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09 September 1998

TRANSCRIPT: CORDESMAN WARNS OF CONSEQUENCES IF IRAQ SANCTIONS LIFTED

(CSIS analyst on UNSCOM, Iran, Gulf security issues) (8050)
Washington -- "Iraq continues to import the parts for missiles, for
chemical weapons. It is almost certainly importing the components for
biological weapons. It is essentially getting ready for the day that
sanctions are lifted, and it is creating new programs," Anthony
Cordesman, one of the top U.S. analysts of Gulf security issues said
in a September 2 WorldNet.
"What you really have here is warning that at some point in the next
few years, if Saddam is still in power, you are going to have an Iraq
with long-range missiles. And once again, it will have at least some
chemical and biological weapons," he stated.
"The minute Iraq breaks out of sanctions, within six months to a year,
it will have biological weapons with the lethality of small nuclear
weapons," he continued. "At some point the sanctions will weaken. And
if Saddam is still in power, you will see a very dangerous threat
emerging from Iraq."
Following is the transcript of the Worldnet "Global Exchange" program:
(Begin transcript)
WORLDNET "GLOBAL EXCHANGE"
UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
Television and Film Service of Washington, D.C.
GUEST:    Dr. Anthony Cordesman, Co-Director, Middle East Studies
		Program, Center for Strategic International Studies
TOPIC:    Security Issues in the Gulf and the Middle East 
HOST:     Noha Abdelwahab (Through Interpreter)
DATE:     September 2, 1998
TIME:     09:00 - 10:00 EDT
MS. ABDELWAHAB: Viewers and listeners, welcome. This is Noha
Abdelwahab welcoming you to "Global Exchange."
Our program today will deal with current security issues in the Gulf
and the Middle East. We talk a little bit about the recent suspension
of United Nations inspections in Iraq, the possible use and effects of
chemical and biological weapons, and the recent U.S. military response
to international terrorism.
First let's take a look at recent events regarding the United Nations
inspection in Iraq.
(Begin videotape.)
ANNOUNCER: The chief United Nations weapons inspector Thursday
defended his commission's work in Iraq as claims surfaced that the
Security Council is preventing the commission from doing its work
effectively.
Chairman Richard Butler's defense of the weapons inspection
commission, UNSCOM, came in response to the resignation Wednesday of a
key member, Scott Ritter. An American, Mr. Ritter was in charge of
finding concealed arms. In his resignation letter, Mr. Ritter accused
the U.N. secretary general, the Security Council and the United States
of making UNSCOM so weak it cannot carry out its work of disarming
Iraq. Mr. Butler denied those charges:
AMB. BUTLER: The Security Council has made abundantly clear that it is
determined that Iraq should comply with its decisions and resolutions.
(End videotape.)
MS. ABDELWAHAB: Here to discuss the situation in Iraq and related
security issues are experts in two different areas. Dr. Anthony
Cordesman is the co-director of the Middle East Studies Program at the
Center for Strategic International Studies here in Washington, D.C. He
has also held a number of senior positions in the State and Defense
Departments, and is a well known Middle East policy analyst here in
the United States. Welcome, Dr. Cordesman, to this edition of "Global
Exchange."
DR. CORDESMAN:  Thank you.
MS. ABDELWAHAB: Also joining us are our viewers all over the world.
And I invite them to call us with their questions about contemporary
issues that have to do with security in the Gulf and the Middle East.
Viewers and listeners, if you have a question in Arabic, please call
us collect at 202-260-3727. Once again the number for questions in
Arabic is 202-260-3727. If you are calling with a question in English,
please call us collect at 202-260-7403. The number once again is
202-260-7403.
We have a number of broadcasters with us today who are standing by
with their questions. But let me first ask Mr. Cordesman to comment on
what Scott Ritter said, the American inspector to UNSCOM, about the
fact that the United Nations did not take strict positions with Iraq
and in order to avoid a confrontation once again with Iraq.
DR. CORDESMAN: I think it is a very difficult choice to make, because
if what you have is open confrontation on every issue, then you push
the inspections to their limit, you may have a crisis in the Security
Council, and you could lose support for the other sanctions, the ones
that limit arms imports or the imports of dual-use items.
On the other hand, what Mr. Ritter raises is a very real long-term
problem. We know Iraq continues to import the parts for missiles, for
chemical weapons. It almost certainly is importing the components for
biological weapons. It is essentially getting ready for the day that
sanctions are lifted, and it is creating new programs, just as UNSCOM
is trying to find the programs they had at the time of the Gulf War.
So I think what you really have here is a warning that at some point
in the next few years, if Saddam is still in power, you are going to
have an Iraq with long-range missiles. And, once again, it will have
at least some chemical and biological weapons.
