Aziz-Butler 3 August Talks --Last Part
Baghdad Iraq Television Network 1520 GMT 11 Aug 98 "Rebroadcast of the last part" of official talks between Iraqi team, led by Deputy Prime Minister Tariq 'Aziz, and the UN Special Commission delegation, led by Executive Chairman Richard Butler, held at the Iraqi Foreign Ministry in Baghdad on 3 August.[Butler] Sir, shall we begin?
['Aziz] Yes.
[Butler] At the conclusion of our discussions this morning, I said that there were quite a number of things that were said to which I felt it was necessary to offer a reply. And with your permission, I would propose to do that now. Thank you. Mr. Deputy Prime Minister, at the beginning of your remarks this morning, you said that there were some fundamental points, with which you wished to begin, or general points. Those general points were based on a construction of argument, which had two premises: The first of these was that UNSCOM is obliged to accept the distinction made by Iraq between what Iraq asserts are major and minor issues. The second premise was that for disarmament there are, in fact, only two questions: Do proscribed weapons still exist? Do proscribed production capabilities still exist? In neither case, neither of those premises are in conformity with the law laid down in the resolutions of the Security Council. Now, UNSCOM is an organ of the Security Council and is, therefore, obliged to carry out the law, the resolutions of the Council. Iraq has no right to determine what is major and what is minor, and what is needed to satisfy the Council's requirements. I don't see that anyway in the legislation.
['Aziz] Has no right to?
[Butler] To determine what is major and what is minor and what is needed to satisfy the Council's requirements. The Council determines those issues. The Council repeatedly, as you know, refers to the mandatory character of the resolutions it has adopted and -- to use the Council's words -- that the governing standard of compliance will be Iraq's conformity to those resolutions. That's what I am referring to. Now under the Council's resolutions, Iraq is required to declare all its proscribed weapons and programs, so that the commission can verify those declarations and then supervise the disposal of those weapons and programs. Now, as you've referred to the notion of major and minor, let me just quickly remind you of what the resolutions require in terms of accounting for and disposal of those weapons. [Butler continues] In the chemical and biological weapons fields, the requirements are identical and they are all chemical and all biological weapons, all stocks of chemical weapons and biological agents, all related subsystems, all related components, all research development support and manufacturing facilities. With respect to missiles, all prescribed missiles, all related major parts, all repair facilities, and all production facilities. The point is these requirements are stated very specifically. No references are made to what might be considered to be major or minor. But they are specifically stated requirements. I submit to you therefore that the construction of this argument that there are major and minor requirements is actually a fundamentally flawed one. Now, UNSCOM will continue to implement its mandate as laid down by the council. We readily acknowledge that this can only be done in cooperation with Iraq. But the fact is its work cannot be directed in ways that you have sought to direct it other than by the Security Council. The next major point I would like to make is that based on the fundamental approach made in your general remarks this morning or outlined in your general remarks this morning, you then went on to say, to charge -- I think it is a fair word to use -- that UNSCOM has been dishonest, slow, and has sought deliberately to create confusion. This sadly was coupled with personal attacks by name on the commission's experts and on officers of the commission. It perhaps won't surprise you that I must reject those attacks; they are not factual, they are unworthy. UNSCOM has never pursued a policy intended to harm the Iraqi people or to prolong the embargo. The absolute opposite is the case. If I may, I invite your attention to some relevant facts. From the very beginning in April 1991, Iraq took a fundamental decision to disobey the council law and resolutions for the adoption of a policy of concealment. From 1991 onwards, its declarations have never been either full, or final, or complete. Now, furthermore, Iraq has immensely complicated the entire process of verification through unilateral destruction, which itself conducted in contravention of the clearly stated requirements of the council. In our attempts to put together a complete picture as soon as possible of Iraq's prescribed programs, the commission has frequently requested and very often been denied documents, which we know to exist. These documents are in the position of the Government of Iraq, and were they to be made available to us, they could enormously expedite the work of verification. For example, at this very moment, the commission is not being given a document, which was found during an inspection a week or so ago at the headquarters of the Iraqi Air force And that is contrary to the law. I would in fact be grateful to receive that document or an authentic copy of it tonight. Other documents not provided, which have been requested include the following: The April 1991 directive on what materials and programs were to be declared to the commission and what materials and programs were to be retained. The June-July 1991 directive on what material was to be unilaterally destroyed and what material would be retained, as well as all implementation reports. The August 1995 investigation into the defection of Husayn Kamil and all follow-up reports. As in the case of all other documents requested, none of these is trivial, none of them relate to punctured tires; all would significantly facilitate the commission's verification process. Now, I would like to take a specific example of Iraq's policies and practices. Until 1995, Iraq denied, and you Mr. deputy prime minister have said that this was done under your personal instructions, Iraq denied that it had any offensive biological weapons program and that al-Hakam was not a facility for the production of biological weapons.