The White House Briefing Room
November 16, 1998
PRESS BRIEFING BY JOE LOCKHART
1:22 P.M. EST
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
______________________________________________________________
For Immediate Release November 16, 1998
PRESS BRIEFING BY
JOE LOCKHART
The Briefing Room
1:22 P.M. EST
MR. LOCKHART: Good afternoon.
Q Do you have anything on the President's trip to
Asia?
MR. LOCKHART: Nothing definitive yet. I think we'll
sit down and make some final decisions this afternoon. As I told you
this morning, I expect the President to complete the Japan, Korea,
Guam section of the trip. I'm sure you all noticed that late last
night our time the elections were certified in Guam, thereby
eliminating one of the problems that we discussed last week at this
podium. But my expectation is, for your planning purposes, that
we're looking at a Wednesday departure. That's most likely, but
we'll let you know.
Q Is there a chance he might not still go? Is there
a remote chance he might not go?
MR. LOCKHART: There's always a chance that the
situation either domestically or around the world can change in a way
that necessitates the President remaining. But at this point I
believe he intends to make this trip.
Q There are some people who are saying he really
wants to go, in addition to other reasons, because he wants to be out
of town when Kenneth Starr testifies publicly before the House
Judiciary Committee.
MR. LOCKHART: Those people, if that's their view of our
politics, shouldn't give up their day job.
Q So you're denying that that is a consideration?
MR. LOCKHART: I am denying that.
..............
Q On the question of travel, can you clarify whether
or not there is a problem if both the President and Vice President
are out of the country at the same time?
MR. LOCKHART: I know that there was some discussion of
the tradition of both of them not being out of the country. I know
there is no statutory or constitutional issue and it's something as
we put the schedule together I'm sure they'll take into
consideration. But I don't have a final answer on that.
Q Will they be out of the --
MR. LOCKHART: I don't know because I don't know what
the schedule is yet.
Q Joe, there have been a lot of news reports about
some of the President's closest advisors being in agreement we should
attack Iraq and some not. For the record, will you set us --
MR. LOCKHART: For the record, I can tell you that the
President, as you know from what he said and what some of his -- from
the National Security Advisor and the Secretary of Defense, who were
here yesterday -- was faced with a decision Saturday morning whether
to move forward action or whether to pause. His advisors offered him
advice, weighing the pros and the cons, and that advice will remain
private to the President. He made his decision.
Q U.S. officials now have said that the next time
Saddam does not comply with all that's required of him, there would
be a military strike without warning -- they suggested that. Does
that mean that aid workers there, the members of the U.N. inspection
teams itself would be there and they would not have any opportunity
to leave the country?
MR. LOCKHART: I don't think it would be useful for me
to speculate down the road. We're in a position right now where
Saddam Hussein has capitulated and has backed down. And as the
President told you, it's now time for him to live up to the
obligations that he set forth through his communications and letters
with the United Nations.
Q But this is the point, is it not? This is a point
that is certainly a concern to the people who are there, whether the
United States would attack without giving them some notice that it
might come.
MR. LOCKHART: Well, clearly, the U.S., the U.N., always
keeps the safety of those people foremost in mind. It's something
that will always come under consideration, but I don't see any use in
trying to go into a speculative discussion of a future operation.
Q Do you know why Secretary of State Albright has
rushed back to Washington?
MR. LOCKHART: My understanding -- and I understand Mr.
Rubin has had a briefing at the State Department -- but I understood
she turned around yesterday -- is that correct -- in order to come
back to deal with the situation. But I think you'll get a much more
fulsome answer from her spokesman.
Q You said that the President has met, will meet with
Sandy Berger for his daily briefing. Does he expect to meet today
with his National Security Council?
MR. LOCKHART: No, I don't expect that there will be any
formal meeting. I think he will get his daily briefing and will be
briefed as appropriate.
Q Joe, recognizing you're not going to give us the
advice given to the President, is it inaccurate to say that some
senior advisors wanted the attack to go forward, that there were
differences within the Cabinet on --
MR. LOCKHART: I believe it would be inappropriate for
me to share with you the candid advice and the issues that were
raised, both pro and con, from the President's advisors.