MS. ABDELWAHAB: Scott Ritter also said, or in his message to the
Security Council he indicated that with the absence of the UNSCOM
inspectors Iraq could resume its weapons production program within six
months. It seems clear that there are -- to what extent is it
dangerous that the absence of the inspectors pose a danger and a
threat to world security?
DR. CORDESMAN: Well, first, I think one question is if you had the
inspectors in there, could they find all of the efforts Iraq has under
way. I think the answer quite frankly is no. The inspectors have got a
lot of what Iraq has done. Remember, we're talking about something
like eight to ten billion dollars worth of investment in equipment and
weapons that has been destroyed. Now we're down to small, scattered
efforts which are probably hidden under civil programs all over the
country.
So what Mr. Ritter is saying is what many people are saying in the
intelligence community, that the minute Iraq breaks out of sanctions,
within six months to a year it will have biological weapons with the
lethality of small nuclear weapons.
Now, it's permitted to have a missile program with 150 kilometers in
range, and there is no dispute about the fact that once the U.N.
inspectors cease to monitor that can very rapidly be pushed back to
ranges of 300, 400, or 600 kilometers, which could reach most of the
targets in the Gulf.
So one thing is virtually inevitable. At some point the UNSCOM
inspections will end. At some point the sanctions will weaken. And if
Saddam is still in power, you will see a very dangerous threat
emerging from Iraq.
MS. ABDELWAHAB: Thank you for this comment. And now we will go to our
viewers and the standing-by broadcasters at ANN Beirut. Beirut, go
ahead with your questions please.
Q: Yes, this is Ghasam Hermoud (sp) from National Broadcasting
Network. I'd like to start with the Iraqi matter. The American arms
inspector, Scott Ritter, accused the Security Council, as you
mentioned, and Secretary General Kofi Annan, the United States,
failing to deal firmly with Iraqi obstruction of U.N. weapons teams.
And he also said that Washington had intervened several times to try
to influence the timing and target of some inspections. In an
interview on public television's NewsHour with Jim Lehrer he said that
inspectors weren't allowed to do their job out of fear of a
confrontation with the United States -- wouldn't be able to muster the
required support in the Security Council to respond effectively.
Now, what we are seeing is Mr. Tariq Aziz -- he sent a letter to the
United Nations saying -- accusing UNSCOM of charging -- of disarming
Iraq -- of being a tool of the United States against Iraq, and accuses
Mr. Ritter for spying on Iraq for the United States and Israel. And
Iraq demands Mr. Annan and the Security Council to open a serious
probe into all these facts.
Now, the question is: How do you comment on that, and what is the U.S.
position vis-a-vis what Ritter said and the accusations of the Iraqi
government? In light of criticism of the United States by certain Arab
leaders or its lack of clear policy over Iraq?
DR. CORDESMAN: Well, you've asked a lot of questions, but let me begin
with the ones relating to weapons of mass destruction. And let's go
back a little in the record. There has never been a point in time
since the cease-fire in the Gulf War -- there has never been a
three-month period in which Iraq was not proven to have lied about
what it was doing with weapons of mass destruction. It lied about its
missile programs, its nuclear programs, its biological programs and
its chemical programs.
Last fall it demanded that there be independent technical panels to
deal with the issues of chemical weapons, of biological weapons, and
missiles. It only got two of these panels. But both of them, which
were really picked with Iraq's suggestions, concluded Iraq had lied,
continued to lie, and that there were very real threats, in spite of
the fact Iraq had insisted on these.
Now, we know -- we watched Iraq in the last year or two import the
guidance platforms from nuclear armed Soviet missiles. We've seen them
bring in the precursors of chemical weapons from India, which were
found in Jordan and Saudi Arabia. We know they are going to go on with
these programs.
Of course Tariq Aziz would like to put an end to all of these
inspections, because he would like to have as much capability as soon
as possible.
Now, the difficulty we face is a very simple one. The inspectors would
like to go everywhere at all times. And they keep getting information
from within Iraq and from other sources that there are very real
problems and efforts going on in Iraq. But if you allow them to go in
and you get into a confrontation, you threaten U.N. support for the
sanctions that keep Iraq from having arms, and which keep Iraq from
openly importing dual-use items. It's not an easy trade-off.
Q: Yes, now Iraq now refuses to cooperate with the U.N. inspection
teams, and preventing them from carrying out most of their duties.
While they may have wanted to previously declared sides, they can't
conduct intrusive inspections. Now, this position -- where could it
lead the United States and the United Nations, and on the basis of
taking any serious action against Iraq?
DR. CORDESMAN: I think at this point what you are watching is a
process where you are not going to see force used unless Iraq openly
deploys new missile systems, or where it is very clear they're rushing
forward in the programs to create weapons of mass destruction. It's a
battle of attrition with diminishing returns.