(more) 111520 ma/o'neill [Butler continues] You asked me this morning why, then, did we decide to destroy al-Hakam. Well, the Commission took a decision to destroy al-Hakam, based on its finding that this facility, in fact, played a crucial role in proscribed biological weapons activities in Iraq. The evidence of the true role and function of al-Hakam was obtained by the Commission against repeated -- and may I say, I think, sometimes, emotional -- denials by Iraq that al-Hakam was involved in any biological weapons activities. These denials were maintained from the time of the very first inspection of al-Hakam in August 1991 until the summer of 1995. Even before August 1995, the Commission came to the conclusion that Iraq, in fact, had an offensive biological weapons program and reported this to the Security Council in April 1995. The Commission came to its assessment of al-Hakam and the conclusion on its role after conducting intensive verification work. This work included development of material balances of components, including growth media; technical analysis and evaluation of equipment acquired by Iraq; consultations with international experts, knowledgeable of weapons production; site inspections in Iraq; and interviews with Iraqi personnel. Employment of these inspection and verification tools proved to be valuable in obtaining solid and correct conclusions. It should be recalled that only when Iraq was confronted with the Commission's conclusions did it admit its offensive biological weapons program, first partially in July 1995 and then more completely in August 1995. It should be recalled further that during our investigations of the biological weapons program in 1994 and in the first half of 1995, that is, in the time when Iraq was still denying the existence of such a program, the Commission heard then the same type of arguments that we've heard this morning; that is, that we are making minor and trivial questions, we are asking minor and trivial questions; that we are overlooking basic facts; that we are too intrusive; that our experts lack competency or are dishonest. So you see this same difficult process of investigation and discovery has, in fact, had to be played out in other areas. Now this morning, you demanded, today, that I report now to the Security Council that Iraq possesses no more proscribed weapons or weapons capabilities. You did that with respect to each of the weapons files, and I heard you. I am sorry to say that I am not able to do this. I regret it deeply. I am not able to do this on the basis of the level of verifications so far achieved. I wish that were not the case, but I am not able to do this on that level now. Because if I were to do so, I would be acting in a contrary way to the very law, which I am required to follow. I am simply not permitted to make disarmament by declaration. I am obliged to base any finding, of which I inform the Security Council, on the basis of credible and solid evidence. (more) 111520 nm/o'neill [Butler continues] If I were to do otherwise -- and I ask you truly to think of this -- if I were to do otherwise, members of the Council would clearly challenge my claim, my personal claim, that Iraq has no more proscribed weapons or capabilities. They would simply ask me for the evidence. And if I didn't have it they wouldn't accept my mere declaration. So, sadly, what you're asking for today isn't possible. We need first to have the remaining supporting evidence we require, and this evidence only Iraq can provide and which we can credibly verify. Having made that point, you can be assured in the report that I will lodge with the Council following these discussions I will make very clear, it might be for the first time -- it's been made clear previously by me and I think by my predecessor -- that I will make very clear and accurately to the Security Council that you made this request of me and that Iraq robustly asserts its claim that it has no more weapons or weapons capabilities. I will make that clear. Now, the commission needs to know verifiably what was acquired, produced, and disposed by Iraq for its proscribed weapons programs, that's basic. And to this end, we are prepared to undertake a serious program of work in the next few weeks before the October report to answer -- I hope -- all of the remaining issues in the missiles, certainly, in the missiles and chemical fields. You have given me advance notice that during our talks today and tomorrow in Baghdad you will make a particular presentation on biology. I look forward to hearing that. But with respect to the missile and chemical files, as you heard this morning, we are not far away from the end. And I've made that clear publicly, as I am sure you know. Now, there are a few remaining issues, and we would like to see them approached in a further intensive program of work in the period prior to our beginning to formulate our October report. In other words, in the next four weeks or so. In this context, my suggestion is that the remaining time that we have during today and tomorrow, these present consultations should be used to focus, in a serious way, on a number of substantive issues, issues that might help to clarify what remains and to find the framework of solutions for remaining problems. It could then be incorporated into an intensive program of work in the next few weeks. For example, in the chemical area, one of the issues is VX. And as I said this morning, we are prepared now to hear your explanations on the presence of traces of VX in warhead remnants. That would allow us to identify what needs to be verified and what impact it would have on the accounting of special warheads and beyond that, verification of the whole VX program, the program which has sadly lacked an adequate basis of verification. We would like to remove that; we believe we could start now. Also in the chemical area, I suggest that you return to us the document that was found by the recent inspection team, to which I've already referred. Our experts will give it a preliminary study. Tomorrow, we could discuss what impact the information contained in the document would have on the verification in the chemical area. It would be best, as I said, if that document could be provided to us tonight. It is something to which, under the rules, under the law of the Security Council, we, in fact, have a right, that document or an authentic copy of it. Now in the missile area, I suggest a discussion on the issue of the destruction of special warheads and Iraq's attempts in 1992 to tamper with evidence of the unilateral destruction. That would help us to obtain confidence that all special warheads were destroyed between 9 and 11 July 1991, as declared by Iraq, and that no special warheads were retained after that date. I believe that under circumstances, such as I've described, if we were to use what remains of that time tomorrow in a substantive way, we could then proceed to the elaboration of an program for intensive work for the next four to five weeks before we need to begin to prepare October report to the Security Council. And it would be my hope that that work, with full Iraqi cooperation -- given the presence state of the missile and chemical files -- could, in fact, see them brought to closure. I believe it is that near, and I think we should focus firmly on those objectives. [Butler continues] So, Mr. Deputy Prime Minister, a lot was said this morning. I've attempted to give you a clear answer to what I consider were the fundamental and most important and relevant issues. My proposal is that we should use our remaining time to focus on substantive issues. This would make our meetings tomorrow much more productive. It should yield positive results. The development of the work program I've suggested, I think, would be the best means of moving forward towards the objective that we deeply share with you; namely, the preparation of Paragraph 22 reports. Thank you.
