19 November 1998
TRANSCRIPT: COHEN/ROBERTSON PRESS CONFERENCE NOVEMBER 19, 1998
(Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo, NKorea, defense industry, Y2K) (2610) Secretary of Defense Cohen and the UK's Secretary of State for Defense Robertson held a press conference at the Pentagon November 19. Following is the Pentagon transcript: (begin transcript) DoD News Briefing Thursday, November 19, 1998 Presenters: US Secretary of Defense William Cohen and Secretary of State for Defense George Robertson, United Kingdom SECRETARY COHEN: Good afternoon. It's always a pleasure for me to welcome my good friend George Robertson to the Pentagon. Last week Prime Minister Blair wrote an OpEd piece in the New York Times about Europe's role in foreign policy, and he noted that in the 1970s, Henry Kissinger asked whom he should call in Europe should a foreign policy crisis arise. Well, when I need advice or counsel or support, one of the first people I call is George Robertson. The resolve of the United States and the United Kingdom to use force in Iraq caused Saddam to back down and to capitulate. Our forces in the Gulf remain poised, should Saddam fail to live up to his word. Our governments are prepared to work together to bring about democratic change to Iraq because we believe that new leadership will be the best way to end the suffering of the Iraqi people. During our meetings this afternoon we covered a number of subjects. We reviewed the Norfolk program for enhancing NATO's capabilities; we reiterated our commitment to NATO enlargement but stressed that new members must meet the very high standards that we expect of all; we discussed the current situation in Bosnia and Kosovo where we're working for a peaceful resolution; and George, I assume this sounds vaguely familiar to you, what we discussed a few moments ago. I'll now yield to George Robertson to deliver a few remarks. SECRETARY ROBERTSON: Just to give you a few introductory remarks, to those I've not met last night or this morning, I'll say it again. Last weekend, not for the first time, Britain and America stood together in common cause. The result was the significant success for international law and order; a humiliation for Saddam. Not a shot was fired, and yet he was forced to climb down with no conditions, with no negotiations, and therefore, the process of examination of his methods of threatening his neighbors goes on as a result of the fact that we two countries stood together and diplomacy was backed up by the significant threat of force. I think we achieved two other things in terms of the argument over Iraq. One is that we have dealt with this argument that has been put forward by some in the world that Saddam wanted to be hit; that in some ways he welcomed force being used against him because it would have united his people against the international community and the UN, or that it would have united the Arab people. That argument has now conclusively been seen off. It has also seen off the argument that Saddam would not crumple under pressure. That this time he was willing to take the action that might be taken against his military capability for some perverse way. This was what he wanted at this time. But we now know that yet again, when significant force is put in place and when we mean to use it, then he will fold. He capitulated and was humiliated as a consequence of it. We have said as a country that we're ready and willing and we're able, along with the United States, to take action if he fails to cooperate with the UNSCOM inspectorate and their bid to get compliance with the UN Security Council resolutions, and I'm happy to repeat that here in Washington today. Saddam Hussein seems to think that he can see off the international community, that he can see off the challenge to him by the United Nations and international law; the resolution and the commitment shown last weekend shows that he is wrong in that respect. If necessary, we're here for the long haul, but he now knows that significant force will be used against him if he again tries to block cooperation with the UNSCOM inspectors. Q: Minister Robertson, might I ask, what is the status now of British efforts, including financial, to aid the Iraqi opposition, and will London and Washington coordinate their efforts? SECRETARY ROBERTSON: Of course we will cooperate, as we cooperate in most other things here, as well. There is an external opposition to Saddam and over the years we've talked to them and we will obviously be trying to encourage them to get together so that they speak with a united voice. But there is within Iraq also opposition to Saddam. We know that. It is common sense that that opposition exists. It cannot be visible because it or the people representing it would be executed in a minute. But the vast majority of people in Iraq must know that the problems that they face in their daily life today is as a result of Saddam's policies. I am sure the vast majority of them, if they ever got the opportunity of an election in that country, would remove him. But it may be there are other methods by which people in Iraq will do that. Q: Do you believe as some members of the US Congress apparently do, that providing money and perhaps military aid to diverse Iraqi opposition will help? SECRETARY ROBERTSON: The message is that Saddam is the person who has brought about the problems that the Iraqi people face today. The sanctions that remain in place are there because he refuses to comply with the ceasefire resolution. The miseries that he has created in certain areas such as the lack of food or the lack of medicine has not been caused by the international community or the UN, but by Saddam directly refusing to take the food and the medicines that he is perfectly entitled to import out with the sanctions regime. So that is a message that we will get over in whatever way we can. And by asking or exhausting the opposition, the external opposition to get together and to speak with one united voice is one way in which we'll get that message through. ........................ Q: Mr. Secretary, has it been ruled out that a security leak tipped off Saddam Hussein to President Clinton's decision to launch airstrikes? Or is that possibility under investigation? SECRETARY COHEN: I really am not aware of any information at this point that would indicate he had been tipped off. There were a number of signals, certainly, that he could read as well as anyone else. It became clear to him that we were, number one, serious. You may recall that I said on a number of occasions that Saddam Hussein apparently feels that the threat is not serious and if it should come it would not come in any substantial numbers that he would have to be concerned about. That, as George Robertson has just pointed out, was perhaps a myth on his part that has since been rebutted or seen off, as we've heard today. But as far as we are concerned, there were a number of signals that were sent. UNSCOM was pulled out. That certainly was an indication that we were serious about it. Some of the UN people started to come out. There were a number of reports, I think on the part of some networks of certain targets that were being selected. That was not necessarily accurate information, to say the least, but nonetheless, that was being run on international networks. That certainly sent a signal to Saddam. And I believe that there were other factors involved. The GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) resolution supported by Syria and also by Egypt was another indication that he was completely isolated. He had the Security Council resolution, he had very strong signals coming from his traditional supporters, as such. The French, the Russians, the Chinese had expressed their frustration in dealing with him. Support for the Security Council resolution, then the GCC statement out of Egypt and Syria, all of that combined with pulling the UNSCOM inspectors out, I think, contributed to his awareness that he was alone, that he was about to face a fairly significant military operation, and that he was not nearly as confident as he thought before that it was something he could easily survive. So I think the combination of factors persuaded him to back down, to capitulate, and basically agree to that which he'd been under obligation to do. Q: No investigation of a possible security breach? SECRETARY COHEN: I'm not aware that there's been any investigation of one at this time. I have not seen the need for it. ............... Press: Thank you. (end transcript)
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