DATE=11/21/98
TYPE=ON THE LINE
NUMBER=1-00689 SHORT # 1
TITLE= WILL SADDAM COMPLY?
EDITOR=OFFICE OF POLICY - 619-0037
CONTENT=
INSERTS AVAILABLE FROM AUDIO SERVICES
THEME: UP, HOLD UNDER AND FADE
ANNCR: ON THE LINE -- A DISCUSSION OF UNITED STATES
POLICIES AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES. THIS WEEK,
"WILL SADDAM COMPLY?" HERE IS YOUR HOST, ROBERT
REILLY.
HOST: HELLO AND WELCOME TO ON THE LINE. THIS MONTH,
UNDER THREAT OF IMMINENT MILITARY ATTACK, IRAQI
DICTATOR SADDAM HUSSEIN AGREED TO ALLOW WEAPONS
INSPECTORS TO RESUME THEIR WORK. EARLIER, IRAQ
HAD ENDED ALL COOPERATION WITH UNITED NATIONS
WEAPONS INSPECTORS. THE U-N MONITORING PROGRAMS
HAD BEEN PUT IN PLACE AT THE END OF THE 1991
GULF WAR TO INSURE THAT IRAQ COULD NOT REBUILD
ITS BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS
CAPABILITIES. PRESIDENT BILL CLINTON SAID THAT
"THE WORLD IS WATCHING SADDAM HUSSEIN TO SEE IF
HE FOLLOWS THE WORDS HE UTTERED WITH DEEDS. OUR
FORCES REMAIN STRONG AND READY IF HE DOES NOT."
JOINING ME TODAY TO DISCUSS IRAQ AND U.S. POLICY
ARE THREE EXPERTS. ZALMAY KHALILZAD IS DIRECTOR
OF THE STRATEGY AND DOCTRINE PROGRAM AT THE RAND
CORPORATION AND FORMER ASSISTANT UNDERSECRETARY
OF DEFENSE. MICHAEL EISENSTADT IS SENIOR FELLOW
AT THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST
POLICY; AND JOSHUA MURAVCHIK IS RESIDENT SCHOLAR
AT THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE. WELCOME
TO THE PROGRAM.
MR. KHALILZAD, BOTH SIDES HAVE DECLARED VICTORY
IN THIS MOST RECENT ENCOUNTER. WHO WON?
KHALILZAD: IT'S NOT SURPRISING THAT BOTH SIDES HAVE
DECLARED VICTORY. IN MY JUDGMENT, THERE WAS NO
CLEAR VICTOR, ALTHOUGH I THINK SADDAM DID BETTER
THAN WE DID BECAUSE HE DID MANAGE NOT TO
COOPERATE WITH THE U-N INSPECTORS FOR SEVERAL
MONTHS. HE MANAGED TO FORCE US TO SPEND A GREAT
DEAL OF RESOURCES AND, IN FACT, OUR MILITARY
READINESS BY DEPLOYING FORCES TO THE AREA. AND
AT THE END HE GAVE US ENOUGH NOT TO ATTACK HIM.
YET, HE HAS GIVEN US PROMISES THAT HE HAS GIVEN
BEFORE, WITH NO REAL PROSPECTS THAT HE WOULD
HONOR THEM. SO, WE'VE PAID MORE OF A PRICE THAN
HE DID AT THE END OF THE DAY. SO, BECAUSE OF
THAT I THINK HE'S COME OFF SOMEWHAT BETTER THAN
WE DID. BUT NO GREAT VICTORS OR VANQUISHED IN
THIS LATEST ROUND.
HOST: MICHAEL EISENSTADT, WHAT'S YOUR ANSWER TO THAT?
