The White House Briefing Room
November 10, 1998
PRESS BRIEFING BY JOE LOCKHART
1:45 P.M. EST
THE WHITE HOUSE Office of the Press Secretary ______________________________________________________________ For Immediate Release November 10, 1998 PRESS BRIEFING BY JOE LOCKHART The Briefing Room 1:45 P.M. EST MR. LOCKHART: Good afternoon, everyone. Questions from the press corps? Q Is the President going on the trip? MR. LOCKHART: As I told you this morning, the President is very much looking forward to the trip and he still is scheduled to go. But we're watching things around the world, particularly in Iraq, closely, but at this point the President is scheduled to take the trip. Q Can you give us any readout on this meeting with the defense officials this morning? MR. LOCKHART: Only that the meeting lasted for about an hour and a half. He met with both his national security team, people from the Pentagon, the Secretary of State, and they had a broad discussion of the options that we've discussed both diplomatic and military that remain on the table. Q On Sunday, the President asked them to go back and develop some more information, some more options. Does the President now have everything that he needs to make the decision, or are they back out developing more? MR. LOCKHART: My understanding is that this is a process that's ongoing. No decisions have been made. Q You said both diplomatic and military options were discussed. I thought this morning you said it was military. MR. LOCKHART: Well, I knew from the arrival of Secretary Cohen and General Shelton, because they arrived just as I was going into the gaggle. I subsequently was informed by NAC that Secretary of State Albright was there and that it was a broader discussion than as described this morning. Q If President Clinton decides to take action either unilaterally or with other countries, are United States forces in a position now to be able to carry out any of those orders? And would the President have to be in Washington if there were any military strike against Iraq? MR. LOCKHART: I'm not going to get into what we need to do to take decision -- I think I described for you in the last couple of weeks that there was a reconfiguration of forces earlier this year to allow for swift activity if needed. But I'm not going to get into the specific decision-making here. Q Would he have to be in Washington? MR. LOCKHART: I'm not going to speculate on that. Q Is there anything on the diplomatic front that could bring this crisis to an end? MR. LOCKHART: Well, I think that there are both public and private diplomatic efforts ongoing, but I think we need to make clear that the international community is not in a position to negotiate with Saddam Hussein. He needs to be in a position to listen and to understand that the international community, as Kofi Annan says, views this as a flagrant violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions. Q Would the United States encourage a diplomatic mission from the U.N. or from some third country? MR. LOCKHART: I think that there are both public and private channels. I would repeat, though, that this is not a situation where we're looking for a negotiation. There's nothing to negotiate. Q You keep repeating that refrain of public and private. What's going on publicly on the diplomatic front? MR. LOCKHART: Well, I think you have seen people who have gone, who have spoken, who are in Baghdad, who have spoken to Iraqi government leaders and I think have delivered the message. I think Kofi Annan over the weekend delivered a very clear and unambiguous message about how he believed that this was a flagrant violation. So I think the international community is speaking clearly and with one voice. Q You're talking about negotiations being out of bounds. Is there somebody who's trying to negotiate and -- MR. LOCKHART: No, not that I'm aware of. Q Is the President making any phone calls? MR. LOCKHART: The President has made a couple of calls today. He may make some more. He spoke to Prime Minister Blair and he spoke to Prime Minister Netanyahu, I think around lunchtime today. Q Why? MR. LOCKHART: He's making calls and consulting with our allies on the situation in Iraq. Obviously, I think in the Netanyahu call we can assume that they had some discussion of the peace process. But his calls today are primarily on consulting our allies on Iraq. .............. Q You said that the President is looking forward to the trip. Is he going to leave on Saturday as scheduled? MR. LOCKHART: I think, given the flip we talked about yesterday on Guam, the latest thinking is sometime on Saturday, yes. Q And then return when? MR. LOCKHART: That's what we're working on now. We're trying to figure out some of the logistics on the back end. But our primarily purpose is to try to get everybody back with enough time for people who are traveling for Thanksgiving to have the time to do that. Q Given the fact that you just said there is no chance for negotiations, and given the fact that Iraq is still defiant, does that mean that these phone calls -- the President is mainly garnering support for a military strike? And does he feel he already has the authority to act militarily, even if some of the allies, say, don't go along? MR. LOCKHART: No, I think he's using this as an opportunity to consult with our allies on a situation that obviously is of great importance to the international community. Q Does he plan any other calls? MR. LOCKHART: I suspect he may have some calls this afternoon, but I'll let you know -- or one of us -- Q Why is he taking so long to come to a decision? MR. LOCKHART: I think we said on Sunday that he received a briefing, was looking for some more information to work through some of these options. That process would take several days. Q Does he think he has an option to go bomb a country? MR. LOCKHART: That