Aziz-Butler 3 August Talks --Part 2
Baghdad Iraq Television Network 1520 GMT 7 Aug 98 "Second part" of official talks between Iraqi team, led by Deputy Prime Minister Tariq 'Aziz and UNSCOM team led by UNSCOM Executive Chairman Richard Butler held at the Iraqi Foreign Ministry in Baghdad on 3 August.['Aziz] [Break in reception] to give you the examples. ['Aziz, in Arabic] Dr. 'Amir al-Sa'di would you give us a picture of the biological program.
['Aziz] Let us the start with the warheads. General Rashid is going to exactly tell you what happened with Mr. Smidovitch and we will go after that to the other areas. ['Aziz, in Arabic] Get yourself ready for this topic. [break in reception]
[Rashid] [indistinct words] Just to give a very short briefing. We have worked on the warheads now to extract the remnants more than a year very extensively. Hundreds of field hours have been put by us and by UNSCOM experts over this period. There has been a lot of classification and categorization of the remnants. We have used very advanced equipment from three countries under our request, which was accepted by UNSCOM, to find any remnants and try to assemble them to reconstruct the total picture. And we arrived at the conclusion that the Iraqi declaration was a 100 percent correct in what it destroyed. There was the issue of the specific agents, which were to be filled in the warheads. This was addressed two weeks ago with Mr. Smidovitch or a week ago with Mr. Smidovitch in detail. [indistinct words, very poor reception] Mr. Butler you have said to Mr. Tariq 'Aziz the last time that we might not need a meeting because what remains is very little. If we need a meeting, there will be a meeting on the warheads. It seems we were surprised to see that there was an inspection team coming to discuss this because there is nothing to discuss and this was admitted by everybody. We asked after the meeting why that inspection team did occur, why engage the Iraqi side in trivial very minor -- I cannot even raise them to the level of being minor -- very minor and trivial questioning over two days. Sickening questioning. Let us see what are these questions: What was the type of soil in (Nibayy)? This is the destruction a site, which UNSCOM visited hundreds of times. Is it hilly? Is it plain? They wanted to check with the experts so that when they have a contradiction [they would say] look, Iraqi declaration or statement is not coherent, its contradictory, how could we verify it? What did you use in terms of bombs, Air Force bombs, to explode the warheads? What were they? Are their weights? What are their dimensions? The warheads are destroyed, and we told you how we destroyed [them]; we gave you a full declaration. They asked people what was the damaging of the bomb? Tell me, how long it is, how was the dimension? How many of these? Were they put together? Were they separated? At what times did you put them? Of course we have video to support these questions. And then: What was the instrument used and the methodology used to assemble the fragments? Because after we destroyed the warheads in 1991, fragments were assembled. Did you use a shovel or a [word indistinct]? What was the type of that shovel, was it (Cowsky) or caterpillar? I'm just making it brief because there are many details, and I could engage you until tomorrow. Is this shovel which you used, was it with wheels, or was it [words indistinct]? Was the shovel large or small? Did the tires of the shovel, which was with wheels, did it have flat tiers, did it go flat during your work? How many times did it get flat during the work? How silly. What were the distances between the fragments? Tell us, in 1991 you ask an officer who did this in a very quick time the fragments which you assembled seven years ago, what were their distances? How they were distanced? Why don't we see fragments in the nearby pit? What is your idea about the distance the fragments arrive after the explosions? Where did you exactly put these fragments after the explosion? Do you know some persons he mentions of course a name? How did these (? Tapes) were buried? Did you leave them open? For how many hours or how many days you left them open before you cover them? The ensemble of the warheads in different pits, were they similar the [indistinct]? Were they different? What was their shape? The parts, which you took out of the pits, did you take them exactly to this warhead? To which pit? Tell us exactly on a photograph. And Mr. Smidovitch shows the evidence, which the explosion of a nuclear bomb, he shows the evidence of these [indistinct] a photograph: Tell us exactly where were the fragments and how did you assemble them. And an officer have to remember seven years after these details in detail. And of course they have contradictions. And the time, and what time? And how did you do it? And who was with you? How did you decide at the time that assembling these fragments is complete? Who done that decision? You know it is a [indistinct] decision and there must be planning of that decision. The scrap of the cars in the area, there were other scrap in the area, did you also take this scrap and put them in or only the fragments of the warhead? When did you go to the site of the destruction of the special warhead? Did you do it by vehicle or you do it by foot? Of course this is a very clever question. Did the shovel dig one pit in one day or more than one pit in a day, I want to know this information. The shovel and [word indistinct] did they work in the same pit or in different pits? The vehicle, which transferred the remnants of the warheads, was it a truck or [word indistinct], etcetera of these silly, sickening questions. Discussion indigenous production with Mr. (Laraby) it was much less detail, I must admit. But it seems at the end he have some instruction to go into detail. And we were handed over a day before the inspection team, questionnaire. Mr. Laraby would be very embarrassed to give the questions to us so I asked my people because I was not a president it is impossible that Mr. Laraby will dare to present to the Iraqis this question. Well, they did present it in front of him, I said do not accept. Next day morning, Mr. Laraby said hand over to me the questionnaire; 29 question which I read to you. And I laughed, he said why are you laughing on one of my inspection team member Mr. Andreas. I said they are laughing question. After a detailed technical, scientific discussion on indigenous production of engines and [word indistinct] pumps, let us see what is now important. I told them if these are the silly