Aziz-Butler 3 August Talks -- Part 1
Baghdad Iraq Television Network 1520 GMT 6 Aug 98 "First part" of official talks between Iraqi team led by Deputy Prime Minister Tariq 'Aziz and UNSCOM Executive Chairman Richard Butler held at the Iraqi Foreign Ministry in Baghdad on 3 August.['Aziz] Ahlan wa sahlan [you are welcome] You are welcome. I give you the floor.
[Butler] Thank you. I regret and apologize for this delay. Apparently there was a small problem with one of the vehicles unfortunately carrying our commissioners whom I would like to introduce. I think Mr. Deputy Prime Minister, you've met Commissioner (Jorfe) from China. It's his second time in that role with us here. He's at the end of the table. Then, past Dr. (Ripps) there's Commissioner (Jack Ums) from the Netherlands and Commissioner (Paul Ash) from Norway. I don't think it is necessary. . . [pauses] could I introduce a new member of our policy team in New York: Nikita Jukov who's been provided to us by the Russian Federation. I think you know everybody else. So, shall I begin?
['Aziz] Yes, please.
[Butler] The purpose of our meeting here as I have understood it is for us to enter into a discussion and make an assessment of the outcome of the schedule for work upon which we agreed in the middle of June. I think it might be most expeditious if I were to proceed to give you our assessment of what we think those outcomes were. Before doing that in a practical way and, may I say as necessary, I would propose to invite team leaders of the technical teams to assist where it may be appropriate. But before going into that assessment, I'd like to make a couple of what I consider to be basic points. First of all I am happy to tell you that UNSCOM was able to complete its side of the work. Under the schedule of work both sides had particular tasks to perform. In the case of UNSCOM, it did involve a heavy degree of organization and reorganization of our program of work. The acquisition of the assistance of teams outside UNSCOM such as those that have special equipment for researching what has been buried or what has been disposed of in waterways. We did all of the necessary work, and I am pleased that I believe that we have fulfilled, on schedule, our part of the program. My second point is that with respect to Iraq's participation in the program, while as you'll hear in a moment there were I think some very good results, I would have to say -- because I think it's a very basic point -- that there were instances in which we had sought new information and/or relevant documents to help us verify Iraq's declarations or its claimed actions of unilateral destruction and there were instances where that new information or documentation was not provided. That of necessity has had a negative impact upon our ability to verify as much as we would have hoped to have been able to verify. The next basic point I would make before commencing our assessment, is a point about the particular issue of VX. Most, perhaps not all, but most of what I will say in a moment in giving you our assessment of the outcome of the schedule of work will leave aside the particular question of VX. May I say: We don't feel the need to leave it aside. We have results from one laboratory, which have been judged by us and by international experts to be impeccable, unambiguous, and clear. Were Iraq in a position to tell us now how those results. . . How those findings were able what they were -- in other words to give us a coherent account of how it was that VX degradation products were found in remnants of special missile warheads -- we might then be able to enter into the necessary acts of verification immediately. A decision to await further analysis in laboratories being conducted in France and Switzerland is yours. It will inevitably delay the process of final verification, and we regret that. [Butler continues] But if that is your decision, we will work with you on it, but I would simply note at this point that in our view there will be a delay involved there, which we deeply regret, because we believe that the evidence that's already been obtained is beyond reproach and, were we able to be given an explanation of it that we could verify, then we could perhaps put the VX matter to rest. So, there are three basic points I wanted to make, and now I give you my assessment of where we've arrived under the schedule of work in each of the areas, missile, chemical, and biological, emphasizing at all stages that our task under this schedule of work, and indeed as ever, is essentially that of verifying what Iraq has either declared or what it's done by way of actions of unilateral destruction. First, in the missile area, there has been a great deal of effort, and I believe very important progress since we decided upon the missile component of the schedule of work. All inspections, all missions, all expert-makings provided for in the schedule of work were carried out. And I think that was a particularly important achievement. The warhead issue under the missile file: In our view, it has progressed to the point where we have been able to conclude the extensive survey of declared destruction sites and the excavation of remnants, and proceed to a final assessment and accounting. Examination of remnants of special excavated warheads shows a unilaterally destroyed quantity of remnants that could account for 43-45 warheads. Now, when that number is added to the 30 special warheads presented for destruction in 1991, we are very close if not indeed on the mark, of the amount of operational special warheads that is 75 declared by Iraq to have been produced. Now, Mr. deputy prime minister, I believe we can agree that that's a major accomplishment in our recent work in the missile area. Now, that's a very positive background against which what I am now going to say is puzzling and regrettable, which is that Iraq has actually failed to provide complete and accurate information on unilateral destruction activities and on what it admits was an attempt to mislead the commission in 1992. I am talking about the ceding of a site by yourself missile [words indistinct]... ['Aziz, interrupting] Could you please repeat the last paragraph of what you have said?
