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Iraq Does Not Back Down: Aziz Letter, Iraq TV, Nov 14

Iraq News, NOVEMBER 14, 1998

By Laurie Mylroie

The central focus of Iraq News is the tension between the considerable, proscribed WMD capabilities that Iraq is holding on to and its increasing stridency that it has complied with UNSCR 687 and it is time to lift sanctions. If you wish to receive Iraq News by email, a service which includes full-text of news reports not archived here, send your request to Laurie Mylroie .

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Baghdad Iraq Television Network in Arabic
1537 GMT 14 Nov
[Announcer-read report]
[FBIS Translated Text]

President Saddam Husayn chaired a joint meeting of the Revolution Command Council and the Iraq Command of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party.

The conferees discussed the latest developments in the situation, particularly the two messages received by President Saddam Husayn from Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin and Russian Federation Prime Minister Yevgeniy Primakov.

The conferees also reviewed the position of the friendly states and the discussions that have taken place over the past few days. The conferees at the joint meeting also discussed the message sent to President Saddam Husayn by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. The conferees decided to charge Deputy Prime Minister Tariq 'Aziz to send the following reply to the message by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan:

His Excellency Kofi Annan
UN Secretary General
New York
Your Excellency,

Your letter dated 13 November 1998, which was addressed to Leader President Saddam Husayn, was presented to a joint meeting of the Revolution Command Council and the Iraq Command of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party presided over by President Saddam Husayn.

I have been asked to convey to you the following response:

1. The aim of the Iraqi decisions of August and 31 October 1998 was not to sever relations with the UN Special Commission [UNSCOM] and the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] and to stop carrying out its commitments in accordance with Part C of Resolution 687 of 1991. Iraq's aim was to end the suffering of its besieged people and implement Paragraph 22 of Resolution 687 as a first step to lifting the other sanctions.

2. The Iraqi Government has dealt with your initiative on the comprehensive review in a positive manner, out of its trust in you and in your good intentions; however, and regrettably, the UN Security Council [UNSC] deliberations on measures to implement this initiative did not result in a clear picture ensuring fairness and objectivity in implementing Paragraph 22 of Resolution 687, which constitutes the declared aim of the comprehensive review in accordance with your initiative.

It is obvious that the primary cause of this is the US stand that does not represent the majority of the UNSC and which has consistently objected to providing any clarification on the purpose of the comprehensive review contrary to your initiative.

3. Despite the assurances provided by you and several UNSC members who support the basic purpose of the comprehensive review; despite the trust that we have in you and in most UNSC members; and in spite of the fact that we are convinced of your good intentions and sincerity, these assurances were not deemed satisfactory by us, because they did not meet our basic demands.

Based on the contents of your letter; in appreciation of the contents of the letter sent by Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Russian Prime Minister Yevegeniy Primakov; in recognition of the positive stands expressed and communicated to us by China, France, Brazil, and other states; and to provide an additional chance for upholding justice by lifting the Iraq embargo, which must begin by implementing Paragraph 22 of Resolution 687 of 1991, the Iraqi leadership has decided to resume cooperation with the UN Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency and to allow them to carry out their ordinary tasks in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and based on the principles that have been agreed upon in the Memorandum of Understanding signed with you on 23 February 1998.

As we give this opportunity, we do so not out of fear of the US aggressive campaign and the threats to launch a fresh aggression against Iraq. Rather, we do so out of our feeling of responsibility and in response to the call made by you and our friends. We stress that Iraq will not relinquish its legitimate rights to have the unfair embargo imposed against it lifted and to live a normal life like other peoples of the world, until we see what your efforts and the review will yield.

Your Excellency UN Secretary General: We rightly feel that if the comprehensive review is to be not a mere formal measure and free of the influences of premeditated objectives, the adoption of the principles that we relayed yesterday, 13 November 1998, to the ambassadors of Russia, France, and China-- a copy of which I attach to this letter -- may make the review serious, fair, and fruitful.

We expect you to continue your efforts to set the principles and correct measures for the review, and to start it as soon as possible.

With best regards,

[Signed] Tariq 'Aziz, deputy prime minister of the Republic of Iraq
[Dated] Baghdad, 25 Rajab 1419 hegira, corresponding to 14 November 1998

Following is the text of the principles:

1. The objective that Iraq sought to achieve through its two decisions on 5 August and on 31 October was not to severe ties with UNSCOM and the IAEA, or to stop fulfilling its commitments as stipulated in Section C of Resolution 687 and in Resolution 715.

2. Iraq's objective is to end the suffering of its people, who are facing an embargo, and to implement Paragraph 22 of Resolution 687 as first step toward lifting the other embargoes.

3. Iraq has demonstrated its readiness to enter the comprehensive review proposed by the secretary general; however, the results yielded by the deliberations of the Council, under US pressure, do not guarantee a fair and objective review, whose objective is to implement Paragraph 22.

4. Iraq's position on the issue of the comprehensive review is as follows:

i. That the review should take place within a very short period of time, seven days for example, after the UNSCOM and IAEA resume their normal activity. This should take place without any conditions, as those that were mentioned in the past on the so-called verification of Iraq's cooperation.

ii. That the review should principally be based on Paragraph Three of the UN secretary general's concept on 15 October, the three Iraqi questions on 3 August, and underlining the issue of evidence.

iii. The UNSC should be ready to implement Paragraph 22 if proved that the requirements of Section C of Resolution 687 had been met.

iv. Should the UNSC decide, based on an objective examination that something needs to be done, a short period of time will be specified to do that. Until the said work is achieved, the UNSC will implement measures to lift or reduce the sanctions-measures that are commensurate with what has been achieved of the requirements of Paragraph 22. After the achievement of the required work, the UNSC should start the implementation of Paragraph 22.

v. The UNSC should adhere to the legal interpretation of Section C of Resolution 687. None of the UNSC's members should impose additional conditions or restrictions to the implementation of Paragraph 22.

5. The UNSC should not start the second revision until after reaching the conclusions regarding the first revision.

6. The second revision should be restricted to the obligations stipulated in clear texts in the resolutions. No issues other than the legal interpretation of the resolutions should be raised.

7. The UNSC members, particularly the five permanent ones, should abide by the international law and the UNSC's resolutions pertaining to all of Iraq's issues.

8. The issue of Butler and the makeup and practices of UNSCOM is very important. The UNSC should look into this issue seriously in order to guarantee good relations in the future. We hope that this will be done as soon as possible.

9. It is necessary that these assurances be directly relayed to the leadership in Baghdad either by the secretary general or a UNSC delegation.

The meeting was attended by the speaker of the National Assembly, the head of the Presidential Office, and the ministers of foreign affairs and culture and information.

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[Description of source: Official television station of the Iraqi Government]