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U.S. Department of State

Daily Press Briefing

..................

QUESTION: Can you give us some idea of the Secretary's involvement in the events over the last couple of days and why the decision was made for her to come home?

MR. RUBIN: Yes. The Secretary anticipated the possibility of needing to return home quickly in light of the situation with regard to Iraq. As you saw from well-published accounts now what was likely to happen or almost happened on Saturday, with respect to the use of force, which did not occur because a decision was made to take a look at what Iraq was offering, but nevertheless, we were on the verge of using force during the course - shortly after her arrival in Indonesia. So she always knew that there was going to be a possibility that she would need to come back.

At the same time, she thought it was extremely important for her to make a presence at APEC, because this is an issue -- that is, economic and financial health of Asian countries - that is extremely important to the Administration and something that President Clinton helped escalate to a leaders-level meeting in 1993.

Furthermore, had there been the use of force, it would have been important for her to work directly with a whole series of ministers who were there to explain what we were doing and why we had done it and what our long-term thinking was in the aftermath of the use of force. So that didn't happen.

In light of the fact that we have now received a series of - Kofi Annan has laid out a series of -- requirements that constitutes serious concessions on the part of Iraq, a wholesale reversal . Let me remind you from this podium, Secretary Albright said on Friday: either Iraq reverses course or faces the consequence. Well, it reversed course. But in order to sustain that position over time, a great deal of diplomatic work is necessary; a great deal of discussion is necessary. The President, for the first time, talked about the need and the way in which we look forward to an alternative regime in Iraq. That's something that draws on and states even more clearly something Secretary Albright said last March - I guess it would be two Marches ago. That's a very serious statement, and it has serious policy implications that she believes it's important to work on.

So, knowing that there was a very high likelihood she would come home if force were used and knowing now of the important elements of this decision not to use force at this time, she felt it was more important to come back and work on the other issues that could not be done from Thailand or Indonesia if she had gone on.

QUESTION: Might she go with the President on his trip and then do Indonesia and Thailand from there?

MR. RUBIN: Only if she wants to put her spokesman through unnecessary physical and mental torture, but I will have to check that for you.

QUESTION: The thing about -- (inaudible) - she did say that at length on PBS, so she was on the subject again just last week - that we look forward to a post-Saddam regime.

MR. RUBIN: Correct. I do think that's the first time the President has said that in those words.

QUESTION: That is significant. I wanted to ask about, I think, daily meetings - at least one a day - in her absence. The Deputy Secretary was there. Can you tell us, mechanically did she weigh in even though she was on an airplane? You know there's a State Department view, but of course people have particular ways of putting things. Did she get the opportunity to weigh in herself?

MR. RUBIN: Well, when we arrived in Kuala Lumpur, there was an extensive meeting that took place that she was able to participate in through the miracles of modern technology from the hotel in Malaysia. Her plane did have communications. I can say that at certain times, those communications were not working perfectly and there was some frustration about that at some important moments.

But beyond saying that she was regularly updated by Under Secretary Pickering, Deputy Secretary Talbott and she spoke to the President at least twice while she was in Kuala Lumpur. I would say she spoke to Mr. Berger over a dozen times. She was involved in the discussions and the decision-making with the exception, as I said, of that small window when there were some communication problems.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) - decisions being made?

MR. RUBIN: Well, I'll have to check back and see that. I do know there were some communication problems.

QUESTION: To follow up on this intensifying the effort to bring about a post-Saddam regime, are there any meetings planned with Iraqi opposition figures in the coming days? And can you tell us how you intend to go about bringing this about?

MR. RUBIN: Well, we're not promising to bring about such a thing. What we're saying is that we're going to intensify our work. As you know, Secretary Albright worked very hard on the reconciliation between the Kurdish factions that occurred some weeks ago here. That was an extremely important development.

Right now, we're focused on providing political support for the opposition, and Congress has given us the authority and funding to arm the opposition. We don't rule that out, but we want to make sure that any action is effective in achieving the goal and is well-prepared. We don't want any ill-prepared efforts to lead to a tragic or unnecessary loss of life.

So what we're going to try to do is engage more deeply with opposition groups, work with the Congress on some of the ideas that they've had and try to step up our activity with them. I don't have any new meetings to report to you, but when and as we do take action that's right for public consumption, I will communicate that to you.

QUESTION: Do you see any way in which political action alone could possibly bring about the downfall of Saddam Hussein?

MR. RUBIN: Well, first of all, let me say we're not going to lose any sleep if Saddam Hussein suddenly isn't their leader from whatever reason; no tears will be shed. Obviously, the President spoke quite clearly at the extent to which Saddam Hussein violates the international community's standards for his people, embodied in Resolution 688, and the extent to which his regime is in flagrant violation in several occasions in recent years with other Security Council resolutions.