['Aziz] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to respond to your comments and make my own comments on them. What you mentioned in the beginning and in the end is very important. And I think it's necessary to hear our position. I know exactly what Security Council resolutions require from Iraq. Security Council Resolutions 687 and 715 were issued in 1991. We know them. If you read the title of those resolutions, it's about Iraq and Kuwait. And the major objective of Resolution 687 is to strip Iraq--to make Iraq free--of mass destruction weapons, classified: long-range missiles and chemical and biological weapons. And the main objective of Resolution 715 is to monitor the Iraqi industry and the Iraqi capabilities so that Iraq cannot reproduce those weapons. Legally speaking, yes, I agree with you. It's not for Iraq to determine what is major and what is minor. But as a common sense in this world, it is possible to discuss between civilized people what is major and what is minor, in every case, in the case of disarmament and in other political, economic, and social issues. So, it is the right of Iraq, it is the legitimate right of Iraq, to speak about this matter very forcefully, strongly, what is major and what is minor, because the prolongation of the work of UNSCOM is not just a game, is not just a political or a diplomatic game. Each day means suffering to the Iraqi people. Therefore, it is important for us, it is very sensitive to every Iraqi so that the Iraqis always speak about what is major, what is minor. They say it in front of you, they say it in the Council, they say it in their discussions with the member states of the Security Council, and they say it to the international community at large. We made it in the past, and we will still make it. I know that the final determination is going to be made by the Security Council. But in the Security Council, there are members, powerful members, who confused deliberately, like your experts, between what is major and what is minor. And I have a very good study case. Lately, a few days ago, when the IAEA presented its report to the Security Council and there were some trivial issues raised by the IAEA and those trivial issues were used by the Americans and the British to deny the closure or the transmission of the nuclear file from the disarmament stage to the monitoring stage. So, when anybody in the IAEA and UNSCOM confuses major and minor issues, he's giving pretexts to the Americans and the British to use against the fact. The majority of the Security Council acknowledged the facts in the IAEA report that the job of disarmament has been done, has been done completely. But Mr.(Galley de Leone) mentioned remaining issues like the intentions of Husayn Kamil. Mr. (Galley de Leone) asked for a document, which do not exist, and so on and so forth, and Richardson and the new British ambassador used that pretext against even the wish of the majority of the Security Council, against the judgment of the majority of the Security Council. ['Aziz continues] So when I speak about what is major and what is minor, I mean business. It is very serious to me because it has political consequences and it means the prolongation of sanctions. In the end, it means the prolongation of sanctions. The second point here, Mr. Butler, you always speak--you and sometimes your predecessor in the beginning--in an imperial, pompous manner, that we decide what is right and what is wrong; we decide what is enough and what is not enough. And you forget that you are not an imperial force. You forget that you are not an occupying force in this country. You forget that you are working under the hat of the United Nations. You are supposed to be a United Nations officer. And the United Nations officer should behave in a humble manner, should behave in an impartial manner, and he, when there is a fact, he should admit it without hesitation. We are dealing with the United Nations. We have been dealing with the United Nations directly since 1980 and lately after the acceptance of Resolution 986 we are dealing directly with the secretary general, with the Secretariat, with officers of the United Nations and they do not talk and they do not behave in the way you and your assistants or your colleagues talk and behave, because they are United Nations officers. You also repeated 1991, the concealment of 1991 and the unilateral destruction, which took place in 1991. Yes, we told you, Mr. Butler, in 1992, that we did not give you all the missiles. Some of the missiles were unilaterally destroyed. They were kept from April, the date of the decision of the Security Council on Resolution 687, till July. April, May, June, and July. Around three and a half months. They were kept; they were not declared to UNSCOM and then they were unilaterally destroyed by us. And we explained to your predecessor and you on hundreds of occasions why we did that. You tell me this is a violation of the law. Well, at that time, as I explained before, there was a cease-fire, but the cease-fire was not stable. George Bush was threatening Iraq everyday to resume the hostilities. So we kept a few number of our military resources in order to face such a probability. When the cease-fire was stabilized in July 1991, and we decided that, well, we don't need to retain this capability for such a probability, we destroyed them first and we decided to declare them later so that when the tension ebbs, when there is less tension than it was at that time. It's a violation of the law. Which law, Mr. Butler? 687. Yes, but 687 says that when Iraq implements all these requirements, the Security Council will lift the sanctions. The Security Council did not lift the sanctions. So if I was not in full compliance with 687 till a year ago, it's not a violation, because the Security Council did not give me my share in the deal, my share in the resolution. They didn't ease 1 percent of the sanctions, which were imposed on Iraq. So the Security Council doesn't have a leverage on Iraq in this case. If I tell you frankly, if I were in full compliance just in 1997, I am entitled to lifting the sanctions when the compliance is full. So all your criticism, all your blames about what happened in 1991, 1992, and even in 1995, are just political propaganda. You want to tell the world that Iraq has not complied, is not in full compliance, which is not true. Iraq now and for a long time is in full compliance. Yes, there was a unilateral destruction; there was a short period of concealment in 1991. But that is 1991. We are in 1995. Moreover, your predecessor closed the missile and the chemical files. When he closed the missile and chemical files, he had investigated the unilateral destruction. Your teams came scores of times to investigate the unilateral destruction, to investigate what was concealed and how it was concealed, etcetera. And then the result was satisfactory to the executive chairman and he closed these two files in 1995. When Husayn Kamil defected in August 1995, no major issue arised regarding unilateral destruction in the missile and in the chemical files, except some new information about the VX, which was exaggerated by your experts, and it is still exaggerated. In the missile, there was nothing new, nothing new in the missile area. So now in 1998, you are still speaking about what happened in 1991 in the missile and the chemical area. I agree about what you said regarding the biological file. Yes, we