07 October 1998
UNSCOM CONCERNED ABOUT MONITORING OF IRAQI WEAPONS SITES
(Reports on progress disarming Iraq) (1340) By Judy Aita USIA United Nations Correspondent United Nations -- The Special Commission overseeing the destruction of Iraqi weapons (UNSCOM) reported to the Security Council October 6 that it is close to having a complete accounting of Iraq's ballistic missile and chemical weapons programs, but warned that its monitoring of Baghdad's weapons programs is being carried out "only at a less than satisfactory level." In a major six-month report to the council, UNSCOM Chairman Richard Butler said that monitoring is vital to ensuring that Baghdad does not reacquire the banned chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles in the future. The report comes at a tense time between Iraq and the United Nations. In August Iraq announced that it would no longer allow intrusive inspections or cooperate with UNSCOM other than to allow the monitoring of certain sites to continue. Another highly contentious issue is the report of tests conducted by a U.S. Army laboratory that found traces of the deadly VX nerve gas on warhead fragments. Iraq has claimed that it did not get to the stage in its VX research to use the agent in weapons. UNSCOM is now waiting for the results of tests on other fragments being conducted in France and Switzerland. A high-level Iraqi delegation, led by Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz, has been at the United Nations for ten days talking with Secretary General Kofi Annan and some members of the Security Council. The Iraqis say they have given all the information on the banned weapons programs to UNSCOM and it is now time to lift sanctions. The Security Council, however, has declared that it will not consider lifting sanctions until Iraq resumes cooperation with the weapons inspectors. The council is scheduled to discuss the reports of UNSCOM and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on October 13. IAEA reported to the council that the agency believes it has a coherent picture of Iraq's clandestine nuclear program based on the information available to date. At the same time, IAEA pointed out, it cannot guarantee that all items have been found and the current stalemate does nothing to help the situation. Citing "a major accomplishment," Butler said UNSCOM was able to account for the destruction of between 43 to 45 of the 45 operational special warheads Iraq said it unilaterally destroyed in 1991. But he reported that Iraq's declarations on the unilateral destruction of special warheads does not match all the physical evidence collected at the destruction sites. And the VX issue needs to be resolved in order for UNSCOM to verify the number of warheads produced and unilaterally destroyed. The most important outstanding issues in the chemical weapons area include the accounting for 550 artillery shells filled with mustard chemical warfare agent, verification of the unilateral destruction of R-400 chemical and biological aerial bombs, accounting for the production of the chemical warfare agent VX, and verification of Iraq's declaration on production equipment. A chemical analysis of a dozen mustard-filled shells found at a former chemical weapons storage facility in 1997 and 1998 revealed that the mustard was still "of the highest quality," the report said. Butler also reported that: -- Iraq refused to discuss the issue of liquid ballistic missile propellant and denied access to documents that would help in verification; -- Accounting of conventional warheads was "significantly advanced," but Iraq has failed to provide UNSCOM with information relating to some 50 warheads that have not been recovered; -- the issue of seven indigenously produced missiles remains unresolved; -- progress has been achieved in developing a rough material balance between components and the number of missile engines Iraq claims to have had; and -- the remnants of some 30 indigenously produced conventional missile warheads which Iraq said were unilaterally destroyed have not yet been found. In the biological weapons areas, the commission has not been able to verify the number of anthrax and botulinum toxin missile warheads nor get a consistent explanation for the number of weapons filled with biological weapons, the report said. "The development of the drop tank for dissemination of biological weapon agents appears to have been pursued with the utmost vigor by Iraq," the report said. "The team of international experts assessed that the account in the FFCD (full, final, complete disclosure) of the drop tank project could not be verified." UNSCOM said it still does not have sufficient information on biological weapons production levels, Iraq's acquisition of growth media, and the disposition of biological weapons aerosol generators. The six inspectors from five nations who monitor the missile programs are currently responsible for 63 sites, 159 items of equipment and over 2,000 operational missiles, the report said. Ten inspectors, three chemists and one explosive specialist from 11 nations who make up the chemical weapons monitoring team periodically inspect 120 sites, another 52 installations that range from petrochemical facilities to water treatment plants, 518 dual-use equipment items, and thousands of tons of dual-use chemicals, it said. The chemical weapons monitoring group continues to discover dual-use items and materials that Iraq had not declared, the report said. As with the chemical monitoring, the biological monitoring team of 11 inspectors from nine nations "continues to find dual-use materials which should have been declared by Iraq," it said. In the lengthy report, Butler outlined the events and meetings leading up to the current stalemate with Iraq. A team of biological weapons experts went to Baghdad in July to review any new information from Iraq and assess the thoroughness of Iraq's final disclosure on its biological weapons programs. Iraq submitted no information to the experts, he wrote. "The team concluded that, as currently presented in Iraq's biological (full, final and complete disclosure) FFCD, none of the components of the material balance could be verified. These included biological weapons munitions, bulk biological weapons agent production and microbiological growth media," Butler said. When he went to Baghdad at the beginning of August, Butler said he told Iraqi officials that "some important progress had been made, specifically in the area of missiles, but that progress in other areas had proved to be much less than had been hoped for." He suggested that Iraq and UNSCOM set out an intensive work program, proposed specific expert meetings and inspections, and asked for several documents including one taken from an UNSCOM chief inspector in July. Iraq rejected the proposals; said that it "would not, indeed never" give UNSCOM a chemical weapons document taken from the inspector; and insisted that Butler report immediately to the council that there were no more banned weapons and related materials and capability in Iraq, the UNSCOM chairman said. Saying that further discussions would be useless, Iraqi officials ended the meeting. A few days later on August 5, Iraq issued the declaration that it would no longer cooperate with the weapons inspectors. Butler also rejected Iraq's assertion that it is up to the weapons inspectors, not Iraq, to prove that there are still banned weapons in the country. That argument, he said, "would reverse the onus of disclosure clearly placed upon Iraq by the council and instead would require the commission to make the full disclosure of proscribed items that only Iraq can make." "The commission has worked as constructively as it could, with Iraq, to try to shed light on the biological weapons area, including by suggesting a new approach," the report said. "But Iraq failed to take that opportunity, failed to provide the disclosures which are essential to the fulfillment of the disarmament mandate." UNSCOM also told the council that at some point the members may have to decide how to proceed if "the commission is obliged to conclude that it is unable to provide 100 percent verification of the claimed fate or disposition of prohibited weapons." (For more information on this subject, contact our special Iraq website at: http://www.usia.gov/iraq)
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