[Butler] I said against this very positive background, it is even more regrettable and puzzling why Iraq continues to choose to provide incomplete and inaccurate information on the unilateral destruction activities and on its attempts to mislead the commission in 1992. Such action makes verification more difficult and certainly more time consuming than it should be. There is information, which we have sought in this context with respect to where did destruction take place? When did it take place? Under what directives? Why was one of the sites ceded with no [word indistinct]? These are not things on which we make an accusation, these are things that in part Iraq has admitted did occur. We need an accurate account of them so we can put it to rest. And it is very puzzling to us that that account has been withheld because of the positive nature of what we've been able to achieve on warheads if we were able to get this final bit of information it would be clear, all would be clear. And it is information, which, in our view, is required for credible verification. Turning now to the analysis of special warhead samples. This was discussed jointly on a technical level in July. Now, VX was found in warhead remnants, and this obviously affects the accounting of special warheads, as all unilaterally destroyed warheads were declared as alcohol-filled. So what this means, Mr. Deputy Prime Minister, is that the VX issue must be resolved for the Commission to be in a position to assess if, if [repeats himself] the current accounting of special warheads is sufficient to verify fully the declared prescribed warhead production in unilateral destruction. Let me just tie that together. We have an account, which substantially adds up to 75, but we need to be absolutely certain of that, because there are one or two sources of ambiguity. You can make us certain if we know where, when, by what means, and (?of) what direction the destruction took place. We've asked for that information, and it has so far not been given to us. We will also need, when you are ready,--we are ready now--, but we will also need to know the truth about VX filling of special warheads, because we will need to know how that relates to the number 45, because all of the 45 were declared to be filled with other substances than VX. So, were those declarations right or wrong? Or what is the number of warheads that were filled with VX additional to the 45? These are the issues that we need to have clarified to finally bed down, to put to rest, the issue of special warheads. Now, since the visit in June, we've also achieved significant progress in accounting of prescribed conventional warheads, both imported and indigenously produced. Based on the results achieved, we would like to hear a statement from you, from Iraq, on whether any further work would be fruitful to close the remaining gaps in the current accounting or whether you consider the current accounting as final. Now, next, we expect Iraq to provide shortly full and credible clarifications on the specific warhead issues, issues that were outlined and discussed during the last warhead inspection mission. Turning now to indigenous production, the schedule for work also addresses the issue of indigenous production of missiles, the materials balance of some major components and the unilateral destruction thereof. A variety of issues involved had been reviewed in depth during recent meetings with the team led by Mr. (John Larabi), who is with us today. That team has tried to obtain a more complete accounting of the major components of the indigenous program, a more complete accounting of its achievements, and of its status. My understanding is that considerable progress has already been achieved in the development of a rough material balance of components for engine production. But the team still needs to prepare its assessments and recommendations. Nevertheless, I am satisfied with the results achieved so far in the implementation of the schedule of work. We must continue to work to verify what can or is able to be verified, and I am [words indistinct] but whatever we can. And in this context, the early provision by Iraq of complete clarifications that was sought, and of supporting documentation, in particular those requested by the missile team and directed by the Commission, provision of such clarifications and documents would be important. To illustrate the importance of this, may I say that a single document that the team has received--this was a document of selected 11 pages from an engineer's notebook--it was very helpful, and it demonstrated how the provision of documents could accelerate progress. And there may be documents of a similar character. The one I've mentioned has been withheld by Iraq since 1997, and the provision of it to us at this juncture was very helpful, and there may be others of a similar kind. And we will be glad if we can see them. Now for the commission to be able to state confidently that all weapons produced or acquired by Iraq have been destroyed, we need to be able to verify major elements of Iraq's declarations. It is a statement of fact that the unilateral destruction activities declared by Iraq in this area, and perhaps in some others, do not match available evidence. And this does apply to special warheads and to some