U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 5, 1998
Briefer: JAMES P. RUBIN
IRAQ | |
1,3-4,5 | UN Security Council Vote on Resolution Today |
1,2 | Travel by Secretary of Defense Cohen |
1-2 | Travel by National Security Advisor Berger to Europe |
2-3,4-5,8 | Iraq and Non-Cooperation with UNSCOM and IAEA/Monitoring and Inspection Regime |
6-7 | Middle East Peace Process and Building Consensus on Iraq |
7 | Threat of the Use of Force |
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB # 122
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 5, 1998, 12:35 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
..............
QUESTION: Iraq. Is it just lack of electricity in the air, or have things cooled down a little bit?
MR. RUBIN: I think nothing has changed, in terms of cooling down; on the contrary. The Security Council members are expected to vote today on a resolution that will do what I suggested yesterday - which is to send a strong and unambiguous message that Iraq must rescind all its decisions restricting the UN inspectors and the IAEA and comply with all the relevant Security Council resolutions.
I would expect that text to become available during the course of the day; but the gist of it, as I've said to you, is a strong and unambiguous message.
Secretary Cohen is continuing his trip; I believe he's in Egypt now. National Security Advisor Berger, I understand, is going to be in Europe this weekend.
After a discussion between President Clinton and President Chirac of France, there was desire to have the national security advisors from some of these countries get together, taking into account a previous plan for the German President's National Security Advisor, Bitterlich, who was leaving and some of then national security advisors were going to meet to bid him farewell. Taking advantage of that, there's been a decision and I expect Sandy Berger, the National Security Advisor - or more accurately, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs - will be meeting in Europe. The prime topic of that discussion, I understand, will be Iraq.
So this is a very grave matter. I think what we have seen in Secretary Albright's consultations and Secretary Cohen's travels is there is a broad consensus both in the Persian Gulf and around the world that Iraq's violation of the UN Security Council Resolution, its defiance of the will of the international community are grave matters, and that they are a direct challenge to the authority of the Security Council, which we expect, as I said, will pass a resolution sending a strong and clear message to Iraq that it must rescind its decisions and come back into compliance.
We are also consulting with our allies in the region; and as I indicated yesterday, based on these consultations, we are confident that the United States will have the support we need to take appropriate action to uphold the United Nations Security Council Resolutions. While we share a preference for all -- a preference for a peaceful resolution to this crisis -- all options remain on the table, including the military option.
QUESTION: Has Russia thought of that - the security advisors --
MR. RUBIN: I don't believe so.
QUESTION: Do you know any of the countries that will be?
MR. RUBIN: I would have to get from the White House. But I know the French -
QUESTION: The French and German.
MR. RUBIN: It came out of a discussion between President Clinton and President Chirac, so it may or may not include other national security advisors. I know that what I was indicating was that Mr. Berger was planning to go to Europe to bid farewell Mr. Bitterlich, who was Chancellor Kohl's National Security Advisor. So exactly what form that meeting will take I do not know; but I know it will include President Chirac's National Security Advisor and Sandy Berger.
QUESTION: But not the new German --
MR. RUBIN: Again, that is as much as I know. I was asked, is there anything else going on; I thought that was relevant and so I passed it on.
QUESTION: How long will we prudently go without inspectors in Iraq with the danger you've noted that the Government could resume developing chemical or biological weapons?
MR. RUBIN: It can't go on indefinitely, but I don't want to put a timetable on it. The President has met several times with his advisors in the last week, and obviously Secretary Cohen is working and Secretary Albright are working. I don't want to put publicly a particular time frame on that because then that tends to be turned into assumptions about other time frames. But obviously, this can't go on indefinitely.
With respect to reconstitution, which I think was part of your question or implied by your question, we've said that if we had evidence that Iraq was reconstituting its weapons of mass destruction we would act. We have no such evidence at this time. But let me be clear -- simply allowing UNSCOM or the IAEA to change cameras is no substitute for UNSCOM and the inspectors going to visit the sites to make sure that the places where weapons of mass destruction could be produced are not so doing or that ballistic missiles of the relevant range could be produced are not being done.
That is what the monitoring and inspection regime is about. That is why this is so important. But I wouldn't be in the position to be more specific about a time frame.
QUESTION: How much harm is being done or could be done by this recess, where we have no inspectors?
MR. RUBIN: Let me say the following. The way the inspectors do their work is, they try to develop a baseline from which they can judge what Iraq has provided to them in terms of information and materials about what they did produce.
The monitoring regime is partly responsible for ensuring the accuracy of the baseline. Without the ability to check the baseline, confidence in that baseline does reduce over time. But I would prefer to leave that to a technical weapons inspector - or maybe not even an inspector, maybe actually an expert on the science of this to be in a position to give you more detail than saying just that confidence does reduce over time.