But I think what's very important in the Middle East, in the Gulf in
particular, is to understand the implications of this, because in Iraq
almost certainly there are laboratories working today on the
production of biological weapons, and it does not take a large
facility, concealed facility, to produce very lethal weapons. Now, Mr.
Ritter is arguing that inspection can solve all of the problems. I
understand why he may feel that way. And if I was in his position I'd
want to be the best inspector too. But you probably can't. And keeping
the sanctions up as long as possible makes things better. But if I
were in the Middle East, what I would be saying to myself is in two or
three years Iraq is not going to be talking in pan-Arab terms, it
isn't going to be talking in Islamic terms; it is going to be talking
for Iraq and Saddam again. And without a very coherent U.N. effort,
he's going to be a Saddam with biological, chemical weapons, and
long-range missiles.
Q: Well, Mr. Cordesman, I think also Mr. Scott Ritter accused Mrs.
Albright and other U.S. leaders of being -- of having intervened in
the inspections. And Mrs. Albright replied by saying he doesn't have a
clue about what our overall plan has been, and that we are the
foremost supporter of UNSCOM, that we have directed -- have inspired
greater, more inspections than anybody else. Well, here we see that
Mr. Ritter is accusing the United States of intervening in the
inspections. It's the same words of Mr. Tariq Aziz.
DR. CORDESMAN: They're different words, because understand what's
happening here. If you're a policeman, you want to be the best
policeman possible, and you don't want to have people say there are
other investigations and other priorities that are more important. But
when you look at any actual effort to enforce the law, you have to
consider the other means at work, and the other investigations. I'm
sure Mr. Ritter hasn't been given carte blanche. But, on the other
hand, if he was allowed to provoke confrontations with Iraq, the end
result might be a sudden problem in the Security Council and an easing
of sanctions, which are far more dangerous.
Now, what Tariq Aziz is arguing for is very simple: it's Iraq's right
to proliferate, to violate the terms of the U.N. cease-fire, and to go
back to having large numbers of weapons of mass destruction. That's
exactly the opposite of what Mr. Ritter is seeking.
Q: Mr. Cordesman, one more question. Since we're talking about Iraq
and the threat that could come from its chemical weapons, don't you
think that there is another threat in the Arab world, which is Israel
and its nuclear weapons and its capability to affect the whole Arab
world with major destruction? What do you say about that?
DR. CORDESMAN: I think the problem you point to is one which goes
throughout the region. It's become clear recently that Algeria had
revived parts of its nuclear program. We know that Syria is deploying
new chemical weapons and is working on biological weapon which will
have nuclear lethality. Egypt's programs are low level, but it too has
new missile programs and some efforts in chemical weapons. If we look
at Iran, we know they are working on nuclear, chemical weapons, they
have long-range missiles, and they have biological weapons. We have
seen that you have elements in the Sudan that are working on weapons
which could be used by extremists and terrorists.
And I think the problem is without new arms control inspection regimes
-- and of course they have to include Israel -- but they have to
include the whole region. What we are watching is a process of
creeping proliferation that threatens everyone in the Middle East.
Q: Mr. Cordesman, does the United States have any plans to make
everybody -- to make the whole region come to a ban on the nuclear and
biological weapon and chemical weapons in the near future?
DR. CORDESMAN: They have the desire. We have strengthened the
Non-Proliferation Treaty. There is a new arms control regime which
would help. We are seeking to give the Chemical Weapons Convention all
the enforcement that is necessary. The United States has been very
active in trying to transform the Biological Weapons Convention so
that it can be used to actually put limits on biological weapons. And
it has been the key sponsor of the Missile Technology Control Regime.
The United States cannot enforce arms control on the Middle East, even
more than it can unilaterally sort of reshape the military balance.
The tools are being developed, but regional arms control has to come
from within the region. The political will has to be there, and at
least as yet people are more interested in getting the arms than in
preventing them.
MS. ABDELWAHAB: I would like to thank Beirut for those questions. And
we go now to ANN in London. Go ahead with your question from London
please.
Q: My question is directed to Mr. Cordesman. There are several dangers
facing the Middle East. It is not only chemical and biological weapons
owned by Iraq that threaten the stability in the area. And I would
like to add that such weapons and the technology per se -- they were
given to Iraq by its Western allies during the first Gulf War or the
first Iran war. I would like also to recall that there are several
calls in England to lift the sanctions on Iraq based on the pretext
that if the West would like to stabilize the area then they should
curb the use and the spread of these weapons in the industrial states
first and foremost.
I come back to the main threat facing the Middle East, and the
existence of foreign, strange, alien area -- a state that does not
mesh in with the culture, the history and the background of the area.
