The White House Briefing Room
November 12, 1998
PRESS BRIEFING BY JOE LOCKHART
12:54 P.M. EST
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
______________________________________________________________
For Immediate Release November 12, 1998
PRESS BRIEFING BY
JOE LOCKHART
The Briefing Room
12:54 P.M. EST
Q How could you tear yourself away from Tariz Aziz?
MR. LOCKHART: I was watching Sports Center, because I was mentioned.
I've now fulfilled one of the requirements in life, being mentioned on ESPN
Sports Center, talking about the bet btw the President and the Vice President --
football game this weekend.
Q Why?
MR. LOCKHART: When you are on Sports Center you will understand.
(Laughter.)
Q Tariq Aziz is talking war and peace. He was flailing the United
States government in no uncertain terms.
MR. LOCKHART: Well, I think what you saw today was someone speaking
from a position of isolation. Tariq Aziz -- I presume he speaks for Saddam
Hussein -- believes that somehow the United States and the United Nations is
responsible for the situation we're in. They singlely subscribe to that view in
this world. The rest of the world takes a different view. The rest of the
world takes the view that it is Iraq that is responsible for their flagrant
violations of their responsibilities with UNSCOM and U.N. Security Council
resolutions.
Just today, the closest neighbors of Saddam Hussein made a clear
statement that he is in violation and he must change his course, and that he
alone -- Saddam Hussein alone is responsible for the consequences of
non-compliance. So I think what you heard was a lone voice that is completely
isolated.
Q Although -- to kind of follow on that same line, why is this
threat of military action basically a U.S. threat? I mean, we're kind of a lone
voice in that, no?
MR. LOCKHART: Well, I think we have talked to allies around the world,
the U.N. has spoken clearly about the need for Saddam Hussein to change course,
and we, as we have in the past, have, in the application of our diplomacy, felt
that the threat of force is both appropriate and may be required.
Q Well, wouldn't be even better if this was an allied threat of
force?
MR. LOCKHART: Well, I think what -- the best outcome
is for us to be able to move forward with our policy objectives,
which is reducing his ability to reconstitute weapons of mass
destruction and deliver those weapons and threatening his
neighbors.
Q Is the President going to wait to see whether Kofi
Annan, the U.N. Secretary General, gets back into this -- makes
some effort to mediate?
MR. LOCKHART: I think Kofi Annan has spoken pretty
clearly about what his views on the subject are, that he believes
Iraq is in flagrant violation. So I don't know what there is to
wait for. The Secretary of State has spoken to Kofi Annan
several times over the last few days. As we've said before,
there's really nothing to negotiate here. The international
community sent a strong, clear message to Saddam Hussein. The
question is will he hear it.
Q Joe, you talked about the policy being the
degradation of his ability to reconstitute weapons of mass
destruction used to threaten people. Why such limited policy
goals? Why isn't the policy to get rid of Saddam completely?
MR. LOCKHART: Well, I think, the international
community, the United States looks forward to a day where there
is an Iraqi government that respects human rights, that respects
international law. We are not in that place right now, and,
therefore our policy is to limit his ability to reconstitute his
weapons of mass destruction and his ability to threaten his
neighbors.
Q What would it take to get to that point?
MR. LOCKHART: We have worked in the past with
opposition groups -- as you know, the President had signed
legislation recently that will expand that effort. Until then,
we need to concentrate on trying to move to a situation where
UNSCOM can do the important work that they've been assigned to
do, and if they are unable to do that work, look at the options
for pursuing our policy.
Q Joe, Tariq Aziz made the case today that it would
be the U.S. policy that as long as Saddam Hussein is in power, we
would never acquiesce to the lifting of the oil embargo against
Iraq. Is he wrong?
MR. LOCKHART: I think it is -- Saddam Hussein has the
ability to demonstrate that he wants sanctions lifted, and he can
do that by allowing UNSCOM to do the work. If you look at over
the last year, UNSCOM, in delivering a plan in the middle of the
year, gave them a sense of how they can get out from underneath
sanctions. There was within the last months some discussion of
-- with cooperation and full cooperation for UNSCOM -- a
comprehensive review of sanctions at the United Nations, which
the United States supported under those conditions. So I think
he knows how to deal with the issue of sanctions, and he is
working in a way that couldn't be more counterproductive.
Q Let me just put this another way. What Aziz asked
for -- and I'm not suggesting that you ought to do this -- but
what he asked for was for the U.S. to say affirmatively, if you,
Iraq, comply with the mandates of UNSCOM, we will lift the oil
embargo. He says that that's what Iraq has been waiting to hear
for seven or eight years, and they haven't heard that.
