U.S. Department of State

Daily Press Briefing

MR. FOLEY: Good afternoon, later than usual; I apologize. Welcome to the State Department. I have no announcements to announce; but I do have an announcement that we'll post after the briefing concerning the expulsions of Eritreans from Ethiopia by which the US Government is expressing concern.

With that, George, I'll go to your questions.

QUESTION: The White House is saying that the announcement yesterday by the Iraqis is totally unacceptable; but Mr. Butler says he doesn't see a crisis situation developing. I suppose those two statements aren't mutually exclusive, but could you shed some light --

MR. FOLEY: Are not, did you say?

QUESTION: Are not mutually exclusive. Could you shed some light on what the thinking is here?

MR. FOLEY: We're not calling it a crisis at the moment simply because the events have just happened in the last 24 hours, and we're certainly going to need time to digest the latest events and to analyze them. In particular, we want to see the results of Chairman Butler's report to the Security Council today; we want to consult with other members of the Security Council to determine how the international community is going to respond.

I think one cardinal point, though, to keep in mind is that if you read the statements coming out of Baghdad yesterday, there is an obvious effort - and it's not the first time - on the part of the Iraqis to characterize this as a confrontation between Iraq and the United States; and we categorically reject that characterization. The fact of the matter is that the confrontation, if there is one, is between Iraq and the UN. Iraq is subject to Security Council resolutions; Iraq signed a Memorandum of Understanding earlier this year with the Secretary General of the United Nations; Iraq is apparently reneging on its commitments to the Secretary General. So it is decidedly an issue, in the first instance, between Iraq and the United Nations.

But just to review where we are today - and I would caution you that we won't be making definitive characterizations today in advance of completion of the Security Council meeting with Ambassador Butler. But what I can say is that clearly, the Iraqi action does violate the February 23 Memorandum of Understanding signed by Secretary General Annan and Iraq. It also violates Security Council resolutions, including 687 and 1154.

Clearly the Iraqi goal is to force the international community to abandon the sanctions regime created in 1990. The Iraqi leadership wants to regain control of Iraq's economy without disarming. As we've always said, they want to have their cake and eat it too - to retain their weapons of mass destruction programs and escape from UN sanctions. They can't have it both ways. That's been the case since the end of the Gulf War and that's not going to change. The aim of the international community is to face the Iraqi leadership with that stark choice: the need, if they want to see sanctions lifted, to definitively abandon their programs of weapons of mass destruction and that is not going to change.

We will not allow Iraq to succeed in breaking the sanctions. We will oppose any change in the sanctions regime until Iraq fully complies. We are confident that we will have the international support necessary to achieve this aim.

QUESTION: Does the United States believe that this is just Iraqi behavior as usual and Iraq's trying to call the UN's bluff and the international community's bluff again and playing a game of chicken, if you will?

MR. FOLEY: Certainly, it's part of a pattern. We've seen this time and again. I think the conclusion is inescapable -- we've certainly reached that conclusion on previous occasions - that Saddam Hussein does not want to give up his programs of weapons of mass destruction; for various reasons, these programs are dear to him. At the same time, he abhors the sanctions regime. The sanctions regime has succeeded in keeping him in his box, keeping him from threatening his neighbors, keeping him from overcoming the isolation that his invasion of Kuwait brought upon him in his regime.

So certainly from time to time, he does try to challenge the inspection regime and try to provoke crises with the hope that the support for the sanctions regime will diminish or that the sanctions regime will be overcome. But again, he does this from time to time, having failed in the interim, to come clean on his weapons of mass destruction. I think it is always a risky business to try to put yourself in Saddam Hussein's head to try to analyze whether this is someone operating on a rational basis. Certainly his aims are clear-cut: he wants to get out from under sanctions. But why he chooses a particular moment to do what he has done on previous occasions is difficult to gauge.

I think we can expect erratic behavior, unpredictable behavior on his part; but what we ought to expect from the international community -- what I can assure you you can count on from the United States - is steadiness of purpose. We are going to ensure that the sanctions regime remains in place and that the status quo does not change, absent real compliance on the part of Iraq.