I mean the state of Israel's position of highly developed and highly
sophisticated weapons of mass destruction. This state created a crisis
for the people of Palestine and all neighboring countries. Don't you
see that focusing on finding a solution to this problem is one of the
major solutions to a problem that has been hanging on us for over 50
years. And do you believe that continuing the siege on Iraq is going
to guarantee that Iraq is not going to build back its arsenal?
DR. CORDESMAN: Well, it's a little difficult to deal with a hundred
questions at once, but let me try to deal with some of those. First,
historically let's remember that most of the wars in the Middle East
have been between Arab states, that if you take all of the casualties
of the Arab-Israeli conflicts combined, over all that time there have
only been a fraction of a number of people who have been killed in the
civil war in the Sudan. They only amount to something like a third of
the casualties that occurred in the Iran-Iraq War. And the refugee
movements involved -- as serious as the Palestinian problem and
tragedy is -- have been smaller. No, you cannot blame the Middle East
on Israel, although I think it perhaps is convenient for other states
to try to do it.
But when we look at what can be attempted to help in this region, what
was proposed after the Oslo talks were the arms control and regional
stability talks. And these were aimed at helping people understand the
arms control options at bringing controls -- not simply for Israel's
nuclear weapons, but for missiles, for chemical weapons and biological
weapons throughout the region.
Now, nations like Egypt and Jordan, other nations in the North Africa
-- Morocco, Tunisia -- nations in the Gulf, have all participated in
these talks. I think it is important that Israel be pushed into
bringing its nuclear weapons into these discussions at some point,
just as each of the other proliferating countries in the Middle East
needs to be pushed into it. But the fact is that who is not
participating in these talks, although they've been invited to do it,
is Libya, Syria, Iraq and Iran. They have all refused. These are not
American talks; these are regional talks. And the problem we face
obviously is not Iraq alone. It is Iran, it is Israel, it is Syria, to
a lesser degree it is Libya, it's Algeria and the other countries.
But historically I would for a moment put aside the usual rhetorical
problems with Israel and remember who used weapons of mass destruction
in war -- Iraq. Who did they use them against? Not simply Iran, but
the Iraqi people. And the fact they were Kurds doesn't mean they were
not Iraqis. And where did Iraq get its chemical weapons from?
Certainly it imported technology from the West, but it got its
chemical weapons on its own. The first mustard gas was produced in
Iraqi laboratories. Just as Egypt produced its own chemical weapons
when it used them in Yemen.
So when we look at the threats here we need to remember history a
little less selectively than you have in your question.
Q: I don't believe that the attempt to pay attention to the main issue
will bring a solution to the problem. If we were to go back to the
history of the wars in the Middle East, these wars were because of
Israel, and they were between the Arab countries and Israel. Also, the
civil wars in the area were part of the legacy of colonialism in the
region. But can we not consider the problem of Iraqi weapons an
internal problem, particularly since these chemical weapons were used
within Iraq and not outside of Iraq?
DR. CORDESMAN: They were used outside of Iraq. They were used very
consistently in Iran in 1988. We know that when it came down to
targeting, Saddam Hussein had ordered that biologically-armed missiles
be dispersed, and these were targeted on Arab countries like Saudi
Arabia, as well as on Israel.
Now, the practical realities too are, again, let's go back: Who was
the first country to use chemical weapons in the Middle East? It was
Egypt in the Yemeni War.
Yes, Israel's possession of weapons of mass destruction is a serious
problem for arms control. But I think to blame all of the region's
problems on people outside the region and Israel is one of the reasons
that there have been so many difficulties in coming to grips with
reality in the area. Arms control in the Gulf is a problem in the
Gulf. It's not a problem with colonialism and it's not a problem with
Israel. If Algeria moves forward to nuclear weapons, it's not because
of colonialism and it's not because it's worried about Israel. When
Libya acquired chemical weapons, when it sought nuclear weapons and
missiles, the rhetoric may have been about Israel, but this was a time
when Libya's expansionist aims, particularly in areas like Chad, went
far beyond the area, and dealt with the problems of North Africa.
So, if we are going to come to grips with the realities of security in
the Middle East, we can't selectively reinvent history.
Q: But the United States dealt a plan to Sudan and Afghanistan without
justification for these strikes, particularly since it was possible to
go back to the Security Council. How do you comment on that?
DR. CORDESMAN: I think there are times when you can use negotiations,
when you can talk to your allies, when you can work through the U.N.
to deal with the problem of extremists and terrorists. There are
problem times when you have to use force, as we did in Bosnia. And I
think in cases like that, if you can use the United Nations, but if
you have to react you are going to have to defend yourself. You can't
blow up embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and somehow then say you have
a sanctuary. And let me note that the problems with Afghanistan go far
beyond the United States. If you look beyond this incident, Mr. bin
Laden has presented Saudi Arabia with very serious internal security
problems. You now have 40,000 Iranian troops moving to the Afghan
border because of problems and pressures on that area.