MR. LOCKHART: Well, all I can say is the U.S. position
on sanctions review, relief, lifting is very clear and hasn't
changed. For eight years, what you have seen from Saddam Hussein
is him trying to evade at every point in the road complying with
what he agreed to. Remember this, all started when Saddam
Hussein invaded Kuwait. There is a history here. He knows what
he needs to do. And he has tried, using a number of methods, to
get out from under doing what he needs to do because he clearly
wants to keep the ability to reconstitute his weapons. And the
international community is saying they're not going to let him.
Q Well, might Saddam now change course and avoid
military action or has time run out?
MR. LOCKHART: That's a question for Saddam.
Q I'm asking whether the President will even at this
late hour --
MR. LOCKHART: We have said all along and continue to
say that the President and the international community prefer a
peaceful resolution to this situation. We prefer the
circumstance where UNSCOM is allowed to do their work -- an
aggressive and intrusive UNSCOM -- to go in and look and do the
work that they were sent to Baghdad, to Iraq, to do, and that
sanctions remain in place until there is compliance.
Q You say you prefer a peaceful resolution, but all
signs suggest that time may have run out to achieve one. And I'm
asking whether that's the case, or whether there is some time
left?
MR. LOCKHART: As anyone who's watched this week, we
are not getting into timelines, we're not getting into deadlines,
we're not getting into ultimatums. UNSCOM is not doing the work
they need to do. As the President said yesterday, this is a
matter of months, not years, potentially to reconstitute. This
cannot go on indefinitely. But I'm not going to go any further
than that.
Q But Joe, as you scan the scope of diplomacy
statements that you've heard today from Iraq, and you say that
the President prefers a peaceful resolution, do you see any
prospect at all for that occurring?
MR. LOCKHART: I am not in the prediction business.
There has been very public diplomacy. You heard the President
yesterday make it very clear what Saddam Hussein needs to do.
You've seen what the GCC has done today. There is private
diplomacy where people are delivering messages which --
delivering that same message to the Iraqis. The question is,
will they hear that message. I can't answer that for you.
Q I'm not asking you for a prediction, Joe. I'm
asking you, do you see right now any indication that this can be
resolved peacefully?
MR. LOCKHART: This can be resolved peacefully if
Saddam Hussein listens to the international community and takes
the steps he needs to take.
Q Joe, how many times can the U.S. keep sending
planes and ships and soldiers to the Persian Gulf at huge cost
and not getting the job done, I mean as far as getting either
Saddam to comply or getting rid of Saddam?
MR. LOCKHART: We have a policy which we're pursuing
here and I don't see the utility in going down the road beyond
where we are right now.
Q Joe, in terms of reversing course, what would
satisfy the United States, simply a statement from Saddam Hussein
that he's reversing course and will allow the inspectors back in?
Does that stop all of this?
MR. LOCKHART: I think the United States and the U.N.
and the international community has made it very clear that he
needs to reverse course here and allow UNSCOM to go in in an
unfettered way and do the work they were sent there to do.
Q But he's done that many times before, Joe. It's
cheat and retreat over and over again. Is the United States
willing at this point to settle for simply his word that he'll
allow UNSCOM to come back in?
MR. LOCKHART: We would need to see that UNSCOM will be
able to do the work they need to do.
Q What's the President's current thinking as to the
advisability of going to Asia at this delicate moment?
MR. LOCKHART: I think, as I've said to you all week,
the President is very much looking forward to this trip. It was
the President's idea for APEC leaders to get together once a year
to work on the important issues of trade and international
finance. The President is scheduled to go on the trip. Clearly,
the situation in Iraq is being watched closely. If there is some
change in the President's schedule, I'll let you know.
Q Do you foresee any further presidential meetings
with his national security team?
MR. LOCKHART: No. I don't have any information, but I
did tell you this morning that if he made some calls, I'd let you
know. He's made a few calls. And these are under the category
of consulting with our allies. He spoke to Chancellor Schroeder
of Germany, Prime Minister Dehaene of Belgium, Prime Minister Kok
of the Netherlands, and Prime Minister Persson of Sweden.
Q Joe, did you say he is not meeting with his
national security team later today?
MR. LOCKHART: I don't have any information. He
obviously gets his daily brief from his National Security
Advisor, but I have no information on a planned meeting this
afternoon.
Q They're not going to be here at 6:00 p.m.?
