U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
INDEX
TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 10, 1998
Briefer: JAMES P. RUBIN
IRAQ 2 Secretary's Contacts/Consultations with Foreign Ministers 3-4,5,6-7 US Policy Toward Iraq/Peaceful Resolution/Full Compliance 4-5 Upcoming Travel Plans by the President and Secretary 5 Prospects for Lifting Sanctions Against Iraq
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB # 124
TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 10, 1998, 12:45 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
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QUESTION: Can you bring us up to date, especially as to the Secretary's phone calls, if any? Then we'll carry on from there.
MR. RUBIN: Yes, I would expect Secretary Albright to be in touch with key foreign ministers today, including Foreign Minister Cook, Foreign Minister Vedrine, and Foreign Minister Ivanov. That is not an exhaustive list, but it is something that I expect to happen during the course of the day. She will be consulting with them about the grave situation in Iraq; beyond that, it's hard to specify.
With respect to Iraq, let me simply say that we obviously prefer a peaceful resolution in which Saddam agrees to comply with Council resolutions and cooperate with UNSCOM. But we have a lot of experience dealing with Saddam Hussein. For over seven years, their leadership has relentlessly deceived and obstructed efforts by the international community to identify and destroy Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. Saddam Hussein has misled fellow Arab leaders about his intention to invade Kuwait. He lied to UNSCOM when he said that he did not weaponize VX; and the Iraqi leadership lied to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan when it signed the agreement pledging full and unfettered access for UN inspectors and then failed to implement it.
Iraq's leadership has never expressed regret or remorse for his past actions, which include gassing his own people and invading Kuwait. We do not believe he has renounced his aggression or using the most ruthless and barbaric means to achieve it. Our policy is designed to ensure that Saddam Hussein will not -- to prevent him from being a threat to his neighbors in the world. That is our view.
QUESTION: Given that catalogue of vices, how can the US deal with an Iraq in any circumstances with Saddam still president? Does he have to leave?
MR. RUBIN: We've stated very clearly that it is up to Saddam Hussein to comply with the resolutions of the Security Council that lay out the needs and requirements, including weapons of mass destruction -- coming back into compliance with those resolutions, including Kuwaiti prisoners, Kuwaiti equipment; and, in short, demonstrating his peaceful intentions -- in which case we are prepared to see an adjustment in the sanctions regime. That is our view. We've never expressed a great deal of optimism that he would do so, but that is our view.
QUESTION: You say you would prefer a diplomatic resolution, but is the time for diplomacy now over?
MR. RUBIN: We continue to pursue and discuss our options, including the military option. With respect to the question of time, let me simply say that this can't go on indefinitely. Saddam Hussein is not an abstract threat. He has fired Scuds at his neighbors, attacked Kuwait, used chemical weapons on Iran and his own people. UNSCOM has shown through its work that he developed massive quantities of chemical and biological weapons and weaponized those weapons for delivery by Scud missiles. He has still not accounted for all these dangerous weapons.
Our preference is for a peaceful resolution in which Saddam resumes cooperation with UNSCOM. But if he continues to block UNSCOM and we do not respond, he will be able to reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction in a matter of months, not years. And if we fail to act, he will feel emboldened to threaten the region further, armed with weapons of mass destruction.
In short, we have set as our policy for some time now preventing Saddam Hussein from being a threat to his neighbors and to the world.
QUESTION: Secretary Cohen today used the expression - an expression we haven't heard in this particular crisis very much - "running out of time." Does this take us into a new phase where some clock is really ticking?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I've indicated to you, in response to Sid's question, that this can't go on indefinitely; that if Saddam continues to block UNSCOM and we do not respond, he will be able to reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction in a matter of months, not a matter of years. This is a dangerous situation; this is why we have considered it a grave situation. If we fail to act, he will feel emboldened to threaten the region further, armed, possibly, with the most dangerous kinds of weapons.
QUESTION: Let me try again.
QUESTION: Will the Secretary be laying out these arguments when she talks to the --
MR. RUBIN: Again, I can't be more specific than saying to you that she will be consulting with her colleagues about the gravity of the situation with respect to Iraq.
QUESTION: Because it sounds like you're laying out the rationale for military action today.
MR. RUBIN: I am laying out our views on the situation. As I've indicated to you for some days, it is not for us to preempt a presidential decision. When the President has made a decision and wants to communicate that decision, that is for the White House to do so.
QUESTION: The only thing absent from this rhetoric, which provides very strong rhetoric we've heard in the past, is a call for the elimination of Saddam Hussein, the removal of Saddam. How can you contemplate him reversing himself, admitting the inspectors and then going through this frustrating exercise, as you're bound to again, based on his track record? The US is willing to have Saddam Hussein say, okay, I was just kidding; bring the inspectors in, and then just resume and pick up from there?
MR. RUBIN: If your question is, what would happen if he were to resume cooperation in full and allow UNSCOM to act effectively and were to comply with the resolutions of the Security Council, it is our policy that we will act pursuant to those resolutions.