elements of indigenous production. I want to mention in this context that I regret that what I think was a promising effort to clarify some of the outstanding issues related to hiding of proscribed warheads was recently terminated or interrupted by the Iraqi side, and site visits and further discussion effort did not take place. I regret that, because I think that was an unhelpful development. Iraq still needs to account for the unilateral destruction of proscribed missile propellants. I am aware of what you have said about that. You want to say that the side that [as heard] I have to repeat to you now that I must continue to seek clarity on that issue to be able provide a solid report to the Security Council. Now, there is a simple solution to it in my understanding, it involves a document, once again a document. Were we to have that document, we would be able to verify that some 300 tones of this Scud specific propellant had been destroyed, then that would be the end of it. I have to say finally too that we have not received, still not received, the documents we requested in our November 1996 letter, and which were identified by the missile warhead TEM [technical evaluation meetings] last February. And that is disappointing. Now, to sum up the missile area, what can I say: First, there has been good progress. A schedule of work has moved this further and closer towards the end of this file from the disarmament perspective. Secondly, I used the word puzzled, I think, twice. We are puzzled as to why Iraq will not give us some remaining elements and documents that we need, which clearly exist, which would end some outstanding issues and end them quickly. Thirdly and finally, this file gives us straight in a very particularly way two things, which I am convinced are simply true. One is this that the action of the unilateral destruction, whatever motivated it in the past has slowed us down unacceptably in the present. It obliges us to put back together [word indistinct] puzzle, to reconstruct the past. And the substantial portion of what we are dealing with here in the missile file are problems created by the acts of unilateral destruction. The whole business of it, of having to analyze tens of tonnes of melted down ingots and so on, very difficult. But we are on the case and we have to solve it. This is a consequence of actions of unilateral destruction [3-second break in reception] That is not to accuse you, it's to state a fact--the fact that governs a great deal of what we had to deal with here. It is difficult. Now, I move to my second basic point illustrated so well by this file. The problems of verification that have been caused by unilateral destruction can be solved. And I think so substantially through the provision of documents and that is my second point. I cannot emphasize too strongly the importance of the provision by you to us, for our sight, for our review and verification of the relevant documents that tell us exactly what was produced, where they were destroyed, when they were destroyed, on what instructions, so that we can say that's it, it's finished, which is what we want to do. So, this file, above all, illustrates the importance of the provision to us of documents. [Butler continues] Let me say that we have identified some steps that could be taken in the weeks ahead, and clearly before the formulation of our (?cable) report in the missile area, some joint work that we could do. I do not know whether it would be part of our schedule of work number two or just continuing work, but joint work that we can do within the next three or four weeks, which might be able to close further the gaps that I have identified and, with the provision of relevant documents, perhaps close them all together. Perhaps later on in our meeting, if you are interested in that approach, I can tell you what those are. Should I tell you now? Well, there are three points. First of all, the issues requiring clarifications--outstanding questions requiring clarification--in the warheads area. We would need to be provided to us by Iraq by the 19th of August. Now Mr. Smidovitch can tell your experts exactly what they are, you know what they are, but we can give a list and say these are the things in the warheads area which we would need by the 19th of August, that is, to meet our deadline, right? Right. Then, secondly, there would be an expert meeting between Iraq and UNSCOM on those warhead issues in early September. The first, request provision of the materials by 19 August would be in order to enable this expert meeting to take place in early September in Baghdad. And then, finally, we would conduct an inspection to verify accountable aspects of the material balance and unilateral destruction of major components for indigenous production. Now, were those steps to be taken, we would be--and what I shall I say, Mr. Smidovitch--in a vastly improved position from our position today. We would have solved all the problems. I think we would have solved all the problems. Now, those are the steps, and I am very happy to give you, to (?stop) them rather than have you just take the necessary steps you have in mind. That is what I wanted to say on the missile area. Shall we do it area by area or do you want to hear the whole lot?
['Aziz] No, I prefer to listen to all your accounts.