MR. LOCKHART: His advisors, as I told you this
morning, are meeting on an almost daily basis, and I expect that
to continue. But I don't have any information on the President.
Q When the President talked about Saddam Hussein
being able to reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction within
months, not years, does he think that in the eight months or so
that the inspectors have not had the kind of access they wanted,
that those weapons have been reconstituted? What about the --
MR. LOCKHART: No, I think he was speaking into future.
I'm not aware of any evidence that that has happened.
Q But how do you know if you haven't had unfettered
access?
MR. LOCKHART: Based on our ability to know these
things, which I'm not going to detail, we don't believe that
that's happened. But without UNSCOM in there at all, we believe
that this is -- there is a possibility that over months rather
than years, he could reconstitute, which is one of the reasons
that we have said that the situation with UNSCOM being out cannot
persist indefinitely.
Q Joe, Senator Spector has written the President a
letter which he's made public, asking for the President to
convene a special session of Congress so they can authorize any
military action if it be needed. He also seems to say that he
thinks that he would get the approval if the President is
considering calling Congress in.
MR. LOCKHART: Well, we have been consulting with
congressional leaders throughout the year, actually, on the
situation in Iraq. We continue that consultation. It's very
important for the President and his team to stay in close
contact. We believe the President, with his duties as Commander
in Chief, has the authority to do this, and particularly given
the resolution in the wake of the Gulf War. But we will continue
to work closely and consult with Congress.
Q In this present situation, which congressional
leaders are you consulting with and how are you doing it --
face-to-face briefings, phone calls?
MR. LOCKHART: I don't have a list, but I would guess
-- my understanding is it would be some combination. Some
members have been seen; some have been talked to.
Q Who is doing the briefing in the White House?
MR. LOCKHART: A combination, but I think it's being
done under the auspices of Mr. Berger's office, but I don't have
the details of who and when.
Q Has the President talked to any congressional
leaders?
MR. LOCKHART: The President has talked to -- I don't
know whether on the phone or in person, but he has had some
conversations.
Q Who and when, Joe?
MR. LOCKHART: I'm not going to get into that.
...............
Q Joe, what's the significance of Clinton following
the likes of the leaders of Belgium, Netherlands, Sweden? Is he
working his way down a list?
MR. LOCKHART: Well, I think it's important in this
situation that the President touch base with our allies in
Europe, in NATO and in the region. And he's working through that
process now.
Q What is his message to them?
MR. LOCKHART: His message is one of consultation. And
I think what we hear in these calls is a united international
community, united around the idea that Saddam Hussein has to
change course and change his behavior.
Q Does he have reason to think that some of
them or some other leaders will come forward and join the United
States in a statement -- more forceful statements against Iraq?
MR. LOCKHART: I think there have been quite forceful
statements from all around the world on this subject.
Q Joe, would it be imprudent for the Judiciary
Committee to have its impeachment hearing next week if the United
States is at war?
MR. LOCKHART: I honestly think anything I said there
could not be seen as anything that would be valid. That's
clearly an issue for the Judiciary Committee. I'm trying to do
this without sending a signal of any kind, way, shape or form.
It's a decision they need to make. I don't believe that there's
anyone in this building who will try to dictate to them whether
that's proper or improper. It's a decision they'll need to make
and we'll abide by their decision.
Q If the military strikes would happen in Iraq, is
there concern that some of the U.S. missiles could wind up
hitting some bunkers with antrax and VX, and if so, is there some
kind of neutralizing chemical that could be used?
MR. LOCKHART: Well, I'm not going to get into the
actual targeting of any military operation except to say that
great care and attention is given to all of these issues. But as
far as the specific question, I don't have an answer to that.
.................
Q Tariq Aziz said that only Kofi Annan can broker a
peaceful resolution to this crisis. Would the United States be
willing to let him have another shot?
MR. LOCKHART: I think that this may be something that
Tariq Aziz has expressed or may want, but I haven't heard it from
anyplace else. The French made a statement today that this is
not even on the agenda or not in the cards, as far as what the
U.N. is doing. What Saddam Hussein and the Iraqis and Tariq Aziz
need to understand is there is nothing to negotiate. They have a
simple choice: to reverse course or face the consequences of
refusing to reverse course.
And importantly, you see from his neighbors and the GCC
a clear statement today that he alone bears responsibility here
and he alone is responsible for this situation and he alone can
provide the answers.
