The VX Report
Iraq News, OCTOBER 28, 1998
By Laurie MylroieThe central focus of Iraq News is the tension between the considerable, proscribed WMD capabilities that Iraq is holding on to and its increasing stridency that it has complied with UNSCR 687 and it is time to lift sanctions. If you wish to receive Iraq News by email, a service which includes full-text of news reports not archived here, send your request to Laurie Mylroie .
I. IRAQI NAT'L ASSEMBLY CONDEMNS WYE ACCORD, IRAQ RADIO, OCT 26
II. BUTLER LETTER TO UNSC INTRODUCING REPORT OF EXPERTS ON VX, OCT 26
III. REPORT OF EXPERTS ON VX, OCT 23
IV. WASH POST ED, WHAT IS THE ADMINISTRATION GOING TO DO?, OCT 28
V. AMIE RUBIN, NOT MUCH, STATE DEPT BRIEFING, IRAQ EXCERPTS, OCT 27
VI. KOFI ANNAN, TALKS TO WASH POST EDS, IRAQ EXCERPTS, OCT 16
Today is the 84th day without weapons inspections in Iraq.
The day after Iraq's Ba'th party leadership criticized the Wye
accord, Iraq's Nat'l Assembly met, Oct 26, and did the same, condemning
Camp David and Oslo as well.
On Oct 26, UNSCOM presented the results of the expert meeting held to
evaluate the results of the US, French and Swiss testing for VX on
remnants of Iraq's "special" warheads. The UNSCOM report, replete with
color slides is at:
http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/s/981026vx/index.html where there is
also a link, under "index" to the entire UNSCOM corpus, all courtesy of
FAS' John Pike.
Amb. Butler's cover letter for the VX report highlighted three
points--1) all findings were considered "conclusive and valid,"
including the original US finding of degraded VX components on SCUD
warhead fragments; 2) that determination contradicts Iraqi declarations
that the "special" warheads it destroyed had never been filled with CW
agents; and 3) the experts recommended that Iraq explain the origin and
history of the fragments and the presence of degradation products of
nerve agents, as well as the presence of a VX stabilizer.
The Report of the VX Expert Meeting reviewed the history of the
dispute. Originally, in 1997, Iraq sought to persuade UNSCOM that its
claim regarding VX production was true, namely it never managed to
produce VX in a stable form and the 3.9 tons of unstable VX that it did
produce were unilaterally destroyed. In Apr 97, Iraq declared a VX
production facility and site where VX was dumped. A US lab analyzed
samples and determined that VX degradation products were on the
equipment and in the soil from the dump site. Also, a VX stabilizer and
its degradation product were found in some samples from the dump site.
Iraq accepted the results then as proof of its claim that it had
unilaterally destroyed its VX stockpile. The US lab results were
reconfirmed, after a Feb 98 Technical Evaluation Meeting.
In Apr/May 98, UNSCOM examined the remnants of "special" warheads
Iraq destroyed unilaterally. The same US lab found VX degradation
products in some samples of the warhead fragments it examined and the
results were reported to UNSCOM in Jun 98.
In Jul, UNSCOM asked the US lab to analyse another set of samples and
did the same with French and Swiss labs. The US lab found no CW related
chemicals on those samples, but did find degradation products of a
decontamination compound. The French lab reported the presence of a
degradation product of a nerve agent, possibly VX. The Swiss lab did
not find any CW related chemicals, even as both the Swiss and French
labs found degradation products of a decontamination compound, as
detected by the US lab.
In other words, Iraq put VX in SCUD missile warheads. And since
Iraq's unilateral destruction of the warheads, in contravention of UNSCR
687, was intended to obscure what it had possessed and what it retained,
Iraq almost certainly still has SCUD warheads that are loaded, or could
be loaded, with VX. Also, Iraq sought to conceal what had been in the
warheads it destroyed, by cleaning them at some point, before releasing
them to UNSCOM.
