UNSCOM, Iraq Liberation Act
Iraq News, OCTOBER 26, 1998
By Laurie MylroieThe central focus of Iraq News is the tension between the considerable, proscribed WMD capabilities that Iraq is holding on to and its increasing stridency that it has complied with UNSCR 687 and it is time to lift sanctions. If you wish to receive Iraq News by email, a service which includes full-text of news reports not archived here, send your request to Laurie Mylroie .
I. TARIQ AZIZ COMPLAINS OF UNSCOM SPYING TO UNSC, INA, OCT 16 II. AL THAWRA, CALLS ON UNSC TO ACT AGAINST UNSCOM SPY, INA, OCT 23 III. NYT EDITORS, DON'T OVERTHROW SADDAM, GET HIS WEAPONS, OCT 19 IV. GEN. ZINNI OPPOSES IRAQ LIBERATION ACT, WASH POST, OCT 22 V. BELGIUM SUPPORTS DEMOCRATIC IRAQ, REUTERS, OCT 20 Today is the 82nd day without weapons inspections in Iraq. A reader reported that, according to "Inside Missile Defense," Oct 14, given the ongoing deterioration of the UNSCOM regime in Iraq, three of the nine members of the Rumsfeld Commission on the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States have modified earlier findings and concluded that Iraq was capable of developing an ICBM that could reach the US within five years. The Wash Post, Oct 22, reported on increased Iraqi trade with Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. Syria recently established a trade office in Baghdad; Saudi firms have some $100 million in contracts under UNSCR 986; and Iranian pilgrim traffic has resumed after a long hiatus. Arnold Beichman, of the Hoover Institution, wrote in the Wash Times, Oct 21, "No greater peril confronts the world today than the dynamic Russo-Iraqi political alliance.... The man chiefly responsible for the Russo-Iraqi political alliance, Yevgeny Primakov, has been promoted from Russian Foreign Minister to Prime Minister.... Both Russia and Iraq may possess biological weapons which in surprise attacks could set off global epidemics. It is now 77 days without what were once UN weapons inspections in Iraq..." This issue of "Iraq News" focuses on 1) Iraq's increasingly belligerent attitude toward UNSCOM, along with the continuing UNSC discussion of Iraq's suspension of UNSCOM inspections; and 2) the ongoing debate over the Iraq Liberation Act--criticism from the NYT editors and Centcom commander, Gen. Zinni, as well as apparent sympathy for the measure from Belgium. IRAQ, UNSCOM AND THE UNSC In his Sept 3 Senate testimony, Scott Ritter said that Iraq could reconstruct its chemical, biological and missile programs within six months [see "Iraq News," Sept 7]. We are nearly half of the way to six months without weapons inspections in Iraq. On Oct 15, UNSG envoy, Prakash Shah, returned to Baghdad to continue discussions broken off, after Tariq Aziz left NYC without agreement on resuming inspections. On Oct 16, Tariq Aziz sent the UNSG a letter with more complaints against UNSCOM, above all charges that it is carrying out activities "that have a clear intelligence nature and that have nothing to do with the objectives of [the UNSC] resolutions and the tasks of UNSCOM." Notably, many of the objections were to UNSCOM's monitoring activities, the only activity allowed since Aug 5. Among the monitoring activities about which Aziz complained was the "visit paid by the MG-19 missile group to the al-Karamah enterprise on 8 October 1998, [when] the American national Carl Flugar [sp?] used his personal camera to take a set of photographs of the warhead of the al-Sumud missile which was being prepared for a test flight." [UNSCR 687 allowed Iraq to keep missiles under a 150 km range, but a missile's range is partly a function of its payload. Thus, the 150 km limit is fuzzier than it seems, a US goof in drafting 687]. Flugar's action--not using a designated UNSCOM camera--was against the rules and UNSCOM recalled him from Iraq. Aziz also criticized an IAEA nuclear monitoring team, claiming information it had requested about Iraq's rivers, constituted "sensitive political information." He also criticized an Aug 30 request from a chemical monitoring group for information about those employed by "the Public Authority for Agricultural Protection," as well as a research center affiliated with the Ministry of Industry. Still, discussions have continued at the UNSC over the "comprehensive review," provided for in UNSCR 1194. As AP, Oct 21, reported, Annan told the UNSC that he couldn't proceed with further talks with Iraq without additional guidance, while his chief of staff, Iqbal Riza, briefed the UNSC Wed on nine questions Iraq had raised regarding the proposed review. But in an article entitled, "Iraq Submits to Annan Queries that could Torpedo Comprehensive Review," Al Hayat's UN correspondent, Raghida Dirgham, reported, Oct 23, "Sources, which are acquainted with the Iraqi position, believe that it is impossible for the secretary general to implement some of these demands. The sources also believe that the secretary general's decision to refer these preoccupations, queries, and demands