process will take several days and we are working through that process. Q Is it accurate to say, Joe, that if Saddam Hussein does not allow the U.N. weapons inspectors to resume their jobs that a military strike is inevitable? MR. LOCKHART: I'm not going to get into what options the President may choose, except to say that all of them remain on the table. I'm not going to get into a timeline. Let me say that we have made clear that our policy is to limit and reduce the ability of Saddam Hussein and Iraq to reconstitute their weapons of mass destruction and to deliver those weapons of mass destruction and to threaten its neighbors. This is not an abstract threat. Saddam Hussein and Iraq is a country that's invaded Kuwait, launched Scud missiles at its neighbors, used chemical and biological weapons on both its neighbors and its own people. So this threat is real. Now, we believe our policy is the most effective way to do this, to pursue the policy, through an aggressive and intrusive UNSCOM regime, as well as sanctions. The sanctions remain in place, but Saddam Hussein has taken steps to reduce the ability of UNSCOM and the monitoring regime. So we will look at options and keep them on the table that allow us to pursue our policy. Q Are you confident that the amount of force currently in the Gulf is enough to carry out the options the President is considering? And given the fact that right now it's really more of a Cruise missile strike or a few bombers, I mean, if you were talking about a significant military strike -- MR. LOCKHART: Beyond what I've said about reconfiguration of forces, I don't want to get into operational details. Q Joe, what would the goal of a military strike be? MR. LOCKHART: Well, what I think what I've said is I'm not going to discuss -- as I said yesterday, I'm not going to discuss the rationale for a decision that hasn't been made. But I think my answer about what our policy is goes to what our objective with Saddam Hussein and with Iraq is. Q Is the administration under the impression that if an air campaign begins, UNSCOM is finished, there's no chance that inspections will begin again? MR. LOCKHART: Our objective and preference is that Saddam Hussein reverse course and this can be done in a peaceful way, and allow UNSCOM to resume their aggressive monitoring regime in order to pursue our policy of limiting his ability to reconstitute his weapons and threaten his neighbors. Q Joe, if I could just finish this line, if I may. If there is a military strike would one of the goals be to remove Saddam Hussein from power? MR. LOCKHART: That question started with "if" so I'm not going to answer. Q Let me ask this question about purpose of attack another way. There was hesitation on the part of U.S. military leaders back in January and February to strike for fear that you would not accomplish the objective of severely degrading his ability to manufacture or deploy weapons of mass destruction. Today the Secretary of Defense said that would once again be our goal, to significantly degrade his capability. Have we made a different calculation now than we did in January and February about the ability of military strikes to degrade that capability? MR. LOCKHART: To answer that question would get into the options that the President is considering. Again, they go beyond military and include diplomatic, and I'm just not in a position to do that here today. Q Back in January and February, the President went over to the Pentagon and made a speech about possible military action -- he sent Sandy Berger and the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense to Ohio State. Before there would be any military strike this time, would you expect that there would be this lead-up, this prelude to any kind of action? MR. LOCKHART: I don't think we're going to do Ohio State again. (Laughter.) Q Don't you think there ought to be some fair warning to innocent people? MR. LOCKHART: I think the President has discussed this -- will discuss Iraq in the future and will effectively make the case both to the American public, to Congress, for whatever option he chooses. Q Before or afterward? MR. LOCKHART: What? Q Before or afterward? MR. LOCKHART: I think he said some things, and I think he will make a case -- an effective case -- whatever option might be employed. And I'm not committing to before or afterwards. ............... Q -- to understand the President did not make any decisions on Iraq at the meeting this morning? MR. LOCKHART: That's my understanding. Q You do not anticipate any decisions today? And would you anticipate that he has to meet with that same core group again? MR. LOCKHART: I'm not going to anticipate further meetings. I'm not going to give you a timeline on the decision-making process. But I did go to authoritative sources to find out before this briefing whether decisions had been made, and I've been informed that they haven't. Q Has he been briefing members on Capitol Hill about -- MR. LOCKHART: There has been ongoing discussions of the situation in Iraq basically throughout the year, actually. And I think we are keeping members, particularly those in leadership positions and important committees, up to date on what are thinking is. Q Are the U.N. inspectors still there? MR. LOCKHART: I think your best place to go -- to UNSCOM for that specific information, but there are -- there have been some who left, but there are some there. But as you know, their effectiveness has been severely curtailed by Saddam Hussein's decision to not allow them to do their work. Q Can I follow up on that? Is it safe to assume the U.S. and the other countries will evacuate their nationals and all of U.N. personnel before any military action? MR. LOCKHART: I'm not going to speculate on a question like that. ............... #017-11/10
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