questions, which are real, that means silly questions file, it means they have done everything except this silly question. There was a turbo pump, which we [words indistinct] from Germany to Iraq at a certain date. What are the 29 questions. Who on the Iraqi side took over the pump? Who was on the Iraqi side was also present with the person who handed over the pump? I want all persons. Who was asked to hand over the pump? When did you ask to be given one pump? Was this desire also expressed in writing? When was the pump handed over? When was the pump built into the engine for testing? Which airline was used to bring the pump to Iraq. Which were the flight date of the plane, which brought the turbo? Just imagine. Which airport in Iraq was used? You know, we have 20 airports in Iraq. What were the packing for the pump? Where the packing original [word indistinct] company? Was the packing of the pump different from the other pump? How was the packing [word indistinct]? How was the pump through customs? How was the pump transported from the airport to your facilities by helicopter? Where exactly the location was the pump handed over? Has the pump been tested before delivery? Were there additional customs papers for the pump? Who paid for the transport? Just imagine. How much was paid for the transport? I leave it for your judgment. Did the pump bear a serial number? Of course, we call this a very important question compared to the silly questions before. Were there any differences between this pumps and the following pumps? Is this pump considered additionally to the contracted 35 pumps? If the first pumps was brought in Autumn, and three in January, what did the box suppose to contain five pumps really bear? How long did the people who handed over the pump stay in Iraq. This is one pump out of 30, how mockery. When and how did, I do not know, leave Iraq? Give the flight data. He added this question later on because he thought [word indistinct]. Would you like to add something? This happened at the final day of Mr. Laraby mission, which was very successful except for he has instructions, since we progressed very well, so we have [word indistinct] regular questions. We talked about this little connector Mr. Butler almost for an hour. These little connectors, you could buy thousands, and you do not buy them in numbers, you buy them in kilos. You go to any shop in London, in Paris, in Germany, everywhere, tell them I would like some two kilograms. He gives you thousand. We have been engaged on these stupid, silly connectors. Why in the contracts, I do not know how much 500 or 1000 and you receive 1005. This is very serious and very important verification of indigenous production. While we have been talking scientifically in detail with data, with full documentation, and the end, we engage [pauses] Of course I have to terminate these silly questions.
['Aziz] Mr. Butler, you promised me in our last meeting, (?I repeat), that the work would be honest and quick. Now you are telling me that Iraq has failed to present accurate answers to questions made by your experts. You are asking me to present documentation to support Iraq's answers. These are the concerns of your experts? I cannot provide answers to such questions, not to speak of accurate or nonaccurate answers. I cannot provide documentation about it. Give me the paper please. How can I provide documentation about a question like the pieces that were shown, that were found outside the pits after the destruction, whether they were put in the pits or not? How can I present a documentation about whether there was a puncture in the shovel, in the carrier, or not? Can I present a documentation about how many punctures occurred during the destruction? How can I present a documentation about the shovel, whether it was (Kowsky) or Caterpillar? And so on and so forth. These are the questions made by your expert, by Mr. Smidovitch. He is at your left side. What kind of documentation do you want? Documentation about the destruction of engines? This matter was solved. Documentation about the destruction of launchers? This matter was solved in 1997. Documentation about the destruction of the warheads? You have collected the remnants of the warheads, each and every piece, and accounted for them, and you told me that you reached an account of 34 to 35. What kind of documentation do you want to have? What kind of verification do you want to make after reaching those facts? So this is shear procrastination, perpetuation, prolongation, deliberate and artificial. If the work was honest and quick, you should have told me now that all the requirements for the sake of disarmament in the missile area have been finalized. There are some other questions, some other stories, which we need to follow. OK, you could follow that because we will be living together after the implementation of Paragraph 22, after elevating the hardships of the Iraqi people. We could work together because you have a monitoring system in Iraq, UNSCOM will remain, UNSCOM will continue its work with Iraq. OK, you can do that. But that does not mean that those issues will be pending or delaying the report, the final report to the Security Council to implement Paragraph 22. So what I conclude from this is that, politically, you are using means and ways in order to prolong the implementation of paragraph 22. This is a political position, Mr. Butler. This is not, this cannot be classified as, technical and expertise. No honest expert--and I insist on that--no honest expert will get engaged in such questions. This is political. This is made by politicized, so-called experts, who would like to keep the sanctions on the people of Iraq for such trivial [word indistinct]. And they made it by instructions, either by you personally or by some influential officials in UNSCOM. If you are not aware of that, now you are aware of that. And I am asking in the presence of all the ladies and gentlemen to watch the films of those meetings so that you could see yourself. We will get them in the afternoon. We will prepare the films, here on television, bring it closer and we will watch. Let us review the work. You said it should be quick and honest. You are making some new requests about documentation and clarification. Let us see whether those requests or demands are really needed for the disarmament purpose. Ourselves, you and I, and the gentlemen who are attending this session. This is in the missile area. There will be other explanations on our side on what happened in the chemical meeting as well as what happened in the biological meeting.