to the Security Council is a signal to Iraq that he as secretary general is unable to respond to them." As al Hayat explained, Iraq's position included "the necessity for the Security Council to implement Clause 22 of Resolution 687 'immediately' after it concludes that Baghdad has implemented Section C of Resolution 687. And if the council decides that there are still outstanding questions, Baghdad believes that a reasonable time schedule should be drawn up for tackling them." Is Iraq negotiating for better terms from the UNSC or buying time to carry out proscribed activities? It may be impossible to tell, but it would be helpful to know what Annan proposed to Baghdad and Iraq's response, even as neither text has been made public. And even as the UNSC discussions continue, Iraqi charges against UNSCOM are escalating. On Oct 21, UNSCOM announced it was withdrawing the US inspector who had wrongly used a camera, while the same day, Iraq charged a Chilean inspector had also wrongly used a private camera and he was withdrawn. For three days running--Oct 23, 24, and 25--Iraq's official press has charged UNSCOM with spying. For example, Al-Thawrah, Oct 23, carried a front page editorial by its chief editor. INA, Oct 23, explained that he asked, "What will UNSCOM do with this spy [Flogar] since he was deported? ... Will the UN General Secretariat and the Security Council deal with this spy and decide on an appropriate punishment for him and take him to court for crossing the red lines of his UN mission or will they adhere to silence because he is an American? Concluding its article, the paper says that such acts of espionage give Iraq the right to cast doubt on the nature of UNSCOM's work, on UNSCOM's inspectors, and UNSCOM's intentions. It adds: Is all this not enough to end this farce and lift the embargo clamped on Iraq or does Iraq have to take another path to bring down the walls of the embargo?" THE IRAQ LIBERATION ACT The editors of the NYT, Oct 19, criticized the Iraqi Liberation Act as "throwing money and weapons at Iraq's feeble and fractious opposition," while decrying the CIA's inclination to oust Saddam through plots within the military, which "have invariably been detected . . . and then manipulated to identify and execute potentially disloyal commanders." The NYT advised, "Instead of dreaming about military rebellions, Washington should devote its energy and resources to preventing Baghdad from rebuilding an arsenal of biological and chemical weapons. That work has all but ceased in the face of Iraqi resistance and an erosion of international support." The Wash Post, Oct 22, reported that Centcom Commander, Gen. Anthony Zinni, "said he saw no 'viable' opposition to Saddam and warned that, under such conditions any attempt to forcefully remove the Iraqi leader could dangerously fragment the country and destabilize the region. ... Posing a greater long-term threat to US security interests than Iraq under Saddam Hussein, Zinni said, is neighoring Iran, which he warned is 'on track' to developing nuclear weapons within five years." And Iraq is not? Zinni also said that Arab leaders "want to see Saddam out, but they want to see it done in a way that doesn't cause the country to come apart and fragment." This is pretty much where we were seven years ago, in Mar 91, when much of the Iraqi population revolted against Saddam and the US stood by and let him crush the uprisings. At the time, the Bush administration believed that Saddam would be overthrown in a coup and that was preferable to the uncertainties in supporting the uprising. Many, including "Iraq News," thought that was the Saudi position as well. But it was not, as Bush Undersec Def, Paul Wolfowitz, told the Middle East Institute's May 27-28, '97 conference on Iraq, where he explained, "Whatever the risks of an Iraq without Saddam Husayn, the leaders of most of our Arab coalition partners made clear that any alternative was better than Saddam's continuation in power. The Saudi leadership in particular expressed this conviction." Finally, apparent support for a policy of overthrowing Saddam through a popular insurgency came from an unexpected quarter, as Reuters, Oct 20, reported. Following a meeting with KDP chief, Massoud Barzani, Belgian's Foreign Minister said that "the Kurdish people should have a place in a democratic Iraq." The question of whether it is advisable to take the risks involved in ousting Saddam, and make the effort to do so, requires consideration of the risks involved in leaving him there, as Wolfowitz suggested. Some, like Sen. John Kerry [D Ma], believe that the risks in leaving Saddam in power are so great, that, if necessary, the US should get rid of him itself. That is also the view of "Iraq News." Indeed, as I explained at AEI's Oct 14 conference, "Rethinking the Middle East," a serious misunderstanding regarding the Iraq threat arose in the seven long years since the Gulf war. The misunderstanding was rooted in the Clinton administration's unwillingness