Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Washington -- Secretary of State Madeleine Albright will soon name a special representative to the Iraqi opposition, "who will have the day-to-day responsibility for working with the opposition and representing the State Department in this effort," a Senior Administration Official said November 20 at a State Department background briefing.

"We've been engaged with the opposition in discussing with them how we can help them be more effective, more unified, and present a more effective opposition to the regime in Baghdad," the Official said.

"Our objective here is to focus our efforts on ... helping them to organize politically, so that ... we can work with them towards the day when there's a new government in Iraq; one that is more representative of the aspirations of the Iraqi people, one that doesn't repress their aspirations; a regime -- a government that is more prepared to live up to Iraq's obligations to the international community; and a government that we can work with to bring Iraq back into the community of nations," the Official stated.

Following is an unofficial transcript of the background briefing, from Legi-Slate:

(Begin transcript)

STATE DEPARTMENT BACKGROUND BRIEFING

SUBJECT: IRAQ

ATTRIBUTABLE TO A SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL

THE STATE DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON, D.C.

3:15 P.M. EST

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 1998

JAMES FOLEY (Deputy spokesman): Welcome to the State Department on a Friday afternoon. This is a rare occasion to see all of you here at this late hour of the week. We have a senior administration official -- this is a background briefing -- who is going to speak to you in response to any questions you have about the current situation in Iraq.

We have about 25 minutes. We'll have to end this at 20 to 4:00. Thank you.

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Hi. In the interest of time and because I really don't have any news to make here, but I understand that there are a lot of questions being asked about what we're doing with Iraq and with the opposition and so on, that Jamie and Jim thought I should come down and try to answer your questions. So I'll be glad to do that.

Q: What do you think of the opposition? You had a meeting. And what else can you tell us you folks are doing?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: You know, Barry, for some time we have been engaged with the opposition in an effort over the past six months, basically, from the time when Congress appropriated some money, the ESF money that is in the State Department account, we had for the first time the ability to engage in State Department activity in support of the opposition.

We've been engaged with the opposition in discussing with them how we can help them be more effective, more unified, and present a more effective opposition to the regime in Baghdad. Our objective here is to focus our efforts on -- in the first instance, at least, on helping them to organize politically, so that, as the president said, we can work with them towards the day when there's a new government in Iraq; one that is more representative of the aspirations of the Iraqi people, one that doesn't repress their aspirations; a regime -- a government that is more prepared to live up to Iraq's obligations to the international community; and a government that we can work with to bring Iraq back into the community of nations. So that's the broad effort that we're engaged in.

On Sunday, the president made clear that rather than just looking towards a day when that government came into being, we were going to start working intensively with the opposition to try to advance that day as best we could. Now, we recognize that this is a long-term process; that we are going to have to work hard at it; that it's a complex task; that in the first instance there's going to be more activity behind the scenes than that that will be noticeable in public, but that it is an important task and one that the president and the administration is committed to pursuing.

Q: Is there going to be an overall coordinator for this effort named? And also, any other details on exactly -- are you going to get the different -- there are some 70-odd opposition groups out there. Are you going to get them together, form a new executive committee, or what?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: The secretary will be naming, very soon, a special representative to the Iraqi opposition, who will have the day-to-day responsibility for working with the opposition and representing the State Department in this effort.

In terms of what we're going to do, I think it's very important to understand that we're there to help, we're not there to do it for them. And I think that there are a lot of people out there who are fed up with Saddam Hussein's regime, who are fed up with the situation of weakness that they find themselves in, and who feel that they have to act because the future is so grim for them and their families and their children. And so what we're seeking to do is to support their efforts. Unifying the opposition is an important part of that to make them effective, but our purpose is to get behind them and help them pursue their program and not dictate that to them.

Yes?

Q: Do you have -- I believe the legislation says that by a certain date you'd have to name to the Congress the groups that will be receiving aid. Can you tell us when that date is? And do you have any idea at this point as to which groups it will be?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: What the legislation requires is for us to report to Congress on those groups that we have identified or designated as groups that are qualified to receive the drawdown that is being authorized by the Congress. And no funds have been appropriated; they've simply authorized that if the administration decides that we could draw down military equipment or other equipment to the tune of $97 million -- in order for that to happen, we will have to designate groups that would be qualified to receive that kind of support. And we are embarked on that process now.

