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UNSCOM, the US, and Iraq's Proscribed Weapons

Iraq News, OCTOBER 13, 1998

The central focus of Iraq News is the tension between the considerable, proscribed WMD capabilities that Iraq is holding on to and its increasing stridency that it has complied with UNSCR 687 and it is time to lift sanctions. If you wish to receive Iraq News by email, a service which includes full-text of news reports not archived here, send your request to Laurie Mylroie .

I. NY POST EDITORIAL, "CLINTON AND IRAQ-FOR SHAME," OCT 1
II. WASH POST EDITORIAL, "IN SEARCH OF A POLICY," OCT 8
III. "A FUTILE GAME OF HIDE AND SEEK," WASH POST, OCT 11
IV. "ARMS INSPECTORS SHAKE THE TREE," WASH POST, OCT 12
   This is the 69th day without weapons inspections in Iraq.
   "Iraq News" has fallen behind on developments regarding Iraq's 
proscribed weapons.  This issue will focus on the recent Wash Post 
reporting, the next issue will focus on last week's developments in NYC, 
where Tariq Aziz left having reached no agreement on resuming weapons 
inspections [nor receiving any meaningful sanction for not resuming 
them], while UNSCOM and the IAEA issued their semi-annual reports.  [The 
UNSCOM report can be found on the website of the Federation of American 
Scientists: http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/s/981008.htm
  The WSJ, Oct 2, in "Clinton Must Convince US Lawmakers, UN, That 
Policy to Contain Saddam is Sustainable," described current US policy, 
"Earlier this year, the US threatened to go to war to force the Iraqi 
leader to grant United Nations weapons inspectors access to suspected 
weapons sites.  But Washington has all but abandoned that effort, which 
couldn't be sustained politically.  Now the top priority is ensuring 
that international economic sanctions remain in place for as long as 
Saddam Hussein is in power.  And when he threatens his neighbors with 
weapons of mass destruction, measured American force-perhaps cruise 
missiles-will be used to contain him, not all-out military 
mobilization."
    Huh?  The New York Post editors, Oct 1, sharply criticized US 
policy, "It turns out that the White House has been lying about a lot 
more than just Monica Lewinsky.  The issue now is nuclear weapons for 
Iraq-and the potential consequences are far more significant than Bill 
Clinton's future."
   The Wash Post editors, Oct 8, wrote similarly, "Two months have 
passed since Saddam Hussein kicked UN weapons inspectors out of Iraq . . 
and the US is nowhere to be found. . . . Frustrated by this policy 
failure, Congress is taking matters into its own hands.  The House 
overwhelmingly approved a bill, backed by Rep. Benjamin Gilman and Sens. 
Trent Lott and Bob Kerrey, that would authorize the administration to 
train and equip Iraqi opposition forces.  The bill is a positive step; 
it recognizes Saddam Hussein as the fundamental problem and his removal 
as ultimately the only viable solution.  But the bill doesn't force the 
administration to act and there's no sign that it will. . .  It comes 
back, again, to US leadership."
 That lack of leadership was revealed in two major Wash Post stories, 
Oct 11 and 12, on UNSCOM.  The Wash Post reporting bore out Scott Ritter 
's charges regarding the Clinton administration's obstruction of UNSCOM. 
  As the Post reported, on Jan 15 1998, as the second Iraq crisis began, 
the US asked Amb. Butler to withdraw Ritter from Baghdad and abort a 
planned search of the headquarters of the Special Security Organization, 
in charge of concealing Iraq's proscribed weapons. [For more on the SSO, 
see the INC webpage http://www.inc.org.uk under "Apparatus of 
Repression."]
   Following the Feb 23 Annan accord, Ritter was sent to Baghdad to lead 
inspections to test the accord.  But Butler came under pressure from NSC 
Adviser Sandy Berger and Sec State Madeleine Albright to relieve Ritter 
and did so Mar 3, provoking a revolt from other team leaders.  UN 
ambassador, Bill Richardson, hearing of the revolt within UNSCOM, urged 
Butler to retain Ritter.  Richardson also found Pres Clinton, who knew 
nothing about the dispute, and got him to send a "congratulatory 
comment" to Butler on UNSCOM's work, and the inspection proceeded.  