[Butler] I would like to respond briefly to what we have just heard in this section where you sought to provide examples of stupid questions. [Butler continues] I will have some things to say later on about your introductory remarks, which contained, I think, some serious errors. And I'd like to discuss them with you. But for the moment, I want to make two remarks about what we've just heard. First, I came to these talks on the assumption that we were here to do serious work, and not withstanding the theater to which we've just been exposed, I continue, I will continue to make that assumption. And speaking of theater, if you want to show some television this afternoon, I guess, as your guests we'll have to watch. I actually suspect that it would be a waste of our time, and time is relatively short. But if that is what you want to do I guess we'll, as I say, behave as good guests. Secondly, and more importantly, you have just asked me: Is this the documentation you want? You want documents about punctured tires and questions of a minor nature? I want you to be in no doubt: No. It is not the documentation to which I referred earlier on and of, sorry, and of which you have been aware for a very long time. In my introductory remarks this morning, I referred to documents of a far greater significance. For example, I referred to the letter of November of 1996 to which we have never received a reply, in which there is a list of serious questions and documents that we know exist, are in your possession, and if we could see them would help close the missile file. Please, Mr. Deputy Prime Minister, you've used the word confusion several times this morning, which I reject, but please do not confuse the issue. You know very well the serious subjects on which we have requested documents. To attempt to suggest that questions of that kind, and I will ask my officers and maybe we will have to watch the video tapes, we can verify whether or not those things were asked. I will ask them: Why such questions were asked. you know, it's very interesting; when this kind of discussion has taken place in the past, I have gone away responsibly and sought to find out why such questions were asked. And mostly, you know, the reason that's been given to me has been a rational one. And I will find out, I will find out. But please, please, do not misrepresent what has happened here this morning and in the past by suggesting that we have asked for documents about punctured tires. No way. We have asked for far more significant documents. Was it November 1996 or 1997, November fourth, wasn't it?
['Aziz] No, no, November 1996, I know the story and I addressed it in our last meeting and I am going to repeat what I said.
[Butler] We asked for a document from Diary Number 12, which we think will tell us the story on the destruction -- if it was destroyed -- of 300 tonnes of scuds specific propellant. Don't tell me that that's a minor issue. Whether or not a truck got a flat tire might be a minor issue, but I'll ask our people about that. But please do not misrepresent what we have asked for. We have never asked for documents of such a trivial character. We have asked for documents about truly important matters. Finally, may I say: I will have a word to say later about your concept of what is major and what is minor, because I do think there is a misrepresentation taking place in that area as well and I'd like to talk it out with you. But now I'm happy to hear the rest of your examples of stupid questions.
['Aziz] No, I have to comment on that. First of all, this is very serious. It's very serious Mr. Butler. This work is very serious to Iraq because it means death and it means suffering to my people. Therefore, it is serious. And what we presented is not theatrical. And watching a video is not a theatrical exercise. It is verifying the truth. This is your responsibility and the responsibility of the commissioners who attend those meetings to know whether UNSCOM is doing its job according to the guidelines of Resolution 687 and 715 or not. So it's not theatrical. When it comes to documents, you referred to November 1996 document. I addressed this matter in our last meeting. Once again I repeat it in the presence of the new gentleman who might not know the story of this document. In October 1996, I agreed with Ekeus that we embark on discussing the missile file by objective and professional means. At that time, he was accusing Iraq of concealing 5-15, 6-12 etc. etc. operational missiles. I told him: instead of making such accusations and instead of we repeating saying that you are a liar, let us embark on a professional method to reach the truth. He said yes. He agreed. Honestly agreed. And we agreed that the pits where the engines were buried to be re-excavated in order to re-count them once again. Then he sent me a letter asking for certain documents. After that, the excavation took place and the engines were [break in reception] the launchers were [words indistinct]. Now you tell me that the warheads are, at least in number, are accounted for. So what is the importance of those documents whether they exist or not? Because the main issue has been settled. The physical evidence has been provided. You don't need those documents. If those documents were available, there is no reason for us not to give them to you. They are simply not available. And to tell me that if you don't provide the documents of November 1996, the missile file will not be closed, this is political. This is political, it is not justified by any technical or scientific or honest standard.(more) 071737 rq/o'neill ['Aziz continues] When we speak about that document, there were, I think, 15 or 16 documents in that list. We provided the available documents and we told you the others were not available. So, the propellant, I told you in our last meeting is out of the disarmament area. It could be discussed later on when you give me my right, which is the implementation of Paragraph 22, then we could discuss the propellant and the punctures, which Mr. Smidovitch asked. You made a statement at the beginning: Iraq did not provide accurate answers to the questions made by your experts. These are the questions. You want me to provide accurate answers to those questions in order to wrap up the file and go to the Security Council and tell them that the missile area is complete? You mention that you want more documentation. Now you are telling me November 1996 and this is my answer and this is not new to you because I made it clear in our last meeting. [sentence as heard] And secondly you want a document about the propellant. I told you I am not going to address the propellant issue in the context of the disarmament requirement because simply propellant is not an arm. It's not an arm. And this view is shared by a number of members in the Security Council; it's not the view of Tariq 'Aziz only. You insist on it and two members insist on it--the British and Americans in the Security Council. The others either said no, it's trivial, or they kept silent. So, it's