[Butler] Turning now to the missile area--sorry, the chemical weapons area. In Paragraph 1 of the chemical section of the schedule for work, or pursuant to Paragraph 1, action was taken to collect 80 swab samples from the remnants of special warheads. This is the paragraph of the document that relates the chemical area to the missile area. From those 80 samples, 40 samples were sent for analysis to a Swiss laboratory and 40 samples were sent to France--a laboratory in France. [five-second break in reception] these will be conducted as [six-minute break in reception] UNSCOM will receive progress reports on a weekly basis. We had hoped that those laboratories might work a bit more quickly than it seems they now will. It is just, I think, at least in part, a consequence of the fact that these samples have gone to European countries at a time where they traditionally have a slightly down time in the summer period. But, we have asked them: Could we please have a progress report week by week? They have said: Yes. We will share the results of those progress reports with you as they come in. So that is all that I think needs to be said from the chemical file with respect to its relationship to the VX issue as it arose under the missile file. So I will turn now to what was provided in Paragraph 2 of the schedule for work in the period from 13 to 15 July, the expert meeting on the results of the chemical analysis of 44 samples from special warheads taken in April 1998 was held. These analyses identified VX degradation products. The international expert team that was assembled was comprised of experts from seven countries: China, France, Germany, Russia, Switzerland, UK, and USA. After the review of the available results, the international experts unanimously judged the results as valid and unambiguous. However, up to the present time, no technical explanations have been offered by Iraq on the source of the degradation products of VX found in the samples. The Iraqi side does not challenge the analysis and the results thereof as such, but it continues to make general statements to the effect that VX had never been weaponized. [Butler continues] Moreover, Iraq states that there are several possibilities to explain the presence of such degradation products, but for the time being Iraq will not give any explanation. Indeed, on the other hand apparently, it stated that if such an explanation would be given in the next two to three, or four months, then UNSCOM would not like it. I am not sure what that means, you may be able to tell me. As I said at the beginning, this can be cleared, I believe if we were given a credible explanation now of how those products, degradation productions, could've occurred in warheads remnants, or we can wait until the labs in Europe do their job. I think it is just a matter of time. Turning now to the accounting of 150 mm mustard-filled shells, Iraq has not yet provided its final clarification. However, recently Iraq presented a verbal progress report on Iraq's investigation to locate remnants on these munitions, which had been lost after the war. Iraq and the Special Commission, at the expert level, reviewed the situation and agreed on further steps to be undertaken to achieve a reasonable accounting of these weapons. According to the schedule for work, Iraq requested the deployment of UNSCOM's ground penetrating surveillance technology to support Iraq's efforts. We were glad to meet this request and to send, in mid-August, an inspection team to operate such equipment and to take samples, which would help to locate the remnants on these munitions. Now on the issue of accounting for R-400 aerial bombs, according to the schedule of work, Iraq provided the commission with documents on the disposition of the key components of these weapons, the conventional parachute tails. Recently, at the expert level, Iraq presented the requested clarifications. The documentation provided by Iraq seems to be satisfactory for the verification on the total number of R-400 aerial bombs. We are satisfied, and we will send, as soon as possible, an inspection team to close this accounting issue. Of course, this data is not sufficient to settle the problem of the distribution of agents in this type of aerial bombs, especially by logical agents. Finally, on the issue of the movement of the chemical weapons production equipment, Iraq, according to the schedule of work, provided its explanations on the events of concern, and we will now proceed with verification. The presentation of documents, which would support Iraq's explanations will enable the Commission to close the issue quickly. And Iraq was recently requested to provide such documentation.
['Aziz] Could you repeat the last sentence, please?
[Butler] Presentation, sorry, the presentation of documents, which would support Iraq's explanations would enable the Commission to close this issue quickly, and Iraq recently was requested to provide such documentation. So, to sum up in the chemical area, I'll leave aside what was said and repeated about the VX issue. That issue aside, on 155 mm mustard shells, we'll have our equipment here shortly in the middle of August and that should, I think, do the job. R-400 aerial bombs, we will be moving to verify the present data to close the accounting issue, and I think I'll be confident that that can be done in the weeks ahead. Finally, the same seems to be true with respect to the issue of the movement of chemical weapons production equipment. But, once again, there is a need for a document or documents there which would help us close that one. So, in a word, VX aside is a separate issue. It seems to me, deputy prime minister, this file is in very good shape. We seem to be getting there. (more) 061736 sl/o'neill [Unidentified UNSCOM official] I would like to add one remark. As I said last week to general Sa'di [Iraqi Presidential adviser] among the, around the degradation products found on special warheads, I have to repeat -- and this was slightly forgotten -- the request of the VX 10 in February this year, and once again the Commission's report of April that this is only one facet of the overall VX complex. Both reports VX 10 and commission's report to the Security Council in April clearly point out that Iraq still has to support its declarations on the 1990 VX activities with either documentation or verifiable evidence. Thank you.
[Butler] Shall I turn now to biology?
['Aziz] Yes.
[Butler] Now, unlike missiles and chemicals this remains an area rather less light than the other two. There is still important work to be done in the other two areas. But work with documentary support is doable and doable quite quickly leading to an end of the disarmament period. I can't say the same with respect to the biological weapons file. Let me get straight to the point. What took place here in Baghdad just recently with respect to the experts meeting; international experts and UNSCOM experts, represented the fourth occasion in about a year I think, is that right? In about a year the fourth occasion? [Unidentified person] Ninety seven.