There is another question which is, what is the likelihood of him doing so; and we have never expressed particular optimism that he would.
QUESTION: Jamie, the President is delaying his trip to the Far East. Are there any plans for the Secretary to delay her trip?
MR. RUBIN: I would have to say that the premise of your question is not something that - I do know there was a one-day issue. With respect to the Secretary's travel, the Secretary is scheduled to leave on Thursday. If there are adjustments in that schedule, I will tell you; that's always been my practice.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) - travel schedule, she's due to give a speech in New York tonight, I believe. Will there be anything in the speech concerning Iraq, or will it be related to the --
MR. RUBIN: It will be related to the subject matter for which she was invited and not other subject matter.
QUESTION: Will you try to get it to us, considering it's a nighttime speech?
MR. RUBIN: We'll do the best we can.
QUESTION: Appreciate it.
QUESTION: Back in February, the United States was very explicit about the aims of a military attack on Iraq. On this occasion, we haven't had any aims spelled out. Could you do that for us now; could you say what the aim would be this time?
MR. RUBIN: I think in several occasions in recent questions, I have stated that our policy goal is to prevent Saddam Hussein from threatening his neighbors and the world. If the use of force were chosen as the desired and best outcome, it would be in furtherance of that objective, which is to prevent him from being a threat to his neighbors and to the world. Our policy goal has been to prevent Saddam Hussein from threatening his neighbors and the world. If the use of force were to occur, it would be in furtherance of that objective.
QUESTION: The Iraqi Trade Minister, Muhammad Mahdi al-Salih, said today that lifting --
MR. RUBIN: Excellent pronunciation.
QUESTION: Thank you. He said that lifting sanctions is key to ending the crisis and that Iraq wishes to end this crisis peacefully. Can you comment?
MR. RUBIN: Yes, if Iraq wants to have sanctions lifted, it has a very simple choice; and that is to do what it has refused to do year after year after year, which is to come into compliance with the requirements of the international community, to provide the inspectors the access and cooperation they need to do their job.
Every time Saddam Hussein and his henchmen complain about sanctions, what they're doing is complaining about their own behavior. The Security Council has set out a very simple path to resolve the situation, and all it requires is him doing what he agreed to do - cooperating with UNSCOM - not refusing cooperation with UNSCOM, but providing them the information they need.
A road map was spelled out by the Security Council to review compliance with the various resolutions. Iraq took that proposal, rejected it, threw it in the face of even some of its friends and suspended cooperation. If they want to see their way towards easing the sanctions regime, they have a very simple way to do that; and that is to comply with what the whole world now sees as their failure to do - which is to provide the necessary information, cooperation and access to UNSCOM.
It's a question they should address towards themselves.
QUESTION: Jamie, how do you envision military action causing compliance of the various UN Security Council --
MR. RUBIN: Again, I have not said that. What I have said is that our objective - the underlying objective of our policy, and there are different means in which you can pursue that objective - has been to prevent Iraq from threatening its neighbors and threatening the world. If military force were chosen as the right course, it would be in furtherance of that objective.
With respect to cooperation with the UN inspectors, what I can tell you is that we would prefer to see this crisis resolved by Iraq choosing to come back into compliance, choosing to cooperate with UNSCOM, which has proven that it is the best way to keep track of, destroy and monitor weapons of mass destruction.
But if another course is chosen, it would be in furtherance of the underlying objective of our policy all along, which has been to prevent Saddam Hussein from threatening his neighbors and the world.
QUESTION: In your view that we-armed Iraq is months away as opposed to years, how did you come to that? Can you say anything about that assessment?
MR. RUBIN: What I can tell you about that is, until Iraq provides immediate, complete and unconditional cooperation with UNSCOM and until Iraq provides a complete declaration of their weapons of mass destruction programs, UNSCOM cannot provide the UN Security Council with any level of assurance regarding elimination of their weapons programs.
These types of weapons are by their very nature relatively easy to conceal. Without inspections and monitoring, we have judged that they could reconstitute those systems in at least the time frame that I've described to you.
In short, without inspections, it's very hard to know precisely what they're doing. We have our own ways of judging what they're up to and judging what we think they are doing. Beyond the broad conclusion that I've described to you, I can't be more specific for obvious reasons.
QUESTION: Do you think he has anything hidden in the way of missiles or CW or BW capability?
MR. RUBIN: I think if you get any briefing from UNSCOM, they will describe to you all the discrepancies between what they believe exists and what Saddam Hussein has declared. So I think UNSCOM would be the easiest avenue for you to get an answer to that question.
QUESTION: Based on what UNSCOM is saying, does Washington draw a conclusion regarding those items?
MR. RUBIN: I'd be happy to get you UNSCOM's reports, which we have no reason to dispute.
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QUESTION: Thank you.
(The briefing concluded at 1:20 P.M.)
[end of document]
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