political. When you raise it is political; it's not scientific. Therefore, I am not going to provide any documentation about this matter and go to the Security Council and tell them that's what Tariq 'Aziz said. So, you don't need any further answers to your questions in the missile area and you don't need any further documentation. When you raise these two requests, that's political. You want to perpetuate the situation. Now, as you promised me in our last meeting, if the work should be honest and quick, now you should tell me and then the Security Council that the missile file is closed in the context of disarmament requirement. The remaining issues, the remaining trivial questions, this and that, when and how, could be later addressed if you are genuinely and objectively interested in it. We could work on them after you tell the Security Council that Iraq does not have missiles, Iraq cannot have any long-range delivery system to carry on any kind of weapon. And that is the most important issue in this armament. What's a disarmament? When you disarm a country or a person, you disarm it or him so that he cannot attack somebody else, another state. If you don't have the means of delivery of whatever arms that might exist, then you cannot attack a person or a state. Why don't you go and tell that to the Security Council now, now, now, immediately. Say it now in the presence of the commissioners and my presence on the record, in the video tape, and then go and say it to the Security Council. Why don't you say that and [not] beat around the bush in such means and methodology, which can take months and years without reaching an end. Go and say that. These are the facts. The engines are destroyed, the launchers are destroyed, the warheads are destroyed. So, Iraq does not have any missile capability. You are watching the current indigenous production very closely and you can check any violation, according to the rules of 687. You can check that. So, your job in the missile area--now we are speaking about the missiles--is finished as far as the requirements of Chapter C are concerned. Say that. You didn't say that. You made nice presentation about progress. What's progress? There should be a finalization, Mr. Butler. Now we are in August 1998; we are not in August 1991, to tell me that there was some progress. Is it a 1,000-mile process when you make progress in 10 or 20 miles you see, you mention that there is progress? This is the end of the game. It should be the end of the game. But you are not ready to end the game. You are still working on means and ways that will prolong the finalization of this and other files. So, it is serious to me and my request is not theatrical; it is subjective. There was a meeting between your experts and my experts. You gave your own account of the meeting as you were told by the chief inspector. Let me and the others check what exactly happened in the meeting. Time is short, what time is short? What's your job, Mr. Chairman? You always mention that you are the executive chairman who is working on the question of Iraq. You have no other job. So, when you need to stay here a whole month, it's your responsibility to stay here a whole month. I am not asking you to stay a whole month. This is your job; you have no other job. (more) 071737 lf/o'neill ['Aziz continues] You are not like Mr. Dhanapala who came here under secretary of. . . You are the executive chairman working on it. And all the gentlemen with you at your right side, and at your left side, with the exception of the commissioners, you are full officers, full time officers in UNSCOM. And this is your job. If your job needs that you stay in Iraq a week, a couple of weeks, three weeks, you have to stay for a good reason. And what I am asking for is a good reason. Therefore, the question of time is irrelevant. Shall we proceed or do you suggest that we meet in the afternoon to watch the film and then proceed to the bilateral. . . [indistinct words in Arabic] I'll leave it to you. If you want to listen to General al-Sa'di [adviser the Iraqi Presidential Office] to give you a briefing on his impressions on the biological work, if you want to see the film now, the film is available. If you want to postpone it till the afternoon, I'll leave it to you.
[Butler] I had understood the way we would work this morning until one o'clock and it is only twelve so I'll be prepared to hear the presentations from General al-Sa'di. Is their a third one or will there just be yours? So let's proceed on that basis and see where [words indistinct] when he is finished.
['Aziz] Go ahead, please. [Al-Sa'di] Thank you sir. Mr. Executive Chairman, you said that the team, the biological team of international experts, in their final remark recommended that no further meetings are to be conducted with Iraq because they would be fruitless. I would tell you right now that if I were an expert in their place I would say just that. . .
[Butler] I object to this, Mr. Deputy Prime Minister. I am sick of being misrepresented. Let me say, what the experts said was: Fruitless unless there is further information. So, please complete the sentence. [Al-Sa'di] Whatever they said. That no further meetings are to be conducted without, as you mentioned, the Iraqi side providing further information. I would recommend that, if I were in their place, it does not change what I was going to say. ['Aziz, laughing] The other way, unless the other side changes its methodology. [Al-Sa'di] Unfortunately, I am not an expert with an UNSCOM team. They would be spared the indignity of having to beat around the bush, around the topic which had been discussed adnauseam. A program, a BW program that had been, Iraq said truthfully, obliterated without leaving a trace, never to be admitted to UNSCOM and UNSCOM never having to carry out any of its usual activities of rendering harmless or removing the program, with the exception of the al-Hakam site, I'll come to that. The problem with the international team is having to compare between a program as painted by the Iraqi side with luckily some corroborating evidence found, but not completely, to compare it with another supposed program built on [word indistinct] ideas on theories of what actually had happened and what kind of program it was. And there is no way of verification, taking this picture painted by UNSCOM, the old group, and the picture that Iraq had presented truthfully in its [word indistinct]. Unfortunately, it appeared during the discussion that the experts were saddled with terms of reference, which did not leave any room for the scientific input in their assessment. The experts were not concerned with any aspect connected with natural characteristic, storage lives of the type of agents produced, whether filled ammunitions or unfilled, and the effect of the storage conditions on the viability of ammunitions. Their only concern, according to their terms of reference, was to verify exact quantities of ammunitions, agents produced, and in some cases presumed by UNSCOM to have been produced. We would like to give