denied it. In 1995, we made a full and complete declaration of what happened. But what that declaration was? It was a declaration about an obliterated program. And we invited you to verify the obliteration of that program and you have been working on that for three years and you do not want to close this matter yet. When I referred to al-Hakam, I did not protest against destroying al-Hakam. I know that according to the law, al-Hakam should be destroyed, because there has been similar destructions in the chemical and the nuclear, as well as the missile areas before 1995, before the destruction of al-Hakam. But my question was: If you have not yet verified the aspects of the biological file, why did you decide to destroy al-Hakam? The destruction of al-Hakam means that you have done a great deal of verification, that you have reached a great deal of clarification about the BW program and then you decided to destroy. That is what happened in the chemical, in the nuclear. When the nuclear, the IAEA decided to destroy al-Athir, they decided to do that after knowing what al-Athir was doing. That means when they completed the picture about the activities of al-Athir, then they said: Well, this unit, this installation should be destroyed. So, the same goes for al-Hakam. You destroyed al-Hakam and you still tell us and tell the Security Council that you do not know anything about the Iraqi biological program. And there is a contradiction here in your positions. You destroyed and the same time you say you do not know enough information about the Iraqi biological program. ['Aziz continues] You know, it is not in the interest of Iraq to enter into any conflict with UNSCOM. It is in the best interest of Iraq that we become friends, and I mean the word, so that you could help us and go and report to the Security Council that our job has been finished and that means the alleviation of the hardships of the people of Iraq. But after seven years of bitter experience with UNSCOM and with your experts, I find myself obliged to tell the truth. Yes, UNSCOM is not impartial; UNSCOM is being influenced by the Americans and the British and used by the Americans and the British. UNSCOM officials have been deliberately prolonging the work of UNSCOM. UNSCOM officials have been deliberately confusing the major issues with the minor issues or vice versa. They have been doing that. We have examples and I made examples this morning, and I had to mention names. Mentioning names is not a personal attack on a certain person. But when I read to you, and General Rashid read to you, the questions made by Mr. Smidovich during the last meetings, just to give you an example how one of your leading experts in the missile area deals with this file. When I mentioned Dr. (Sperzel) because Dr. Sperzel did the same. So it is not a personal attack on this or that person. It is stating the facts. And these facts have to be known by you, if you are not part of the game itself, if you are ready to put an end to such tricks and games, which doesn't. I am not satisfied about that, I don't feel comfortable because you are protecting them, defending them, which means that you are endorsing their policy. But at least for the impartial gentlemen who come to represent their countries in the Commission and to the world, I put it on the record so that the international community, the members of the Security Council, know these facts. It is not personal. As regards documents, you always speak about documents. You always, in each and every meeting between us, in each and every meeting between your experts and the Iraqi counterparts, you ask [for] documents. As if we have not provided UNSCOM with document. We have been providing UNSCOM with documents since 1991 till now. When I raised the question of documents in our last meeting, I asked you exactly what documents you want. What documents do you want? In exact terms, in precise terms. In this morning session, you referred to the document of November 1996. I addressed this matter in our last meeting. Let me repeat it once again. What is that document, which you are still asking for? In November 1995, Mr. Ekeus sent me a letter. I read it in our last session. I am going to read it again. This is the letter. Excellency, pursuant to our agreement reached during the last round of talks in Baghdad to hold in-depth discussions in December concerning the material balance of imported missile systems; that is the Russian, the Commission requests that the Government of Iraq provide the documents listed in the attachment to this letter. I would appreciate if you could devote your personal attention to this important request. This request was related with the material balance of the imported missile systems. He listed 10 documents. I was ready, I was capable of finding a number of them and the others were simply unavailable. Then, we worked on this matter and the material balance of the imported missile systems was finished, was closed: The engines, the launchers, etcetera. So the repetition of requests of those documents makes no sense, doesn't bring any new information because all the information and all the physical evidence are already in your hands. So when you continue asking for such documents, that means that you are deliberately raising this issue as one of the pretexts to prolong, to attack Iraq that Iraq is not cooperating fully with UNSCOM. Well, Iraq has done everything needed of it. In the chemical area, what kind of documents do you need? For what purpose? What is still not clear to you in the terms of disarmament for which you need a document? ['Aziz continues] In the biological area, what kind of further documents do you [want to] know? I spoke about a document, which I called in one of our meetings the mother of all documents in the BW area. The director general, who was in charge of the BW program, reported to his boss, not to you, not to the Security Council, to his boss, to Husayn Kamil, that this is what we have done, this is what we have produced, this is what we have. And that was four days, or three days, or two days before the beginning of the hostilities. So, what else do you want to know about the matters mentioned in those documents? Why do you need more and more documents about that? This is a first class document about the matter. If your experts were real experts and impartial and balanced experts they would have satisfied with this document. It's OK if this finishes the job, but you are still asking for documents. This is an endless game. You always say: Give me documents, more and more documents. Many of those documents, or all of them, are not available. We have repeatedly said that when we find a document, which serves the purposes of the compliance with Resolution 687, we will present it to you, and you are not that satisfied. You asked me to hand over to you the document you found in the Air Force headquarters. My answer is no. I am not going to hand over this document to you neither tonight nor any time in the future. The reason is the following: The mandate of UNSCOM is under the title of Iraq and Kuwait. It is not under the title of Iraq and Iran. The issues in that document relate to the activities of the Iraqi Air Force in the Iraq-Iran war period. So, it's none of your business. I do not accept your absolute pretension that you will take anything you want to take. I've made that very clear to you and to your predecessor. You are entitled, you