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U.S. Department of State

Daily Press Briefing

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QUESTION: The breakdown in talks between the UN folks - Butler's group - and Iraq sounds ominous. What is the size-up here; and specifically, do you think sanctions could be maintained among your not-always-constant allies?

MR. RUBIN: First of all, let me say that the decision by Iraq to break off talks is disturbing. Let's bear in mind that Chairman Butler traveled to Baghdad to follow up on an accelerated work plan he agreed on with the Iraqis two months ago, which in turn followed a series of technical meetings held over the last eight months.

To quote Butler in a comment today from Bahrain, "If we did that work program for the next four or five weeks and experienced full Iraqi cooperation, I (Butler) could have been in a position to report to the Security Council the end or very near the end of the missile and chemical weapons files."

In short, it is inexplicable for Iraq to break off talks that were specifically designed to accelerate the lifting of sanctions. Iraq is only harming itself and its people since this action only puts off the day when UNSCOM would be in a position to verify that Iraq had finally complied with the requirements of the Security Council resolutions.

Iraq's responsibility remains what the Security Council has made clear it must do - that is, fully disclose its weapons programs and cooperate fully with UNSCOM. If it were to do so, rather than breaking off talks with the person delegated by the international community the responsibility to get to the bottom of this, then they would be in a position to move quickly towards compliance with this requirement of the Security Council. So Iraq has only harmed itself; its actions are inexplicable; and we are continuing to demand Iraqi compliance.

With respect to the sanctions issue, I do not believe this can do anything but harm Iraq's standing in the Council with respect to sanctions relief. Even those who had a more forward-leaning position in terms of looking at an earlier hoped-for date for lifting the sanctions will only be undercut in their efforts by Iraq's refusal to even deal with the work plan that they wanted, that Ambassador Butler put together; and so they have set themselves back again.

QUESTION: Iraq has kind of zig-zagged in the past - it sounds like the US hasn't totally given up hope that there will be cooperation with Butler?

MR. RUBIN: The cooperation between UNSCOM and Iraq has ebbed and flowed over the years. They tend to cooperate more when it's apparent that UNSCOM has discovered something that they need to acknowledge or finally admit. We'll have to see; it's hard to know. This drama has been played out many, many times before. There have been many scenes and acts in this play, but the bottom line is that the Iraqi people are suffering for the failure of its government to do what the international community has demanded.

QUESTION: Would you care to resurrect the threats of grave consequences that you all used frequently during the last crisis if they do not resume - if they don't --

MR. RUBIN: At this point, what we want to do is wait for Chairman Butler's report on the precise details of what happened in his discussions and the state of play. And I'm not going to speculate on what would happen after that.

QUESTION: Are there any signs of any obstruction on the ground as far as the inspection work that is continuing is concerned?

MR. RUBIN: This would be a question that Ambassador Butler would answer in New York to the entire Security Council and then we'd be able to talk more about it. But let me say there has been work that has continued since the crisis in the winter. There's been access for the inspectors; they've been able to do their work. That's what we want to see happen because it's only by conducting the inspections, verifying the weaponry that has been there or has been destroyed that we can get to the bottom and answer the question of how much chemical, biological and ballistic missile weaponry and technology Iraq had; how much has been destroyed; and then finally eliminate what is remaining.

QUESTION: Will the United States be urging Kofi Annan to return to the region to help defuse the situation?

MR. RUBIN: I think that's a few steps down the road at this point. We need to see what Chairman Butler reports, what he thinks is necessary; and we'll have to see.

QUESTION: To pick up on your word "inexplicable" in terms of the Iraqi people and the Iraqi Government - has it occurred to you that their interests may not be identical -- that Saddam Hussein derives a certain political benefit from a crisis atmosphere and the image of the outside world starving Iraqi children?

MR. RUBIN: First of all, with respect to the humanitarian efforts, I think I could provide you after the briefing some rather dramatic information about what's gone on in Iraq over the last several years and the extent to which the oil-for-food program has provided the Iraqi people with significant standards in terms of caloric intake and medical supplies and basic foodstuffs. So the Iraqi people are getting their assistance because of the international community. We have no illusion that Saddam Hussein cares about his people. I'm simply pointing out that even by his stated objective, which is to lift sanctions -- if you look at the statements from Tariq Aziz and Saddam Hussein over recent weeks they start from the premise of getting sanctions lifted and demanding that sanctions be lifted.

If one takes that goal at face value, all that they've done by denying Butler the ability to complete his work and follow through on the work plan is shoot their own goal in the foot.

QUESTION: Well, that's the stated purpose. May they not have an ulterior motive, which is to derive this political benefit from this crisis atmosphere?

MR. RUBIN: You are welcome to speculate on the motivations of Saddam Hussein; it's not a growth industry, in my opinion. People have been speculating on it back and forth. It's rather fashionable to somehow declare that when the international community gets him to back down that somehow it's good for him. It's impossible for those of us who measure success and benefits in the normal way to come to that conclusion. But you're welcome to such speculation.

QUESTION: You referenced to - well, rather than shooting himself in the foot and maybe he's hurt his cause with other governments. Has the US been in serious contact lately with these other governments? He has protectors on the Council - sympathizers.

MR. RUBIN: We're in regular touch with the key countries that are on the Security Council. I expect the next round of serious consultations to occur on Thursday, when Ambassador Butler - prior to, during and after Ambassador Butler's report.

QUESTION: Jamie, if I can ask you -- you seem unwilling to say, though I'll ask you whether the United States is concerned that a new Iraqi crisis seems to be brewing.

