saddam
Hussein is therefore offered here.
Just Cause: The first just cause is the anticipatory self-defense of
the international community from the threat of use entailed in Saddam
Hussein's possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) (U.N.
Security Council Res. 687). His use of poison gas in aggressive wars,
torture and mass murder are sufficient evidence for probable cause
assumption of malice aforethought on his part, given opportunity, with
any WMD capabilities possessed. Inaction to forestall such opportunity
would be morally irresponsible.
As a murderer and tyrant, Saddam Hussein has forfeited his right to
life and any possibility of a right to rule. Whether the death penalty
is exacted judicially or tyrannicide occurs (an Executive Order
prohibiting assassination may be rescinded, or amended, by the president
so as to permit a single, specific exception in a clear situation of
tyranny). Saddam Hussein is an enemy of mankind, first and foremost of
the Iraqi people. Their liberation is the second just cause.
Legitimate Authority: Iraqi noncompliance with U.N. Res. 687,
requiring WMD disarmament, and 678, which "Authorizes Member States ...
to use all necessary means to restore international peace and security
in the area," provide continuing legitimization for action to ensure
compliance. Uprisings in Iraq in 1991 and subsequently show that there
is no legitimate authority in Iraq. Rather, there is misrule by what
St. Augustine termed "a band of robbers," most obviously evidenced in
the looting of Kuwait. Accordingly, Desert Storm Coalition members have
legal and moral authority to act "with all necessary means" to secure
unauthorized purposes. The removal of Saddam Hussein's regime is
necessary to secure those purposes.
Right Intention: This requires fighting for a decisive outcome to
secure a just peace through appropriate war-termination policy and
forbids private spite.
It presupposes that the post-bellum solution will need to prove
acceptable to the Iraqi people, with whatever local autonomy they
possess. Iraq must not remain a threat to its own citizens or to
others. The Iraqi National Congress (INC) appears the appropriate focus
for support and should provide reassurances to Iraq's neighbors.
The rapid cease-fire ending Desert Storm prevented a decisive
outcome proportionate to the problems posed by Saddam Hussein. The
morally necessary liberation of Kuwait and the courage and sacrifices
involved do great credit to all concerned. However, there remained an
unfulfilled dimension of right intention that did not "restore
international peace and security in the area."
Unfinished business has remained that now needs to be finished.
Last Resort: The opportunity for Saddam Hussein to fulfill U.N.
obligations has been scorned. To avoid the moral evasion by which
appeasers are tempted, it is necessary to demonstrate determination that
his defiance will lead to his removal from power, for that very defiance
has occasioned a situation of which Winston Churchill called "last
resort: a final end of definite conviction" that military action is
morally necessary.
Prospect of Success: "Panacea bombing" by cruise missile strikes alone
will not disarm Saddam Hussein and replace his regime. What level of
resistance Saddam Hussein could mount, including vengeance WMD strikes,
is uncertain. Much depends on the extent to which the INC can attract
popular support, and how loyal to Saddam Hussein the Iraqi army and
Republican Guard prove to be. It may be necessary to offer Saddam
Hussein safe passage into exile as an incentive not to launch WMD
strikes (apparently he has previously not wished to flee into exile).
If exile was rejected by Saddam Hussein, Iraq would have to be
completely defeated militarily but not required to accept unconditional
surrender, as it is WMD and Saddam Hussein's regime that must be
removed. All other issues are negotiable, and matters for Iraqis
themselves. However, Saddam Hussein's record suggests that he would do
his worst and use chemical and biological weapons (and nuclear weapons)
if he had them operational.
Military action, therefore, must be on a scale and at a time scale
that minimizes Saddam Hussein's options. NATO should contribute levels
and types of forces as needed. Saddam Hussein could be overthrown, but
the more WMD options he possesses, the greater costs he could inflict.
This necessitates military action as soon as possible.
Discrimination: Weapon accuracy is considered by the U.S. military to
have improved since Desert Storm, and the principle of noncombatant
immunity from direct and intentional attack is respected.
Discrimination combined with the principle of double effect allows
foreseen but unwanted, indirect unintentional noncombatant destruction
if unavoidable and not disproportionate. Discrimination also allows
direct and intentional killing of aggressors when strictly necessary.
Attempts should be made, therefore, to attack to the full extent
necessary all regime power bases and vainglorious symbols of Saddam
Hussein's megalomania: WMD locations, loyal forces, secret police,
palaces unoccupied by noncombatants.
Simultaneously, greater efforts are required to spare the Iraqi
population, insofar as possible given military necessities, from attacks
that will result in pollution of water supplies and the sewerage system
(especially given the prospect of chemical and biological strikes).
Desert Storm precision-targeting of electrical installations, in
practice, was not as discriminate as target planners had intended.
Proportion: Proportion can be violated both by excessive force and by
failing to be steadfast in attaining the good that can be realized. It
requires the calculation, necessarily ongoing in wartime, that war will
not result in more harm than good. However, revenge as a motive for
Saddam Hussein will gain more scope the longer uninspected, conceded and
reconstituted Iraqi assets are allowed to proliferate, eventually
resulting in Iraqi nuclear weapon(s)capability.
On balance, then, it is time for the United States (and its allies) to
use the muscle in the long arm of international law. A successful
outcome will prevent Saddam Hussein's meddling in other Middle East
disputes. The above application of the principles, however, needs
scrutiny by legitimate authority (essentially the U.S. government) in
the light of any relevant classified information to assess its prospects
of success and proportionality.
Anthony Sivers is an independent researcher and writer. His Ph.D. is
in War Studies.
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