our position on the obstacle we feel that UNSCOM has created which precludes the recognition of Iraq's justified claim that the BW program has been completely removed or rendered harmless and no biological ammunitions or agents remained. Furthermore, that any limited uncertainty in the material balance resulted from what UNSCOM considered insufficient documentary of physical or analytical evidence is more than offset by the degradation of the agents produced up to 1990 through the scientific assessment of experts. This is where the expert opinion [2-second break in reception] considering this question. And the chief inspectors of UNSCOM mentioned in the presence of the deputy prime minister that this is not the experts' concern to judge or to assess whether Iraq produced viable biological weapons on the one hand or if they are still viable if they still exist. This was not their concern. Now what is their concern then? We never said, we never misled UNSCOM to say that we will produce at some site all the BW weapons that we have produced, all the quantities of bulk agents we have produced and put them to UNSCOM experts for a head count. This is easy anybody can do that, it does not need experts to make a head count or to make a checklist. (more) 071737 fh/o'neill [Al-Sa'di] What was needed was the scientific input in the areas of uncertainty, in case of insufficient documents or evidence or the material balance. We said from the outset we cannot corroborate certain areas that were destroyed by Iraq, such as the 157 [word indistinct] 400 bombs filled. We know the total number is 157, but we are not sure how much from each agent is filled in those 157. We think to the best of our information and calculation from the quantities produced, from the quantities labeled and designated that around 100 were filled with agent A. And around 50 plus -2 degree, perhaps, of agent B (the Anthrax), and the rest was agent C. This was our statement from the beginning, and we never said we could produce that exact figure for verification. Therefore, they asked to verify the unverifiable. And this is what they told [word indistinct]. Unless we produce document, which says exactly how many within the total of 157 were filled with agent A, were filled with Agent B, were filled with Agent C, and any other [word indistinct], which we always maintained never existed. How can they tell you that they can verify that if the terms of reference does not allow them to consider the viability of agent filled in such cases in those examples I gave, whether they are viable for two months, three months, four months, or one year or more. Now, what is the significance of this; they say it is not their concern. How come it is not their concern, what are they here for? It is their concern, but we presume that they have terms of reference, with the limitation of it, was made by the executive chairman or someone in executive position that this is not their task to state or to assess whether Iraq has produced viable weapons or not. This has been always our contention; that scientific input are necessary because there are some areas which are areas of contention. Dr. Sperzel in the presence of the deputy prime minister said it is very serious. If Anthrax, he chose Anthrax of [word indistinct] agent, in itself is something. He chose Anthrax to say that if Anthrax has been dried, it is known for a fact and there evidence to state that Anthrax was not dried, up to the 15th of January 1991 -- the eve of the war. In a report, signed by the director general of the establishment that is concerned in production of Anthrax, it says this attempt was abandoned in this report because we could not simply achieve it. Now why is this is ignored? OK, if Dr. Sperzel still believes that Anthrax was dried, he must mean that this was done after 1991 or after, say, the war to be more precise, because who would dry Anthrax during the war. And it was monitored from the beginning and recently Dr. (Kelly) with his group came and gave us a report saying they witnessed no activity in the area of attempting to dry Anthrax, not to this effect, but drying attempts were made at [word indistinct]. If suspicions lead us that Iraq has dried Anthrax and is keeping Anthrax, let us address that on what evidence. We gave you all the evidence we have, but we have not taken the step, we could not, not for lacking one thing to do it. It was obvious, we wanted to do it, it is there in our reports, and we have admitted it in [words indistinct]. But why then prolong the discussions on this issue on the basis of suspicions. A picture painted by certain members of UNSCOM's teams, BW teams, that Iraq must have done this or that. And Iraq's story cannot be corroborated by documentary evidence. There is another document, which illustrates the lack of understanding or misunderstanding, I would say, between UNSCOM experts and the Iraqi side. The document, which is signed by the leading specialists in the BW program, giving a position regarding the agent they have produced so far. And they are identified by their names and labels, A, B, C. And in each case, it is stipulated that it is a slurry form, and not in any other form. And they gave their estimation of the storage, the viability of those agents. And for each one they gave an assessment rather than factual on the basis of the short period, which they followed those agents, maybe six months or nine months. They saw degradation, but they based their assessments on ideal conditions of storage; refrigeration that is.(more) 071737 ma/o'neill [Al-Sa'di] However, they said if those agents were filled, degradation would be very serious within one month, within one month, and their recommendations that the filling should be undertaken, let us say, a month before the [word indistinct]. That in itself is proof that no drying had taken place and there is no question regarding the viability of those agents. The agents produced in the nonsterile conditions of filling, in the nonsterile containers in which they were put, they do not last for more than a few months, say three, four months at most. And this was evidently seen when they were extracted from their storage positions and were taken to be chemically treated for destruction prior to explosive destruction, they were found to be heavily contaminated with fungus and other polluting matter. So we are talking about a program which has been obliterated by munitions that were not viable and no longer make any threat to anybody, and we are discussing all the time details of the past program, whether this or that event was accurate to the last detail or whether this pit is in this microlocation or that microlocation whether so many warheads, 12 or 10, were in this, or 50. All this is time-consuming and irrelevant to disarmament because if any of those warheads are [words indistinct] for any reason not found or still existing in some burial ground, it would not be a viable weapon, and this the experts refused to discuss. It is not within their terms of reference. Why? Thank you very much.