MR. RUBIN: The question being --

QUESTION: Does the United States see a new Iraqi crisis brewing - question mark?

MR. RUBIN: Ah, question mark. I'll tell you a joke about that afterwards - about questions without question marks.

Look, it's impossible to predict. Saddam Hussein and his henchmen for many, many years have been creating artificial crises, artificial situations that then are turned off in a matter of days. If the desire was to gain support for the lifting of sanctions, all I'm saying is that that failed, because it's our judgment that people will see this for what it is - which is a demand by Iraq to immediately declare them in full compliance, when all the evidence over the recent weeks has been in the opposite direction, whether it was the VX gas or other pieces of evidence that UNSCOM has been collecting that demonstrate there still is considerable work to be done to uncover what they had, what they've destroyed and what they might have left.

Is it going to escalate; is it going to develop in that direction? It's impossible to predict at this point. All I can say is that we have a lot of experience dealing with Saddam Hussein. We've very successfully contained his efforts over the last six years, whether that's been through the no-fly zones or the determination to get the inspectors to be able to do their work. We will continue to follow a policy that has kept him contained and kept the pressure on him to finally come clean in this area, in the absence of which sanctions cannot be lifted.

QUESTION: Can I just follow up and ask you, is it still the case that there is one American aircraft carrier in the Gulf; and do you have an update on the sort of status of American forces there?

MR. RUBIN: I don't have a --it's a good question; I will try to get one of my Pentagon colleagues to brief you on that. I don't know the exact order of battle in the Gulf at this time.

QUESTION: One more on Iraq -- how goes the effort to build up the Iraqi opposition forces - political opposition?

MR. RUBIN: We are putting that plan together; it's been briefed to Congress. I can try to get you some more information about it. It's a long term effort to try to bring greater coordination and skills to those who can present an alternative for the people of Iraq to the leadership that has done so much damage to the country of Iraq.

QUESTION: And are you inviting the Kurdish faction leaders to come?

MR. RUBIN: I believe that we are expecting talks along those lines this fall.

QUESTION: But how far are you along on the Shi'ite leader? When last I pursued this, if the think tank invites him, you wouldn't bar the door to him; but the think tank says it hasn't invited him but if he came, they wouldn't bar the door. Are you going to bring in this highly - I don't know what -- regarded or influential leader of southern Shi'ites who's parked in Iran at the moment as a way of getting under Saddam's skin?

MR. RUBIN: I don't know what our plan is in that regard. I'll try to get you an answer.

QUESTION: Regarding this inexplicable road that Saddam has gone down, there is some thought that he has taken -- maybe -- calculation that Europe is thinking about Kosovo and therefore distracted in that direction and the President is thinking about his domestic problems with Monica and what not. What are your thoughts on that?

MR. RUBIN: I've heard a lot of speculation over many years over what might motivate him to take these actions. All I can say to you is that this government and the governments with which it works closely in Europe has a long history of being ready, willing and able to deal with these situations that Saddam Hussein creates. We are ready, willing and able to deal with them; and I'm not aware that there's been any reduction in the intensity with which we follow this issue and would be prepared to deal with it if it got worse.

QUESTION: There is some, I'm sure, entirely erroneous speculation which says that perhaps the United States isn't really too bothered if Saddam Hussein continues to cooperate on a limited basis -- and thus, delaying the day of which sanctions can be lifted - because it means that you'll have people on the ground in Iraq, he's limited in what he can do and in the developments he can make. That said, is the United States really anxious to see this whole matter deal with? If the Kofi Annan agreement is adhered to and that sort of trundles along at its own pace, isn't quite a nice outcome for the United States?

MR. RUBIN: I've certainly heard that speculation, and never understood where it directly comes from. I know it's the kind of thing that the parlor game includes. But as far as we're concerned, the job here is to identify, locate and destroy the danger; and the danger is the weapons of mass destruction. Our focus is on how to ensure that Saddam Hussein can never again threaten his neighbors or the world with weapons of mass destruction. In order to do that, UNSCOM has to get to the bottom of what he has and get it destroyed; that is our primary objective here.

Sanctions is a policy of containment that is a result of his failure to comply with that and other resolutions. It's a means, not an end.

QUESTION: More on Iran --

MR. RUBIN: Welcome back, Lee; go ahead.

QUESTION: What do you think is in the blueprint that Ambassador Butler has? Is there something in there that you think - in the blueprint - can you explain the blueprint a little more?

MR. RUBIN: I really don't know, other than, as I did, I tried to be as helpful as I could in quoting what Butler said: "If we did that work for the next four or five weeks and experienced full Iraqi cooperation, I (Butler) could have been in a position to report that we were at the end or near the end of the missile and chemical weapons files."

So clearly, a focus of the blueprint was the chemical and missile files and things that needed to be done in a short number of weeks that would permit him to believe that he had verified the absence of such weaponry.

QUESTION: Does the US feel that could happen in the next couple of weeks - that he could have actually verified the absence of chemical and missiles?

MR. RUBIN: Well, we have full confidence and respect for Ambassador Butler's work and the work of the experts. If you go back over the last many years of the to-ing and fro-ing on Iraq, you'll see that we have been fully supportive of the experts' judgment by UNSCOM as to what they have, what they have refused to reveal and what needs to be done to close the gaps. So that is whose judgment we will be happy to accept.

It would be a happy problem to deal with if he fully complied with the resolutions.

.............

(The briefing concluded at 1:45 P.M.)

[end of document]