have the right to take documents and things, which are under your mandate, which are related to your job, not things and documents and information, which are not related to your job. As regards your position that you are not ready to report to the Security Council that the requirements of Chapter C of Resolution 687 have not yet been met, you are not ready to say it now. You are still proposing a plan of action from the coming weeks and months. Mr. Butler: I have told you before, in several occasions, that all the requirements of Chapter C have been implemented long ago fully, fully -- the destruction of weapons, the destruction of the equipment and the rendering harmless of those equipment, and the monitoring system. This is not a new fact; it's a fact since a very long time. You did not admit this fact; you did not report this fact to the Security Council for political purposes. You didn't do that, I mean you refrain from reporting the truth to the Security Council because of political reasons, not because of scientific and objective reasons. I was hopeful when you took over in July 1997, and we held our first meeting, I was hopeful that you will report to the Security Council in October that year, 1997, that you have finished your job, because a few months before you came to this job Mr. Ekeus reported to the Council in his April report that what has remained is not too much. And he mentioned that there might be few missiles and those missiles might be filled with VX or with anthrax and therefore this matter has to be verified. After his departure, the question of missiles was closed, and we agreed, both you and myself, that there will be meeting on the chemical, which took place in September. And I thought that that meeting will close the matter of the VX. And you were asking for a new FFCD [not further specified] in the biological and we were preparing that FFCD. And I thought that you accept that FFCD and finish the job and report to the Security Council in October 1997 that Chapter C has been finished and the Security Council would start looking into the implementation of Paragraph 22. That was my anticipation. Therefore, I continued the work with you. Because, why not? What happened is that you created a crisis, quite, quite deliberate crisis on your side. You sent Mr. Scott Ritter to seek inspection of presidential sites. And this happened for the first time. Your predecessor, during his tenure between 1991 till September 1996, did not ask to inspect, to enter into the presidential sites. He closed the missile file in 1995 without entering the presidential sites; he closed the chemical file without entering the presidential sites; the IAEA closed the nuclear file without asking to enter the presidential sites. You, under your chairmanship, this demand was made. And this created a crisis; and the crisis developed since late September till the 23rd of February. And the world was confused about the huge stockpiles in the presidential sites and the stockpiles that are going to destroy the whole world, threatening people in Japan and Brazil. So, the focus shifted from the completion of the requirements of Chapter C to those fabricated allegations made by you, I mean by UNSCOM and your experts who appeared on television repeating those allegations, and by Mr. Clinton and Mr. Tony Blair, and Mrs. Albright, Mr. Cohen, Mr. Cook, etc etc. And you know the drama that was created at that period. So, we have to solve that problem. We have to show the world that these are lies, that the presidential sites are just guest houses. We reached an agreement with the secretary general. There was an entry to this site and the lies were exposed. We met in March, that was the first time after the crisis. The entry to the presidential sites did not take place at that time. We followed up, we started to continue, or recontinue the work which we agreed on in December, and then you came in June. In June, I was slightly, slightly optimistic that you'll finish the job, because after the clearance of the presidential site and the fact, which was solidified, that all those lies about Iraq concealing weapons had been cleared, in your work, your day-to-day work, you haven't found any traces of weapons concealment, you haven't found any concealed missiles, you haven't found any concealed quantity of BW, you haven't found any concealed quantity of CW. Therefore, I was anticipating that you will report now, in this meeting, that the job in the three files has been finished. You suggested a program of action, or what you call it schedule for work. I said: Yes, let us work. There are some slight issue here, slight issue there. We have to work on it in good faith so that in August when we meet, you would tell me: Okay, thank you, this job has been done. And we prepare ourselves to the Security Council, not necessarily in October Mr. Butler. The six monthly report is according to Resolution 715, it is not according to Resolution 687. Remember that. Your predecessor was presenting reports to the Security Council each 60 days. In 1995, he was asked by the Security Council to report each month. By the end of each month, he should go to the Security Council and give an oral report to the Council about the progress of work. So now, if you decide to finish the job you can immediately go to the Security Council and present a report and tell them: I've finished the job. You don't need to wait for October. What happened is that the 60 days report, and there was a six-month report according to Resolution 715 [sentence incomplete as heard]. And the irony, was and still is, is that the monitoring system has been working while the disarmament job has not yet finished in the eye of UNSCOM. This is an irony by itself because the establishment of the monitoring system and the functioning of the monitoring system means, logically, that the first phase of disarmament, that is Chapter C, has been completed. But, there was this mixture between the two, therefore they resorted that there should be a report each six months. ['Aziz continues] That's not important. Now, what I asked you is fair, fair, that to go and report to the Security Council that you have finished the job. That means the requirements of Chapter C of Resolution 687. Those requirements are: The destruction of weapons, the destruction of equipment, rendering harmless another category of equipment, and the monitoring system. This job has been done in the missile, in the chemical, and in the BW. You say you have not yet ascertained that, you would be criticized by the Security Council, this is your problem, it's not my problem. You are an official, you have to have the courage and determination to say the truth, if you believe in that truth. You don't have any evidence contrary to this fact. You don't have any evidence, physical, convincing evidence, contrary to the fact that all weapons have been destroyed. If you have an evidence to the contrary of this statement, say it now, I am ready to discuss it. If you tell me, no Mr. 