...............
Q There are reports at the U.N. that the President
tried to discourage Kofi Annan from sending one final letter to
Saddam Hussein Friday evening. Is that true?
MR. LOCKHART: I'm not aware of any communication like
that. I know that the President talked to Kofi Annan through the
week and through the weekend, but I'm not aware of any communication
that sought to do that.
Q Was the White House unhappy when Annan made a
last-ditch attempt?
MR. LOCKHART: If you take this back to where we are on
the policy front, I think the answer should be obvious. We believe
that as a matter of policy -- and the President has articulated this
now for a long time -- that the best way to pursue our goal of
limiting Saddam Hussein's ability to reconstitute his weapons of mass
destruction, deliver those weapons, and threaten his neighbors is
through an aggressive UNSCOM and an effective UNSCOM.
Q That's not my question.
MR. LOCKHART: And where we are now is we have a
situation where those inspectors will be going back in and they will
be going back in in a situation where the burden is completely on
Saddam Hussein to prove and to demonstrate that he is going to
cooperate and do the important work.
Q Well, the letter from Kofi Annan obviously turned
the trick here. So did you try to discourage it?
MR. LOCKHART: I'm not aware of any communications.
Q Can you list the things that the President has now
authorized the government to do to try to remove Saddam Hussein from
power?
MR. LOCKHART: I don't have a specific list. This is
obviously something we've been doing in the past, working with
opposition groups to encourage and to try to help strengthen
opposition groups, because we believe that they are an important
voice of change for the people of Iraq. That work to date has been
mostly political, but as we move into the future, I can't rule in or
rule out any potential options.
Q You say you've been doing that in the past, but it
is said now that there is a new policy here, that there is a new face
on what Washington thinks about removing Saddam. How would you
describe it? Tougher, more aggressive --
MR. LOCKHART: I would say that we're going to increase
our actions that works to strengthen the opposition. We have -- the
President signed several weeks ago the Iraq Liberation Act, which
appropriates about $100 million for this effort. And we believe that
we can work prudently and effectively with opposition groups to help
them be a stronger voice.
Q I'll give up, but if I could just have one last
crack. I'm trying to see is there something new here, or is a
restatement of a policy the Iraqi --
MR. LOCKHART: No, I think if you look at our policy, we
are going to move forward with the thought that -- we've discussed
over the last two days many of the short-term things that we need to
do to keep him from threatening his neighbors. But we're very
cognizant of the real threat he poses to his neighbors. And as a
long-term policy we believe we need to work with opposition groups to
look to the day where there can be a government of Iraq that respects
human rights, respects the international -- and can rejoin the
international community.
Q Joe, are you saying that it's the goal of the
policy -- it's one of your policy goals to remove him from office,
from power? It's a goal of U.S. policy to remove --
MR. LOCKHART: It is a goal of long-term policy to see a
different Iraqi government, because we believe it's --
Q What's the difference between that and saying that
your goal is to see him removed from power?
MR. LOCKHART: Well, I'm articulating it the way I'm
articulating it, that we believe --
Q I was going to just try to clarify that. Is the
policy of containing Saddam Hussein dead now, that instead the policy
is to remove him?
MR. LOCKHART: Absolutely not. Absolutely not. We
have, as is appropriate, we have short-term steps and we have
long-term steps. Short-term, the policy of containment is very much
alive and very much stronger today than it was last week. The burden
of proof has shifted back to Saddam Hussein. The international
community is stronger than it has been at any time since -- and more
united -- than at any time since the Gulf War. But those are
short-term steps. And over the long-term, as the President
articulated here yesterday, we believe that working through
opposition groups we can take steps to come up with a different
solution.
Q The Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister says that's a
flagrant violation of the U.N. Charter, to try to interfere in the
domestic affairs of Iraq.
MR. LOCKHART: Well, I think that he is the one who
ought to be an expert on flagrantly violating the will of the
international community and the United Nations and its Charter.
Q The Pentagon is now -- Secretary Cohen has now
announced that deployments are ceasing, that some of the forces that
were flowing over the Gulf are now going to be rotated back. Doesn't
that send to Saddam a signal that he can breathe easy?