EISENSTADT: I WOULD SAY IF THERE WAS A VICTORY FOR THE
UNITED STATES IT WAS A HOLLOW VICTORY. SADDAM
WAS ABLE TO ONCE AGAIN ENGAGE IN OBSTRUCTION
WITHOUT PAYING A PRICE. WE MISSED AN
OPPORTUNITY WHERE WE HAD BROAD INTERNATIONAL
SUPPORT FOR MILITARY ACTION. WE DID NOT. WE
DID NOT ENGAGE IN MILITARY ACTION. WE MISSED AN
OPPORTUNITY THERE. IF WE WANT TO KEEP THE
INSPECTORS IN IRAQ, IF WE WANT THE INSPECTORS TO
BE ABLE TO SUCCEED IN THEIR MISSION, WE CANNOT
DO THAT UNLESS WE ARE WILLING TO USE FORCE.
HOST: WHAT WOULD THE CONSEQUENCES HAVE BEEN WERE THE
UNITED STATES TO HAVE USED MILITARY FORCE AFTER
A CLEAR OFFER FROM IRAQ TO FULLY COMPLY?
EISENSTADT: I THINK THAT GIVEN THE LATE DATE OF THE OFFER,
GIVEN THE FACT THAT IT WAS AT THE LAST MINUTE
AND THE ATTACK ALREADY WAS IN TRAIN, I THINK WE
COULD HAVE COMMENCED OPERATIONS, CONTINUED THEM
FOR A DAY OR TWO WHILE NEGOTIATIONS WERE
CONTINUING OVER THE TERMS OF THE DIPLOMATIC
SETTLEMENT. AND WHY NOT NEGOTIATE WHILE BOMBING?
THAT WAY WE WOULD STILL GET THE SAME AGREEMENT
THAT WE GOT OUT OF THIS WHOLE CONFRONTATION AND
YET SADDAM WOULD HAVE BEEN FORCED TO PAY A
PRICE. IF WE USED FORCE, THERE WOULD BE A
GREATER DISINCENTIVE FOR HIM TO CHALLENGE US
SOON. NOW, BECAUSE HE DID NOT PAY A PRICE, I
THINK THE CHALLENGE WILL COME SOONER RATHER THAN
LATER, THAN IF WE HAD USED FORCE.
HOST: JOSHUA MURAVCHIK?
MURAVCHIK: WE'VE GOT OURSELVES IN A TERRIBLE BIND ON THIS
BUSINESS OF USING THREATS TO RESTORE
INSPECTIONS. WE ALREADY GAVE UP MEANINGFUL
INSPECTIONS WHEN WE AGREED TO KOFI ANNAN'S DEAL
BACK IN FEBRUARY. AND AT NO POINT IN THIS
CURRENT CRISIS DID THE ADMINISTRATION SUGGEST
UNDOING THAT. BUT THAT AGREEMENT ITSELF PUTS
MORE THAN A THOUSAND BUILDINGS IN THE SO-CALLED
PRESIDENTIAL SITES OFF LIMITS FOR THE KIND OF
CONFRONTATIONAL INVESTIGATIONS BY THE INSPECTORS
THAT ARE THE ONLY KIND THAT ARE LIKELY TO
DISCOVER WHAT IS GOING ON THERE.
HOST: BUT LET ME ASK YOU: IF YOU SAID THAT THE
INSPECTION REGIME AFTER FEBRUARY WAS
INEFFECTIVE, WHY WAS SADDAM HUSSEIN SO
INTERESTED IN ENDING IT?
MURAVCHIK: HE WANTS TO CONTINUE ROLLING IT BACK TO ZERO.
THE NATURE OF THE WAY HE PLAYS THE GAME IS THAT
HE PUSHES FOR EVERYTHING HE GETS. AND THEN HE'S
VERY ADEPT AT PULLING BACK A LITTLE BIT AT THE
LAST MOMENT ONCE HE'S TESTED THE LIMIT. BUT BY
DOING THIS OVER THE COURSE OF SEVEN YEARS, HE'S
PROGRESSIVELY WEAKENED THE INSPECTION REGIME.