When we come down to the Sudan, let me note the history of the Sudan.
This noble state is using the force draft. Young men can't freely walk
through the northern Sudan without the fear of being drafted. The
government has pursued policies in the southern part of Sudan, which
have caused millions of refugees and killed hundreds of thousands of
people. There's no country on its borders, including Egypt, which has
not found the Sudan to be a strong supporter of terrorism, and indeed
to be linked to an assassination attempt on Mr. Mubarak. This kind of
claim that the Sudan somehow has emerged all of a sudden as a moderate
state is rather unique. And when you talk about nerve gas, whatever
ultimately become the details of this particular pharmaceutical plant,
remember that thousands of people ended up being wounded in the
embassy bombings. One very well organized use of VX gas would be tens
of thousands dead. When you change the rules fundamentally in terms of
the terrorist threat, you provoke a response to stop it.
Q: Don't you think that what is referred to as "terrorism" is a
response to the international chaos that exists after the collapse of
the Soviet Union and the Communist Bloc and the disintegration of
former countries into smaller ethnic units, and that this is also, all
of it, is a result of the increasing gap between the rich countries
and the poorer developing countries? Is there a difference between
this kind of terrorism that we have seen examples of and the terrorism
conducted by the state? Is this -- can you add some light to this
phenomenon that we are talking about, terrorism by groups as opposed
to state terrorism? And how do we describe the support of starving the
Iraqi children and people? And where is international law in all of
this?
DR. CORDESMAN: Again, the problem is dealing with so many questions at
once. But let's go back to the patterns of terrorism, which is the
first part of your question. Actually there's been a decline in the
overall rate of terrorism since the end of the Soviet Union and the
end of the Cold War. People I think focus much more on these kinds of
incidents of violence because they are much more apparent at a time
when you're not talking about global threats and global confrontation
than they were when these other issues focused the media and the news.
When we look at the causes of terrorism, they certainly are a matter
often of poverty and of repressive regimes. But it is I think a fact
of life that if you go back historically, and you look at what
happened, particularly in the Middle East, for the whole decade
between 1980 and 1990, most countries had a declining real per capita
income, because they weren't willing to come to grips with massive
population growth and because governments insisted on state planning
and forms of socialism which prevented growth. War was a factor, but
not a dominant cause.
Now, to change that nations are going to have to come to grips in the
Middle East with their demographics and with economic reform. It isn't
going to be a matter of asking for aid; it's going to be a matter of
internal change. And I think until that occurs it is true there are
going to be a lot of recurrent problems with terrorism. What can
change terrorism is not that there will be more incidents, but that
there will be larger bombs and potentially the use of weapons of mass
destruction.
MS. ABDELWAHAB: We thank ANN in London, and we go now to Abu Dhabi in
the United Arab Emirates. Go ahead with your question, please.
Q: This is Dr. -- (inaudible) -- from the TV of the UAR, calling from
Abu Dhabi. And my question is to Mr. Cordesman. I have been following
the discussion, the questions. And my question to you is: Don't you
see that the United States, in facing what is termed the
"international terrorism," is also violating international law when
they strike at sovereign state, members in the United Nations system?
A case in point: attacking Iraq, Somalia, Afghanistan and Sudan. And
at the same time that after the Gulf War and the new global order the
United States calls officially of respecting the international law and
calling on everyone to respect international law. Don't you see any
problem in this where the foremost state in the world does not show
any respect for the international law? And then you call on countries
that have no heritage or history to respect that. Would you please be
specific in your answer? Thank you.
DR. CORDESMAN: Let me be as specific as possible. First, under Article
51 of the U.N. Charter, nations have a right of self-defense. When you
blow up embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, international law allows you
to act in defense. When a group declares openly that it is at war with
the United States, the meaning of international law on that is quite
clear.
Now, when you lump this together with Iraq, where you had the U.N.
Security Council passing I think seven resolutions in support of the
actions involved, and where it meets at six-month intervals to review
what is going on, international law is in full force. Within the
Sudan, let me go back and remind you that U.N. resolutions were being
used there too, and that the then-secretary general of the United
Nations, Mr. Boutros-Ghali, wanted far more dramatic action at several
times from the U.S. military than the U.S. was willing to make in a
country torn apart by civil conflict.
I don't think anyone has argued as yet that Mr. bin Laden was not
preparing to commit more attacks against Americans. Now, let me note
that he's also been involved in sponsoring attacks against Egyptians.