MR. LOCKHART: No, I think that would be a terrible
mistake if he read it that way. I think what he should read from
this weekend is the forces that are in the Gulf are configured and
able to deliver a swift and decisive blow. The forces that you're
talking about are forces that would not have been there this weekend.
So I think he should get the message -- and it's an
important message -- that this is a credible force that's out there
and that the President and the international community are united.
The President will use this force. We obviously came close to using
it this weekend before taking this pause to get the commitments that
we got from Saddam Hussein. So I don't think that news from the
Pentagon on deployment should send any message like that at all.
Q The leaders of U.N. arms inspections teams say
there's nothing in the five conditions that the President set down
that Saddam Hussein wasn't already obligated to do. Is that your
understanding, too?
MR. LOCKHART: Well, I think there's -- certainly under
the U.N. sanctions he was obligated to do, but he, over the last
year, had not been doing. And in this capitulation he has now
expressly committed to work -- affirmatively working with UNSCOM.
And I believe the burden in that relationship is squarely on the
shoulders of Saddam Hussein in helping them get the information they
need. And if he does not meet that burden and they are not getting
the kind of cooperation that Mr. Butler and UNSCOM deserves, then
perhaps others steps will have to be taken.
Q But the burden was there before, right, the very
same burden?
MR. LOCKHART: Well, this is I think an important point
of why we believe we're in a different position today than we were
some months ago. If you remember, back in February we were in a
situation where the international community wasn't united. There
were some people who were going through what they called sanctions
fatigue and there was actually some receptive capitals listening to
Saddam Hussein's pleas for release of sanctions. We're not there
now. We're in a completely different position. We're in a position
where six Gulf states plus two other Arab states sent a strong
message to Saddam Hussein, where the Security Council is united
behind the idea that the burden is squarely with Saddam Hussein to
comply and affirmatively act to comply with the UNSCOM inspectors.
Q Is there any difference between the kind of
commitments he made this weekend and the kind of commitments he's
made in the past, in the other crises? Is there any difference
between -- I know that the international community is more united and
all that, but is there any difference in the commitments that he's
made?
MR. LOCKHART: I think that these commitments are
explicit, and I think the international community is -- and I can't
separate the two for you -- is united in making sure that the burden
remains on him and committing to them.
Q Were his commitments in the past less explicit?
MR. LOCKHART: I think there are various commitments and
there are various commitments he hasn't lived up to. And I think now
the message is very clear for him what he has to do and what will
happen if he doesn't.
Q Along that point, does the President or anyone else
at the White House, for that matter, really think that Saddam Hussein
will live up to this latest set of assurances?
MR. LOCKHART: It's not a question of whether we trust
him or whether we believe him; it's whether -- what he'll do. It's
whether, now that he's backed down, will he live up to his
obligations. We have a strong and united international community
that wants that to happen. We have a military that's poised to act
if it doesn't happen.
Q Would it have been worth -- Joe, there is a report
in The Washington Post today that there was an estimate that 10,000
civilians would be killed in this initial attack --
MR. LOCKHART: I'm not sure that's what that said, but
go ahead.
Q There would be 10,000 casualties -- 10,000 Iraqi
casualties, I assume, not 10,000 U.S. casualties -- 10,000 Iraqi
casualties if the order would have gone forward. The question is
two-part. Does President Clinton believe it's worth getting those
inspectors in to kill 10,000 people? And the second part of the
question is, is that report accurate?
MR. LOCKHART: I'm not going to get into the assessments
that the Pentagon made on various options. I'm not sure I understand
the first part of the question.
Q The first part of the question, the bombs, the
cruise missiles -- if they would have killed 10,000 people in the
initial wave, would it be worth it to kill that many people to get
those U.N. inspectors back in?
MR. LOCKHART: No, I think you're looking at this
perhaps from the wrong way. What's worth it is trying to limit the
threat that Saddam Hussein poses to his own people and to his
neighbors, and ultimately to the world, through his weapons of mass
destruction. The policy goal here is to keep him from being able to
reconstitute and deliver those weapons and thereby threaten the rest
of the world.