HOST: SUPPOSEDLY, ACCORDING TO PRESIDENT CLINTON, IRAQ
HAS AGREED TO UNFETTERED AND UNRESTRICTED
INSPECTIONS. IS THAT YOUR UNDERSTANDING, ZALMAY
KHALILZAD? AND IF SO, ARE THE INSPECTIONS BY
THE U-N SPECIAL COMMISSION ON IRAQ A SUFFICIENT
TOOL TO, AS THEY SAY, KEEP SADDAM IN THE BOX AT
LEAST AS FAR AS WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ARE
CONCERNED?
KHALILZAD: OF COURSE HE HAS AGREED TO INSPECTIONS,
UNFETTERED INSPECTIONS. BUT THIS IS NOT THE
FIRST TIME THAT HE'S DONE IT. HE'S DONE THIS
REPEATEDLY AND HE HAS NOT HONORED THEM. I DO
NOT BELIEVE THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN IS WILLING TO
COME CLEAN IN TERMS OF HIS WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION. HIS AIM IS TO ERODE OUR RESOLVE
AND TO IMPOSE COSTS ON US SO THAT HE ULTIMATELY
WILL CONFRONT US WITH EITHER GOING TO WAR OR TO
ACQUIESCE TO HIS POSSESSION OF WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION. CLEARLY, HIS PREFERENCES ARE
ACQUIESCENCE. I THINK THE ONLY PROSPECTS FOR
IRAQ COMING CLEAN IN TERMS OF ITS WEAPONS OF
MASS DESTRUCTION IS IF THERE IS A REGIME IN IRAQ
THAT HAS NO INTEREST IN THESE WEAPONS AND IS
WILLING TO REMAIN AT PEACE WITH IRAQIS AND WITH
THE NEIGHBORHOOD. AND SADDAM IS NOT THAT PERSON.
SO WE ARE LIKELY TO CONFRONT THIS PROBLEM ONCE
AGAIN, PERHAPS IN WEEKS IF NOT IN MONTHS.
HOST: WHICH RAISES THE INTERESTING QUESTION: WHAT IS
HIS INTEREST IN WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION?
WHAT IS THE POLITICAL PURPOSE THOSE WEAPONS OF
MASS DESTRUCTION ARE THERE TO SERVE?
EISENSTADT: ULTIMATELY, IT'S BOUND UP WITH HIS SURVIVAL. HE
SEES THAT AS LONG AS HE HAS CHEMICAL OR
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, NOBODY'S GOING TO ASSEMBLE A
COALITION TO DRIVE ON BAGHDAD. AND THE
OPPOSTIONISTS WHO MIGHT HAVE THE IDEA OF TRYING
TO OVERTHROW HIM, HE BASICALLY HAS USED WEAPONS
IN THE PAST AGAINST INSURGENTS IN HIS OWN
COUNTRY -- CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND THE LIKE -- AND
THIS IS THE ULTIMATE WEAPON OF TERROR. SO, HE
SEES HIS SURVIVAL AS BOUND UP WITH THE WEAPONS
OF MASS DESTRUCTION. IN THE END, THE BOTTOM
LINE IS, IF HE HAS TO CHOOSE BETWEEN SURVIVAL OR
THE WEAPONS, HE'LL GIVE UP THE WEAPONS IF
NECESSARY OR HE'LL USE THEM IF NECESSARY. BUT,
CLEARLY, HE SEES THEM VERY CLOSELY BOUND UP TO
HIS OWN SURVIVAL IN THE FUTURE.
HOST: JOSHUA MURAVCHIK, THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT THE
ULTIMATE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM IN BAGHDAD IS A
NEW GOVERNMENT THERE. AND HE DID SIGN THE IRAQ
LIBERATION ACT, WHICH MAKES SOME HUNDRED MILLION
DOLLARS AVAILABLE TO IRAQI OPPOSITION GROUPS.
DO YOU THINK HE'S RIGHT IN SAYING THAT? AND DO
YOU THINK IT'S A REALISTIC COURSE TO PURSUE?