He's been involved in supporting movements which have committed
terrorism in Saudi Arabia. And when it comes down to international
law, I would invite you -- there are about seven conventions on
terrorism, and I would ask you to look at them very carefully, because
when someone acts, as Mr. bin Laden has acted, and when a country
hosts a movement conducting such military actions, it under
international law allows nations to act in self-defense.
Q: I'm calling from the TV of the Emirates. Mr. Cordesman, what are
the priorities of the United States regarding inspection in Iraq in
light of this current crisis between UNSCOM and the Iraqi government?
DR. CORDESMAN: It's a very good question. And I don't think,
unfortunately, there are very good answers. The priorities would be to
first keep the monitoring system in Iraq. That at least ensures that
the facilities we know can quickly be converted to large-scale weapons
of mass destruction will have some kind of monitoring. The second
would be to at least allow the kind of inspections which again will
stop the rapid mass production of these weapons.
Now, in an ideal world what you want to have is the free right of
inspection to immediately pursue all of the reports that we are
getting, and most of them would indicate that Iraq continues its
chemical, biological programs, and its missile development program.
But the trade off has to be it is also important to maintain sanctions
that stop arms imports and stop the imports of the technology for the
mass production of weapons of mass destruction. And if you are too
strong in pursuing the inspections, you may lose those controls which
at this point are more important. But the unfortunate reality is that
sooner or later you are going to face an Iraq which can rebuild some
of these capabilities, and in fact probably already has.
Q: A question: Would the United States continue adopting the theory of
Martin Indyk to the double containing to Iraq and Iran in the light
that there is another new theory that the United States should adopt
vis-a-vis Iraq -- I'm sorry, vis-a-vis Iran -- in the light of the
current developments and the recent developments in the area?
DR. CORDESMAN: Well, I have to say that I personally feel that our
policy of economic sanctions towards Iran has been misguided, that
with President Khatemi's election, and indeed before that, with
President Rafsanjani's effort to reach out to the United States with
the Conoco deal, we should have dealt with Iran on economic terms. We
should have moved more quickly -- not simply toward dialogue, but
towards improving relations.
But I think what you have already seen from President Clinton and from
Secretary Albright is a message that we do wish to improve our
relations with Iran, and we are prepared to do so -- not perhaps as
aggressively as some of us outside government might like -- but I
can't fault the administration for moving forward on dialogue, and
doing so often with a great deal of objection from the American
Congress. And I think it is certainly true that you cannot treat Iraq
and Iran as the same countries. And with the changes taking place in
Iran, the issues become issues like proliferation, like the treatment
of Abu Musa and the Tombs, the issues affecting terrorism to the
extent it still continues, which is largely outside the Gulf. But
these are issues which I think we can talk about, and of course the
United States has issues and probably things that it will have to
change in these negotiations too.
We perhaps could move more quickly, but I think it is again important
to note that President Clinton, Secretary Albright, and indeed Martin
Indyk himself, are all supporting a dialogue with Iran, responding to
President Khatemi, and do wish to move forward in these areas.
Q: How would you evaluate how the U.S. State Department evaluates the
accusations of Scott Ritter to the United States State Department, to
everyone else that they are not doing enough in order to eradicate the
massive weapons arsenals of Iraq?
DR. CORDESMAN: Again, I think if you think of Mr. Ritter as the kind
of policeman who wants to be a perfect policeman, and of the State
Department and the administration as having to operate a national
justice system where no one policeman can do everything they want,
because you have to make trade-offs in other areas, you put this in
perspective. It is not that either is wrong. Ideally I would like to
see UNSCOM pursue all of these inspections and try to get rid of the
last remnants of these weapons of mass destruction and prevent new
programs from coming in. Unfortunately on a technical level I suspect
that we have done just about as much as we can, unless we have a major
new defector.
Understand that a biological weapons laboratory can fit in a couple of
rooms; that during the Iran-Iraq War, when they developed these
programs, they were very ambitious. But in preparing for the Gulf War
they converted a pharmaceutical plant to the mass production of
anthrax in less than three months. You can't stop all of this, and
that's why the other aspects of this system are equally important. One
is stopping arms imports. It's easy to talk about the negative effect
of sanctions, but remember that Iraq imported so many arms during the
Iran-Iraq War, and did so much to weaken its economy, that the average
Iraqi's income, real income, was cut in half before the Gulf War even
began.
If Iraq had continued to import arms after the Gulf War at the rate it
did before the Gulf War, nearly half of all of Iraq's oil revenues
without sanctions would have gone to arms, and we would have been
talking about a massive nuclear biological and chemical power.
So unless we maintain those controls, we have a very good picture of
what's going to happen. Remember, for all of the talk about the
hardships here -- and for the Iraqi people they are real and tragic --
it is Saddam Hussein who blocked oil for food for half a decade, it is
Saddam Hussein who spent millions of dollars importing -- smuggling in
illegal Russian missile guidance platforms for nuclear-armed ballistic
submarine-launched missiles. And these are realities that people in
the region have to deal with, particularly when they are close to the
launch points for Iraqi missiles and aircraft.