The Wash Post editors discussed the implications of the VX report
today, writing, "Weapons experts from seven countries have confirmed
what American investigators reported months ago: that Iraq loaded deadly
VX nerve gas into missile warheads. . . . . For most of the past year,
Saddam Hussein has been testing international resolve. With each test,
the Iraqi dictator found he could push a bit harder. . . . Now nearly
three months have passed since he kicked out UN weapons inspectors, and
the administration-which explicitly promised a forceful response-has not
responded. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright insists that Saddam
Hussein remains 'in a box' of international sanctions. But as The
Post's Howard Schneider reported, Iraq's neighbors more and more are
ignoring the sanctions and trading with Iraq. And the sanctions do not
prevent Saddam Hussein, now free of intrusive inspection, from
rebuilding his dangerous weapons. To top off this policy disarray, the
head of US military forces in the Persian Gulf, Marine Gen. Anthony
Zinni, suggests that Iran poses more of a threat than Iraq and that a
splintered Iraq could be more dangerous than one under Saddam Hussein's
command. Congress this year had a different idea. Its "Iraq Liberation
Act" authorized the administration to spend $97 million arming and
training Iraq's anti-Saddam opposition. But the bill doesn't require
the administration to do so, and executive branch officials have made
clear they're not going to act soon. . . . There's no question that such
an endeavor should be mounted only following a debate that truly engages
the public. Supporting the opposition would commit the United States,
at least morally, to offer support if insurgents ran into trouble. But
the administration, for its part, has an obligation to do more than
belittle the opposition groups. Until recently, it portrayed Saddam
Hussein and his weapons of mass destruction as imminent dangers to the
region. If that's no longer true, the administration should explain why
not. If it is true, what does Mr. Clinton plan to do about it?"
Not much, as State Dept. spokesman, Jamie Rubin, explained, when
asked about the VX report yesterday. Rubin said, "These findings make
clear that Saddam Hussein did produce VX weapons contrary to what he
said; that he produced these most horrible weapons, even though he said
he didn't. It shows the urgency and necessity of Iraq coming clean on
what they built, what they have . . . Until Iraq is disarmed of its
weapons of mass destruction, until Iraq complies with international
Security Council resolutions that demonstrate its peaceful intentions,
sanctions must remain on indefinitely because he is a threat to the
region and a threat to the world."
But if sanctions do not cause Saddam to turn over his proscribed
weapons, or even to allow a resumption of UNSCOM inspections, how do
sanctions address the threat?
Finally, the full text of the Iraq-related parts of Kofi Annan's Oct
16 meeting with the Wash Post Editorial board follows below.
I. IRAQI NAT'L ASSEMBLY CONDEMNS WYE ACCORD
Baghdad Republic of Iraq Radio Network in Arabic 1700 GMT 26 Oct 98
[FBIS Translated Text] The National Assembly has reiterated its
adherence to national and pan-Arab constants and its rejection of the
approach of settlement, normalization, and capitulation. It a1so
reiterated support for the Palestinian people's national rights to their
entire land, as well as for the liberation of holy Jerusalem.
In a statement it issued on the Wye Plantation accord today, it said:
the previous and subsequent approaches of settlement will lead to the
fragmentation of the Palestine question and to turning it into technical
details, instead of reinforcing its pan-Arab and national stands.
The statement added; All attempts aimed at undermining Arab and
Palestinian forces will inflict losses on Palestine and the Arab nation.
We should adopt means and methods to liberate man and land based on the
comprehensive pan-Arab principles of liberation. The suspect plans
resulting from the political settlement have pushed Palestine and the
Arab-Zionist conflict toward serious turning points. The accords that
have been signed since Oslo and Camp David have turned the Palestine
question from a central cause in the Arabs' national and pan-Arab
struggle, as well as the holy places in Jerusalem, into deals and
compromises on the fate of the Palestinian people and the Arab nation.
This has weakened comprehensive Arab efforts and consequently, the
nation's pan-Arab objective of liberation.
[Description of source: Official radio station of the Iraqi Government]
II. AMB. BUTLER LETTER TO UNSC INTRODUCING REPORT OF EXPERTS ON VX
His Excellency
Sir Jeremy Greenstock, KCMG
President of the Security Council
United Nations
26 October 1998
Excellency,
During the informal consultations held by the Security Council on 13
October, I reported to the Council that a group of international experts
would meet in New York on 22-23 October, to consider the findings from
analyses, conducted in three laboratories, of special missile warheads
remnants excavated in Iraq. The purpose of the laboratory analyses was
to seek to establish the substances with which those special missile
warheads had been filled. As Council members were aware, one substance
at issue was the chemical warfare agent, known as VX.
Council members will recall that results from an analyses conducted
by a laboratory in the United States were given to the Commission in
June 1998. Those results were passed to the Iraqi authorities during
my visit to Baghdad from 11-15 June 1998.
