TRANSCRIPT: 11/15 BRIEFING BY SPOKESMAN JAMES RUBIN
President Clinton postponed his attendance at the APEC Leaders Meeting and delayed scheduled visits to Japan and Korea, Rubin said, because of the fluidity of the situation with Iraq. "For months and months the United States has been patient while Iraq has been provocative. In consequence, we are prepared to act, we remain poised to act, and it is up to Saddam Hussein to agree to the will of the international community without conditions, without delay. Otherwise, he alone will be responsible for the consequences," Rubin said. Following is a transcript of the press briefing: (begin transcript) U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE Office of the Spokesman (New World Hotel, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia) Immediate Release November 15, 1998 BRIEFING BY JAMES P. RUBIN, SPOKESMAN MR. RUBIN: Greetings. I just wanted to give you an update. Obviously, this is a fairly fast-moving situation. You'll forgive me if I'm not able to discuss all the nuances that may unfold. During the course of the night and throughout the morning Secretary Albright and Assistant Secretary Roth have been in touch with over a dozen folks on the telephone, including the President and Secretary Cohen and National Security Advisor Berger. She's also spoken to U.N. Secretary General Annan, the Brazilian Foreign Minister, the British Foreign Minister, the Portuguese Foreign Minister, the Swedish Foreign Minister, and just had a one-hour meeting with the Chinese Foreign Minister. Essentially, she has been arguing that Iraq's initial step -- this famous two-part letter -- is unacceptable, for the reasons that it's not an unconditional climb down and unconditional reversal of course. And what we're looking for, as Mr. Berger has said in Washington, is a clear public statement that Iraq intends to cooperate with UNSCOM and to comply with the Security Council resolutions. She is now heading over to the Ministerial, where she'll obviously have a chance to talk to many of the foreign ministers who are there. I have a list for you, but you probably know who's here and who's not here. At which time she will begin her remarks with some discussion of Iraq, despite the fact that the topic, of course, is the Asian economic situation. She will say that time and time again Iraq has promised to come into compliance with UN resolutions and then broken that promise. Yesterday Iraq made another such promise in a letter to Secretary-General Annan, but that letter included a demand that the world agree to Iraq's terms about what a review of Iraq's obligations would entail, and this is a demand that we regard as unacceptable. Given the fluidity of the situation, as you know President Clinton has chosen to delay his visit to Asia. For months and months the United States has been patient while Iraq has been provocative. In consequence, we are prepared to act, we remain poised to act, and it is up to Saddam Hussein to agree to the will of the international community without conditions, without delay. Otherwise, he alone will be responsible for the consequences. With respect to the President's not being here, obviously Secretary Albright felt it was extremely important, despite the unfolding situation, to fly over here. You who have been with us on the plane know the meaning of that, and she is going to be here to discuss the importance of the Asian economic situation to the United States generally, and the obvious sectoral liberalization and other agenda items that are on the table. She is not expected to hold any bilateral meetings with the Government of Malaysia. The state of our relationship, I think, is quite well known, and we're here to discuss the issues that APEC brought to Malaysia -- not the specifics of our relationship with Malaysia. Although I do and I know you're likely to ask me this, so let me get right to it. She does expect to see Wan Azizah. You are all aware that we expressed publicly in many different ways our concerns about the treatment of Anwar, the mistreatment in prison, and the importance we attach to due process during the course of this trial. The purpose of her visit to Wan Azizah is to express our concern about his treatment and the importance we attach to due process in the trial. With that, let me try to answer your questions as best I can. Q: Can I just ask you, is there a deadline (inaudible) Iraq, a deadline to strike? MR. RUBIN: We've said with respect to that question that -- and let me repeat -- that we're poised to act, and we see no need for further warnings. Q: Will the Secretary continue on with her itinerary after Kuala Lumpur? MR. RUBIN: At this point this morning all I can say is that she is scheduled to continue her itinerary as planned, but given the fluidity of the situation I don't want to say that I can rule out any changes in that schedule. But if there are changes, I'll try to communicate those to you as soon as I can. Q: Did she take part yesterday -- there was a four-hour meeting yesterday at the White House (inaudible)? MR. RUBIN: Through the miracles of modern technology she was a participant in those discussions. Q: For all four hours? MR. RUBIN: I believe she slept nary an hour last night. Q: Just to follow up on these various conversations she had with the Portuguese and the British, Brazilians, and Swedes, that's on Iraq? MR. RUBIN: Yes, all on Iraq. Q: Are those all members of the Security Council? MR. RUBIN: Yes. Q: What do you expect the Security Council to do? MR. RUBIN: Well, I