Q: Do you think that -- there is a popular feeling here asking for the
departure of the American forces, and the reason is that for a lot of
time, due to several political aspects on the part of American policy,
the feeling is going on the Arab street that the American forces,
military forces in the Gulf area should leave. When do you think they
should leave, and under what conditions?
DR. CORDESMAN: Well, one set of conditions would be very simple: If
you had a moderate leader in Iraq, who concentrated on economic
development and the needs of his people, rather than megalomania and
ambitions to have dominance over states like Iran and Kuwait, that
would be a very good reason for the United States to go back over the
horizon.
Another condition is if relations improve with Iran to the point,
where what you have is not simply diplomatic relations but a security
structure which people on the street aren't looking at, which is,
Where are those Iranian missiles aimed, how many will there be, and
how many biological and nuclear warheads will they have with or
without Mr. Khatemi? And how many new anti-ship missiles are going to
be in the straits not that far from the United Arab Emirates? Because
ultimately for the United States to leave the Gulf you have to have a
balance of security in the region, and one which not only deals with
conventional military forces but weapons of mass destruction.
Now, let me just note that the United States has already very sharply
reduced its presence in the Gulf, and it's working with many of the
states in the southern Gulf to minimize that presence and move as far
back over the horizon as it can. It's all very well to talk about the
problem of having the U.S. there. I think the difficulty is what
happens when we leave. Well, we saw that during the Iran-Iraq War, we
saw it after the Iran-Iraq War when Iraq invaded Kuwait. And I do not
see as yet that there have been fundamental changes of character in
the northern Gulf.
MS. ABDELWAHAB: We have now a call from Chad. Chad, go ahead with your
question please.
Q: Mr. Cordesman, my question has three parts. The first one: Does
Iraq have actually military capabilities that threaten the Gulf area
after all the series of inspections, as we know that the inspection
process has been going on for over seven years now?
And the second part of the question: When is the United Nations going
to lift the sanctions on Iraq, in the light that Iraq claims to have
faced up with all the requirements of the Security Council?
And my third question is: The food-for-oil program, in order to lift
the sufferings on the Iraqi people -- would you please elaborate?
DR. CORDESMAN: Well, I think the problem with the three-part question
is very difficult. First, I think it's very clear Iraq continues to
proliferate -- not at a massive level, but by importing these
illegally, by going on with biological and chemical missile programs.
And we are never going to have an easy stopping point. There will just
be a point at which we can't find everything that's left.
In terms of what's happened with oil for food, I think we have a
different case. At this point in time, Iraq can export all of the oil
it can produce, and can recover its oil production facilities. But
consider the history in real-world terms of Saddam Hussein. About half
of the country's oil exports had gone for arms and weapons throughout
his entire career -- not simply since the Gulf War. Without that
program, where do you think the money will really be spent? On the
hardship of the Iraqi people? And, if so, who? The Sunnis? Because it
won't be equal for the Shiites? And it certainly isn't going to go to
the Kurds. Consider the regime, consider the man, and consider the
future.
MS. ABDELWAHAB: We go now to Jordanian TV for more questions for Mr.
Cordesman. Jordanian TV, go ahead with your questions please.
Jordanian TV are you there? Are you on the line, TV in Jordan? I think
we have a call now coming, and we'll go back to Jordan. Mr. Ahmed?
Q: I would like to thank you for this highly informative edition of
your program, covering all the issues of significance to Arabs and the
Middle East. And my question is: Why does the United States settle its
political problems with other countries not in the same way that they
see them in the figures of Saddam Hussein or Osama bin Laden? Wouldn't
it be more appropriate for the United States to deal with Saddam
Hussein and Osama bin Laden as persons and not to slaughter innocent
persons? Or the United States would like just to go and obliterate
Muslims simply for the fact that they are Muslims?
DR. CORDESMAN: Well, let's consider where the targets were. If you are
arguing that innocent people were killed in Afghanistan, perhaps you
can name one, because it's quite clear that these were terrorist
camps. They've been identified as terrorist camps not simply by the
United States, but by countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and other
states in the Arab world.
When we look at what happened in the Sudan, all of Sudan's neighbors
have accused it as supporting terrorism -- and not of being Islamic,
but in severing the ambitions of it own regime. And when we look at
the specifics of the Sudan, there weren't innocent people being
slaughtered there.
On the other hand, when you look at what happened in Kenya and
Tanzania, you had several hundred people who absolutely had nothing to
do with the United States murdered. You had several thousand people
wounded. Most of those people, or at least many of them, were
certainly Moslem. Because having just come from those countries, let
me say that I spent several weeks traveling with people who are
Islamic.