When passing these initial results to the Iraqi side, I authorized at
the same time that further laboratory analyses be conducted in the
laboratory in the United States and then in two other laboratories, one
in France, the other in Switzerland.
In July 1998, the Commission sent an international expert team to
Baghdad to discuss the initial results of the chemical analyses which
had been conducted in the laboratory in the United States and which had
identified VX degradation products in the samples taken from special
warhead remnants. At that time, the international experts judged the
results as valid but the Iraqi side stated that it could not accept the
results.
In my subsequent visit to Baghdad, on 3 August 1998, I raised again
with Iraqi authorities the possibility of further discussions on the
question of VX but, in the event, no such discussions took place.
On 1 September 1998, at the request of members of the Council, I
wrote to the President of the Council providing answers to some
technical questions which members had posed. One of those questions
was that of the discovery of VX degradation products on special warhead
remnants.
Following the conclusion of its meeting on the evening of last Friday
23 October, the group of international experts gave me its report. The
report had been adopted unanimously by the experts.
Attached to this letter is a copy of that report and its technical
annex.
As indicated to the Council on 13 October, in addition to providing
this report to members of the Council immediately, I propose to pass it,
at the same time, to the Permanent Representative of Iraq for
transmission to the authorities in Baghdad.
When passing this report to the Permanent Representative, I would
propose to invite his particular attention and through him that of the
authorities in Baghdad, to three key aspects of the report: "all
analytical data provided by the three laboratories were again considered
as conclusive and valid"; "the existence of VX degradation products
conflicts with Iraqi declarations that the unilaterally destroyed
special warheads had never been filled with CW agents"; and, the
recommendations of the group of experts that UNSCOM invite Iraq "to
explain first the origin and history of the fragments analysed by all
three laboratories and then the presence of degradation products of
nerve agents" and "to explain the presence of a compound known as VX
stabilizer and its degradation product and to provide more information
on the Iraqi efforts during the period mid-1988 to the end of 1990 to
develop and produce VX by improved synthetic routes".
I might also mention that consistent with the letter addressed to me
by the President of the Security Council on 18 August 1998, to which I
referred in my letter of 19 August addressed to the Deputy Prime
Minister of Iraq, and with the terms of Security Council resolution 1194
(1998), which, inter alia, calls upon Iraq to resume dialogue with the
Special Commission immediately, I will be asking the Permanent
Representative of Iraq to express to the authorities in Baghdad the
willingness of the Commission to resume work at the earliest possible
moment with competent Iraqi authorities in order to address the
questions posed by this expert report.
Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.
Richard Butler
III. REPORT OF EXPERTS ON VX
Report of the VX Expert Meeting
Over the period 22-23 October 1998, the United Nations Special
Commission (UNSCOM) held, in New York, a meeting of international
experts on the issue of VX. This was the third meeting in this area of
discussions related to the evaluation of analytical results generated by
the laboratories on samples taken from Special Missile Warhead remnants.
21 experts from seven countries (China, France, Russian Federation,
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States), and experts
from the Special Commission, participated in the meeting.
The purpose of this meeting was to discuss all analytical results
obtained in the course of the Commission's verification of Iraq's
Declarations related to the VX activities, and to assess how these
results verify Iraq's Declarations. Another purpose was to provide the
Chairman of the Special Commission with recommendations concerning
further steps to be undertaken in the attempts to finalise the
verification process.
All participating experts were requested to provide their opinions on
the above mentioned issues.
The meeting began with the presentation made by the Commission's
experts on the sequence and results of all VX related sampling missions
conducted by UNSCOM.
The first samples were taken with respect to VX in April 1997, after
Iraq declared the VX production facility and the dump site where bulk VX
was disposed. These samples were analysed in the US laboratory. VX
degradation products were found on the equipment pointed out by Iraq and
in the soil from the dump site. In addition to these chemicals,
compounds known as VX stabilizer and its degradation product were
identified in some of the samples from the dump site. These results
allowed the Commission to make further progress in the verification of
Iraq's Declarations. At that stage, Iraq accepted the results as proof
of its claims on the production site and on the unilateral disposal of
VX. According to the recommendations of the international expert team
to the Technical Evaluation Meeting (TEM) in February 1998, the US
laboratory performed further analyses of samples from the same site.