   But the next month, as a high-ranking US official explained, a policy 
review was conducted and a "'conscious policy decision' was made 'to 
take the trigger out of Butler's hands for going to war' by slowing the 
pace of the commission's most controversial work."  That was pretty much 
what Ritter charged when he resigned.  
   Furthermore, as the Post explained, "With inspections stopped since 
Aug. 3 and no prospect in view for their resumption, the administration 
now plays down their significance.  Defense Secretary William S. Cohen 
praised the inspectors in Senate testimony last Tuesday but counseled 
'not to overstate what their role is': 'If you take a group of 20 or 30 
people, and you put them in a country the size of all New England, plus 
New York, plus Pennsylvania, plus New Jersey, and say, 'Go find evidence 
of chemical weapons,' you are asking a great deal of those inspectors.'"
  However, in a perhaps understandable attempt not to appear too 
one-sided against the administration, the report glided over some 
aspects of the story.  The Clinton administration has never--not 
once--supported UNSCOM with the threat to use military force to make 
Iraq back down over a blocked inspection.  Only in Clinton's second 
term--late last year/early this year--did the administration threaten 
force in support of UNSCOM.  But that was not in response to blocked 
inspections.  It was in response to the provocations Iraq raised, first 
regarding US weapons inspectors and then inspections of "presidential 
sites," with known results. 
  Under Clinton, the question of blocked inspections did not arise until 
after Hussein Kamil's Aug 95 defection, which prompted UNSCOM to adopt 
the aggressive approach towards Iraq's concealment apparatus, known as 
"Shake the Tree."  The first of those inspections, in Mar 96, was 
blocked for hours, although UNSCOM was eventually allowed into the sites 
that it wanted to visit.
   But three months later, in Jun 96, UNSCOM was prevented entirely from 
entering a site, which appeared to contain SCUD missiles.  UNSCOM then 
followed its establish procedures, which included surrounding the site 
to prevent Iraq from taking material out and turning to Washington for 
support.  But UNSCOM did not receive the support that it had been 
accustomed to receiving from the Bush administration, which used 
to fairly regularly threaten Iraq with military force, when it defied 
UNSCOM. 
    In Jun 96, Albright, then UN ambassador, did move to try to secure a 
UNSC resolution that would declare Iraq in "material breach" of the 
cease-fire resolution, thereby authorizing the use of force against 
Iraq.  But the White House felt she was moving too fast.  NSC advisor 
Anthony Lake told Amb. Rolf Ekeus then, "Don't give us sweaty palms."  
Lacking US support, Ekeus called off his team in Iraq and went there to 
secure an agreement on access for UNSCOM, intended to make the best of a 
situation in which UNSCOM did not have the necessary US support.
   But in mid-July, another inspection was blocked.  An informed source 
explained to "Iraq News" that a disagreement over tactics followed.  
Some thought that UNSCOM should respond to being blocked by quickly 
calling off an inspection and reporting to the Security Council that it 
had been blocked.  Such a response, it was argued, would secure support 
for a subsequent military attack on Iraq.   But Ekeus considered that 
pie-in-the-sky.  UNSCOM had not received that kind of support in Jun, so 
why should it in Jul?  Moreover, UNSCOM had to be serious about its 
inspections.  If it went to a site, it had to be for a genuine purpose, 
and then UNSCOM had to be serious about demanding entry.  It could not 
afford to be seen to be pursuing inspections in a desultory fashion, in 
order to precipitate a US attack on Iraq, which wasn't likely to happen 
anyway, and in the unlikely case that it did, with what result?
    Indeed, throughout Clinton's first term, the White House repeatedly 
refused to issue an ultimatum to Iraq, although there were several 
occasions in which that would have been appropriate.  The White House 
seemed to have been consistently apprehensive that Iraq would not back 
down in the face of a US threat and concerned about what the next step 
would be, if Baghdad didn't back down. Thus, in Oct 94, following 
Saddam's lunge at Kuwait, Sec Def William Perry wanted to declare a 
no-drive zone in southern Iraq, raising the idea publicly.  The State 
Dept was agreeable.  But once the US announced that it was rushing 
troops to Kuwait, the advancing Iraqi forces halted and began to 
withdraw.  The White House hesitated to make a further demand--the 
withdrawal of Iraqi forces from the south--lest Saddam defy it.  So 
rather than punish Saddam for his aggression, by establishing a no-drive 
zone in the south, for example, the Clinton administration essentially 
settled for restoring the status quo ante.