The most effective way to do that, in our judgment, is
through UNSCOM. Now, if UNSCOM is not allowed to do their work, we
have to look at other options. Those options might prove as
effective as an effective UNSCOM regime would be, but I don't see a
direct connection.
Q Let me try this again. How much did that 10,000
figure weigh on the President's mind Saturday morning?
MR. LOCKHART: Well, I think, obviously, all of the --
the idea -- and again, I'm not subscribing to your point of view
about what someone else may have reported, but obviously the
President has to take seriously, and does, the idea when you embark
on an operation like this, there is a risk both to U.S. servicemen
and women, a risk of collateral damage to civilians.
But, ultimately, the President is prepared to move
forward, even in the face of these risks, if he believes that UNSCOM
will not be able to do their job effectively. There will be a test
now for whether the Iraqis are serious in this unconditional
capitulation and we'll just have to watch, remain vigilant and remain
poised to act.
Q Had the raid been carried forward the timing
appears to be that the bombs would have fallen at dusk or late
afternoon, as opposed to sometime in the middle of the night. Was
that a consideration? Isn't that a possibility of more civilian
death?
MR. LOCKHART: I'm not going to get into operational
detail, nor am I going to suggest that you have correct information
there.
.................
Q You talked about the unconditional compliance --
what if Saddam goes back to some sort of middle ground thing like he
was doing in August, in which he basically says, no field
inspections, monitoring is okay, as he was just about two weeks ago,
is that then enough for us --
MR. LOCKHART: I think the four points that we had an
agreement -- and I'll go through them again -- that he stated in
writing the decision to cooperate with UNSCOM was clear and
unequivocal; that he rescinded in writing the decisions of August 5th
and October 31st; he made clear that UNSCOM would be allowed not
simply to monitor, but to resume all their activities; and, four,
withdraw the nine unacceptable conditions on the -- review that was
linked; and then the five additional points that the Secretary
General agreed with us on -- I think all of those things put together
make one clear and unmistakable point, is there's no middle ground
for Saddam Hussein anymore.
Q I understand it would be a violation of that. My
question is, is that enough for us to ratchet back up the military
buildup to get back into the position that we were just a day or two
ago? In other words, we didn't do that until he went the full step
--
MR. LOCKHART: Well, again, I think if you look at where
we were this weekend, I think you'll see that we were ready with the
forces deployed to strike decisively and quickly. And if we get to
the point where it's in our judgment that he is not in accord with
what he and his government has agreed to this weekend, then that
option will be available to us and the military remains poised.
Q -- August 5th, the structure they set up on August
5th is not in accord, as you've said, so, therefore, if he goes back
to some sort of regime like that, that again would trigger the
possibility of a military confrontation?
MR. LOCKHART: We expect him now that he's backed down,
to live up to everything he's agreed to.
Q -- make the judgment about whether he's going to
live up to what he's agreed to? UNSCOM inspectors will be back in
tomorrow or the next day, presumably, and will immediately begin
testing. How long are we going to take to determine whether or not
Saddam Hussein will live up to the obligation?
MR. LOCKHART: That is a determination that Mr. Butler
and the UNSCOM team can make. They will be going back in tomorrow,
it's my understanding. And they -- I can't put a timeline on it. I
wouldn't expect it to be tomorrow. But he is in the best position to
know whether he believes he's getting full cooperation. Again, he
has not been shy in the past about expressing his views when he
believes his work has been obstructed.
Q If I could follow that up, we're now in a position
of paying for a much more costly military deployment in the Persian
Gulf. Do we expect to know within days, weeks, or is it months
whether or not we're going to have to continue that deployment for an
even longer period of time?
MR. LOCKHART: We have what we believe is an effective
force deployed in the Gulf. They will remain there for the time
being. They have been there now for some time. I cannot predict for
you when and if Saddam Hussein will not comply. We certainly have a
hope that he will comply, but that is not something that we are
betting on. And we will be prepared to deal with any other
alternatives.