Their results confirmed the previous findings and provided more data for
the evaluation of Iraq's declarations. In April/May 1998, UNSCOM
undertook to verify Iraq's declarations on the filling of 45 Special
Missile Warheads through the analysis of samples taken from their
remnants. These warheads had been destroyed unilaterally by Iraq
through demolition and buried in the desert. Of these 45 warheads,
according to Iraq, 25 had been filled with biological warfare agents and
20 with a mixture of alcohols (isopropanol and cyclohexanol). The
purpose of chemical analysis was to verify Iraq's statement on the 20
special warheads filled with alcohols. The same US laboratory found VX
degradation products in some of the samples from 46 fragments of the 45
special warheads. The chemicals found on the missile warhead remnants
were similar to those found at the VX dump site declared by Iraq. The
laboratory reported these results to the Commission in June 1998.
In July 1998, the Commission requested that the US laboratory analyse
another set of samples taken from some 43 different remnants of the same
20 warheads. No CW related chemicals were found. However, chemicals
known as degradation products of a decontamination compound were
identified in five samples. Signatures of unidentified non-phosphorus
compounds were found in many samples.
Before these results were known, the Commission requested the French
and Swiss laboratories to analyse samples from 40 other fragments of the
same 20 special warheads, the majority of which were not sampled during
the first and second rounds of analysis conducted by the US laboratory.
The French laboratory reported the presence of a degradation product
of nerve agent (G- or V- agent) in one sample (The French experts noted
that this product could also originate from other compounds, such as
detergents. The US experts said that they are not aware of any of such
compounds in connection with any commercial product).
The Swiss laboratory did not find any CW related chemicals. However,
both the Swiss and French laboratories found the chemicals known to be
degradation products of a decontamination compound, as well as a large
number of samples containing the same unidentified non-phosphorous
compounds, which had been detected in the second set of samples analysed
by the US laboratory (The French experts noted that this decontaminant
could also have been used for the purpose of chemical destruction of
biological warfare agents. UNSCOM and other experts emphasised that
according to Iraq's declarations sampled missile fragments were
excavated from the burial site of chemical warheads, and that only
potassium permanganate or a mixture of potassium permanganate and
formaldehyde were used for biological decontamination. In addition, such
a view would have serious implications for the accounting of the
biological special warheads). These chemicals were not detected on the
first set of samples of missile fragments analysed by the US laboratory.
During the meeting, all analytical data provided by the three
laboratories were again considered as conclusive and valid. The
difference in the results between the first set of samples taken by the
US laboratory in April and subsequent samples taken by the US, Swiss and
French laboratories in June / July was discussed by the experts. In
particular, the presence of certain non-CW related compounds in a
significant amount of the June / July samples, which are completely
absent from the April set of samples has no obvious explanation. In the
course of the meeting, the chemists from all three laboratories gave
more details on the performed chemical analyses.
Experts from the US laboratory reported that they had re-evaluated
all activities carried out in the laboratory in the course of chemical
analyses in order to confirm that no cross-contamination or other
mistakes had taken place.
Experts from the French laboratory reported that as a result of their
investigation of two samples which had been previously reported as
containing ethyl- and methyl- phosphonic compounds, the presence of
those compounds could not be confirmed.
Experts from the Swiss laboratory gave more details on technical
aspects of their chemical analysis.
Over the past six months, a large number of chemical analyses has
been carried out in three separate establishments. The result of this
work has enabled the Commission to collect more data and to move forward
in the investigation. The Commission appreciates the support of the
relevant Governments and acknowledges the high standard of technical
support provided.
The existence of VX degradation products conflicts with Iraq's
declarations that the unilaterally destroyed special warheads had never
been filled with any CW agents. The findings by all three laboratories
of chemicals, known as degradation products of decontamination compound,
also do not support Iraq's declarations that these warhead containers
had only been in contact with alcohols.
As a result of the evaluation of analytical data, reported to the
Special Commission by three laboratories, it is recommended that UNSCOM
invite Iraq to explain first the origin and history of the fragments
analysed by all three laboratories and then the presence of degradation
products of nerve agents. It was also emphasized, that Iraq would be
invited to explain the presence of a compound known as VX stabilizer and
its degradation product, and to provide more information on the Iraqi
efforts during the period mid-1988 to the end of 1990 to develop and
produce VX by improved synthetic routes.
The current report was adopted by experts involved in the meeting on
23 October 1998.
New York, 23 October 1998, 18:30 hrs.
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