With respect to what is necessary, I'm not going to speculate on what is necessary. There are a whole range of possibilities around the world that have caused regime change. What I am saying is that we intend to step up and intensify our political work with opposition leaders and will then look at other options and consider them after the first and most important step is taken, which is to try to get as effective and as coordinated and as viable an opposition leadership and political grouping as possible.

QUESTION: Do you have any idea what the political views of that group - or general policy - you don't think Thomas Jefferson is waiting in the wings in Baghdad --

MR. RUBIN: Well, I think another way of --

QUESTION: If Saddam is so terrible, I suppose you can't do worse.

MR. RUBIN: It's hard to imagine you could do worse than Saddam Hussein.

QUESTION: Do you consider this to be a new policy? Is the policy of containment over?

MR. RUBIN: No, I think what the President did is spell out the ways in which containment remain - that is, the importance of maintaining the no-fly zone, maintaining the prohibition on deploying Republican Guard forces in the south, maintaining the toughest sanctions regime in history, plus working more intensively with the opposition. So it's containment plus this additional element.

QUESTION: Is this $97 million package that Congress approved, is that going to give you the tools that you need to carry out this policy to its conclusion, or are you going to be looking to the next Congress to do something more to take the strategy in a different direction?

MR. RUBIN: If one looks at that package, what that is is $97 million of military assistance, provided as authority that the Executive Branch can use should it deem appropriate.

What I'm saying to you is I wouldn't rule out using that authority, provided we have a capability politically , through stepped-up efforts, to develop a viable and effective and coordinated opposition.

So that's certainly something we wouldn't want to rule out, but first things first. This is no easy task, and no one is exaggerating the ease with which we can do this, but rather merely signaling our intent to work harder on it.

QUESTION: There are those who say that any effort to unseat Saddam would require the support of neighboring countries such as Jordan or Turkey. Do you have any thoughts on that?

MR. RUBIN: I think I will leave it to neighboring countries to describe their own views in this matter. I think that I can say without fear of contradiction there are few countries in the world that would shed tears if Saddam Hussein were suddenly to pass from the scene.

QUESTION: Could I ask about the other possible track of developments, and that is there's going to be now inspectors going back; they're going to have more rigorous demands, I suppose. The question is, what happens should they be able to exhaust their questions? What are the conditions now for lifting sanctions?

MR. RUBIN: Well, that would be a lovely situation and one that the world's been waiting for for seven years. What Kofi Annan made clear was that the inspectors are going to be able to go where they need to go; they're going to have free access; they're going to turn over relevant documents; they're not going to interfere with the independence or professional expertise; they're going to resolve the outstanding issues.

That is a view that we are pleased that Kofi Annan is going to adopt very clearly in his examination of these issues. All we've said is that if the UN determines that there is a pattern of cooperation, then we will be prepared to review the situation. The easiest way for Saddam Hussein to begin down a path he's never gone down - which is to begin to cooperate in full with UNSCOM's inspections - I've seen some who somehow doubt what it is that UNSCOM's done and even suggest that I've not been clear in that regard.

Let me give you some detail. UNSCOM has supervised the destruction of - in the missile area - 48 operational missiles, 14 conventional missile warheads, six operational mobile launchers, 28 operational fixed launch pads, 32 fixed launch pads; in the area of missiles as well, 30 missile chemical warheads, other missile support equipment and materials, supervision of the destruction of a variety of assembled and non-assembled super gun components; in the chemical area, 38,537 filled and empty chemical munitions, 690 tons of chemical weapons agent, more than 3,000 tons of precursor chemicals, 426 pieces of chemical weapons production equipment, 91 pieces of related analytical instruments. In the biological area, the entire Al Hakam biological weapons production facility and a variety of production materials all have been destroyed by UNSCOM. Anyone who suggests that UNSCOM hasn't done anything should take a long, hard look at what the damage that could have been done from that material.

With respect to what remains to be done, there is a large discrepancy between the amount of biological growth media - that's the culture in which you grow biological weapons - procured and the amount of agents that were or could have been produced. Iraq's accounting of the amount of the agent it produced and the number of failed batches, is seriously flawed and cannot be reconciled on the basis of this full disclosure Iraq has made.

Of the 31,000 kilograms of biological weapon growth media that Iraq imported, Baghdad has not accounted - ready for this - about 3,500 kilograms. That's an enormous amount of growth media that can grow these most horrific of weapons. In the chemical area, Iraq has declared that since the end of the Iran-Iraq War, it produced four metric tons of VX, 100 to 150 metric tons of G agents such as sarin, and 500 to 600 metric tons of mustard. But on the basis of public UNSCOM reports, plenary meetings and unaccounted-for CW precursors, we estimate that Iraq could have produced as much as an additional 600 metric tons of these agents.