MURAVCHIK: IT'S THE MOST WELCOME THING THAT'S COME OUT OF
THIS CONFRONTATION. AND TO THE EXTENT THAT
THERE'S ANY AMERICAN VICTORY, IT MAY BE THAT
THAT VICTORY LIES IN THESE EVENTS HAVING FINALLY
PROPELLED THE PRESIDENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION
TO TAKE UP THIS COURSE OF ACTION, WHICH, DESPITE
SIGNING THE LEGISLATION, THEY HAD NOT EMBRACED
BEFORE. AND I THINK IT WAS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT
THIS IS A NEW DEPARTURE IN POLICY. NOW, IT
REMAINS TO BE IMPLEMENTED BUT NOBODY KNOWS HOW
EFFECTIVE THIS CAN BE. BUT WHAT I'M PUT IN MIND
OF IS BACK IN THE 1980S UNDER PRESIDENT REAGAN,
WHEN WE HAD THE SO-CALLED REAGAN DOCTRINE. AND
WHEN WE GAVE SUPPORT TO INSURGENT GROUPS IN
AFGHANISTAN, NICARAGUA, ANGOLA, CAMBODIA -- AND
THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM AT THE TIME WAS THAT
THIS WAS A COMPLETELY HOPELESS ENDEAVOR, THAT
THE NICARAGUAN CONTRAS COULDN'T ACCOMPLISH
ANYTHING. IN THE END, WE DIDN'T KNOW UNTIL WE
TRIED AND WHEN WE TRIED, IT WORKED. THE AFGHAN
MUJAHADEEN DEFEATED THE SOVIET UNION, THE
CONTRAS FORCED THE SANDINISTA REGIME INTO AN
ELECTION WHICH IT LOST AND WE HAD A CHANGE OF
GOVERNMENT THEN. SO, IT TURNED OUT TO BE A VERY
EFFECTIVE POLICY IN THAT CASE. AND WE'VE GOT TO
SEE HOW EFFECTIVE IT CAN BE HERE.
HOST: LET ME ASK THIS QUESTION THEN. THE OBJECTIVES
IN PURSUING SUCH A COURSE NOW WOULD BE QUITE
DIFFERENT FROM WHAT THEY WERE DURING THE COLD
WAR THAT JOSHUA MURAVCHIK JUST MENTIONED. FOR
INSTANCE, IT IS ALWAYS AN ANNOUNCED OBJECTIVE OF
U.S. POLICY TO PRESERVE THE SOVEREIGNTY AND
TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF IRAQ. NOW, IF THE
UNITED STATES ATTEMPTS TO ASSEMBLE A COALITION
OF ANTI-SADDAM FORCES, SOME SAY THAT THE MOST
EFFECTIVE WAY TO DO THAT WOULD BE BY
EXACERBATING TRIBAL RIVALRIES WITHIN IRAQ
BECAUSE SADDAM REPRESENTS A MINORITY TRIBE AND
HAS STAFFED HIS ADMINISTRATION WITH HIS
RELATIVES AND FRIENDS FROM THAT TRIBE. MIGHT
NOT DOING THAT VERY THING LEAD TO THE
DISINTEGRATION OF IRAQ, THOUGH, AND THEREFORE
DEFEAT OUR LARGER OBJECTIVE?
KHALILZAD: THE PROCESS FOR STRENGTHENING THE IRAQI
OPPOSITION AND GETTING RID OF SADDAM BY
SUPPORTING THE IRAQI PEOPLE TO HAVE A NEW
GOVERNMENT IS LIKELY TO BE A PROTRACTED PROCESS.