I believe that it has to be done somewhere around the end of December -- we would have to report to Congress on that. That process is the first instance, designation of the groups that could receive it. As for what we would do after that, that's further on down the road.

Q: Have you identified any credible leaders among the opposition?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, there are people in Europe, in London, who have played a leadership role in the opposition. We've been in touch with them for some time. I engage with them; I think Barry noted that I've met with Achmed Chalabi. Of course, that's not the first time I've done that. I think I've done that three times in the last six months or so. He comes to Washington. There are a lot of others who are in London that we're in touch with. And we're also working with the British government, who are also engaged with them.

But I think that it's important to send the signal to them now that we are engaged more actively. I think the president's statement in that regard was very important, in terms of sending that signal. And we will see what emerges from the many individuals and groups who have an interest in seeing a better future for Iraq.

Q: And would you consider Chalabi a credible leader, though?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Chalabi is certainly one of the people that we're engaged with and one of the -- his organization, the INC, is certainly an important group within the opposition, and it's -- and one of the organizations that we will be supporting.

Q: On Tuesday Chairman Butler sent a letter to the Iraqis, listing some documents that he's interested in seeing, some Air Force documents, some other ones. Today a Doctor Al-Keisi (sp) sent him a letter back, essentially saying that "the documents that you've requested either don't exist or are" -- or that the requests are -- have already been answered in previous correspondences, and also noted that the request is provocative rather than professional. And I think the gist of it is that "sorry, no."

What do you make now of this -- sort of the post-crisis inspection environment? If --

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Yeah. We're aware of these letters. They've been circulated to the members of the Security Council We're now taking a look at them. We're waiting to hear from UNSCOM what their assessment of these responses is, how they view them, how they would characterize them. And then we'll have a more definitive response for you.

Obviously, documents are a very important part of trying to establish what Iraq has done with its weapons of mass destruction. And there are some very important documents that UNSCOM has now requested again; they've requested them before and been denied them. And I think that in order to establish Iraq's intention to cooperate fully, as they've promised to do, and in order to establish whether UNSCOM can do its job, we will have to look at their response as one of the indications of that intent.

Q: So you have not yet determined whether this most recent exchange demonstrates fettered or unfettered work?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: As I said to you, we're taking a look at it now, and it won't be long before we make that determination. But in the first instance, I think, we look to UNSCOM, as the professional body responsible for doing this work, to give guidance to the members of the Security Council as to what this response means, and, you know, then we'll have an opportunity to react in due course.

Q: As you work with the opposition groups, is this just the State Department that's going to be in contact with them, or is the Defense Department also going to be in contact with them? And I wonder if the views at the Defense Department are the same as they are here?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I'll restrain myself.

Q: It's okay!

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: (Laughs.)

Q: Feel free to state your heart and mind! (Laughter.)

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: The State Department has responsibility for administering the ESF funds that the Congress has appropriated, and that's approximately $8 million, for activities including support for the opposition, funding for Radio Free Iraq, and funding for the war crimes effort, the effort to indict Saddam Hussein as a war criminal. So that's our piece of the action.

We also have the lead in terms of designating the groups that might qualify for drawdown. Of course the drawdown is for defense equipment and, obviously, this has to come from the Pentagon, and so the Pentagon will have a say in that part of it.

So I think that's the division of responsibility. And I would just underscore again that the president, on Sunday, made clear that we are going to work towards a day when there's a new government in Iraq, and that, as he said at that point, as part of that process, he will be implementing the Iraq Liberation Act.

Q: Well, is the Defense Department going to follow the president's new policy and --

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Yes. (Chuckles.)

Q: Yeah?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Is that a serious question?

Q: I mean, are they going to meet with Chalabi, for instance? Do you know?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, I don't think that's -- that's not part of the Pentagon's responsibility as I've explained it.

Q: How concerned are you that this will actually strengthen support for Saddam inside Iraq from the Sunni Muslims?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: As I said, I think, to answer the first question, I really sense that in Iraq itself, across the board, whether it's Shi'as or Sunnis or Kurds, there is a feeling, which is also reflected, by the way, in the wider Arab world, that enough is enough; that the Iraqi people have suffered too much under Saddam Hussein's repressive hands. And, you know, I think many of them lived in hope that either he would comply and sanctions would come off and that would create a different situation for them or that he would somehow pass from the scene. But as time has gone on, I think they are now at a point of being fed up with the situation, and I think that actually may be part of the reason why he feels it necessary to try to square the circle, which is that he wants sanctions lifted without giving up his weapons of mass destruction because, I think, he feels that his own situation is becoming more and more desperate.