In other words, these are the differences between what they say they have and what we have reason to believe they have. The importance of this agreement now is it clarifies for all to see, that the burden of proof is on Iraq, to clarify the difference between what UNSCOM thinks is there and what Iraq says it has. That burden of proof will be resolved only when Iraq begins to provide the relevant documents, let UNSCOM go where it needs to go, cooperate with UNSCOM in determining how to get to the bottom of this.

I haven't given you an exhaustive list, but these are the problems. The burden of proof is on them. We would be happy to deal with the situation in which Iraq was beginning to resolve all these myriad questions, and that's the easiest way for them to go down the path of lifting sanctions.

QUESTION: I guess my question - that is a staggering list that you give there, but my question is that assuming - and maybe it may be a huge leap - that there is an accounting and a destruction, of course, of the weapons found, are there other conditions, then, that have to be satisfied before sanctions would be lifted? All relevant resolutions - the issue of prisoners, the issue of --

MR. RUBIN: Let me simply say given the staggering nature of the information I've described, I think if Iraq made a strategic decision to finally do what it has refused to do for six or seven years - and that is, come clean on its weapons of mass destruction, disclose its weapons of mass destruction - the other issues could be easily resolved.

It is our view that under 687, Iraq has to demonstrate peaceful intentions. We believe that to do that, he must comply with relevant resolutions, including and most importantly -- given the extreme danger that they pose - the full compliance with weapons of mass destruction.

If he's serious about wanting sanctions lifted, the easiest way to show it is to comply with these issues.

QUESTION: The question is the prisoners issue and property - are those still alive?

MR. RUBIN: I think he has to comply with all relevant resolutions. But as I said, if he made a strategic decision to give up his weapons of mass destruction, which many analysts think he is determined not to do, it seems to me the other issues, although important, could easily fall into place.

So it's a moot point, Roy. It's the kind of point that matters in technical legal terms but doesn't matter in the real world. In the real world, the big issue is will he finally and fully give up what he said he would give up in 1991 and what, for seven long years, he's refused to do so.

QUESTION: How do you put that together with the attempt to clear the air and clear the accounts with the President's determination, basically, to seek a new regime? Because in order to do the one, you have to have cooperation with the current regime. The other, however, seeks the removal of that regime.

MR. RUBIN: Well, a different regime that was committed to the rule of law and international security would have no trouble meeting all these requirements.

QUESTION: But how do you go to this regime and say, we want you to cooperate and actually clear these accounts; by the way, we'd like to remove you at the same time?

MR. RUBIN: I think promoting democracy around the world is something we do all the time and still work to push dictators to meet international standards. That's not a new phenomenon.

QUESTION: Why did Secretary Albright decide that she had to come back this week and not just complete her trip and in the meanwhile make her phone calls and what not? What is the difference that's made with her being back in Washington in pursuing promoting other opposition leaders?

MR. RUBIN: Well, I didn't say that was all it was. What I said is that she always anticipated the possibility of returning quickly to Washington in light of what she knew may well go on over the weekend. So she had contingency plans to do so.

She, at the same time, had a very strong desire to participate in the economic forum occurring in Kuala Lumpur. As a result of the way the situation turned out, she made the judgment that the best place for her to work from on this issue, in light of its now nearly exclusive focus on ensuring that other countries and other actors are in sync with the American position - because let's remember what was really unique about this situation this time was the fact that the entire world was supporting the American view and was opposing the Iraqi position. Whether it was in the Arab world, whether it was Russia, whether it was China, whether it was European countries, they all placed blame for this crisis on Iraq. That didn't happen by accident.

She feels that in order to ensure that if we get down the road where Saddam is not complying with this resolution, we have said we are prepared to act. We need to be sure that we can master the same type of support for action, if necessary, in the future.

QUESTION: If, for instance, the inspectors who are due to return tomorrow are rebuffed, then and there, the Secretary wants to make sure that everyone is on the same page if the US were to decide to launch attacks as soon as this would --

MR. RUBIN: That would be a fair conclusion if we made the decision to use force.

QUESTION: Who do you see the problems might come up with? Is it with the Europeans, the --

MR. RUBIN: We don't normally talk about problems from here; we talk about solutions. But let me just say that having a lot of experience with the Iraq issue and knowing the ease with which some want to take yes for an answer, if you saw what happened over the weekend, you know some countries were just thrilled to grab on to anything they saw as evidence of an Iraqi turnaround. We waited and we examined it carefully and we made sure that Kofi Annan agreed with us on the meaning of all of this before we decided that it was a complete reversal and a climb down by Saddam Hussein.