to acknowledge and deal with the Iraqi danger, but it was complemented by a strategic intelligence failure in Israel, based in the way Itzhak Rabin defined the Middle East in order to pursue the peace process. Israelis developed the notion that the US victory in the Gulf war and Cold war had produced a new Middle East, one in which reasonable, i.e. secular parties, would have no choice but to reach peace agreements with Israel, while the enemies--the enemies of peace, were limited to unreasonable people, i.e. religious extremists. Moreover, when popular support for the peace process began to flag with Islamic suicide bombings in 1994/95, the advocates of the peace process focused on the threat from Militant Muslim Fundamentalists. They wanted to ostracise and isolate the fundamentalists, put them beyond the pale, and prevent them from blocking the peace process, as they conceived of it. Many of their opponents argued the reverse. The fundamentalists represented such a great danger, that Israel couldn't afford to cede territory. That had the effect of exaggerating the threat the fundamentalists posed, relative to other dangers. Indeed, as Itzhak Shamir's chief of staff, Yossi Ben Ahaaron, told an AEI gathering earlier this year, the threat the fundamentalists pose is not a strategic threat. Their terrorism "hurts," but the strategic threat comes from states, with their armies, missiles, and unconventional weapons. But the semi-hysteria worked up about Militant Muslim Fundamentalists, grounded in the highly-charged dispute over the peace process, affected how Israelis/Americans saw other issues. In particular, they didn't recognize that Iraqi intelligence was operating among Sunni fundamentalists to undermine the anti-Iraq coalition. The targets included the US, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. The Arab Gov't's recognized what was going on, but Israel/the US did not. Over the past year, the Israeli center-right changed its position on Iraq. It tends to recognize that Saddam is a serious danger. But with rare exception, Israel's center-left did not move. Hence, the difference between the editorial position of the Jerusalem Post [overthrow Saddam] and that of Ha'aretz, which scarcely takes note of the problem. In order to help explain why Saddam, with the unconventional weapons he possesses and will not turn over to UNSCOM, represents an intolerable threat, "Iraq News" will shortly address the strategic intelligence failure that occurred in Israel and persists in the center-left. It will do so largely on the basis of a review of the recent volumes of the Middle East Contemporary Survey, an exhaustive and ordinarily very useful, annual published by the Dayan Center of Tel Aviv University. The volumes are written in the year after the events they describe. If anyone wants to do the exercise himself, he can read them with an eye to what happens to Iraq in 1993 and subsequently. In '91 and '92, Saddam is the figure familiar from the Gulf war--vengeful, vicious, and unrepentant. But beginning in '93, the year of Oslo, Saddam starts to become less and less of a problem, for no obvious reason. I. TARIQ AZIZ COMPLAINS OF UNSCOM SPYING TO UNSC, INA, OCT 16 FBIS-NES-98-290 Baghdad INA in Arabic 2050 GMT 16 Oct 98 New York, 16 Oct (INA)--Deputy Prime Minister TAziz has sent a message to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, which was delivered by Nizar Hamdun, Iraq's permanent representative to the international organization. Following is the text of the message: Your Excellency Kofi Annan, UN secretary general New York I referred on several occasions, the latest of which was my letter to your excellency on 30 September 1998, to the practices of the UN Special Commission [UNSCOM] personnel, which encroach on the security and sovereignty of Iraq. I expressed our serious concern about these practices and warned that the UNSCOM personnel employ the Security Council resolutions as a cover for carrying out activities that have a clear intelligence nature and that have nothing to do with the objectives of these resolutions and the tasks of UNSCOM according to these resolutions. This was confirmed by the recent report published by The Washington Post on 29 September 1998, which revealed information about relations between inspector Scott Ritter and other UNSCOM personnel with intelligence services of countries that have particular aggressive objectives against Iraq. It was revealed in the past that former US inspector David Kay, from the International Atomic Energy Agency, had links with the CIA. I remind you that I had notified you that Ritter's practices were unprofessional and were not in line with the behavior of an international employee working under the UN flag. 