QUESTION: Jamie, you said that the US wants to send - or believes that this UN resolution sends a strong, unambiguous message to Iraq. As recently as yesterday, you had said that you expected this resolution would include language that said that what Iraq was doing by preventing UNSCOM from coming in was essentially posing a threat to international security. But in point of fact, that paragraph is not going to be in there --
MR. RUBIN: I didn't say that - I hope I didn't. What I said yesterday was that we expected it to track the language from Saturday, which declared it a flagrant violation. And I believe that language is in there.
With respect to Chapter 7, let me say that the resolution does refer back to -- resolution of the Security Council - I believe it's 1154 - that made clear there would be the severest consequences for non-compliance.
So whether it's this resolution's reference to 1154, whether it is the underlying reality that by being in flagrant violation of the Security Council resolution that imposed the cease-fire, we believe there is a basis - as a result of this and many other resolutions - for military action to be taken if necessary.
QUESTION: So the US is not at all disappointed by the fact that there was a sentence, a paragraph that was not included -- because the Chinese had asked that it not be included - that said that what Iraq was doing was posing a threat to international security; that isn't a problem?
MR. RUBIN: I think, in response to several questions yesterday, I tried to make clear that we were not seeking through this resolution to make a large point about the authority to use force. We were seeking merely unanimity on the flagrancy of the violation.
During the course of discussions - there are 15 members of the Security Council and various countries put in various sentences and words. I've been there; it happens. And some countries are concerned about that.
But we're not concerned that this resolution didn't specify explicitly authority, because we believe the authority is already there.
QUESTION: Could I ask about - if literally you mean that the only monitoring procedures that have gone on since Saturday is checking on cameras --
MR. RUBIN: Right.
QUESTION: -- I think Monday, in fact, you spoke of some basic monitoring.
MR. RUBIN: No.
QUESTION: Can you give us a sense of what's --
MR. RUBIN: My understanding of the situation is the IAEA is being distinguished by the Iraqis - something that we find unacceptable. The IAEA is allowed to continue its monitoring. But UNSCOM, which does the missiles, the chemicals, the biological weapons, has been limited to the question of adjusting some of the cameras.
I think that Chairman Butler has told the Security Council that a clear distinction between IAEA and the Commission's monitoring activities, which Iraq has sought to draw, will be difficult to establish, considering the inherent links between the mandates of the Commission and the IAEA.
Regardless, this is a very serious matter - whether or not some teams are changing cameras - because allowing UNSCOM to change a few cameras is not a reversal of Iraq's obstruction of the UN's activity. Full access for UNSCOM - the UN inspectors - and the IAEA to do their necessary inspection and monitoring activities is what we're looking for.
QUESTION: IAEA is distinct from the UN - this is not just a matter of principle with the US. The IAEA cannot conduct sufficient surveillance or monitoring to --
MR. RUBIN: Well, let me separate it; it gets very complex, but let me try to answer it as best I can. The IAEA is charged by the Security Council with the basic responsibility for monitoring on the nuclear question and makes certain judgments. They also operate under the general purview of the UN Special Commission. But the expertise and the actual work is done by the IAEA.
What Butler is saying is that it's going to be very hard over time, if this were to persist, to maintain some artificial distinction between the work of the nuclear inspecting agency - the IAEA - on the one hand and the UN Special Commission, which focuses on chemical, biological and missiles on the other.
But regardless of all that - which are technical details - none of this is a substitute for a wholesale return to cooperation, which is what the Security Council will be demanding in its resolution.
QUESTION: Jamie, earlier you used the term "broad consensus" relating to the resolution today, I believe. Would it be - let me just ask you, would you extend the broad consensus to military action as well, if it comes to that?
MR. RUBIN: I don't want to be speaking for others on this question. I've specifically avoided making any premature discussion publicly of the question of military action; other than to tell you, number one, we believe we have the authority in Security Council resolutions to act militarily if necessary. Number two, all options - including the military option - are on the table. Secretary Cohen is consulting with allies and friends in the Gulf, and Secretary Albright has been consulting with her colleagues.
With respect to the specific question about the basing issue, we have said that we believe we have confidence that we will have the necessary support to act. But I don't intend to be more specific about the military question.
With respect to the broad consensus, I didn't refer to the Security Council. I was referring to the consensus in the region and around the world that Iraq's violation of UN Security Council resolutions and defiance of the will of the international community are very grave matters.
QUESTION: Just as a follow-up, would the US be prepared to act alone or alone only with Great Britain?