'Aziz I have an evidence that you are still retaining missiles, or you are still retaining bulks, quantities of chemical weapons or quantities of biological weapons that could be used against this or that state. If you have a physical, real evidence, put it on the table, and we will discuss it. You don't have, you haven't made any such statement that you have evidence. You have speculations, you have doubts, etcetera. etcetera. but this is part of the game. So, if you are not ready now to tell the truth to the Security Council, I have no confidence that you will be ready to say, to tell the truth in October. I am repeating that. In June, I had some relative optimism that you will act in a way to wrap up the work, but from the very beginning of our meetings this morning, I realized that the game is still the game. I thought that you will listen to your experts and tell them, well, you did some good things, but the other questions you raised with the Iraqis are not important, let us not embark on them, let us wrap up the missile, the chemical, and let us focus on the BW according to the request of Tariq 'Aziz. But you came in the morning and you endorsed all the work which was done by your experts or your supposed experts, which is contrary, contrary to the spirit, and to the letter and spirit of the schedule of work, which we agreed on, which means that you do not respect your promises. I am not saying you personally, I am saying UNSCOM, whether you are part of the game or not, it's up to you to say it, but your people who were present with us. Mr. Smidovich, Mr. Laraby, and the gentlemen Mr. Reaps and Mr. (Metrokhin) were present with us in June, and they knew exactly what we agreed upon, that we focus on the disarmament, major disarmament issues, aiming at closing the files. When they ask such questions, when they consume the whole work in the means and ways they use, which means they did not respect the agreement between you and me. Therefore, I have no confidence that you will go to the Security Council in October and report truthfully the fact. I have no trust in that. And I don't see any logic that if you have reached that conclusion, why don't you do it now immediately upon your return to New York. It seems to me that you are not ready to do it. If you are not ready to do it, allow me to say our work is useless. You are telling me that let us have a new program of action in the coming weeks, I say no. I am not going to engage with you in any new program of action. Our work is useless. If you want to listen to our case in the BW, I think General al-Sa'di made it, made his remarks this morning, what could I say more than I said. The biological weapons are destroyed and the numbers are accounted for, whether we filled 15 VX or five VX, Anthrax, that's a secondary issue, it's a secondary issue. It was a weapon, and the weapon is dead. We are not capable of reproducing such a weapon, so, it's just a story. As regards the VX, I told you in the morning: If we filled warheads with VX, there is no reason, there is no sense that we do not declare them. If we did that in order to conceal it, it's foolish because a warhead is not a weapon if you don't have a missile to fix it on it. So, it makes no sense that a government decides to conceal warheads that cannot be used for any military purpose. If we intended to conceal them how could you find them in the destruction sites. So, there is a lot of questions and contradictions in this episode. There might be a chemical explanation for that. If you are interested, General al-Sa'di could make such an explanation. It might be the final one, but it makes no sense. Even I do not see any reason that we make such explanations. If we are going to make it we will make it to the international public opinion because we might have a better audience there. Therefore, Mr. Butler, if you are not ready to state the truth now, here in this meeting, and report it to the Security Council, our further work is totally useless. The sanctions are still imposed on Iraq, the two powerful members in the Security Council are not ready to lift the sanctions, you are not ready to state the truth, why should we continue this vicious circle, this futile effort, it makes no sense. Thank you.
[Butler] I'd like to ask you a question: When you say that under these circumstances you're not prepared to continue our work. You are referring to our work with respect to disarmament or our work with respect to disarmament and monitoring, either or both? Could you clarify that?
['Aziz] Mr. Butler, you proposed that we engage ourselves in a new program of action. That means further technical work between our experts, and maybe, further meetings between me and you. I am not ready to engage in that business because I am sure now, I am confident that such an activity is futile. As regards what will the next steps be, this is not my decision to make, I am going to report to the Iraqi leadership what happened in the period between June and our meeting and the meeting which took place between you and me, which did not add anything to my assessment, anything hopeful to my assessment, and I leave it to the leadership and the Iraqi people what to do. But, there is one important fact, which is very well known to you, and which has been declared lately and repeatedly, that it cannot go both ways, that Iraq implements all the requirements of Security Council resolutions and the sanctions continue. This is a contradiction that should be ended in a way or another. And, you, personally, have a special responsibility in that.
[Butler] Thank you for answering my question. Now I'd like to make the following very clear to you. You have just said to me that unless I am prepared to tell the truth now to the Security Council, there will be no further cooperation between Iraq and the commission. I am clarifying the question I put to you with respect to expert discussion on disarmament or discussions between me and you? You did not answer my question with respect to monitoring, perhaps you might in a moment?
['Aziz] No, I did not answer that question, but I told you I am not going to get engaged in further meetings and activities between our experts and your experts, or any new plan of action, and I do not see any usefulness in another meeting between you and me unless you come and tell me: Well, Tariq, I am ready to tell the truth, then I'll be ready.
[Butler] Well, that is what I would like to address. Let this be very clear for the record: You have put it to me that unless I am prepared to go now to the Security Council and tell it what you call the truth; namely and specifically, that Iraq has no more weapons of mass destruction, has no more ability to make them, and that this is true in missile, chemical, and biological areas; unless I am prepared to state that now, there will be no further cooperation between us. Now, I want you to hear me again when I tell you our position: I am not able to do what you ask. I am not able to tell your truth, as you call it, to the Security Council credibly, because I cannot give the Council the required evidence of your claim.
['Aziz] Do you have an evidence contrary to this truth?
[Butler] Please allow me to finish.
['Aziz] Finish.
[Butler] Our job is to verify your claim. It is not to prove a case to you. We are not a prosecutor or inquisitor. I do not have to put on your table the things that a prosecutor or an inquisitor would present. The Council established a three-part system, and you know it very well: 1) Iraq declares; 2) UNSCOM verifies; and 3) Together we destroy, remove, or render harmless. That is what the law says. Now... ['Aziz, interrupting] Allow me to say in between. Iraq has declared. You have been verifying for seven years, and you have destroyed. Isn't that enough?
[Butler] No. Allow me to respond. Iraq has declared. But over the years, never fully, accurately.