['Aziz] Furthermore to the statement of General al-Sa'di, there is--and I am going to say it frankly, very frankly--there has been a sinister attempt from the very beginning to give a very bad, confusing picture about the biological issue throughout the past three years. This has been used politically by the same governments who are insisting on keeping the sanctions. There are major facts, which have been ignored deliberately and artificially by the experts UNSCOM used or sent to deal with this matter, mainly Mr. Sperzel. Major facts. First of all, biological weapons were not used in any conflict. This is a fact. Secondly, biological weapons and material were, as General al-Sa'di said, obliterated in 1991. For seven years, UNSCOM has been working in Iraq. UNSCOM has not proved the contrary. You haven't found any biological weapons in Iraq, you have not found any biological agent in Iraq for seven years of inspections and verifications and visits, etcetera, etcetera. The last episode was the presidential sites. The governments of Washington and London were telling the world that there are hundreds of thousands of tonnes of biological and chemical weapons in the presidential sites, and means to produce those lethal weapons. Then in the end, UNSCOM and the IAEA and the representatives of the international community, all the representatives of the 15 members of the Security Council, and the representative of the secretary general, entered those presidential sites, the eight presidential sites, and found nothing. So you haven't given any evidence contrary to the declaration of Iraq. By all standards, Mr. Butler, by all standards, when somebody goes to the court, goes to an investigation, goes wherever he goes, and says I have not done this, can you sentence him to prison unless you find an evidence, a physical evidence, a clear evidence to the contrary? Yes, you might wait for a month, or two or three in order to check whether his declaration is correct or not, but after seven years and you are still not ready to tell the Security Council that there is no biological weapons in Iraq? You tell me and every time they say--your experts say--your declarations are unverifiable. I have a very important question. If our declarations are not verifiable, why did you destroy al-Hakam and the other sites? You destroyed everything in al-Hakam, even the furniture, the cooling system, the chairs, the tables. If you were not capable of verifying the quality and the quantity and the whereabouts of the biological program n Iraq, why did UNSCOM decide to destroy an industrial unit, which was producing civilian products at the time of destruction, why did you do it? ['Aziz continues] It should be based on a scientific assessment that this production site is capable of doing this and that. And that means that you have a clear idea about what happened and what could happen. The other one which General Sa'di referred to, well, I asked Mr. [word indistinct] what you are asking for now, you are making a lot of questions during the meeting. Is it a weapon? What you are searching for? What you are trying to verify? Is it a weapon? Or is it a degraded, deteriorated material? He said: well, I cannot answer this question. If your job is to verify whether Iraq still has weapons of mass destruction, if those agents, which were produced in 1990 and before, are not now a weapon, then it is a major fact, it is a major conclusion. And you have to report it, therefore, there is no track for peace and security in the region, in this area, and therefore, the requirements of Chapter C of Resolution No. 687 would be final. The story of what happened, who did it, when it was done, etcetera who moved this material from this place to another, this is a matter of history. If it is not complete, it could be completed in the process of the joint work and joint cooperation between the two sides. But the major conclusion about whether the weapons exist or not should be declared. Mr. Butler, when I asked you to conduct attempt [as heard] on the BW file, and when I further asked you to conduct another meeting and when I requested that experts from a number of countries attend such a meeting, why I did that? I did that to judge first whether the work on the biological program was an ideal one or was a sloppy one. Experts could need certain judgment, wrong. The quality of the equipment and from the way the program was [word indistinct] When they tell me this is not in their terms of reference, so then what is the need for such a meeting? When the experts refuse to judge what they are asking for is the weapon which could be used now to attack somebody, then what is the need for such a meeting? That meeting was going to be failure, because the terms of reference you or somebody else in your office gave to [word indistinct]. The requirements of disarmament in the biological file have all been met. You have no evidence to the contrary. Put it on the table, if you have an evidence to the contrary, show it to me and I will judge, I will make comments on that. Give any evidence you have that Iraq might or still conceal a biological weapon. If you do not have such an evidence after the work of seven years, if you do not have such an evidence after the thorough investigations you made on the BW program since August 1995 till now, go to the Security Council and tell them the truth. You are not doing that, you are still asking for documentation, clarification. Documentation on what? When we give you a first-class document, you ignore it. What is the most important [word indistinct] in such a case? If the report done by this Gentlemen -- the director general who was in charge of the production of weapons on the 15th of January 1991 -- four days before war to Husayn Kamil not to Richard Butler, who was his boss? And he did not at that time anticipate that Sperzel or Mr. Butler or Mr. Duelfer are going to check these reports. He was doing it to his boss and he told him we have produced this and that; these are the quantities and this is the progress we have made. And you ignored this document. This document should have settled all the investigation from the moment it was given to UNSCOM, because this is the final document of the whole work in the BW and it is a first-class document, it is a genuine one. And by forensic means you can judge whether it was written in the 15th of January 1991 or it was written later to confuse or to mislead UNSCOM. And to my knowledge, you accepted the authenticity of that document. (more) 071737 ma/o'neill ['Aziz continues] So what kind of documents you want, more, and more and more. Give me documents, give me clarifications. Documents about what? Clarifications about what? So, there is a deliberate policy of confusion about this program. In the end, it's not a weapon. In the end, there are no biological weapons in Iraq. In the end, all the equipment that were used in the past program were destroyed. In the end, more than 70, how many sites Husam in the biological. . . ? More than 100 sites, even hospitals, and universities, and other sites where there are so-called dual-use equipment are under strict intrusive monitoring, daily monitoring. So, what else do you want to wrap up your work? What else do you want? Stories, about the donkeys, which were used in the experiments? The film which we showed to Lakhdar Ibrahimi about what Sperzel was asking about the donkeys whether they were tied to a pole or tied to the cart. Similar to the questions raised recently, which we mentioned in this meeting. When we checked that, in your presence, with Mr. Sperzel, why are you asking such trivial questions, he said: I wanted to test the reliability of the memory of the person who was answering the questions. Is this a work of an expert under the hat of the United Nations? Or is this the expertise of the FBI, allow me to say it. And I have good reason to mention the FBI, a good reason, because I have information--I am saying that for the history--that your experts had training in the FBI about the methods of investigation. They were trained in the headquarters of the FBI in the United States about how to investigate Iraq.
[Butler] Would you share that information with me.
['Aziz] I am mentioning it on the record.
[Butler] I know, but would you share that information with me?
['Aziz] No.