And so, far from scaring them, I think it sent an important signal that there is a better future for Iraq out there, that this does not have to continue forever and that if there was a new government in Iraq, one that was prepared to live up to its international obligations, that the United States would work with that government actively and responsively as it fulfilled its obligations to lift the sanctions and to welcome it back into the international community.

And that's the message that we want to send to the Sunni heartland, to the Shi'as, to the Kurds of Iraq, that we want a government there that represents their interests, all of their interests, and we want an Iraq that is unified and whole and whose territorial integrity is respected, but an Iraq that has a government that is, as I said before, more representative of their needs and more willing to live up to Iraq's obligations.

Q: Can you address what you think the situation is with possible internal opposition, as opposed to opposition outside, what your assessment is of whether there is any north or south?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, in the south there has been an ongoing insurgency, a resistance, to the Saddam Hussein regime. Every day people are dying in the south resisting the Iraqi regime.

In the north, the Kurds have been one of the communities that have suffered the most under Saddam Hussein's repressive regime. And, of course, they suffered a terrible fate when Saddam used chemical weapons against them. In comparison to that situation, their situation now is much, much better -- or comparison to the situation after the Gulf War when there was this massive refugee movement north.

The Kurdish -- main Kurdish parties, the KDP and the PUK, have, as you know, signed this pact under our sponsorship and with the involvement of the Turkish government, that creates a much more stable situation in northern Iraq. With the oil-for-food revenues, one-third of which are going -- sorry -- 13 percent of which are going to the north, their economic situation is much better now; things are functioning there. It's actually becoming somewhat of a magnet to Iraqis in the center of the country because the situation is so much better there.

So you have elements in the north and the south that are resisting Saddam, that are able to function outside of his purview, and that phenomenon is something that we are helping to foster, in particular by the operation of the no-fly zones in the north and the south. And in terms of what else we can do, that's something that we've got to take a look at now. The external opposition, as I said before, is political in its makeup. It's base is really much more in England than it is here. And as I've said, we intend to work with them to help them more effectively represent this alternative to the Iraqi regime and to help them over time establish an ability to put forward an alternative government to this Iraqi regime.

Q: Given that the Iraqi opposition is in disarray, there are a large number of organizations, given that these, as you say, groups are mainly political as opposed to military groups, is spending $97 million on military equipment -- does it make any sense? Is it possible that a lot of this money will go unspent?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, we'll have to take it one step at a time. We're glad to have the authorization from Congress. It gives us a new tool to work with. But, as I said before, it's a complicated process. It's a longer-term effort. And it's something which we have a responsibility to make sure that we're not simply arming people and sending them off to die for no good purpose.

So, we take it one step at a time. We'll help them organize. We'll designate the -- identify the groups that are eligible for this kind of assistance, and then we'll see what the next steps are.

Q Have the Kurds in the North, Talabani and Barzani, signed on to this effort to oust Saddam, or are they simply resisting in terms of protecting their turf in the north?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Yeah, I think -- I think that they are -- certainly their first interest is to protect their populations from the Iraqi regime. And we have an interest in helping them do that. When they were divided, it was much easier for Saddam to play one off against the other and to take advantage of that, as he did in 1996, when he moved north. And that is why we have been very focused in the last year on this reconciliation effort, which has been successful.

They have been an important part of the opposition in the past. And again, we will -- we are working very actively with them. And I think that we can build on the fact that they want to protect their populations from the Iraqi regime.

Q: So the answer, then, is they're not at this point signed on to a broader effort to oust Saddam?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: You know, I think you are pressing for some definitive -- yeah, I'm not here to make news -- (laughs) -- you're pressing for some kind of definitive judgment about this. And I'm -- what I'm telling you is that we're in a process here that's going to take a little time to develop. So, you know, it needs to be done carefully and patiently, but it also needs to be done vigorously and intensively. And that's what we're committed to doing.

(Cross talk.) Sid?