I think it's only speculative at this point, but clearly, Secretary General Annan's agreement -- the Memorandum of Understanding reached with Iraq back in February - put Iraq on the spot. If you'll recall, the United States applauded the Secretary General's efforts, supported the Memorandum of Understanding because it called for compliance on Iraq's part with UN Security Council resolutions. But we also made the additional point that we felt that the Memorandum of Understanding needed to be tested to test Iraq's bona fides, its willingness to comply.

Chairman Butler of UNSCOM actually put Iraq to an honest test by offering an accelerated work program plan of action by which Iraq would have the opportunity to answer the remaining questions; to allow UNSCOM to verify the elimination of its weapons of mass destruction; and, therefore, enable and accelerate consideration of the lifting of sanctions.

I think, again, it's speculative at this point, but the fact is that they were put to the test, and that's a test that Iraq is clearly unwilling to meet and to pass; and having been placed in that position perhaps explains why yet again, as you say, not for the first time Saddam is trying to provoke a crisis.

QUESTION: Jim, just real quickly, does it seem to you - to the US - that he's more obstinate this time around than he has been, let's say, in February?

MR. FOLEY: It's too early to say.

QUESTION: What could he gain? Is he trying to gain time to hide the evidence, say of his warheads and his - the gases that have been analyzed in those warheads or what?

MR. FOLEY: Again, it's only speculation at this point. It would seem, on the basis of this having happened many times before, that his aim is to escape from sanctions. He's sick and tired of the isolation; he's sick and tired of the inability of the Iraqi regime to rebuild its power potential - its power projection potential; he wants to flex his muscles and re-enter the international stage. That seems to be what's behind this, as also behind previous occasions of recalcitrance.

QUESTION: Is there any direct link between the oil-for-food deal and his living up to the MOU?

MR. FOLEY: I'm not sure I understand the question.

QUESTION: Well, in other words, if he does scrap the Memorandum of Understanding, is it still possible that the oil-for-food operation could continue separately?

MR. FOLEY: I'd want to check before giving you a definitive answer; I'll give you what my understanding is, which is that that program will continue, because we always maintained that the oil-for-food program was a separate issue from the inspections regime, from the overall sanctions regime. We regarded the humanitarian plight and needs of the Iraqi people as an imperative that we needed to respond to, and that the Iraqi people indeed should not be punished for Saddam Hussein's misbehavior and worse on the international scene. So my understanding is that the oil-for-food program will continue.

Of course it's a carefully monitored program; it's a program that ensures that while on the one hand, humanitarian assistance, food and medicine is able to go to especially Iraqis in need - pregnant women, children, the elderly and across the board - at the same time that those moneys are carefully monitored by the United Nations to ensure that there is not diversion to Saddam Hussein's weapons programs or other unjustified ends.

QUESTION: You've said that we're not in a crisis yet. Before Mr. Annan's visit to Baghdad in February, the aircraft carriers were on station in the Gulf all prepared to act. Will you draw a comparison between now and then; what are the differences now?

MR. FOLEY: I think the difference now is simply that we're only 24 hours into the situation created by the Iraqi announcement. As I said, our focus now is on the United Nations, is on the Security Council and what we, together with our friends on the Security Council, decide to do in response. It's too early to say what those responses might be.

But we're not calling it a crisis because, frankly, we don't want to play into Saddam Hussein's hands. Clearly, he's in a box; he's trying to squirm his way out; he's trying to provoke a crisis, provoke some kind of a response that he thinks would allow him to create diversions and perhaps lessen support for the sanctions, which is, again, his aim - namely, to get the sanctions removed.

We're certainly not going to play into his hands. We're going to ensure that we have the capability - and we do have the capability, a robust one - in the Gulf, which is superior to the force levels and capabilities we had there before the last crisis, last fall. We're going to ensure we have what we need to meet any contingency if we deem there to be a threat to our interests or a threat to Iraq's neighbors. So we certainly don't rule out any options. But we're going to take this cautiously. We're going to act in a way and in a pace that's in conformity with our interests; and we're not going to allow Saddam Hussein to call the shots or to dictate our moves.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) - what you were saying there about the forces that we have on hand. Are you saying that the forces that the United States has on hand in the Gulf are equivalent to what were there in February or whenever that was?

