The White House Briefing Room
November 9, 1998
PRESS BRIEFING BY JOE LOCKHART
1:26 P.M. EST
THE WHITE HOUSE Office of the Press Secretary ______________________________________________________________ For Immediate Release November 9, 1998 PRESS BRIEFING BY JOE LOCKHART The Briefing Room 1:26 P.M. EST ................... Q Does the United States believe that the use of military force against Iraq would lead to an end to the weapons inspections there? MR. LOCKHART: I can't speculate on a potential policy decision that's yet to be made. Q But is that part of our calculation in terms of whether we act? MR. LOCKHART: There are certainly a lot of calculations that go into the presenting policy options and making policy decisions. But I'm not going to speculate or lay out what those are here. Q How much time does the Iraqi government have before the President exercises military options? MR. LOCKHART: Well, first off, as we told you yesterday, the President met with his team, but has asked for further information and has not made any decisions on any diplomatic or military options. I'm not going to get into timelines here. But our objective is the same, which is to have Saddam Hussein reverse course in allowing UNSCOM inspectors to do their work. He knows what he needs to do. And while I won't get into a timeline, I think both --the Secretary of State has said that the current standoff and flagrant violation, as Kofi Annan calls it, cannot go on indefinitely. Q In previous crises with the Iraqi government, when we've asked about the timeline, Secretary of State Albright, for example, has said she's not talking about months, she's talking about weeks, as opposed to days. Are you talking about days, weeks, months? How long is this standoff, ballpark, going to last? MR. LOCKHART: I'm not going to ballpark a timeline or get specific on a timeline. Q Joe, is there no desire to end this cycle? MR. LOCKHART: End what cycle? Q The Saddam Hussein cycle. We moved the military out there; it cost $1.5 billion. Once we do that, he backs down, and then he does it again. MR. LOCKHART: There's certainly a desire right now to get Saddam Hussein to reverse his decision to not allow -- or not cooperate with UNSCOM inspectors. Q But how do you get him to do it once and for all, Joe? How do you break the cycle? How do you get Saddam to do it once and for all? MR. LOCKHART: Well, those are certainly things that the President and the foreign policy team are looking at, but I can't tell you that any decisions have been made. Q Joe, to follow on that, short of knocking Saddam Hussein out of power, how do you expect bombing to get him to reverse the cycle? MR. LOCKHART: Well, again, let me refer you to my previous non-answer. Q Joe, on Iraq still, does the administration feel the need for a final ultimatum to Iraq? Would that be part of the use of force? MR. LOCKHART: As we've said, the President had options put down in front of him yesterday. He's asked for more information on both diplomatic and military options, and I'm not going to detail what they might be. Q Okay. I guess I'm just asking, though, before we've said, you have until "x" time to do this; otherwise, all options are on the table. Are we going to give Iraq an ultimatum? MR. LOCKHART: I'm not going to get into what options we might choose to exercise, what diplomatic efforts we might choose to exercise. But I think it is clear that Saddam Hussein knows what he needs to do. Q When would you expect the President to hear back from his National Security Advisor? MR. LOCKHART: Sometime in the next couple of days. ................ Q Back to Iraq, can you tell us if you're discussing anything on tightening the sanctions regime, which is notoriously leaky? MR. LOCKHART: I think there is a series of diplomatic channels and communications both private and public, but I don't think it's useful at this point to detail either anything that may happen diplomatically or militarily. Thanks. END 2:03 P.M. EST #016-11/09
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