  Similarly, in Aug 96, the US did nothing as Iraq's Republican Guards 
marched up to Irbil, with the intent of assaulting the Iraqi National 
Congress headquartered there.  There was no ultimatum or warning to 
Saddam about the consequences of such an assault, only a cruise missile 
attack on some relatively worthless air defense sites in the south, 
after the fact.
    Thus, while anything might be possible, it is a little hard to 
credit the Wash Post account that following the administration's failure 
to back up UNSCOM in Jun 96, it found its cahones in Jul/Aug, only to 
lose them by month's end, as Saddam attacked Irbil.
   As for the present, the Wash Post reported, "In the policy review 
that came last spring, the Clinton administration concluded that a loss 
of diplomatic support left little room to back intrusive searches by 
threat of US force.  The best the government believed it could do for 
now is to maintain a broad consensus for economic sanctions."
   If that is so, it is because of the administration's stubborn refusal 
to deal with the Iraq problem, when it was more manageable.  Over a 
period of years, the administration was repeatedly told that it had a 
very serious problem with Iraq.  That was  particularly so following 
Hussein Kamil's Aug 95 defection. 
   Some of the first information to emerge after Kamil's defection 
concerned Iraq's bw program.  In Oct 95, then Israeli ambassador, Itamar 
Rabinovich, told "Iraq News" of his concern about Iraq's biological 
weapons and said he would raise the issue with the US officials with 
whom he dealt, including Martin Indyk.
   In Dec 95, following the assassination of Itzhak Rabin, Israeli Prime 
Minister Shimon Peres and Foreign Minister Ehud Barak visited Wash DC 
and expressed their concern about a possible Iraqi nuclear breakout.  
Barak did so in exceptionally strong terms.
   Around the same time, a State Dept official proposed to take a second 
look at Iraq's retained unconventional capabilities.  Prior to Kamil's 
defection, the US had looked at that issue in terms of keeping sanctions 
on Iraq.   His idea was to look at the question in terms of any 
offensive threat that Iraq's unconventional capabilities might 
represent.  His boss agreed that he should study that matter and do so 
in conjunction with a colleague from the CIA.  The project seemed set 
up, but it was never carried out, because the CIA never came through.  
  A friend, retired from the US Gov't told me of a figure within the 
Gov't, working with UNSCOM, who repeatedly briefed US officials, 
including one Cabinet level official, on the danger posed by Iraq's bw 
program.  Nothing was ever done to address the problem, nor was the 
danger explained to the American public, save for a few brief moments 
during the past year's Iraq crises.
   In Feb 97, a large Saudi delegation, headed by the Defense Minister, 
Prince Sultan, came to Washington to see whether the US was willing to 
take a more aggressive stance on Iraq.  The delegation received no 
satisfactory answer and the Saudis soon began making their first 
approaches toward Iran.
   In the early spring of 97, two senior Republican foreign policy 
figures, attending a dinner with Madeleine Albright, pressed her on Iraq 
policy.  She assured them that US policy on Iraq was in good shape.
   In Jun, 97 Rolf Ekeus, as he left his position as UNSCOM chairman, 
warned of UNSCOM's precarious position and Iraq's untempered ambition, 
as reported in the introductory issue of "Iraq News."  
   Finally, as late as Mar 98, King Hussein, in a visit to Wash DC, 
warned the administration of the Saddam menace [see "Iraq News," Apr 5]. 
 Again, the administration did nothing.
    What can anyone say?  The administration was repeatedly told that 
it had a serious problem with Iraq; disregarded those warnings; and now 
really has no one but itself to blame for its problems with Iraq.  
Moreover, it can only get worse, until and unless, the administration 
gets a grip on the problem.