WE CAN USE OUR LEVERAGE OF SUPPORT FOR THE IRAQI
OPPOSITION, TAKING THIS DANGER INTO ACCOUNT, BY
ENCOURAGING COOPERATION, BY ENCOURAGING
LEADERSHIP THAT'S BROAD BASED, REPRESENTING
DIFFERENT SECTS AND ETHNIC GROUPS IN IRAQ. BUT
AT THE END OF THE DAY, THERE IS SOME RISK THAT A
VICTORIOUS IRAQI OPPOSITION COULD LEAD TO A
DEGREE OF INSTABILITY IN IRAQ. THAT RISK WE CAN
TRY TO MINIMIZE, BUT I THINK NO ONE CAN
GUARANTEE THE ABSENCE OF THAT SORT OF
INSTABILITY. BUT THE STRATEGIC QUESTION FOR US
IS: IS THAT MORE DANGEROUS FOR AMERICAN
INTERESTS, TO REGIONAL STABILITY, THAN HAVING
SADDAM ARMED WITH WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION?
IN MY JUDGMENT, THAT IS A RISK THAT WE SHOULD BE
PREPARED TO RUN, ALTHOUGH WE SHOULD DO
EVERYTHING WE CAN IN THE PROCESS OF ASSISTING
THE IRAQIS TO MINIMIZE THAT PROSPECT.
HOST: WHAT DO YOU THINK OF THAT?
EISENSTADT: I AGREE WITH ZAL AND JOSH. I THINK IT'S CLEAR
THAT CONTAINMENT AS A POLICY, THE POLICY WE'VE
BEEN PURSUING SINCE THE GULF WAR, IS NECESSARY
BUT IT'S NOT ENOUGH, AND IT DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR
A MECHANISM FOR GETTING RID OF THE REGIME, WHICH
IS REALLY THE SOURCE OF THE PROBLEM. SO WE HAVE
TO WORK WITH THE OPPOSITION. WE HAVE TO DO MORE
THAN WE HAVE BEEN DOING IN THE PAST IN ORDER TO
SUPPORT THE OPPOSITION. MY CONCERN IS, HOWEVER,
THE CONTEXT IN WHICH THIS WHOLE AMERICAN
INITIATIVE CAME OUT. I SEE THIS, UNFORTUNATELY,
AS REALLY A GESTURE BY CLINTON TO PROTECT HIS
EXPOSED FLANK AT A TIME WHEN HE DREW BACK FROM
MILITARY ACTION, TO PROTECT HIS FLANK FROM
DOMESTIC CRITICS AND NOT BEING REALLY A GENUINE
DECISION IN ORDER TO SUPPORT THE OPPOSITION.
HOST: BUT HE HAD SIGNED THE IRAQI LIBERATION ACT
BEFORE THIS LATEST CONFRONTATION.
EISENSTADT: SURE. BUT IT'S VERY CLEAR THAT THE
ADMINISTRATION AND THE CONGRESS HAVE DIFFERENT
IDEAS AS TO WHAT SUPPORTING THE OPPOSITION
MEANS. AND I DON'T THINK ENOUGH THOUGHT AND WORK
HAS BEEN DONE AND PLANNING HAS BEEN DONE BY THE
ADMINISTRATION TO REALLY TAKE THIS BEYOND THE
LEVEL OF PLANNING INTO IMPLEMENTATION.
HOST: CONSIDERING THE ALTERNATIVES, IS IT NOT BETTER
TO HAVE THE INSPECTORS BACK IN IRAQ NOW, THAN
THE POSSIBLE OUTCOME OF TEN THOUSAND DEAD
IRAQIS, MANY OF THEM CIVILIANS? SADDAM HUSSEIN,
WHO WAS WILLING TO WITHSTAND THE KIND OF
POUNDING THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD HAVE
DELIVERED BUT WHO AFTERWARD SAYS, I HAVE NO
FURTHER INCENTIVE TO DEAL WITH THE U-N AND MEET
THE U-N RESOLUTIONS.