[Butler] Why not?
['Aziz] I am putting it on the record.
[Butler] But, you're putting a statement on the record, and I am asking your help so that I can look into it and see what. . . ['Aziz, interrupting] It happened before you came to your post.
[Butler] [indistinct words]
['Aziz] Ask your deputy about it.
[Butler] Then say, do you want to make a statement that you might share with me so that I can do something about it?
['Aziz] No, it is a secret information. It's a secret information, and I do not want to expose my source, but this is a fact. I put it on the record and history will prove it, because there are persons who are involved in this training and means. And this happened and it is one of the facts of the history of UNSCOM. That's why, I also made a conclusion, this is not just an analysis: When supposed-to-be respected expert in the BW ask such trivial questions, when we ask them why do you do that, he says: I am testing the memory of the person. You and I, as diplomats, understand that this methodology is not a methodology of a scientist. This is the methodology of cops. [Unidentified UNSCOM expert] Mr. Chairman, I would like to explain the circumstances of those meetings. On the second day of our arrival, we went to (Nibayy) and asked persons who were destroying biological and chemical weapons; that is, the special weapons, to present us the accounting of their destroying. They did. And we spent six hours under the sun on that day. In the evening, when we arrived for the meeting, we were presented with an explanation of why, after the laboratory findings of the anthrax warheads, which indicated that there were more anthrax warheads than Iraq declared previously. And your statement was that it was not five anthrax warheads, but 16. And it was after eight years of investigation of those issues. We asked what we can do and based on what this statement was made. It was explained to us that it was of what those persons are saying and recollecting and now the only persons who have any recollection of what actually happened, this new explanation, only logical without any supporting fact, is to be taken into account. What followed is exactly this: We accepted that explanation, but tried to in further sessions with those who were personally engaged in the destruction [word indistinct] to identify at least some facts that could support a new logical explanation that was presented to us, which on the surface of it, was admitted to contradict all the previous statements made by persons who were directly involved in the destruction. That includes, for example, such a statement as 50 warheads were destroyed in (kifri) and not 10. The statement on the 10 warheads destroyed in (kifri) was as late as 22 July this year. We are gladly willing to investigate new statements but we at least need some facts, albeit very minor facts, that could support a logical construction that was presented to us. That is why we honestly looking with these officers for some at least minor facts that can still corroborate the logical explanation presented to us the day before, and a few hours later, then the same officers presented a different story at [word indistinct], because on a big issue there was no fact that could corroborate that statement. Thank you very much. [Lt. Gen. 'Amir Rashid] It is important first to set [words indistinct] for this discussion. Iraq, regarding the specific agents which were filled in warheads, never remembered exactly what was filled. But to the best of the recollection, Iraq stated [sentence incomplete].
['Aziz] Iraq means the experts.
[Rashid] The Iraqi experts, to the best of their recollection, it was stated that possibly anthrax was filled in five. We proved scientifically--and this is not only logic, it is scientific and it depends on the document which his excellency gave to prime minister 15th of January 1991. How much was produced of agent A, how much was produced of agent B, how many warheads filled and how many aircraft bombs. OK, I have agent A, I could fill either 16 or five warheads. If I fill 16, then, please Mr. Butler, then I could fill aircraft bomb less. If I fill five warhead, then I could fill aircraft bombs more. Only [word indistinct] whether agent A or agent B The problem is we realize very concretely that people who remembered did not remember exactly how much they filled. We told the fact as it is and [words indistinct]. So there was a document which says A and B, they are 16 and five but it is not written A and B. It is written special three, special five. So people thought it might be five, [words indistinct]. It was not written B it was written special five. So there are two possibilities. It is not a gradual combination. If A is 16 then B is five; if A is five, then B is 16. And of course if it is 16 then the aircraft bomb is so much because the quantity of the agents which is produced is well known. It is documented, it is factual, this is scientific analyses and we made the mathematics of it in front of your team. We would have hoped of course that they would analyze the scientific analyses and depending on the documentation and the total production. What we arrived at the end by the way, just to make a long story short, we arrived that it is equally, scientifically, and based on the documentation and based on the production of the agent, it is equally possible that either 16 or five. This is B and similarly for A. Now how do we determine if it is 16-5 or 5-16, we said we have to look on the facts which we had now. What are the facts? We depended on your information, we did not even check the authenticity of that information because Mr. Smidovitch told us there are anthrax in two pits and since in every pit we know together, that there is no less than 10. So, if it was five it would have been seen in one pit. If we have seen it in two pits, that means it is more than five. So since they have either five or 16, that means 16 is logical. This is one reason. [Rashid continues] What does this have to do with the recollection of the experts, I do not know. The Second reason: He says we have evidences of laboratory tests that at least we have seven Anthrax. So that means it is not five, because if five how could we get seven. So we said: As a scientific analysis, as a detection, as a conclusion, as a statement, [word indistinct] they will make a similar analysis, let them contradict scientifically, let them agree, let them modify, make a different conclusion. They did not utter one word. We know this procedure. Whenever we have a solid case, it needs to be investigated. We have finalized it [word indistinct]. You know, we have to look at in depth, we have to corroborate. But when there is a silly statement by an expert making a recollection of eight years ago on a detailed situation in the field, this is important, we have to adopt it, it is an Iraqi declaration, it becomes a big issue. Now regarding the 15 [word indistinct], Mr. Butler executed outside, and you were surprised the extent of that [Words indistinct]. But it is quite unpopulated area. Mr. Smidovitch