Developments
Iraq News, AUGUST 21, 1998
By Laurie MylroieThe central focus of Iraq News is the tension between the considerable, proscribed WMD capabilities that Iraq is holding on to and its increasing stridency that it has complied with UNSCR 687 and it is time to lift sanctions. If you wish to receive Iraq News by email, a service which includes full-text of news reports not archived here, send your request to Laurie Mylroie .
I. AZIZ REITERATES REFUSAL TO ALLOW UNSCOM INSPECTIONS, INA AUG 21
II. UNSC EASILY RENEWS SANCTIONS, NYT AUG 21
III. HELLE BERING, CLINTON'S WEAKNESS ON IRAQ, WASH TIMES, AUG 20
This is the 16th day without weapons inspections in Iraq.
Yesterday, Tariq Aziz reiterated Iraq's refusal to allow weapons
inspections, "The Iraqi leadership's decision on 5 August 1998 . . . is
firm and will not change until the Security Council looks into Iraq's
legitimate demands as defined in the 5 August 1998 statement both
seriously and fairly away from US pressure and blackmail, and begins to
lift the embargo by implementing Paragraph 22 of Resolution 687 without
any restrictions or additional conditions."
Thus, yesterday's UNSC sanctions review, was a cakewalk for the US,
as the NYT reported today. As Bill Richardson said, "sanctions may stay
on in perpetuity."
Paul Lewis has taken over the NYT's UN reporting from Barbara
Crosette [?on vacation?] and Lewis looks to have been hibernating for
some time. The NYT reported, "Such remarks [as Richardson's] are fueling
speculation among diplomats here that with many of Iraq's most dangerous
weapons eliminated and the administration clearly reluctant to seek a
new military confrontation, the focus of US policy might be shifting.
Instead of concentrating on further disarming President Saddam Hussein,
the United States may not be more interested in insuring that he remains
a powerless pariah in Middle East affairs."
But Saddam is not a "powerless pariah," given the unconventional
capabilities he retains and refuses to turn over to UNSCOM. Yesterday,
Helle Bering criticized the administration's attempt to shift to a
"deterrence" policy, "If Saddam Hussein provokes a confrontation over
weapons inspections with the United States, we will deny him the
gratification of a fight. . . . Incredibly, non-confrontation was
actually the essence of Secretary Albright's remarks on Friday in
response to Saddam Hussein's decision to declare unilaterally an end to
UNSCOM weapons inspections. . . . 'We're not going to play Saddam's game
on his terms. He wants to create a US-Iraq confrontation,' said Mrs.
Albright . . . 'If necessary, we will use force, on our timetable, in
response to threats, at a time and place of our choosing.' Though the
administration likes to pretend otherwise, our Iraq policy has taken a
180 degree turn--and certainly for the worse."
Bering described how the Republican Congressional leadership--two
months ago--had learned that the administration was blocking UNSCOM
inspections. On Jun 22, Newt Gingrich, Trent Lott, Jesse Helms and Ben
Gilman wrote Clinton, "We have heard that the United States has
acquiesced in the suspension of challenge inspections by UNSCOM designed
to uncover evidence of Iraqi concealment." "Clinton replied on July 8,
'You can be certain UNSCOM will have my full support'--a statement whose
hollowness after the Albright interventions, now speaks for itself."
I. AZIZ REITERATES REFUSAL TO ALLOW UNSCOM INSPECTIONS
Baghdad INA in Arabic 0918 GMT 20 Aug 98
[FBIS Translated Text] Baghdad, 20 Aug (INA)
Commenting on Richard Butler's letter to Deputy Prime Minister Tariq
Aziz on 19 August 1998 calling for the resumption of all the activities
of the UN Special Commission [UNSCOM] in Iraq, Tariq 'Aziz said that
Iraq has cooperated with UNSCOM for more than seven years, and Butler
was in Baghdad on 3 August to follow up on the program we agreed on in
June. We became categorically certain during the recent meeting that
Butler intentionally maneuvers, procrastinates, and mixes between the
basic issues that have to do with disarmament requirements, and
secondary and fabricated issues. The purpose of all this is clear.
Butler does not want to tell the UN Security Council and the world that
UNSCOM has completed its task in the field of disarmament
Tariq 'Aziz added that Butler refused to answer three questions he
has put to him: Whether Iraq is free from any banned weapons, and
whether UNSCOM possesses tangible evidence to the contrary to offer to
us and to the UN Security Council. Butler also refused to admit that
UNSCOM has not been able to register any serious violation by Iraq of
its commitments through the monitoring system that has been in place
since 1994. Butler also refused to admit that after UNSCOM destroyed
thousands of factories, equipment, and machinery and under the strict
comprehensive monitoring system, Iraq cannot produce weapons that are
banned under resolution 687.
The deputy prime minister said: Butler's decline to answer these
questions reveals the fact that he does not want to deal with his
mission fairly and responsibly. It is no longer a secret that Butler and
some elements dominating UNSCOM are not international employees; they
are serving America's policy to maintain the embargo and are carrying
out its orders. This has recently been disclosed by the Americans
themselves; their statements proved that they are the ones who draw up
UNSCOM's agenda.
On the attitude toward Butler, Tariq Aziz said: Therefore, we do not
trust Butler or the elements dominating UNSCOM, and we do not think
there is any use in resuming work with them.
He added: The Iraqi leadership's decision on 5 August 1998 came after
seven years of a bitter and futile experience with UNSCOM. Therefore,
this decision is firm and will not change until the Security Council
looks into Iraq 's legitimate demands as defined in the 5 August 1998
statement both seriously and fairly away from US pressure and blackmail,
and begins to lift the embargo by implementing Paragraph 22 of
Resolution 687 without any restrictions or additional conditions.
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