EISENSTADT: I DISAGREE WITH THOSE PREMISES. FIRST OF ALL,
OUR EXPERIENCE WITH SADDAM IS THIS: HE ALWAYS
DRAWS BACK FROM THE BRINK WHEN FACED WITH THE
THREAT OF FORCE. AND IN FACT, WE SAW IT
ALREADY. IF HE DREW BACK FROM THE BRINK WITHOUT
US USING FORCE, WHY DO YOU THINK HE'S GOING TO
RIDE THROUGH A BOMBING CAMPAIGN AND EMERGE
UNSCATHED. I THINK THAT HE BELIEVES THAT HIS
DOMESTIC SITUATION IS VERY TENUOUS. HE DOESN'T
WANT TO TAKE A RISK WITH A BOMBING CAMPAIGN THAT
COULD PERHAPS DESTABILIZE HIM DOMESTICALLY.
WITH REGARD TO REPORTS ABOUT TEN THOUSAND
CASUALTIES, I DON'T KNOW WHERE THIS NUMBER CAME
FROM. IF YOU LOOK AT DESERT STORM, THE BEST
ESTIMATES THAT HAVE BEEN DONE RIGHT AFTER THE
WAR BY HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WAS THAT -- AND THIS
WAS A TERRIBLE TOLL -- NO MORE THAN TWENTY FIVE
HUNDRED TO THREE THOUSAND IRAQI CIVILIANS WERE
KILLED IN THAT WAR, A FORTY-THREE DAY WAR. I
DON'T SEE HOW THEY GOT A TEN THOUSAND NUMBER
WHEN WE'RE TALKING ABOUT FOUR TO SIX DAYS OF
BOMBING IN VERY RESTRICTED WAYS.
HOST: I THINK THEY GOT IT BECAUSE THE IRAQIS, SADDAM
HUSSEIN, HAS BEEN RELOCATING HIS WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION OR THE FACILITIES TO DEVELOP THEM IN
CIVILIAN AREAS, KNOWING ABOUT THE U.S.
RELUCTANCE TO INFLICT CIVILIAN CASUALTIES. IS
THAT RIGHT?
KHALILZAD: OF COURSE IN THESE BOMBINGS, YOU CAN'T BE
ENTIRELY SURE HOW IT WILL COME OUT. WAR IS AN
UNCERTAIN BUSINESS. THERE COULD HAVE BEEN
CASUALTIES. WHETHER THE TEN THOUSAND FIGURE IS
RIGHT OR WRONG, IT'S DIFFICULT TO BE CERTAIN.
MY OWN JUDGMENT IS THAT A BOMBING CAMPAIGN OF
LIMITED DURATION AIMED AT PUNISHING IRAQ FOR ITS
DEFIANCE WITHOUT IT BEING TIED TO A STRATEGIC
OBJECTIVE OF GETTING RID OF THE PROBLEM, WHICH
IS SADDAM'S POSSESSION OF W-M-D, THAT CANNOT BE
ACHIEVED WITHOUT GETTING RID OF SADDAM, AND
WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN A GREAT CONTRIBUTION. I
THINK IF THE CAMPAIGN HAS BEEN TIED TO THE
OBJECTIVE OF GETTING RID OF THE REGIME, THEN I
THINK IT WOULD HAVE BEEN AN ENTERPRISE WORTH
UNDERTAKING.
HOST: JOSH MURAVCHIK?
MURAVCHIK: I THINK I AGREE WITH THAT. THAT IS, IF WE WERE
GOING TO UNDERTAKE BOMBING, I THINK PROBABLY THE
WORST THAT WE COULD HAVE DONE IS TO MAKE IT A
LIMITED CAMPAIGN. I THINK IF WE WERE GOING TO
GO DOWN THAT ROUTE, WE SHOULD ANNOUNCE AT THE
OUTSET THAT THIS IS A CAMPAIGN THAT'S NOT GOING
TO BE LIMITED TO FOUR DAYS OR TO SIX DAYS. IT'S
GOT NO END POINT AND WE SHOULD JUST CONTINUE TO
TAKE OUT ANY FACILITY IN IRAQ THAT WE SUSPECT IS
INVOLVED IN HIS WEAPONS PROGRAM. BUT THAT IS
SOMETHING THAT WE MIGHT LOSE THE STEEL IN OUR
NERVES TO CONTINUE DOING BECAUSE CASUALTIES
WOULD MOUNT. BUT IT'S THE ONLY KIND OF CAMPAIGN
THAT I CAN SEE AS MEANINGFUL. AND THEREFORE, I
EMBRACE THAT ALTERNATIVE THAT ZAL HAS BEEN
POINTING TOWARDS, WHICH IS: FOCUS ON GETTING RID
OF THE REGIME AND DOING WHATEVER IT WILL TAKE TO
DO THAT.