'Aziz said the proven facts supported by evidence of these dangerous and numerous practices indicate a serious flaw in the UNSCOM system of work and structure. These practices seriously threaten the UN credibility and honesty, something that bolsters our demand for opening an official investigation into this commission, its behavior, and links, and for taking the appropriate measures to correct them in order to protect the UN credibility and neutrality. He added: One of these dangerous practices was the request for updated information about individuals, vital activities, and strategic installations that are closely related to the security and future of the Iraqi people and have nothing to do with the tasks stipulated in Section C of Resolutions 687. I want to acquaint you with examples of these dangerous practices that took place over the past three months. On 30 August 1998, the head of the chemical group requested information about the holders of doctorate degrees and veterinarians employed by the Public Authority for Agricultural Protection. The following list of information was requested: Post. Scientific degree/specialization. The country from which the degree was obtained. The name of the college or university from which the employee graduated. Date of the certificate. We made a clarification to the head of the group that in accordance with the second annex to the monitoring plan under Resolution 715 and the protocols that were set up in 1994 concerning the sites included in the monitoring regime, only the overall number of employees at each site, including the number of holders of higher degrees, needed to be submitted. However, he insisted on demanding the above information. A week later, he requested the same information about the holders of high degrees at the Construction Research Center, which is affiliated with the Industry Ministry. When the representative of the National Monitoring Department [NMD] objected, the head of the group contended that the information was requested upon instructions from New York. On 28 July 1998, and while a group from the UNSCOM 242 inspection team was on a diving mission in [words indistinct] Tigris river, US inspector Jasson Gilbert [name as transliterated] who was supervising the diving mission, while hiding behind a large UNSCOM truck, secretly photographed a train carrying military equipment as it was traveling through the area. When spotted by the Iraqi escort, he was requested to destroy the film. He did what he was asked to do and destroyed the film. Then, we asked your representative Prakash Shah to verify the incident, since such an action was a clear intelligence activity. During a visit paid by the MG-19 missile group to the al-Karamah enterprise on 8 October 1998, the American national Carl Flugar [name as transliterated] used his personal camera to take a set of photographs of the war head of the al-Sumud missile which was being prepared for a test flight. When the NMD representative, having received the approval of the head of the group, requested that he be given the film, Mr. Flugar admitted that the camera was a personal camera and refused to destroy the film. He said the film contained personal photographs. The NMD escort proposed that he keep the film until the NMD was briefed on the incident. Mr. Flugar rejected the proposal. He then pretended to remove the film from the camera which was hidden in his bag to destroy it. However, it was found that the film he handed over was a new film. When the Iraqi escort checked the camera, he found that the film was still inside. Only then did Mr. Flugar remove the film and hand it over for destruction. Tariq 'Aziz said: In another flagrant example of intelligence activity, the environmental nuclear monitoring team, which is affiliated with the International Atomic Energy Agency, in June 1998 requested information about all the water resources in the country. The team, which was led by the American John Highland and included three other Americans as members, claimed that it needed to establish an environmental information base for the permanent nuclear monitoring regime. Information was requested on the following: Stations for monitoring water level and drainage; River intersections; River sediments and measuring and analyzing methods; D. Data on dams, reservoirs, their locations, dates of operation, their [word indistinct] signs, and the daily levels and drainage of dams and reservoirs. Water basins and vegetation. The Iraqi side discussed, with good intention, these requests to see to what extent they were needed. The inspection team said that they wanted to prepare a mathematical chart on the flow of rivers in Iraq and movement of sediment. The inspection team added that the required hydrogen [sic, hydrological] data was necessary for this chart. Experts in the Iraqi Irrigation Ministry noted that they were not convinced that the chart would serve the objective of the continuous monitoring system through monitoring the heavy elements in water that are related to nuclear activities. The Iraqi experts also noted that there was no need for this detailed information, which includes defining water resources in the country and the methods of operation and usage. Tariq 'Aziz added that last September, another team, which was led by the Frenchman Jacques Poute [name as transliterated] and in which the two US inspectors Ned Wegman and David Swenden [both names as transliterated] were members, requested the same information. After looking at the chart, it became clear that it was one of the special charts on the flow of river water. It also became clear that this chart covers all information related to water resources in Iraq. 