['Aziz] I explained that, I explained that in this meeting, and the previous meeting. I explained the reasons for the evolution, as you call them, the evolution of Iraqi declarations. We made a declaration. You made questions. You seeked answers. We provided the answers. The answers were attached to the previous declarations. Then, you wanted to update the FFCD [not further specified]. We updated the FFCD. Then, further questions were made. Further answers and clarifications were made. You wanted to update the new clarifications and answers and attach them and fix them in another document. That was the second or the third FFCD, and so on and so forth. Yes, there was an evolution in the declarations, which is correct, which is right. And I told you also one major important fact; that we didn't know from the very beginning exactly what you are asking for. It is a new job to us; 687 is a new job to Iraq as it is a new job to the United Nations. The United Nations never exercised such a work as it has been exercising in Iraq since 1991. So you learned, during the process, how to do your job, and we also learned how to do our job. And there was an evolution in your means and ways, and there was an evolution in our means and ways, an evolution in our declarations. But this game has gone on for seven years. You are not talking to me in 1992, Mr. Butler. You are not talking to me in 1993. You are repeating this very well-known job to me in 1998. Declare, we verify, and then we destroy. You have been verifying for seven years. Just for the record, if you don't know, and the gentlemen attending don't know: The number of the inspection teams which have visited Iraq from 1991 up to now is 260 teams, comprising 3,517 inspectors. Those teams conducted 2,522 inspections. The number of monitoring groups which have worked in the BMVC [not further specified] is 160 groups. They conducted 6,818 visits and air surveillance to sites which are subject and not subject to monitoring throughout Iraq. The number of the American spy aircraft activities since 12 August 1991 up to 20 July are 415 sorties, 1,725 hours of flights, and so on and so forth. So, if we add the meetings, the interviews, the visits, they are in hundreds and in thousands. So, you have been verifying, Mr. Butler. But you, [pauses] the truth is that you don't want to end the verification process. This is an open-ended process. This is an open-ended process, an endless process. And the examples are there. This is not the first time I give examples about this endless game. You are working. The questions your experts are raising, the clarifications they are seeking, the (?false) documentation they are asking, requesting us to provide. The verification has been done. When I ask that you do have, in the end, after seven years of work, after three years since the defection of Husayn Kamil and the new trivial findings, have you found anything contrary to the Iraqi declarations? You say no, I am not an inquisitor. You are an inquisitor. You are an inquisitor. You have to tell the Security Council where Iraq is guilty or not guilty. You are an inquisitor, a juror, whatever you say. You have to go to the Council and say that Iraq is still guilty of noncompliance with Resolution 687 or Iraq is not guilty. And I know after that it is the decision of the Security Council. ['Aziz continues] But, when I ask you to do your job, you throw the ball to the court of the Security Council. When we go and talk to the members of the Security Council, they say, they throw the ball on the court of UNSCOM, but UNSCOM does not come and present a report: We will not be able to consider the implementation of Paragraph 22. And this is a deliberate vicious circle. You have responsibility to go to the Council and tell the truth. You tell them: I have received Iraqi declarations. I verified them. We witnessed a lot of destruction. We witnessed the accounting of the destroyed weapons. I don't have any evidence contrary to those declarations made by Iraq. This is an honest report to the international body. Why you are not ready to do it, you are unable to do? Who is going to attack you? I know who is going to attack you. Two members, not the Security Council. If you are afraid to displease those two members, then you are serving their own purposes; you are not serving an international job. That's why I am saying it's futile to continue this kind of work, because if you are not ready, in your integrity as the executive chairman of UNSCOM to tell the truth to the Security Council and be bold enough, courageous enough to tell the truth, why should I continue this effort with you. It's futile. And I have experiences, very bitter experiences of that. Mr. Butler, you remember, you were here in March, and there are representatives of the diplomatic corps who heard what you told them. You told them rosy words about the progress that was made in the meeting between you and me. And you even gave them percentages of completion of files. You returned to New York and you reported in April that the progress was zero. Here, in our last meeting, you and I for the first time, this is the first time in the history of the relations between the deputy prime minister of Iraq and the executive chairman that we speak together to the press after the end of our meetings. We went jointly and we spoke positively in front of the press. And you were telling that the you will present a different report in October. You returned to New York and you changed the tone. So, therefore, I have no trust that the continuation of this work is going to bring any positive results, that's why...I have good reasons for that.
[Butler] Can I now resume?
['Aziz] Yes, please.
[Butler] Thank you. I was beginning to make our position clear to you when sought to make what you described would be a brief interpolation. I'll get back to the beginning because I think we somewhat lost our way. And I will not respond to the personal remarks you've made. Now, you have asked me to go to the Security Council now and report to them what you call the truth. I have told you that I am not able to do that now on the basis of the present level of verification. I've made a proposal to you through which, I believe, we would be able to quickly improve that level of verification. What I understand of what you've said is that you reject that proposal and unless I am prepared to report your truth, as you call it, there'll be no further cooperation between us? Correct?
['Aziz] Not my truth; I asked you to report the truth, not my truth. There's a truth that the weapons are destroyed, the equipment which were used in the production of those weapons were destroyed, the monitoring system for four years has not detected any violation on Iraq's sides of the requirements of resolution 687. This is a truth. It's not Tariq 'Aziz's truth; it's the truth. Why don't you go and report it to the Security Council?
[Butler] But, Mr. Deputy Prime Minister, I already said tonight in my opening remarks that I certainly would report your claim to the Security Council and I assure you of this. I will do a report to the Council on these discussions that we've had in Baghdad. As I have done in the past, I will report truthfully. That will include a truthful report of what you asked me to do and the answer I gave, and of your claim that there are no more prohibited or proscribed capabilities, and of our inability to verify that claim, much as we would wish you. And I will tell the Council some of the main reasons for which we are unable to verify your claim. And all of that will be truthful. ['Aziz Do you have a physical evidence contrary to my statement?
[Butler] We have been over that, I have given you my answer. It is our job to verify.
['Aziz] No, it is our job to tell the truth. I am asking you a simple, clear question. Do you have any material, credible evidence contrary to my statement? All UNSCOM is present in this room, the leading experts in all the three areas.