[Butler] Yea, in about a year in which a gathering involving international experts reviewed Iraq's FFCD -- in other words the whole biological file -- and found that it was simply inadequate as a basis for verification in its particular parts and as a whole. A very serious matter. When we were here seven weeks ago, I proposed an alternate method a logical approach, which was to go from top to the bottom; that is from weapons at the top down to growth media at the bottom rather than starting at what used to be the methodology of starting with growth media and working towards weapons. You agreed to that, and I believe the meeting that took place in Baghdad from the 17th to the 23d of July followed this alternative approach and started with weapons. First, there was ... [pauses] they started with the focus on material balance with weapons at the top, then agents, the filling of ammunitions at the next level, and then material such as growth media at the last level. Both sides accepted this approach and it formed the agenda and approach of the meeting. Now, what were the results? First of all, starting at the top, weapons. None of the sub-components of the R400 aerial bombs material balance; that is production, filling or destruction of filled or destruction of unfilled bombs. None of it could be verified. None of the sub-components of the biological al-Husayn warheads material balance as production, filling, or destruction could be verified. Finally, the account in the FFCD on the drop tanks and the so-called Zubaydi spray device could not be verified. Now, what I am presenting to you is the view of the experts who attended that meeting. Turning to production of agents. This could be laborious, but let me say I've got one, two, three, four, five agents here (Clostridium voltralinumtoxine (Vaxilous antherasus spores) aflotoxin (Clostridium perfringine spores) and (Witcover smutt) and in each case, my notes say this: None of the sub-components balance ... [pauses] sorry, none of the sub-components material balance; that is production, filling, losses, or destruction could be verified. In each case, with respect to each of them. I want to say that again: None of the sub-components of, for example, the Clostridium voltralinumtoxine material balance could be verified. The same was true for anthrax, aflotoxin, clostridium, perfringines, and witcover smutt. None. That's production of agents. Now moving further towards the bottom, growth media. None of the sub-components of the material balance for the growth media that is acquisition procurement use lost or destroyed could be verified. This is very dark picture. I do have to say and I'm glad to say that there were some features in the Iraqi account that could be confirmed. And these included aspects of the modified dropped tank, the agent fill of some of the R400 bombs and the import of some of the media. We had repeatedly sought new evidence or new material on the basis of which we could verify Iraq's FFCD. But no material was provided to or to amend the September 1997 FFCD. And so it was this account of the material balance that UNSCOM 250; that was the meeting in July, sought to verify. Conducting the verification process, all information available to the Special Commission at the present time was considered. Some of the FFCD [not further identified] are present in the topic for further investigations. But, I have to say that in the absence of additional supporting evidence on all outstanding issues, the expert team said that it could see no solution to these verification problems at the technical level. And may I say, Mr. Deputy Prime Minister, the experts made an explicit recommendation in the report. And I am sorry to say this, but this was their recommendation made explicitly. It was that no further verification assessment of Iraq's biological FFCD can be conducted at the senior international expert level until Iraq commits itself to provide new substantial information. Let me emphasize that. These experts made clear that they do not want to do it again. They said: Don't ask us to come again. It is a waste of their time. It will be fruitless to make the task of verification. That is what they are asked to do. Please tell us whether what Iraq states here as the truth is able to be verified and believed on the basis of the information in these documents. And they have said: Unless that information changes, don't waste our time in the future, because it is an undoable job. We cannot verify Iraq's claims on the basis of this information. We need more and better information. Now, were we to continue working on the basis of the present FFCD in the weeks ahead before we prepare our October report to the Council, we could see a couple of tasks that UNSCOM could do in addition to continuing to implore you to amend and make more credible the 1997 FFCD. But we could continue to investigate some other areas relevant to the BW file to determine the extent of the BW program as a follow-up to the TEM [technical evaluation meeting] report, which concluded, among other things, that planning, management, and development of the research program is not clearly defined in the FFCD. I am, quite frankly, I am not sure, in the light of the international experts' view, whether that work would be worthwhile. But it was recommended to us by TEM, and that is what we could presumably do in the next few weeks. More important in the next few weeks would be what you might be able to do to fill the void that exists in this file. Now, in that context, I noted in your last message to me that you indicated that while we are here in Baghdad today or tomorrow, you will have a new or different presentation to make to us on the biological file. I look forward to hearing that. But the account I have given you now is our assessment of, our knowledge of the outcome of the schedule of work with respect to the biological file. There are other issues not on the schedule of work. But I assume we will come to those at some other stage. That for the moment concludes my presentation to you of our assessment of the outcomes of the July schedule of work. Thank you.