'Aziz noted that the objective of the monitoring system is to ban any Iraqi nuclear activities. This can be achieved by taking water and sediment samples. There is no excuse to obtain all information on water resources and usage in Iraq. Our conviction is that the insistence on requesting this information is an act of spying on the strategic water resources in Iraq and that this is sensitive political information. Tariq 'Aziz added: I am attaching to my letter a description of this mathematical chart and the required information, something which shows without any doubt that it is a process to collect intelligence data on Iraq's water resources. We believe that these acts are not isolated, individual incidents, but are part of the relationship between the UNSCOM and some IAEA quarters on the one hand and anti-Iraq quarters on the other. They are also part of UNSCOM's methods that are not in harmony with the actions of an organization that works under the UN auspices. In addition to the official investigation, I ask your excellency to take the necessary measures against UNSCOM members who play such roles and carry out such practices that are threatening Iraq's security and sovereignty. The continuation of these serious practices and the failure to take deterrent measures to put an end to them will force Iraq to adopt the appropriate measures to protect its security and sovereignty. Regards, [Signed] Deputy Prime Minister Tariq 'Aziz [Dated] Baghdad, 16 October 1998 [Description of source: Official news agency of the Iraqi Government] II. AL THAWRA, CALLS ON UNSC TO ACT AGAINST UNSCOM SPY Baghdad, INA, in Arabic, 1020 GMT, 23 Oct 98 [FBIS Trans1ated Text] Baghdad, 23 Oct (INA)~-The newspaper al-Thawrah says that the American inspector who was recently ousted by UNSCOM was spying for the United States. The newspaper, which speaks for the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party, says in a front-page article today by Chief Editor Sami Mahdi: This inspector who goes by the name (Carl Flogar) did not take photographs of an Iraqi missile site for a souvenir. His objective must have been to spy and since he is an American, it would be only logical to say that he is spying for the US Government, which has never stopped declaring its hostility toward Iraq, conspiring against Iraq, and threatening to strike Iraq, and it actually attacked Iraq three times over the past few years. This, the writer says, is sufficient to show us how dangerously this spy was acting and the threat that will culminate from the acts of espionage by UNSCOM inspectors, particularly when we take into consideration the fact that this man was not the first spy to be exposed The paper cites the case of former US inspector with UNSCOM Scott Ritter and the Chilean pilot who was commissioned to work with UNSCOM. This pilot was caught by the Iraqi authorities on Tuesday f 13 October] taking photographs of sensitive sites dedicated for experiments The paper believes that the Iraqi authorities did not take it upon themselves to announce the news about the spy Carl Flogar and did not officially announce that he is persona non-grata asking that he be deported within 24 hours. This is perhaps because they [Iraqi authorities] believed that the way they acted was wiser and more tactful, or perhaps so that tension in relations with UNSCOM would not be heightened. The paper adds: UNSCOM, however, should act in no other way than to stick literally to the law without showing any flexibility or tolerance after the truth about UNSCOM became evident to Iraq and the international community. The paper asks: What will UNSCOM do with this spy since he was deported? Will it settle accounts with him and punish him or will it find justifications for him and for his acts? Will it be satisfied with merely withdrawing him because he is an American? Will the UN General Secretariat and the Security Council deal with this spy and decide on an appropriate punishment for him and take him to court for crossing the red lines of his UN mission or will they adhere to silence because his is an American? Concluding its article, the paper says that such acts of espionage give Iraq the right to cast doubt on the nature of UNSCOM's work, on UNSCOM's inspectors, and UNSCOM's intentions. It adds: Is all this not enough to end this farce and lift the embargo clamped on Iraq or does Iraq have to take another path to bring down the walls of the embargo? [Description of source: Official news agency of the Iraqi Government]
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