think that at this point what they're doing is discussing the situation. Originally, the meeting was scheduled to talk about an unrelated aspect of Iraq, which is the monitoring of the food side of the oil-for-food. I think it was the (inaudible) monitors. But, obviously, with the Iraqi letter and the tense and urgency of this crisis, they are going to discuss Iraq more broadly. But we are getting updates as quickly as we can, and when I left her she was on the phone with the National Security Advisor Berger. So I don't have the latest information about what's going on in the Council. Q: Could I bring you back to your answer to a previous question. It's "we were poised to act and see no need for further warnings" or "we are poised to act"? MR. RUBIN: We are poised to act, and we see no need for further warnings. Q: Do you have any particular preference for the form that the Iraqi response should take, if they do respond, if they do offer clarifications to their earlier language. MR. RUBIN: Well, my understanding is Mr. Berger made clear what we're looking for is a clear public statement by Iraq that he intends -- he, Saddam Hussein, Iraq -- intends to cooperate with UNSCOM and comply with Security Council resolutions. We did not deem the letter that came late last night, if I've got those hours right -- certainly it was late last night for us -- made it clear, and I will state that, on the contrary, it was filled with the kind of conditions and arguments that would just give Iraq an opportunity to make mischief in the future in this area. That's something that we have seen them try to do time and time again. Q: To what extent does this Iraqi gesture weaken both the (inaudible) -- MR. RUBIN: Well, as an example, Secretary Albright had a meeting with the Chinese Foreign Minister this morning, and one thing that they did agree on is that Saddam Hussein is responsible for the current crisis. They talked about this at length, and I wouldn't want to go beyond that in talking about it, except to say what our views are -- which is that we regard this letter as the latest in a long line of attempts by Iraq to obscure its responsibilities and, given the attached conditions, a way to make mischief. And so she made clear that we, the United States, regard that letter as unacceptable. Q: In her discussions with the various folks you mentioned on the phone and so on, did she come away with the sense that there is same, stronger, or weaker support for any possible U.S. military action? MR. RUBIN: I would say, I think it's fair to say that not every foreign minister had the kind of real-time information that she had with respect to these letters and what was going on in New York. They tended to be discussions in which she -- based on our information -- made clear what our views are, and they responded by offering to examine the situation and get back to her. Some countries that I include on that list have had long-standing positions, whether on the phone or here, that didn't change. Q: And you're saying the Chinese are also in support of your position on Iraq? MR. RUBIN: No, I was very careful what I said about the Chinese. What I said was that one thing that she and the Chinese Foreign Minister certainly agreed on was that Iraq is to blame for the current crisis. Their decision to suspend cooperation in August and again on October 31 made it clear they were squarely to blame for the current crisis. With respect to various countries' ideas on how to resolve the crisis, I think it's fair to say that the Chinese have a long-standing position on matters like this, but I wouldn't want to spell it out. That would be up to them to do. Q: But what's your impression, though? Is Saddam Hussein trying to back down? Is he looking for a face-saving mechanism? Is he just looking for time? What's your impression? MR. RUBIN: Well, I've been at this for a long time, assisting Secretary Albright, and I've kind of given up trying to determine what his motivation or intention is on any given day. Clearly, they recognize the precarious situation they were in. Whether that recognition is sufficient to make clear, as I said, in a clear and unequivocal way that they intend to comply unconditionally with the requirements of the Security Council resolution is an open question. Q: Two things. There are reports out of Washington that the U.S. was within an hour of actually launching a strike. Can you confirm that? MR. RUBIN: I wouldn't be able to get into that kind of detail, but I think Mr. Berger said we were poised to act and we are poised to act. Q: Secondly, since the President was crucial in setting up the Leaders' Summit here at APEC -- he seemed to invest a fair bit of time -- the fact that he's not coming, does that undermine the U.S. commitment to what is -- MR. RUBIN: I don't think so. I think that, given the fact that the President did work so hard in 1993 to set up this kind of a forum for discussion of these important issues, given the fact that Vice President Gore did jump on a plane to come here -- or will shortly -- and given the fact that Secretary Albright came here knowing full well the nature of the crisis with Iraq, I think is a very clear symbol of the importance we attach to this kind of a meeting and this kind of a grouping. But it's also true that there are events in the world sometimes that require the President's attention in a way that he can only give to it at home. And certainly Secretary Albright and I'm sure Vice President Gore will be explaining the exigencies of this situation. And so far, I haven't heard of countries not expressing general understanding of this unique set of circumstances. ................. Q: Well, she's scheduled to leave tomorrow, is she not? MR. RUBIN: I think we're here 'til Tuesday, is the schedule. Q: Did the Secretary and Mr. Tang have time to discuss anything other than Iraq and, if so, do you have any progress to report on any of those other issues? MR. RUBIN: In candor, I think the Iraq situation took up the bulk of their meeting. ................ Q: Are there any plans to meet with the Russian delegation here to discuss Iraq. MR. RUBIN: Secretary Albright is scheduled to have dinner with Foreign Minister Ivanov this evening. Q: They will discuss Iraq? MR. RUBIN: I'm sure that Iraq will be the prime topic of discussion. Q: Did the Chinese Foreign Minister reiterate his government's position on Iraq, that they are opposed to military action? MR. RUBIN: I've gone as far as I can in describing China's position. I think those of you who have been around the block will understand what I am saying, and I know you've been around the block diplomatically. Q: Is Vice President Gore going to carry out President Clinton's same itinerary, not only here but in Korea and Japan? MR. RUBIN: Well, as I understand the statement out of the White House, it is that the President still hopes to be able to go to Japan and Korea and Guam. That's what Joe Lockhart, the Spokesman, said this morning. Q: And is Secretary Albright going to continue her trip? MR. RUBIN: Well, as I indicated at the outset, the current schedule is still our schedule. When and if our schedule changes, I will tell you about the schedule changes. Q: Iraq's ambassador to the U.N. told reporters after his meeting with Ambassador Burleigh that they felt that the letter did represent unequivocal acceptance of the demands and that this would be discussed at the Security Council. You're telling us today though that that's not how the U.S. views the situation, despite its attempt at clarification? MR. RUBIN: Yes, I did observe Secretary Albright on the phone with several foreign ministers during the course of the day going through the seven points, eight points that were in the annex of the letter -- which boiled down to Iraq trying to put the burden of proof for completing the inspections of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction on UNSCOM. And it's very clear from the resolutions of the Security Council that the burden of proof is on Iraq to provide the cooperation and assistance and information necessary for UNSCOM to confirm Iraq's not having weapons of mass destruction and set up a system to ensure that it never does again. That is the basic construct of the U.N. Security Council resolutions. One of the reasons why we regarded this letter as making mischief is because it suggested that the burden of proof was on UNSCOM and further suggested that Iraq has done everything it needs to do -- when every country in the world's experts who have participated in this, that is, all the countries that make up UNSCOM, have made clear there are still huge gaps on the subjects of chemical and biological and missiles that Iraq has not clarified. And so, to suggest that there's a guaranteed timeframe for review of this complicated information, to suggest that it's UNSCOM that must prove its case, is a fundamental and unacceptable misreading of the relationship between UNSCOM and the Security Council. Q: The clarification you're looking for from Iraq, what -- can you be a little clearer on what precise form is that? Is that a letter signed by Saddam Hussein, Tariq Aziz? Does Baghdad TV announce it? And what constitutes -- MR. RUBIN: I don't think Baghdad TV will do it in the scheme of official statements. As official as Baghdad TV is, I don't think that fully qualifies as an official statement. But if you'll allow me to (inaudible) further questions, because these are things going on upstairs and on a lot of telephone lines as we speak, and I don't want to get ahead of the decision-making on that, much as I want to be able to answer your question. Q: I know that you hate to give deadlines, timeframes, and so on, but are you expecting this clarification within a matter of hours or days (inaudible)? MR. RUBIN: I'm just not going to -- We're poised to act. We see no need for further warnings to Iraq. We've stated, Sandy Berger has stated at the White House what is necessary, and that's where we are. Q: But the diplomacy's pretty active. Everybody's talking to Iraq. You're talking (inaudible) talking to Iraq -- MR. RUBIN: Well, you know, it all depends on what you call diplomacy. I certainly told you during the course of the week that, to the extent that diplomacy constituted exhortation and pressure on Iraq to reverse course, that we expected those kind of communications between governments and Iraq. To the extent it was diplomacy in the form of the kind of discussions that Kofi Annan had about new modalities for UNSCOM's operations, we see no need for that. There's no justification for it, and we wouldn't support that. But this kind of exhortation and pressure I think I've been saying all week is not surprising to us. The question is what's the result. Q: Can you characterize -- This is not a negotiating process, since Iraq hasn't backed down? MR. RUBIN: Either Iraq will reverse course or, as Secretary Albright said yesterday, it will face the consequences. I think we've done enough morning damage. ................ (end transcript)
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