MR. FOLEY: No, I didn't say that. I said they were superior to what was there before the crisis - the last crisis occurred, beginning in October. We had a subsequent build-up, and there have been force adjustments. But my understanding is that the residual force in the region is indeed more powerful than that which we had prior to last October and November. We certainly have an extra strike capacity. I refer you, though, to the Pentagon for the actual details.

QUESTION: I will ask them, but do you know if it includes a carrier task force?

MR. FOLEY: Yes, it does.

QUESTION: Jim, you talked about steadiness of purpose and you don't want to call this a crisis; but in the past, the US has essentially been forced to play into his hand by responding on more than one occasion - not just last winter. How do you refrain from doing that without --

MR. FOLEY: Well, you've seen, certainly, that in various and previous crises, we've had to build up our forces in the Gulf. What we have done is to ensure, following the last crisis - diffused by Kofi Annan's agreement in Baghdad - we've ensured that we maintained, while coming down from those high levels, that we've maintained a capability, as I said, superior to what was there in firepower prior to last fall. So we maintain the range of options that we can turn to if necessary on short notice.

QUESTION: Notwithstanding that answer and notwithstanding your finely worded statement that you're not letting him call the shots, it still is a reactive policy, is it not? I mean, the amount of force you have in the region now is not greater than what you had after the build-up; it perhaps is greater than what it was before the build-up, but --

MR. FOLEY: I think, Charlie, that the key element is the strike capability that we have there. I'd have to refer you to the Pentagon for the specifics, but the President has assured that we have a real-time capability to respond to any contingencies that could occur in real time. We certainly have reinforcement capabilities as well. But the point about reactive, I would argue the contrary. I think that our policy, dating back to the end of the Gulf War, spanning two Administrations has been steady. The key element is the sanctions regime and the willingness of the international community to back up the sanctions regime. That's what's put Saddam in isolation; what's kept him in a box; and which has not varied. He has reacted - and I say that he's been the reactive one from time to time - to try to escape this. He has never succeeded in escaping the containment that we've successfully maintained; and that is not going to change in the current circumstances either.

Other questions on this issue?

QUESTION: You said that the US is confident of the support of its allies. What do you think of the Russian comments putting part of the blame on Richard Butler for this crisis?

MR. FOLEY: We have full confidence in Chairman Butler and the UNSCOM staff. They have proven themselves to be professional, objective and dispassionate disarmament experts. We have full confidence in both Chairman Butler and his UNSCOM team.

We think that, indeed, Chairman Butler has gone the extra mile to lay out a work plan and the possibility -- and he's been explicit on this - a road map that could lead Iraq to the lifting of sanctions if they made that existential decision to give up their weapons of mass destruction programs. We've not seen any indication on the Security Council of any nation questioning the need for Saddam Hussein to give up his weapons of mass destruction before there is a consideration of the lifting of sanctions.

QUESTION: One more. What is the likelihood now, considering this confrontation, of a lifting of the sanctions the next time they come up for review in October?

MR. FOLEY: Well, it's obvious that if Saddam Hussein is arresting cooperation with UNSCOM or in some ways trying to subvert the UNSCOM regime or stopping inspections -- we understand that there is some willingness to allow ongoing monitoring, but that is obviously willfully insufficient - but if he's arresting the continuation of the inspection regime, then he has succeeded, in one sense, in delaying the possibility that sanctions relief will be considered. And that is not the first time that he has acted contrary to his stated interests.

But again, I think this is understandable if you go back to the premise with which I began my response, which is that he wants sanctions relief, but he wants to keep his weapons of mass destruction programs. Until he has solved that conundrum, he will only find the prospect of sanctions relief moving further into the distant future.

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(The briefing concluded at 2:10 P.M.)

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