Q: Two -- just two quick questions: One, how do you handle the sensitive aspects of this operation, given your concerns about infiltration of these groups by Baghdad? And then just a second question: How do you dance around the relations with Iran's situation when you're dealing with the Shi'ites in the South?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, you know, they're both good questions, Sid. Clearly Saddam Hussein feels threatened by opposition activities. And he does devote a lot of resources to trying to counter them, and one tried and true method of his is infiltration. So it's an issue that the groups themselves have to try to deal with.

Again, it's not -- this is not a made-in-America operation; we are there to help them to support their activities, to help them become more effective. And we're looking at all sorts of different ways to do that. But in the end, it will be up to them, and it has to be up to them. And so they'll have to deal with that problem, too.

In terms of dealing with the Shi'a, we are in contact with the Sirri (sp), the main Shi'a opposition group. They are part of the broad-based opposition movement, which includes Shi'as and Sunnis and Kurds, Bob, and we can deal with them directly. But I think that they have enjoyed support from Iran in the past, and we -- you know, we don't see that as an obstacle to working with them, along with working with all the other groups to try to achieve this objective of a better future for Iraq.

Q: What is your general assessment of this INC plan that's being pitched around town, and developed with the assistance of some former American officials, to essentially seize some of the outward reaches of Iraq with American air power?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: As I said before, we feel a responsibility to do this right. In the past, Iraqis have died in large numbers, partly in response to urgings by administration officials, partly in response to what they thought were commitments on our part. And we are conscious of the fact that if we go off half-cocked, this could have very negative consequences. People could die -- a lot of people could die for no good effect. And so I think it's -- we have a special responsibility to do it right, and that's what we intend to do. That means looking at these ideas, taking them seriously, but not acting until we have a sense that something that can be achieved that will redound to the benefit of all Iraqis.

Q: Can I ask you just one quick question?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q: Is there any consideration being given in the U.S. government to enlisting Iran's support in trying to topple Saddam Hussein?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, we'll certainly take support from wherever we can get it. I think that all of Iraq's neighbors have a common interest in seeing a different government there; one that, as I said before, is more responsive to Iraq's obligations to the international community, one that is prepared to live in peace with its neighbors rather than threaten them. And so, you know, I think that Iran has, along with some of Iraq's other neighbors, has suffered particularly from Saddam Hussein's aggressive intentions. He used chemical weapons against the Iranians, and there was a long, bitter and bloody 10-year war between Iraq and Iran, so Iran knows very well what kind of a danger Iraq poses. And so I think that there's a common interest there, as there's a common interest with many of Iraq's other neighbors in finding a way to change the situation for the better.

Q: Has there been any communications directly or indirectly with the Iranian government, enlisting support?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: No, I'm just not going to get into that.

Q: (Off mike) -- on Saddam Hussein. Why do you keep professing -- the administration -- keep professing support for Iraq's territorial integrity? I mean, I suppose you owe that to the other Arab countries, but would it be a part of the -- doesn't it contradict a lot of the scheming and a lot of this propagandizing?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Barry, we're not interested in creating, unloosing chaos on Iraq or on the region, and --

Q: Well, to deal with Iran is about as chaotic an approach as I can imagine.

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well --

Q: So, I mean, how are you going to inspire the Kurds, for instance --

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: (Off mike.)

Q: Of course, but how are you going to inspire the Kurds that there's a better future for them, for instance, if you keep talking about Iraq's territorial integrity and who are the Thomas Jeffersons --

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: The Kurdish groups themselves, if you talk to them and certainly that's a position that they made very clear to us, is that they are not interested in the disintegration of Iraq and they are interested in maintaining the unity of the Iraqi people, and that is part of their approach. They see themselves as Iraqis just like the Shi'as in the south see themselves as Iraqis and so it's not part of their agenda, it's not part of our agenda to see the dismemberment of Iraq.

Q: If we could just narrow the question of why is it not part of the agenda? Why is it not part of the agenda?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Thank you.

Q: (Off mike) -- response on the Iraqi proposal today? You said that you all will respond once Butler's --

MR. FOLEY: We'll respond when we -- ?? we're going to --

Q: Will it be a piece of paper or will it be --

MR. FOLEY: As he indicated, we're going to wait Butler's judgment, first of all --

Q: Right.

MR. FOLEY: -- he's just been circling -- he didn't get in time -- (off mike) -- whether we'll have something to announce today, I doubt that.

Q: Do you have any idea when that'll be?

MR. FOLEY: No, I don't know.

(End transcript)