HOST: WHAT ABOUT THE LEVEL OF INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT
FOR A COURSE OF ACTION LIKE THAT? THERE WAS AN
UNUSUAL CONSTELLATION OF EVENTS THAT LED TO
TOTAL SUPPORT FOR THE CONTEMPLATED MILITARY
ACTION AGAINST IRAQ THIS TIME, WITH EVEN RUSSIA
AND FRANCE SUPPORTING IT. BUT IT SEEMS THAT
RUSSIA, CHINA AND FRANCE ARE THE FIRST ONES TO
BEGIN MAKING EXCUSES FOR IRAQ AND MAY ALREADY
AGAIN BE ENGAGED IN SAYING, THEY'RE COOPERATING,
SO NO STRIKES. WHAT'S THE LIKELIHOOD THAT THE
UNITED STATES WILL AGAIN ENJOY THAT KIND OF
UNANIMOUS SUPPORT, ALLOWING THE FREEDOM OF
ACTION THAT WE HAD.
KHALILZAD: THE QUESTION IS HOW IMPORTANT IS UNANIMOUS
SUPPORT IF THE PURPOSES FOR WHICH YOU HAVE THAT
SUPPORT ARE NOT THAT MEANINGFUL. IF OUR
OBJECTIVE IS TO GET RID OF SADDAM BECAUSE WE
THINK THE PROBLEM CAN'T BE SOLVED WITHOUT THAT,
WHAT WE NEED IS THE SUPPORT OF THOSE COUNTRIES
THAT CAN MAKE A DIFFERENCE IN BRINGING THAT
ABOUT. AND IN THE KIND OF STRATEGY THAT WE HAVE
BEEN DISCUSSING HERE TODAY, THE SUPPORT OF
SEVERAL COUNTRIES WILL BE KEY. IT WILL BE
TURKEY. IT WILL BE SAUDI ARABIA. IT WILL BE
KUWAIT AND POSSIBLY JORDAN. I THINK IF WE HAD A
SERIOUS PLAN THAT COULD DEAL WITH THIS PROBLEM
OF ELIMINATING SADDAM, I THINK THOSE COUNTRIES
WOULD SUPPORT US. THEY'RE NOT INTERESTED IN
SOME LIMITED EFFORT THAT CAN STIR THE POT BUT
NOT SOLVE THE PROBLEM.
HOST: THE UNITED STATES DID HAVE THE KEY SUPPORT OF
EGYPT, SYRIA, SAUDI ARABIA AND THE FIVE GULF
STATES THIS TIME, AT LEAST IN THEIR SAYING THAT
WHATEVER HAPPENS, LET IT BE UPON SADDAM'S HEAD.
IS THE UNITED STATE LIKELY TO MAINTAIN THAT KIND
OF SUPPORT FOR A COURSE OF ACTION THAT THE
PRESIDENT HAS SPOKEN OF THAT WOULD LEAD TO A
CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT IN BAGHDAD?