Q Joe, just in this year alone, because of the two
military buildups that Saddam Hussein singlehandedly provoked,
American taxpayers have spent about $2 billion with these
deployments. Is there any price to pay that Saddam Hussein will have
to come up with other than basically going back to what he had agreed
to do originally? We've got him back to square one, and meanwhile
the taxpayers are out $2 billion.
MR. LOCKHART: I disagree with your assessment that
we've got him back to square one. I think we're in a much stronger
position than we were earlier this year, given the strength and
unanimous view of the international community. We have explicit and
unconditional agreements that the burden rests on him to prove that
he will fulfill. And if he doesn't fulfill, our options remain open.
Q Joe, just to come back to Peter's question, for
three months we accepted a certain level of operation for UNSCOM and
we didn't threaten to go to war over it. Now it sounds like we have
a new -- we've set a new bar for him. Is that correct? I mean, our
policy has changed. What was acceptable to us for inspections for
three months --
MR. LOCKHART: I think what's gone on -- partly what's
gone on in three months is we have in many ways strengthened and
built the kind of consensus among the international community that we
had at the end of the Gulf War. And that's an important point.
Q So you're saying that you didn't provoke a
crisis --
MR. LOCKHART: Yes. And that's an important point which
I neglected to mention, which was we had, through the normal United
Nations process, we had a sanctions review policy that came up on a
biannual basis that was completely taken off the table -- bimonthly,
sorry. But that was completely off the table. There is no process
now for him to get out of what he most desperately wants to get out
of, which is the sanctions, until he demonstrates that he will
comply.
Q So you're basically saying that for the three
months that we put up with fettered access, we did a lot of good
diplomatic work and created this consensus in the international
community that didn't exist before, right? That's one of the things
we've accomplished.
MR. LOCKHART: That is certainly where we are today.
Q But what I'm asking you is if he hadn't done what
he did on October 31st, which is say he was going to kick the
inspectors out altogether, we would not have been ready to take a
military strike against him.
MR. LOCKHART: We work through the situation as it is.
I'm not going to try to get into what-ifs here.
Q What obligation does the United States recognize to
consult with allies before any future military action if Iraq reneges
on its promises?
MR. LOCKHART: We believe we have the authority should
we deem it appropriate or necessary to move forward.
Q Joe, how is the United States going to judge
compliance? If a single team is turned away from a single factory,
is that enough? Do we have essentially a zero tolerance policy now?
MR. LOCKHART: I think we will leave it to the auspices
of Mr. Butler and UNSCOM, and they will report back to the U.N. and
ultimately to us if they believe Saddam Hussein is living up to the
obligations he agreed to this weekend.
...............
Q Do you know if the President's still planning on
addressing the situation in Iraq at the top of his remarks at his
3:30 p.m.?
MR. LOCKHART: 4:00 p.m. -- the event's now at 4:00 p.m.
Yes, the answer's yes.
Q Is it true as reported today that the Justice
Department is about to launch an investigation -- a formal
investigation -- into Kenneth Starr's alleged mistreatment of Monica
Lewinsky?
MR. LOCKHART: That is a question for the Justice
Department.
.............
Q Can you talk about a question you answered here
about Mr. Butler? Do I read you right at saying that the U.S. is
leaving up to Butler to determine whether or not Saddam Hussein has
complied, that the U.S. will not make a unilateral action, and that
we will wait for him?
MR. LOCKHART: No, I think it's -- what these agreements
are for is to provide cooperation -- a permanent cooperation for the
work of UNSCOM. And I think it's -- we will look to UNSCOM and the
people on the ground to provide us with a judgment of whether they're
living up to these obligations.
Q Does that mean that we won't act before we hear
from Mr. Butler? We won't make unilateral actions?
MR. LOCKHART: There would be no basis to act without
talking to Mr. Butler. Mr. Butler is the person on the ground who
runs UNSCOM. That is the organization that does the inspection work.
Q But doesn't that mean that will take a while? I
mean, it will take him a while to figure out whether --
MR. LOCKHART: Certainly, it's going to take some time
for them to go in and for them to continue on what they're testing
and establish whether they believe that Saddam Hussein is in
compliance.
..................
Are we done? Thank you.
END 2:02 P.M. EST
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