['Aziz] Mr. Chairman, I welcome you and your colleagues again, especially the new gentlemen who are participating in this session. I have followed the work after our last meeting in June, and I am not surprised at all to hear what I heard from you. I am not surprised; I was expecting that. We agreed in June that we will focus on the major questions of disarmament in order to be able to report to the Security Council that the basic requirements in Chapter C of Resolution 687 have been met, satisfactorily met, and the Security Council would be obliged then to consider the implementation of Paragraph 22. In our view and in the view of every fair person or government, the major issues in disarmament are two: Whether there is a weapon or not; and whether there is a capability of producing such a weapon or not. This is common sense. Every politicians, and even experts, know this fact. You promised me, and in verbatim, that the scheduled work on the outstanding disarmament issues will be done honestly and quickly so that you could report to the Security Council in October, or make a report in October, different from the previous reports. That means a good report, a positive report, that will enable the Council to consider the implementation of Paragraph 22. This did not happen. The work on your side, I mean on the side of the team you sent, was neither honest nor quick in all the three files. The teams of UNSCOM, which were sent to Baghdad in the last period followed the same old methods of confusion--deliberate and artificial confusion-- between the major issues related to the disarmament requirements and the trivial, marginal, secondary issues that could be followed anytime without making them an obstacle towards the implementation of Paragraph 22. This, first, is a general assessment, and then I am going to get into the details. In your presentation, you spoke about unilateral destruction as an obstacle for verification. In our last meeting--and it is on the record--I said, and as a repetition for several times, that the unilateral destruction took place in 1991. And now we are in 1998. No unilateral destruction occurred after 1991. UNSCOM worked in 1991, 1992, 1993, and 1994. And in 1995, in June 1995, your predecessor reported to the Security Council on the missile and the chemical file. ['Aziz continues] And the question of unilateral destruction was already addressed and finalized. So, when you are still digging into unilateral destruction now in 1998 what does that mean to any far impartial observer? Unilateral destruction of missiles, unilateral destruction of chemical weapons and agents was already addressed. And till now [ten-second break in reception]. And in 1996, and early 1997, I addressed this issue of where, and why, and when, because this was the game played by Mr. Smidovitch. Mr. Smidovitch was always asking or focusing on when and where and why and how, not focusing on the fact that the weapon was destroyed or not. And I told him in the presence of Ekeus the best evidence for destruction is the dead weapon, there it is, the engine is dead. That's enough for the verification for disarmament. When that engine was destroyed on the 9th of July or on the 12th July is not important. Was it destroyed in the morning or in the evening is not important. How it was brought from the store, by a car or by another vehicle that's not the main issue. The main issue is whether it was destroyed or not. There it is in your hands verified that it has been destroyed. And I know very well, and this is the experience of seven years, those questions of why and when and how and who, are questions used in order to perpetuate the situation, to prolong it endlessly. And this has been the endless game played by your experts in all the files. And unfortunately the same games, the same tricks were played during the work in July. The same games the same tricks. If I am going to get material evidence, I mean evidence in terms of examples to that, I will come to that. Documentation, well, I repeat what I said in our last meeting: Why do you speak about documentation as if we haven't provided any documents to you? We have provided hundreds of thousands of documents to UNSCOM on each and every issue, in each and every file, in each and every detailed issue. The documents, which were available in Iraq which we succeeded in collecting them from the institutions, from the individual [5-second break in reception] And you are still asking about documentation. Documentation on what? On the missiles? The missiles are destroyed, the engines are destroyed, the launchers are destroyed, the warheads are destroyed, and so on so forth. So, what more documentation are you asking for? This is also an endless game. You always tell the Security Council and the international public: Iraq, we need Iraq to provide further information and documentation, and you make it as a basic requirement for wrapping up your work. This could be done for a century without an end. What document do you need? For what purpose? Verification, you have been making verification for seven years. We haven't mentioned anything to you unless you followed that with verification. Inspection teams, interviews, visits, discussions, tens, hundreds of them, they were all to verify Iraq's declarations and still you need to verify. Verifying, verify, whatever we tell you, this is a cup of tea, it's a cup of tea; yes it looks like a cup of tea, but we are going to verify it. This is a spoon. Yes, it looks like a spoon, but we are going to verify it, and so on and so forth. And we have examples. I am going to give you