So we're well aware that there are ranges of views in the international community on this subject, and work always needs to be done; but I'd prefer not to name those who need the most work.

QUESTION: Jamie, just to be clear, if Saddam does not cooperate then strikes will ensue immediately?

MR. RUBIN: I'm not going to specify in writing for you to read back to me every time you think you found an example of non-cooperation. Suffice it to say we are ready, willing and able to act if the President makes that decision.

QUESTION: What I'm trying to get at is, are you going to go through this whole exercise of diplomacy and buildup and waste of taxpayers money with every one of these crises, or will you act - and not to mention the inspectors that are now there and the IAEA people, will you move forward with them there, will you withdraw them? How is it going to look?

MR. RUBIN: First of all, I don't think you were very thoughtful and kind to those who work very hard on this issue and all our soldiers who were deployed at sea, regarding that as a waste of taxpayers' money. The work that our soldiers do is something that means very much to us, those of us in government who are responsible for them. We do not regard ourselves as having wasted taxpayers' money.

On the contrary, in order to defend the United States and defend America's interest, sometimes one has to make deployments to be prepared to act. There are costs to those deployments, but as one former Secretary of State said yesterday, sometimes that's the cost of being the world's leader. And we don't regard it as a waste of money.

With respect to how we would proceed, I think it is fair to say that we are ready and we are willing and we're able to act. Beyond saying that, I don't care to specify the tactical situation which may arise depending on the circumstances.

QUESTION: Jamie, the build up of forces has been suspended, although what's there is staying there for the --

MR. RUBIN: Yes, and I think some that was on the way will continue on the way; but the Pentagon would have to deal with it.

QUESTION: Not as much about the level, I was wondering about the people who withdrew from embassies. Are they still --

MR. RUBIN: We haven't changed our notice at this time. As soon as we do that, we will.

QUESTION: Jamie, although I can't say I'm overly hopeful of getting a response on this, I've got to ask the question for the record. You spoke of a range of views, talking about allies and other peoples' views. Can you speak to the issue of a range of views, if any, in the decision-making process to proceed with the strike or not to proceed, and where specifically the Secretary stood or where she weighed in on it?

MR. RUBIN: Well, your answer to your question comes in your preamble. Let me simply say that the Secretary, and I believe all the President's national security advisors, support the decision the President made, and it is not my practice to provide her personal views in any form.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) -- sidewise, thinking we had half a chance at an answer by asking you while she was away and a stand-in was at the meetings, if that stand-in represented her views -- the State Department views?

MR. RUBIN: Yes that is the kind of detailed-discussion of the inner workings of government which I am not prepared to provide.

QUESTION: Now, this is a little tougher. Not until day -- you came the closest I've heard an official come -- to saying if Saddam Hussein provides unfettered access, those other resolutions just kind of negligible.

MR. RUBIN: I definitely did not say that. Let me rephrase it.

QUESTION: All your allies who aren't your allies all the time, say that's all the guy's got to do.

MR. RUBIN: I sure hope that nobody misquotes what I said or misunderstands it.

QUESTION: We're not out of the room yet.

MR. RUBIN: Good. What I said was since most analysts believe that Saddam Hussein has been determined, as one of the prime objectives of his rule, to do two things: keep his weapons of mass destruction and get sanctions lifted. We've said those two are incompatible. But certainly nearly everyone agrees that trying to retain of mass destruction is the highest national goal of his government or his regime.

All I am saying that if he were to change to his goal and decide, nope, I'm going to provide all the information that UNSCOM needs, the other issues that we believe are relevant in any decision that would be relevant in determining his peaceful intentions are very important issues to the people involved, including those Kuwaiti families who have not found out what happened to their relatives, including those who have lost material and equipment.

But if the first decision was made, it flows from natural logic that it might be easier to resolve the other ones. But none of that is to say we have changed our view on the importance of so doing.

QUESTION: Earlier today Secretary Cohen said that this was Saddam Hussein's last, last chance. Is that something that Secretary Albright would echo?

MR. RUBIN: It nearly wasn't.

QUESTION: But I mean, would she say the same thing -- this is the last time we could expect to step back from the brink with Hussein?

MR. RUBIN: Saddam Hussein would be making a very big mistake if he didn't see the writing on the wall. The United States was ready, willing and able to act this weekend; we remain ready, willing and able to act. We nearly did and only through this last ditch capitulation was he able to avoid the use of force. He'd be making a big, big mistake if he thinks he should play games in the future.

(The briefing concluded at 1:30 P.M.)

[end of document]