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Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Great Seal

U.S. Department of State

Daily Press Briefing

INDEX
WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 9, 1998
Briefer: JAMES B. FOLEY

IRAQ
1Difficulties UNSCOM Encountered with Inspections/Butler's Announcement onInspections/Violations by Iraq
2Awaiting Chairman Butler's Assessment/Issue of Military Force
2-3Resolutions/President's Remarks on Force/Authorization for Use of Force/Berger's Remarks at Stanford on Iraq
3US Policy on Keeping Troops in the Gulf/Sanctions/Turning Point in Attitudes in Neighboring States of Hussein/GCC Statement/Issue of Use of Force
4-5Support for Opposition Groups/Albright's Communication with Other Senior-Level Government Officials/Remarks by Secretary General Annan
5-6Suggests of Need for Further Security Council Authorization Before Using Force/Comprehensive Review/Criteria of What Butler May Report


U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB #135
WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 9, 1998, 1:35 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. FOLEY: Welcome to the State Department. I don't have any announcements for you today, so I'd be happy to turn to George Gedda for the first question.

QUESTION: Any comment on the experiences of UNSCOM in Iraq today?

MR. FOLEY: Yes. Of course we've just received reports that you equally have seen in the press about difficulties UNSCOM has encountered this morning in Iraq. As we, the United States Government, have repeatedly made clear, we expect Iraq to cooperate fully with UNSCOM; and that, indeed, is what they said they would do.

UNSCOM inspectors must be able to do their work unfettered. UNSCOM Chairman Richard Butler has announced that UNSCOM is undertaking a series of inspections to test Iraqi cooperation. UNSCOM has a variety of activities underway, and we expect Iraqi cooperation across the full spectrum - from documents to inspections to interviews with relevant officials and whatever else UNSCOM feels it needs in order to pursue and complete its mandate.

We will want to hear from Chairman Butler about the results of these activities and his assessment of Iraqi cooperation. At that point, as we've indicated earlier in this week, we will make a judgment.

QUESTION: Are you saying that today's intended raid on - I guess it was the -- (inaudible) -- party headquarters was intended only as a test of cooperation, or was there evidence - do you have evidence that something incriminating might be there?

MR. FOLEY: You'd have to ask UNSCOM that question. I think they're the relevant authority; they're the ones pursuing the inspections. They can, if they so wish, address what it was specifically they were looking for. But we presume that UNSCOM indeed knows what it's doing, knows what it's looking for, and that its activities are wholly legitimate inside Iraq.

QUESTION: Jim, how serious does the Administration see this violation?

MR. FOLEY: Well, as I've indicated, we're going to await Chairman Butler's assessment before we arrive at our own conclusions, along with the other members of the Security Council. He as well as the IAEA are going to report to the Security Council on the status of Iraqi cooperation.

Certainly any incident, whether it involves the lack of cooperation on the provision of documents, whether it involves lack of cooperation on providing access to sites does not bode well for Iraqi compliance with Iraqi obligations under the relevant UN Security Council resolutions. We're withholding judgment, clearly, until we officially receive Chairman Butler's report. Such problems and such blockages as we have seen from Iraq - both in recent times and over the years - certainly doesn't bode well for Iraqi hopes to receive favorable treatment in the Security Council. I don't want to get ahead of what assessment Chairman Butler's going to make; I'm just giving you sort of a preliminary reaction to events as they unfold.

QUESTION: Can you say whether you think this opens the door wider for a military resolution to this problem?

MR. FOLEY: We've made clear - and I refer to you previous remarks of the President - that if Iraq does not comply with its obligations and if UNSCOM, indeed, is unable to do its job, the United States has the forces in the region necessary to respond. I can't be more specific than that for obvious reasons.

QUESTION: Is it still your point of view that the United States needs no further authorization from the Security Council?

MR. FOLEY: Yes, I think we've made that crystal clear.

QUESTION: Do you have any reaction to Jack Straw's announcement in England?

MR. FOLEY: I think we're still on Iraq.