examples on what your experts are doing and were doing in July. The main fact, the major fact, which you are deliberately not telling the world, not telling the Security Council, is that Iraq is free of the proscribed weapons. Iraq is 100 percent free of proscribed weapons. You haven't uttered this fact. You are still making speculations, you are still raising suspicions, but you have not provided to the Security Council and to the world any evidence, any physical or material evidence to the contrary. For seven years you have been working in this country, inspections, intrusions, spying, and all the other activities of UNSCOM and you haven't found a weapon, after the destruction that took place in 1991 and some early time in 1992. And still you are searching, you are verifying. Verifying what? Verifying that Iraq does not have a weapon, a proscribed weapon. Or, verifying what? First of all, you have to go and tell the Security Council that after seven years of work we have not detected the existence of a prohibited, proscribed weapon in the whole territory of Iraq. This is a fact. You report it. Secondly, you have an overwhelming, comprehensive, rigid, intrusive monitoring system, which has been working for four years, you have not detected any major violation of Iraq's obligations under [Security Council Resolutions] 687 and 750. And you know very well that Iraq cannot produce, reproduce any of those weapons, proscribed weapons, without being detected by the monitoring system in Iraq. So, the two major requirements for disarmament have already been implemented. They are there. No weapons and no capability of reproducing weapons. I was expecting you, when you promised me in our last meeting that you will wrap up this job quickly and honestly, that in this meeting you will tell me: Yes, in the missile area this has been achieved, in the chemical area this has been achieved. There is a confusion. And here the confusion was deliberately, deliberately, and artificially created by Dr. Spirzel, the American Doctor Spirzel. He deliberately and artificially confused all the questions regarding the BW, because he is serving the policies of his government, and he is not an expert, or at least he is not an honest and impartial expert. And I, in good faith, asked you, requested you, during this meeting, to extend your visit, bring the necessary experts on your side, and we will both review the situation in the BW program and then decide where are the major facts, where are the minor and trivial issues, separate them, verify the major aspects of the program [break in reception for a few seconds] for further consideration, then go to the Security Council. [break in reception for a few seconds]. This did not happen. You refused my request. [break in reception for several seconds] the Security Council and the international community to reach the truth. You can play such games. I am used to that, it is not a surprise to me. ['Aziz continues] I give you one example of the issues you are raising, you raised the question, you said, well, let us leave the VX aside, if you want to address it now, we are ready to address it, if you want to wait till the end of the results of the labs in Europe. What's this question? What's this trick, which was used in the VX? You took samples or swaps of destroyed warheads. First, destroyed warheads: You took them to an American laboratory, let us say a French laboratory, and then they realized that there are traces of VX in them. VX is a chemical agent, is chemistry. Here I put it from the disarmament point of view. If Iraq filled warheads with VX, why should Iraq not say that, not mention that to UNSCOM, what's the reason? We declared that we filled warheads with anthrax. Anthrax, according to the experts, is more lethal than the VX. So, we admitted that we filled warheads with anthrax, why should we not admit that we filled with VX if that was the case? The sinister conclusion might be that we filled warheads with anthrax and concealed them. Well, you know very well, and the man in the street knows, that a warhead is not a weapon that might create any destruction unless there is a means of delivery to that weapon. A warhead of a missile by itself is not a lethal weapon unless it is carried and delivered by a missile to a certain [word indistinct], and you know that the missiles are destroyed. We do not have any missiles. So, it would be quite foolish for Iraq to fill warheads with VX, conceal them without having any missile to deliver them. It makes no sense. It's an Indian film as General Rashid says, you see. It makes no sense at all. If we filled the warheads with VX in order to conceal them, how could you find them in the destruction pits, Mr. Butler? You see the contradiction in the whole picture? So, those traces are chemical traces. There could be an explanation. We worked on that separately. We just want to understand what happened, how, why this happened? I am not a chemist, and I do not [und-min break in reception] But it could be research, but that does not mean that Iraq has a weapon. It does not change the picture about the chemical area. The chemical area is destroyed, the weapons are destroyed completely. The capability of production was destroyed, equipment were totally destroyed, and the remaining dual use equipment are under strict monitoring, so where is the problem? Yes, there was a finding, but this finding could be followed up by experts without making it an issue, which confuses the Security Council and the world and delays the implementation of Paragraph 22. You speak about your TEM, biological TEM, which came