MR. RUBIN: All options means all options.
QUESTION: Jamie, is the Wye River Accord helping you build this consensus on what to do with Iraq?
MR. RUBIN: I wouldn't want to - there's been a tendency over time for people to vastly exaggerate the linkages between the Middle East peace process and Iraq. I am aware, from the trips where I accompanied Secretary Albright, that there was a tendency in the media in certain countries - or perhaps to the extent that it reflects the public in those countries - to link these two; namely that because Israel was not pursuing, in their minds, the peace process, that it was a double standard to require Iraq to comply with the Security Council resolutions.
We always regarded that argument as baloney. But we recognize that in some parts of the world the argument is either used or exists. Certainly, whoever were putting forward such a phony argument would be in a much less authoritative position to do so when the peace process has been placed back on track. And with the Cabinet meeting that has begun now in Israel, we look forward to its being approved very shortly and implemented.
So to the extent that argument ever had any saliency, which we didn't think it did, I think that it no longer does.
QUESTION: Can I just follow up? Can you talk about some of the concerns out there that the Administration is addressing? I mean, if there's such a clear-cut case about Iraq, what are you discussing over all these weeks, months --
MR. RUBIN: Matters that we don't care to discuss in public.
QUESTION: Well, are you discussing or notifying; are you consulting or notifying?
MR. RUBIN: I think I used the word "consult." That is the word that Secretary Cohen has been associated with.
QUESTION: Well, that suggests you need to know the sentiment of people like the Saudis to know whether you have a basis for going against Iraq; doesn't it?
MR. RUBIN: You're making an assumption about what he's doing that I'm not prepared to entertain.
QUESTION: I thought maybe you - what about sanctions, for instance?
MR. RUBIN: Well, the other issue that comes up here - and I'd be happy to speak to it - is that there's a lot of concern in the Arab world about the Iraqi people. We recognize that. That is why the United States has done so much to create a mechanism by which the Iraqi people have received billions of dollars in food and medicine that their government refused to provide, that has only been provided as a result of the oil-for-food and medicine program that the United States put into place.
No country is more touched by the plight of the Iraqi people than the United States. It's not a result of sanctions; it's a result of the politics and policies of a regime that has not the least concern for its people.
We led efforts to establish and then expand the oil-for-food program, which ensures that billions of dollars worth of oil is sold and billions of dollars worth of food and medicine are provided to the people of Iraq. It is the United States and the international community who are providing for the people of Iraq, despite the lack of concern on the part of their government.
QUESTION: Just on the Wye discussions --
QUESTION: This has been going on for about five days now, and we hear every day that all the options are on the table. Leaving aside the military options, which, understandably, perhaps you don't want to talk about, what other options are under serious consideration, apart from getting a Security Council resolution, which you don't seem very interested in anyway? What are these options - sanctions --
MR. RUBIN: Very well-formulated question, but in order to - extremely well-formulated - but in order to answer it, I would have to discuss the options that are being considered; and we don't normally do that until we've chosen an option.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) - change the pattern, it would be, the military option remains on the table and you wouldn't have to say all the options. Then you wouldn't be asked about other options. Your purpose is to say the military option is out there, isn't it? Are there any other live options, besides surrender?
MR. RUBIN: You've started a flood.
QUESTION: It's been code for several years that you're not withdrawing the military threat. But literally, what other options are there?
MR. RUBIN: The military option is on the table.
QUESTION: Thank you.
QUESTION: There are other options?
(Laughter.)
No, seriously.
MR. RUBIN: I have no further response.
QUESTION: You mentioned the IAEA is operating (inaudible) --
MR. RUBIN: Very clever, very clever.
QUESTION: -- is operating under two regimes: one of its own and the other under UNSCOM. But isn't it true that the agency, under its own steam, can only inspect what are declared sites - declared by the government of Iraq to be nuclear installations?
MR. RUBIN: I'll have to check with the IAEA on exactly what it does and doesn't do in Iraq. But the regime created by the Security Council, as opposed to the IAEA's negotiated arrangement with countries around the world, which the question of any time anywhere inspections comes in. But with respect to Iraq, special provisions were allowed to provide the inspectors, whoever they may be, the right to go anywhere they need to go to do their job.
So whatever provisions may or may not exist in the IAEA's modus operandi in other countries where they have an agreement I wouldn't think would apply in Iraq, where the Security Council's authority supersedes.
QUESTION: Well, just to get to the point, as far as you understand it, the atomic energy inspectors can go anywhere, look at anything and whatever they find --
MR. RUBIN: Do whatever they need to do their job, right.
..................
(The briefing concluded at 1:25 P.M.)
[end of document]
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