QUESTION: I wanted, if you can, to get into the inspection problems today in Lake's - excuse me - Sandy Berger's speech last night at Stanford. I trust you've seen that - a fairly comprehensive statement on our policy towards Iraq, apparently some changes in it as far as our opinion about how sustainable it is, economically, on our part; whether the US is willing to sustain it as it is, and whether the allies will support it in an ongoing way. Can you comment on the current policy now towards keeping troops in the Gulf, towards weapons inspections, whether that's going to go away, maintaining the sanctions --

MR. FOLEY: Well, I think it's not appropriate for me here in the State Department to comment at length on the National Security Adviser's speech, and I'd refer you to the White House for follow up questions on his speech. Broadly speaking, I think it's fair to say that his speech did not, in any way, indicate any lessening of US vigilance vis-à-vis Iraq, of US support for UNSCOM, and our belief that sanctions need to be and will be continued on Iraq for so long as Iraq has not met the terms of the relevant Security Council resolutions and complied fully with UNSCOM and the IAEA.

I think it's a truism, though, that as time goes on there is an evident danger of a slacking of international support. I'm not talking about US vigilance, but of international support for continuing with the robust sanctions regime. I think any observer in 1991 would have been hard pressed to predict that we would have been able to maintain broad international support for our policy of containing Iraq and maintaining sanctions over the seven-year period that ensued. In fact, I think this is testament to the ability and the force and the credibility of American diplomacy - that we've, through thick and thin, through ups and downs, have been able to maintain international consensus on our Iraq policy, as was evidenced in the latest crisis with Iraq in November, when Saddam Hussein found himself totally isolated internationally.

But I think, though, if you go back to the President's remarks at the time when the President announced that we were not going to be pursuing military action in view of Saddam Hussein's turn-around and resumption of cooperation with UNSCOM, the President discussed, I think, openly for the first time, our interest in seeing a post-Saddam Iraq and working with the Iraqi opposition. So the National Security Advisor's speech has to be seen in that line. I don't see that it broke new ground.

But I think we discovered in that crisis in November - and this continues to be the case today - that there had been a kind of turning point in Middle Eastern attitudes towards Saddam Hussein; a growing realization that his attempts to blame the United States for the problems of his country really were no longer credible. I'm talking about the opinion in neighboring states that he bore responsibility for the suffering of his people; he bore responsibility for this constant recurrence of crises between Iraq and the international community. Indeed, we saw that in the GCC statement, which assigned responsibility to Saddam Hussein for any consequences that would ensue from his failure to cooperate with the international community.

So we saw that kind of changing, shifting attitudes that indeed the plight of the Iraqi people was the responsibility of Saddam Hussein. We see growing conviction throughout the region that a post-Saddam Iraq would be in the interest certainly of the people of Iraq but also of the peoples of the region. National Security Advisor Berger spoke, I think, to some of those shifting attitudes. So I can restate for you what he said yesterday about our support for the Iraqi opposition, but you've heard it many times; I don't see I need to go over it once again.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) - and may be reading to much into it, but he seemed to be saying that - and this would be the first time you all have said this - that the United States would be willing to use force to - pick a word - unseat, help replace, whatever word you'd like to use, Saddam Hussein.

MR. FOLEY: Well, I'd really want to have the text before me. I read the section you mentioned, but I think it was a little more nuanced than that. The word "force" was used, but I really rather have that before me. Again, I refer you to the White House for the explicit commentary on what he said.

But he talked about -- I think you're getting at the fact that he talked about a couple of stages: one, we're working with them and helping them to unite and to agree on a common platform and a common strategy for producing change inside Iraq; and that we'll be willing to help them down the road as they grow in unity and grow in cohesiveness and grow in effectiveness. I wouldn't want to specify further. I'd refer you to the White House.

QUESTION: I'm sorry, but is the policy - policy is policy, whether it's you or Joe Lockhart or the President. Is the policy to use - over time - to use force to help the opposition?

MR. FOLEY: Well, that's not something that I'm in a position to lay out, specifically, in a public forum. We have received authority from the Congress - draw-down authority - to provide military equipment to the Iraqi opposition if we're able to identify groups deserving of the aid that meet certain criteria, and we intend to do so. Congress gave us 90 days, I believe, to go through this process. We intend to abide by the congressional mandate. To complete that process, I believe we're looking towards some time in, perhaps, mid-January to have completed that process.

QUESTION: That's a far cry from using force.

MR. FOLEY: Well, if you're asking me to lay out in specificity something that, frankly, is too sensitive to talk about in a public forum, I'm not going to do it.