Q Joe, would you consider -- just to follow up on
that -- would you consider Annan or someone else entering in to
seek a diplomatic solution as a delaying tactic or --
MR. LOCKHART: As we've said, there is a series of
public diplomatic efforts, some private diplomatic efforts, those
are ongoing; but they all come down to the same thing, which is
that Saddam Hussein needs to get the message. And the message is
clear and I don't see how it could become any more clear to him.
Q Russia has always been basically on the side of
Saddam, and the President is calling a lot of prime ministers.
Would he consider calling Boris Yeltsin or Primakov on this
issue?
MR. LOCKHART: I don't have any information on that.
Q Has the President spoken to the Chinese or the
French along the same line?
COLONEL CROWLEY: He spoke to President Chirac last
week.
MR. LOCKHART: Last week, yes.
Q How about the Saudis?
MR. LOCKHART: He spoke to them last week, yes -- as
did the Vice President, as did Secretary Cohen, obviously, from
his visit to the region.
Q And on the Chinese the answer is
no?
MR. LOCKHART: No.
Q Joe, you say he needs to get the message, but he's
never really gotten the message for the long-term. He's backed
down and then he's gone back to his bad old ways. What's going
to make the difference this time?
MR. LOCKHART: Again, I can't look into his mind and
try to figure out he gets a message, but the message is there and
the message is clear.
Q Let me get back to the trip the day after
tomorrow. You've spoken of a range of options that have been
given to the President, but do any of them, any of those options
preclude his being out of the country? Or could he exercise them
from anyplace in the world?
MR. LOCKHART: I am not going to get into talking in
any way, shape, or form about the options that are available to
the President.
Q But can he exercise all of them from anyplace in
the world?
MR. LOCKHART: I am not going to get into what the
options are or where he'll exercise them from.
Q The question --
MR. LOCKHART: I understand the question; I'm just not
answering it. (Laughter.)
Q Joe, with U.S. forces now moving in that region on
a war footing, isn't it already imprudent for the President to
leave the country, where we are today?
MR. LOCKHART: I think the President is in a good
position to make those decisions, and my previous answer still
applies for how we view this trip.
Q Will he be saying anything today about this in his
event?
MR. LOCKHART: I don't expect so. I think the event
today is on child care and the importance of after-school
programs and the important work that the administration has done
on that. We're going to take advantage of talking about child
care, domestic issues.
Q But he has often begun those things by saying that
this is only opportunity to meet -- he had no time to meet the
press.
MR. LOCKHART: I don't expect him to do that today.
....................
Q The President was once asked about the mental
stability of Saddam Hussein, and I'm just wondering if the
administration is confident that Saddam can make a rational
decision on this matter.
MR. LOCKHART: I haven't heard any information that
leads me to believe that he can't make a rational decision. I've
seen a lot of evidence that he's not making rational decisions.
Q Joe, many people in the administration, including
yourself and the President yesterday, have said that Hussein
could reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction in months
rather than years. Why do we think so, and specifically which
kind of weapon of mass destruction are we talking about?
MR. LOCKHART: Without getting into any great detail,
because it's beyond my limited ability to understand or explain
the complicated issues of WMD and chemical weapons, we believe
from both -- and also from what UNSCOM, the work they have done
-- that is a matter of months rather than years. And it's not
only an issue of reconstituting; it's also the issue of delivery.
And again, as I said on Tuesday, this is not an
abstract threat about something down the road. We are talking
about a leader who used chemical weapons on his own people, who
fired Scuds at his neighbors, who invaded Kuwait. He has a
demonstrated pattern of using the weapons that are available to
him. So this is a serious threat.
Q If I could follow up, you said "delivery." Do you
mean to say that his missile capability can be restored as months
as well as his warhead capability?
MR. LOCKHART: Our concerns extend to not just
including reconstituting, but also in delivery.
Q U.S. diplomatic personnel in Israel have been
informed that their dependents there can leave with the
assistance of the U.S. government if they chose. Do we fear
there's going to be an attack on Israel?
MR. LOCKHART: We believe that the State Department
takes this kind of situation very seriously. They believe, as
they said yesterday, that tensions in the region make it prudent
to take this step. And it is a reflection of their view of the
situation in the region.
Q And if Saddam should attack a neighboring country --
Israel or any other country -- what would be the U.S. position?
MR. LOCKHART: I'm not going to speculate on that kind
of hypothetical.
................
Q Joe, what's the rationale for not giving Iraq a
deadline?
MR. LOCKHART: We think that it's very clear what they
need to do. We're not in a negotiation. They need to decide and
we have patiently and diplomatically worked through these issues
over the last year. But as we've said in the past, this cannot
go on indefinitely.
.................
END 1:25 P.M. EST
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