[Butler] Well, let me answer the question this way. You begin by misrepresenting, completely misrepresenting Paragraph 22, and the paragraph to which it is connected; 8 through 13. You completely misrepresent what is in those texts. Paragraph 22 says when the council agrees that Iraq has taken all the actions required of it, then the oil embargo will go away.
['Aziz] Yes, haven't we taken all the... [Butler, interrupting] And all of the actions required of it are spelled out in 8 through 13. Now, I went through those actions tonight.
['Aziz] I know them.
[Butler] My answer to use, no, my only job in that context is to provide a report to the council which would enable it, not us, to take that decision.
['Aziz] Yes, I know.
[Butler] And our report has to be: Yes we think Iraq has taken all the actions required of it and we think that on the basis of evidence, not just my graceful opinion. And that is the only question we are required to answer. Not the funny question that you have now posed. Do I think you have got some missiles in the back room?!! That is not the right question, that is not our job.
['Aziz] No, no. I am making this question on serious basis, because you have been working in Iraq for seven years, and you have conducted all these inspections and activities inside Iraq. You have been monitoring Iraq for four years, and in all those activities, and in all this long period, if you have not found, you have not detected material evidence contrary to the Iraqi declaration, this is a verification by itself. Mr. Butler, why do you inspect sites in Iraq, including the presidential sites? In order to verify the facts. You have done all these inspections and you have not found a violation on the side of Iraq. This is a fact by itself, this is a verification process. How long do you need to do this verification? Here is the endless game I pointed to. This is an endless game because you do not want to wrap up the work and go and tell the council: Well, Iraq declared this and that. We destroyed this and that. Iraq unilaterally destroyed this and that. We verified the destruction. We made the material balance of this and that, which was destroyed unilaterally. We made thousands of inspections. We have been monitoring Iraq for four years. We had not detected any violation and we think that the disarmament job has been done. It is your responsibility, it is your responsibility, you can you do it. If somebody in the Security Council challenges that, it is up to him. But when that person asks you: What has remained in Iraq which is not yet known? You can tell him this and that. Is that a weapon? You can make an answer. Can Iraq constitute a threat to its neighbors in terms of.. [Butler; interrupting] But that is not in our mandate.
['Aziz] You are an expert. You are supposed to be a disarmament expert, Mr. Butler. You have to make such answers. If you seek the help of a certain expert in specifics, you can do it. That is what, for instance, I asked Mr. (Salstrom). He spoke about aflatoxin; he told me this is not a weapon. I said: Well, if it is not a weapon, that is good news. You said: No, it is not my job. It is not a weapon, nevertheless, I am going to ask about it. What does that mean, what does that mean? Does that mean that you are working to finish the disarmament job? Or you are playing an endless game? ['Aziz continues] You have all the facts that enable you to go to the Security Council and tell them: Iraq does not possess the weapons you specified as proscribed in Resolution 687. We don't have any evidence contrary to the Iraqi declarations. We have been monitoring Iraq for four years, and we have not detected any serious violation of Iraq's commitments according to the Security Council resolution. Say that, and let them decide whether it is enough for Paragraph 22 or not. Do your job honestly and courageously. Do it, and when you do that, even if the Security Council does not agree to the implementation of Paragraph 22, I am not going to criticize you, to blame you, because you did honestly what you have to do. But now, in this meeting, you are not prepared to do what you should do.
[Butler] I am not able to. Sorry, I am not able to do what you... ['Aziz, interrupting] You are not able. This is your explanation.
[Butler] Sorry, I can't accept that. You say I am not prepared to do what I should do. I have not said that to you. I said I am not able to do what you ask me to do.
['Aziz] I heard you. But my interpretation is that you are not prepared to do it. You say I am not able to do it. My explanation, interpretation, is that you are not prepared to do it.
[Butler] Well, I think, as I've heard it several times, I do thoroughly understand your position. I hope you understand what I've said in reply. Yes, I will report this truthfully to the Security Council.
['Aziz] The meeting, well, the meeting, you report it or not. It is videotaped. All the members of the Security Council could get their version of it. What I am asking you to do is to report the truth, not report the contents of this meeting. That is part of the job. Of course, you will do it. But that is not the most important matter. I am going also to [pauses]. I might write, you see, something to the Security Council. But I am asking you, after seven years of hard work, intensive work, intensive investigation, verification, inspections, etcetera, etcetera, etcetera, to go and tell the council the truth as it is, exactly what I mentioned: Iraq does not possess any more weapons of mass destruction in the three areas. Iraq does not possess any equipment which can produce such weapons; they were destroyed. The dual-use equipment that might be used are under full monitoring. We have not detected any violation by Iraq in this area. We don't have any physical evidence contrary to the Iraqi declarations. Say that and relieve your conscience.
[Butler] I cannot do that, and I have a clear conscience (words indistinct) that.
['Aziz] Okay. If you cannot or unable to go... [Butler, interrupting] Not at the present level of verification, no I cannot.
['Aziz] I think the present level of verification is enough for reporting this truth.
[Butler] Well, I guess that concludes our meeting.
['Aziz] I beg your pardon.
[Butler] I said I assume that concludes our meeting.
['Aziz] Yes, is there anything new?
[Butler] No, I have nothing else I wish to add.
['Aziz] I've also nothing new to say.
[Butler] Is there any point in meeting tomorrow?
['Aziz] If you have something new regarding my question, my request, I will be glad to see you. If your position will not change, it will be a futile meeting.
[Butler] Well, let's leave it on the basis, then, that we may be in touch with each other in the morning. Thank you.
['Aziz] You're welcome.
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