EISENSTADT: THAT I'M NOT QUITE SURE ABOUT. I THINK THERE IS
BROAD SUPPORT IN PRINCIPLE FOR THE IDEA OF
CONTINUING U-N INSPECTIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH
U-N RESOLUTIONS. BUT EVEN GIVEN THAT, IT HAS
BEEN VERY DIFFICULT TO GET SUPPORT FOR MILITARY
ACTION WHICH IS NECESSARY TO IMPLEMENT THAT
POLICY, TO MAKE THAT POLICY WORK. I THINK ALL
THE MORE SO IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO HAVE BROAD
REGIONAL SUPPORT FOR AN OPPOSITION-BASED
STRATEGY, BUT AS ZAL SAID, WE DON'T NEED THE
SUPPORT OF THE ENTIRE REGION. WE NEED JUST THE
SUPPORT OF A FEW COUNTRIES IN ORDER TO MAKE THAT
OPTION WORK.
MURAVCHIK: IF I CAN ALLUDE AGAIN TO MY ANALOGY TO THE 1980S
AND THE REAGAN DOCTRINE. WE CERTAINLY DID NOT
HAVE UNANIMOUS SUPPORT FOR WHAT WE WERE DOING
THEN, BUT WE DID HAVE SOMETHING THAT WAS VERY
IMPORTANT, WHICH WAS A STRONG FEELING THAT THE
ADMINISTRATION AT THAT POINT WAS VERY DETERMINED
TO PUSH FORWARD WITH THIS POLICY. AND OTHERS
MAY HAVE BEEN RELUCTANT BUT THEY AT LEAST COULD
CALCULATE THAT IF THEY DECIDED TO SIGN UP ON OUR
TEAM, THAT WE WERE GOING TO SEE IT THROUGH. I
THINK WE GOT OURSELVES IN A DIFFICULT SITUATION
IN WHICH WE PLAY HAMLET AND OTHER COUNTRIES
AREN'T SURE HOW SERIOUS WE ARE WITH ANY
PARTICULAR COURSE OF ACTION. AND THEN, FIRST OF
ALL, THEY MAY NOT COMPLETELY AGREE WITH US, AND
SECOND OF ALL, THEY'VE GOT NO INCENTIVE TO PUT
ASIDE THEIR DOUBTS IF THEY THINK WE OURSELVES
MAY CHANGE OUR MINDS NEXT MONTH, NEXT YEAR. I
THINK THAT IF WE SHOW THAT WE HAVE REALLY COME
TO A POLICY WITH GREAT DETERMINATION AND THAT WE
ARE GOING TO SEE IT THROUGH, HOWEVER LONG IT
TAKES AND HOWEVER MUCH EFFORT IT TAKES, THEN AT
LEAST A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF OTHERS WILL BE
WILLING TO COOPERATE.
KHALILZAD: I THINK JOSHUA'S POINT IS KEY. THE CRITICAL
ISSUE FOR US IS A DECISION HERE, THAT WE DECIDE
ON WHAT'S OUR OBJECTIVE AND THAT WE HAVE A
STRATEGY THAT CAN GET US FROM HERE TO THERE.
ONCE WE HAVE RESOLVED THAT HERE, I THINK THAT
EVERYBODY'S CALCULATION WILL CHANGE. AND I HAVE
NO DOUBT THAT WITH REGARD TO SOME OF THE KEY
COUNTRIES WHOSE SUPPORT WE WILL NEED IN THIS
STRATEGY, THEY WILL COME ON BOARD.
HOST: I'M AFRAID THAT'S ALL THE TIME WE HAVE THIS
WEEK. I'D LIKE TO THANK OUR GUESTS -- ZALMAY
KHALILZAD FROM THE RAND CORPORATION AND FORMER
ASSISTANT UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE; MICHAEL
EISENSTADT FROM THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR
NEAR EAST POLICY; AND JOSHUA MURAVCHIK FROM THE
AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE -- FOR JOINING ME
THIS WEEK TO DISCUSS IRAQ AND U.S. POLICY. THIS
IS ROBERT REILLY FOR ON THE LINE.
20-Nov-98 2:28 PM EST (1928 UTC)
NNNN
Source: Voice of America
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