now is considering it a very important contradiction. How our people recollected eight years ago, we are remembering eight or seven years ago, and the distance between them is only 500 meter in an area where there are few more than 10 kilometers totally unpopulated [words indistinct], we want them to say 15 and 10 or is it 10 and 15. God knows who remembers this. Of course when you terrorize them, when they are thinking they are making a big responsibility on behalf of Iraq, because we consider these official statements, I told this to Mr. Smidovitch, sometimes you mislead them. Ok, there was 15, how could you remember this 10 and that 15. And he wanted to check a scientific information or recollection of one or two officers. And he talked about all the people. I am really surprised how misleading and misrepresenting of the facts. The only officer who started to doubt his memory after listening to the scientific analysis, he said: Possibly, I remember them wrong, instead of 15 to 10 it is 10 to 15. He is the only person who started to doubt and change his recollection. He is changing a very important data. I have been to this site many times, to be honest, I do not remember where was [word indistinct]. There are no landmarks there, it is totally deserted. How could he remember. And they dwell on what you have done in March 1992. Tell me exactly, who came with you, how did you come two days across examinations? We allowed it to see the end of it and we thought they might allocate one session to discuss that side [word indistinct] of the filling of the agents in the warheads and the air bombs, because this is an important issue. Let us examine it till today. And there was Mr. (Reed), Mr. (Egor), Mr. (Himich), Madam (Gabriel), Mr. (Smidovitch), all the people concerned were in front of [word indistinct] of the presentation, privately in the break, this is very satisfactory, this looks very intelligent, it answers a lot of questions. But in their seminar, no one gives us any answer. We have to assess it, we have to go to New York, we have to verify it, we have to check. And the verification you see it is unbelievable. Even they told me I have to see the video myself, because sometimes I join Mr. Laraby. I could not believe the methodology of the question, why because they are thorough, where are exactly the pit? Where are the fragments? Which has nothing to do neither with the disarmament nor the issues which we have put to Mr. Smidovitch on the first meeting, where they are put extensive efforts and [word indistinct] they will appreciate. They say it has settled a lot of ambiguity in their mind. It is a rechecking on the recollection of our experts. Why not? Why not? Let us check their recollection. Now, it is change of recollection in all people except one. Thank you very much. ['Aziz continues] We know it, this is a tactic to procrastinate, to prolong, and we're, as General Rashid said, we can find a lot of contradictions, because you are asking trivial questions about events, which happened seven or eight years ago. And people are human beings, they might recollect exactly what happened sometime and might not. But, when they find themselves interrogated to give an answer, they give an answer, and that answer might not be fully accurate, but about what, fully accurate about what? Fully accurate about legal issues or about trivial and minor issues? We are used to that tactic. When General Rashid briefed me about the meetings, I asked him: How was the meeting? He said: We are back to the old tricks, to the same episode which occurred in 1997 and before were repeated. That's why you come and tell me: Well, there has a progress but it's not enough, we need more accurate answers, we need more documentation, we need this. This is the old game. While the main issues have been verified. Most importantly, what you are talking about are destroyed warheads. This is the most important fact. Destroyed seven years ago, whether 15 war anthrax or five war anthrax, it does not make a big difference in the sense of threats and security to the region. They are destroyed, dead. But, this is an issue. It's a big issue in your methodology. You have to know everything. And when even a major fact about this matter emerges, as the analysis made by General Rashid, he made a [word indistinct] analysis, because, as he said, the persons or the person, Mahmud, who was in charge of the filling, does not remember exactly how many of this type, how many of that type. He is a human being. He does not remember. There is not document for that. Okay, when there was a confusion, Gen. Rashid did his best to make a scientific and logical analysis, and he made the scientific and logical analysis. Okay, 15 anthrax, 15 B, and five A, so what, they are destroyed Mr. Butler. They are destroyed, dead. And they are accounted for the number. The agent itself, whether it is anthrax, or it is A, or B, or C, does not live till now as a weapon. So, the investigation on it does not relate to the requirements of disarmament. That's why I am asking you honestly to tell the Security Council and the international community that Iraq does not have weapons of mass destruction. You could say there are some stories, and there are some backgrounds which are not yet clear to us, which do not change the major fact. Okay, say that. And we will follow up such stories and backgrounds to give you the best possible perfect picture about what happened in 1985, in 1986, in 1990, in 1991, but that does not change the major fact that Iraq does not have weapons of mass destruction that could be used, as the Americans say, as a threat to their neighbors, because the main objection of the Americans to lift the sanctions is that Iraq is still a threat to its neighbors. By the way, nobody among our neighbors, except Kuwait, say that. It is the American statement. They make it for their own. Nobody endorses that statement. We say the truth. If you don't say the truth, if you beat around the bush and go after those trivial and minor issues, that means that you are serving the American policy. That's a conclusion. I have no other conclusion. Your are by technical means--or supposed-to-be technical, they are not technical, they are, as I said, cheap forensic means you are serving a political purpose by a government, which wants to strangle the people of Iraq for reasons that do not relate to the terms of the Security Council resolutions. Why you are doing that? Why your experts are doing that? If they are real experts, if they work as you said, as you promised me in verbatim that the work will be honest and quick, and it will be done honestly and quickly?
[Butler] It's five past one, as I said earlier, I would like to take up some of the issues you raised and referred to in your opening remarks. It's also very clear to me, including from your last remarks, the main questions your are posing to us, I would like to come back to those too this evening. At what time shall we meet this evening? Fine, seven o'clock. Thank you.
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