to Baghdad and strictly, obeyed or followed the methodology you mentioned now, Mr. Butler? I followed two-day meetings, four meetings, and I received reports from General al-Sa'di about each meeting at the end of the meeting, and I was worried that the work was not going on as agreed upon between you and me. So, I wanted to meet with the chief inspector. And ironically, which is quite understood by me, he did not come alone, he brought the American Spirzel with him. He is the chief inspector. I invited the chief inspector for a meeting with me. ['Aziz continues] He didn't bring a French or a Russian or a Chinese expert with him; he brought the man who was in charge of this file for years and who is responsible for all the confusion that was created about the BW program. He brought him with him. I said okay. I told him, Mr. (Selstrom), I have followed your meetings with General al-Sa'di and his colleagues. You are asking questions. Are those questions related to the disarmament requirements, which Mr. Butler and I agreed that they will be the major issues of work. He said: No, Sir, I have no such guidelines. I said: But I agreed with the executive chairman that you will focus whether what you are asking for is a weapon or not. He said: That is not my capacity. How is it not your capacity? He said, well, I am an expert. I said, yes, this is your job. When you go to the Security Council and tell them that this glass is not verified, a member in the Security Council would ask you: Mr. Selstrom, is this a weapon? You have to answer that. He said: No, it is not up to me to answer. It is for Mr. Butler to decide whether it is a weapon or not. I said: Well, Mr. Butler is like me. We are both diplomats and politicians; we are not technicians. So why you are asking so many questions about things which might not be weapons? He said: I am puzzled about the aflatoxin. I don't know, you know, I am not an expert. You produced aflatoxin and aflatoxin is not a biological weapon. He said: That's good; that's good news. We produce something which is not a weapon. He said: Yes, but this is puzzling. You tell me that it is not a weapon, so why you are so puzzled about it? We foolishly did something which ended to be not a weapon. That's good. He said: Well, I'm puzzled. I said: Why you are puzzled? You have been working with us for years. Who was responsible for the biological program? Husayn Kamil is not an expert. The director general of the program, Dr. Murtada, is an engineer. He is a doctor in engineering. He is not a BW expert. So when somebody comes and tells him: Well, I could do this and that, he cannot personally, as an expert, verify the quality of the work. But this could not happen in the chemical area because General 'Amir al-Sa'di is a chemist. He is a scientist, a chemist. He could argue with that person whether what he is doing is real chemistry or not. So why you are puzzled. I told him, and here is important and this has been a matter which was discussed for years. And I mentioned that in our last meeting. He insisted that: Your declarations cannot be verified by western-style methods. I said, yes, certainly, they cannot be verified by western-style methods, because Iraq is not a western country. And here I repeat what I said: Iraq is not the United States; Iraq is not Norway; Iraq is not Sweden; Iraq is not Canada; Iraq is Iraq. Iraq is a developing nation. We can do something good, and we sometimes, or many times, fail to do that. So when we do something which is not ideal from the scientific point of view, it should be understood honestly by any honest expert, by any honest diplomat or politician. To judge me, to judge the work of Iraq by western-style methods means that you are not going to reach the truth. Because simply Iraq is not a developed nation. It is a developing nation. He didn't listen to me and he continued the same methodology, which was the same case in the previous. You mentioned four occasions. Yes, they were four occasions, and it could be 40 other occasions with the same results. You tell me the international experts, what is the role of it? I would like everybody to know that and put it on the record. What do you do with the international experts? First of all, you bring international experts who have known previous knowledge of the work in Iraq. That's always the case. Secondly, you take them to Bahrain and you start brainwashing them. Iraqis lie; Iraqis conceal; Iraqis present contradictory answers; etcetera, and you put them in a very sinister atmosphere before they come to Baghdad. The international experts are not briefed about what are the major requirements and what are the minor requirements. You don't tell them: Please go and see in Iraq, in your discussions with the Iraqi counterpart, whether there is a major issue remaining or a minor issue remaining. You confuse them and then there is the flow of questions. And the whole meeting is confused. When General al-Sa'di tried one time after another to bring them to make a distinction between what is major and what is minor, both Selstrom and Spirzel confused that; they refused that. No, you have to answer the question. And I am going to give you, the ladies and gentlemen present, examples of what kinds of questions there were. In the biological meeting and lately in the warheads meeting, especially Mr. Smidovitch, who is one of the best experts in UNSCOM in procrastination and perpetuation and confusing what is important and what is not important. We have lived with that for years. And this has been repeated lately.
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