UNSCOM
UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMISSION
26 August 1998
Richard Butler
Executive Chairman
United Nations Special Commission
New York, New York
Dear Mr. Butler,
Since September 1991 I have dedicated my professional life to the
furtherance of the mandate of the Special Commission as set forth in
relevant Security Council resolutions. I believed in what the Special
Commission stood for, and made many sacrifices, both personal and
professional, required to perform my duties. In this I was no different
from hundreds of my colleagues, who likewise dedicated themselves to
carrying out a difficult but worthwhile task.
The Special Commission was created for the purpose of disarming
Iraq. As part of the Special Commission team, I have worked to achieve
a simple end: the removal, destruction or rendering harmless of Iraq's
proscribed weapons. The sad truth is that Iraq today is not disarmed
anywhere near the level required by Security Council resolutions.
As you know, UNSCOM has good reason to believe that there are significant
numbers of proscribed weapons and related components and the means to
manufacture such weapons unaccounted for in Iraq today.
Unfortunately, the recent decisions by the Security Council to
downplay the significance of the recent Iraqi decision to cease
cooperation with Commission inspectors clearly indicates that the
organization which created the Special Commission in its resolution 687
(1991) is no longer willing and/or capable of
the implementation of its own law, in this case an enforceable
resolution passed under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. This
abrogation of its most basic of responsibilities has made the Security
Council a witting partner to an overall Iraqi strategy of weakening the
Special Commission. The Secretary General and his Special
Representative have allowed the grand office of the Secretary General to
become a sounding board for Iraqi grievances, real or imagined. In
fact, the Secretary General himself has proposed a "comprehensive
review" of the UNSCOM-Iraqi relationship, an action that would result in
having the investigators becoming the investigated, all at the behest of
Iraq. Such an action, in addition to being a farce, would create a
clear distraction from the critical disarmament issues related to Iraq
and its compliance with Security Council resolutions.
Iraq has lied to the Special Commission and the world since day one
concerning the true scope and nature of its proscribed programs and
weapons systems. This lie has been perpetuated over the years through
systematic acts of concealment. It was for the purpose of uncovering
Iraq's mechanism of concealment, and in doing so gaining access to the
hidden weapons, components and weapons programs, that you created a
dedicated capability to investigate Iraq's concealment activities, which
I have had the privilege to head. During the period of time that this
effort has been underway, the Commission has uncovered indisputable
proof of a systematic concealment mechanism, run by the Presidency of
Iraq and protected by the Presidential security forces. This
investigation has led the Commission to the door step of Iraq's hidden
retained capability, and yet the Commission has been frustrated by
Iraq's continued refusal to abide by its obligations under Security
Council resolutions and the Memorandum of Understanding of 23 February
1998 to allow inspections, the Security Council's refusal to effectively
respond to Iraq's actions, and now the current decision by the Security
Council and the Secretary General, backed at least implicitly by the
United States, to seek a "diplomatic" alternative to inspection-driven
confrontation with Iraq, a decision which constitutes a surrender to the
Iraqi leadership that has succeeded in thwarting the stated will of the
United Nations.
Inspections do work - too well, in fact, prompting Iraq to shut them
down all together. Almost without exception, every one of the
impressive gains made by UNSCOM over the years in disarming Iraq can be
traced to the effectiveness of the inspection regime implemented by the
Special Commission. The issue of immediate, unrestricted access is, in
my opinion, the cornerstone of any viable inspection regime, and as such
is an issue worth fighting for. Unfortunately, others do not share this
opinion, including the Security Council and the United States. The
Special Commission of today, hobbled as it is by unfettered Iraqi
obstruction and non-existent Security Council enforcement of its own
resolutions, is not the organization I joined almost seven years ago. I
am, and will always be, fully supportive of the difficult mission that
you, the Executive Chairman, and my colleagues at the Special Commission
are tasked to accomplish. The refusal and/or inability on the part of
the Security Council to exercise responsibility concerning the
disarmament obligations of Iraq makes a mockery of the mission the staff
of the Special Commission have been charged with implementing.
The illusion of arms control is more dangerous than no arms control at
all. What is being propagated by the Security Council today in relation
to the work of the Special Commission is such an illusion, one which in
all good faith I cannot, and will not, be a party to. I have no other
option than to resign from my position here at the Commission effective
immediately.
I want you to be assured that I hold both you and the staff of the
Special Commission in the highest regard. I am aware of the immensely
difficult task you have been charged with implementing. I only wish the
world truly understood the heroic efforts you have undertaken, and the
impossible conditions which you have been compelled to operate. I wish
you and the staff the best in whatever the future holds.
Sincerely,
William S. Ritter, Jr.
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