Now, these are the realities of this. And when you talk about dealing
with peoples, let me note that we have tried, I think consistently
since 1991, to get Iraq to adopt the oil-for-food program. For five
years Saddam built palaces, imported arms, cheated and lied in terms
of weapons of mass destruction. Remember, in 1996, we still were
finding millions of dollars worth of biological weapons that Saddam
had denied existed.
So be very careful about the historical record here.
MS. ABDELWAHAB: We will try again with Jordanian TV. Are you on the
line, TV in Jordan? Go ahead with your question please.
Q: Jordan TV. Dr. Cordesman, this is Ramzi Khouri (sp), political
editor of the Jordan Times. What remains about Iraq is that Iraq is a
nation of 25 million people. These people are the people who are
mostly hard hit by the sanctions imposed on Iraq. And you have -- in
your statements today have talked about the fact that these people are
being hurt by Saddam Hussein. There are certain nations in the Middle
East, Dr. Cordesman, that -- who do not get to choose their
government. And yet these people have not chosen the United States as
the party to choose a government for them. During the Cold War we saw
the United States support many Islamist movements in the region in the
fight against Communism, the big evil, the Communist regime, the
Soviet Union. And now we see the United States fighting the same
parties that they had supported at the time.
My question here is that is there a double standard in U.S. policy
concerning political parties, about Islamists, between the time of the
Cold War and now? And what about the Iraqi people if we don't get rid
of Saddam Hussein?
DR. CORDESMAN: Let's take those questions separately. First, I think
it is very dangerous to assume that Islamic movements represent bin
Laden, or the Islamic jihad in Egypt, or the GIA in Algeria. We never
supported movements like this during the Cold War. I don't know of any
Islamic government that ever supported movements like this during the
Cold War. Trying to liberate Afghanistan from a Soviet occupation did
not mean that the United States supported the rise of the Taliban,
which did not even exist as an organized movement until the Russians
had left. These are not Islamic -- these are people who use Islam to
defend violence, extremism and mass murder. And I think I can honestly
say our standard has always been to oppose that.
Now, within Iraq, remember when it came down to what we did in the
Gulf War, we didn't try to change the government, and indeed I have
heard constant criticism from within the Gulf that we should have gone
on and removed Saddam, in spite of the U.N. resolutions and others.
So just keep in mind the only reason we deal with Iraq today is Iraq
invaded Kuwait, and then proceeded to lie about the U.N. sanctions and
about UNSCOM for more than half a decade. This could have been over
five to six years ago if Saddam had just simply chosen to comply with
what he promised in terms of the cease-fire. We didn't set that double
standard; Saddam Hussein did.
Q: (Inaudible) -- at this time is that Saddam Hussein is going to be
building long-range missiles and going back to his chemical weapons
program. And the problem I have with this is what does that mean? The
sanctions have to continue forever in order to ensure that Saddam
Hussein does not do that? Or do we have to wait until a change of
regime occurs in Iraq?
DR. CORDESMAN: Definitely what it may well mean, given world opinion,
is that the sanctions lift. But when the sanctions lift, what you are
going to have is an Iraq which reemerges as a very major threat to its
neighbors, which will go back to much of its old policies. And, yes,
in the long run you are going to have to wait until Saddam is gone,
and people like him are gone, because remember where a third of the
Iraqi army is currently located is on the border of the Kurdish areas
of Iraq, with the ability to move toward Iran within 48 hours. And
throughout all of this period, for all the hardships of the Iraqi
people, Saddam has been fighting a civil war against the Shiites in
the south, much of it concentrated in the marsh area. He is not going
to change.
MS. ABDELWAHAB: Dr. Cordesman, a last question for you. You as an
expert in the security status in the Middle East, what should the
United States do in order to secure and safeguard the security in the
Gulf area, particularly the safety of U.S. embassies overseas?
DR. CORDESMAN: Well, I think the strongest thing that can be done in
the Gulf area is not something that affects American embassies, but it
is to try to strengthen the emergence of a moderate regime in Iran, to
strengthen the southern Gulf states in creating their own self-defense
and security capabilities. Now, in that process we can certainly
improve the security of our embassies, reduce the number of Americans
in the region, and move them out of populated areas. But what we need
is a security structure where eventually the Gulf can handle its own
security. And that means we need a stronger southern Gulf and a
moderate Iran, and hopefully someday a moderate Iraq.
MS. ABDELWAHAB: Viewers and listeners, we have only a few minutes
left, in which I would like to thank our guest here, Dr. Cordesman,
for having participated in our dialogue. Thank you, Dr. Cordesman.
We also thank everyone who called in today. This is Noha Abdelwahab
thanking you all and signing off.
(End transcript)