QUESTION: A follow up to Sid's question in the last bit, Jim, can you tell us whether any of that draw-down authority has been exercised, either on the military equipment side or on the other side? I don't know what you call it - the political - getting groups, meeting with people.

MR. FOLEY: I don't believe so. We're currently engaged in identifying those groups, which meet the Iraq Liberation Act's criteria for support. We will present our findings to Congress, as I said, within the specified time frame.

QUESTION: Jim, can you tell us if Albright has had conversations today with Shelton and the President and Cohen about the situation in Iraq?

MR. FOLEY: I can't speak to her telephone activities today. I think her spokesman is traveling with her, and is perhaps addressing this as she travels -- she's currently in France -- but I'm not privy to that.

QUESTION: Two things, Jim, you said the United States doesn't believe that it needs any further action by the Security Council in order to take military action if it deems it necessary. Apparently, if I read the copy right, Iraq has seen some remarks by the Secretary General that they're interpreting in a different way. I'm curious of your assessment of what he has said. And the other thing was, you said -

MR. FOLEY: I'm afraid you'll have to be more specific, because I truly don't know what you're referring to.

QUESTION: I believe it was a speech by the Secretary General. Annan was suggesting that there would need to be further action by the Security Council before there would be military strike on Iraq.

MR. FOLEY: I'm not aware of what he said, but the United States' view that I state today is certainly not new and is not news to anyone that we believe - and we've said it all along - that there is sufficient authority to act and that we are prepared to act. We don't believe there's need for further Security Council debate or authorization. We made that clear. The Security Council itself is on record in resolutions going back to earlier this year - is on record warning Iraq of the severest consequences in the event of a failure to comply with its obligations.

QUESTION: And just one other thing - you said earlier that once you talked to Butler that you will make a judgment. Can you be just a little bit clearer on what you're talking about - a judgment on what? Is this a judgment on whether Iraq is cooperating; a judgment as to whether to begin the use of military force? Can you clarify it?

MR. FOLEY: As you know, Security Council Resolution 1194 envisages the possibility of a comprehensive review of Iraqi compliance and of sanctions. It's part of that resolution that a comprehensive review will be considered by the Security Council in the event that UNSCOM and the IAEA report to the Security Council that Iraq has resumed full cooperation. That's the report we await.

QUESTION: Can you tell us how quickly you expect to get the details from UNSCOM of what happened today so that you can make this judgment? Is it something that will happen within hours or does it require a meeting of the Security Council or what?

MR. FOLEY: I think there's a misimpression I need to correct on this score. There were inspections today. There appears to have been some kind of an incident involving one inspection. I would expect -- I believe Chairman Butler reports regularly - I'm not sure if it's weekly or bi-weekly - on the status of inspections. I expect he will report on the most recent inspections and perhaps on this incident. But that's a separate item from the report that he and the head of the IAEA will give the Security Council on across-the-board compliance, or lack thereof, that will enable the Security Council to judge whether or not to go forward with the comprehensive review.

QUESTION: Yes, but presumably you're interested in the first report that he --

MR. FOLEY: But when you asked a question about our judgment --maybe it was you or a colleague - our judgment on going forward with the comprehensive review will be based on those reports.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) - on whether this incident today amounts to a violation of the agreement which Iraq made back last month?

MR. FOLEY: Well, we'll await Chairman Butler's report on that. I can't tell you specifically when he's going to report.

QUESTION: So are you referring to the final report, then, Jim, or to sort of the interim?

MR. FOLEY: You'll have to ask your fellow questioner. I'm referring to both, in effect. Certainly if he reports on sort of an interim basis on a given set of inspections or an incident, we'll study that report; and if we have something to say, we will. But we're also expecting Chairman Butler and the IAEA to report on the overall level of compliance.

Insofar as that is concerned as I indicated, that involves - I think President Clinton spoke about many different areas - five different areas of benchmarks he described. But certainly as far as UNSCOM is concerned, we're talking about access to documents; we're talking about access to sites for inspections; we're talking about interviews with officials. In other words, there's a panoply of criteria upon which Chairman Butler is going to report to the Security Council.

.............

(The briefing concluded at 2:20 P.M.)

[end of document]



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