Developments in US Iraq Policy
Iraq News 03 August 1998
By Laurie MylroieThe central focus of Iraq News is the tension between the considerable, proscribed WMD capabilities that Iraq is holding on to and its increasing stridency that it has complied with UNSCR 687 and it is time to lift sanctions. If you wish to receive Iraq News by email, a service which includes full-text of news reports not archived here, send your request to Laurie Mylroie .
I. IRAQ BLAMES KUWAIT FOR 1990 INVASION, AP, AUG 2
II. ROBT PELLETRAU, THE KURDISH NEGOTIATIONS, AL HAYAT, AUG 2
III. INDYK TESTIMONY BEFORE HIRC, JUL 29 [EXCERPTS ON IRAQ]
IV. "US AIMS TO UNIFY FOES OF SADDAM," WASH POST, AUG 2
With the anniversary of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and Amb.
Butler's arrival in Baghdad, both Aug 2, things are heating up. The
Iraqi press viciously attacked Kuwait, as well as Butler. As AP
reported, Al Thawra charged Kuwait was to blame for the invasion and
that "Kuwait is an American base. . . The rulers are hiding behind the
borders of the Security Council, supplying the agents and mercenaries
with what they need to plot against our country." Similarly, Babil
attacked Kuwait for using its resources to make war on Iraq and "to
bribe this international official or that to prolong the sanctions."
Former Asst Sec State for Near East Affairs, Robert Pelletrau, in Al
Hayat, Aug 2, wrote an astonishingly frank, interesting, and useful
account of the events of Aug 31, 96, when Baghdad assaulted the
US-backed Iraqi opposition in Irbil.
As Pelletrau wrote, "In September 1996, the Iraqi Army intervened in
Iraqi Kurdistan and the US administration responded with weak rocket
attacks on Iraqi air defense sites south of Baghdad and extended the
no-fly zone north to the 33rd parallel. After this, Secretary of State
Warren Christopher asked me to undertake a difficult mission to restore
U.S. influence in Northern Iraq . . . It was a large undertaking.
Indeed, in August Talabani had violated a cease-fire which had been
negotiated with our assistance and he occupied areas traditionally under
the control of the KDP. The purpose of the attack was not the land
itself, but money. Part of the cease-fire had been that the KDP would
share with the PUK revenues collected by the KDP from the trucks coming
from Turkey across the Habur border crossing and returning with Iraqi
diesel fuel. . . . The PUK forces had received some arms from Iran and
there was possibly some Iranian artillery assistance across the border
to the PUK. But according to my knowledge, there was no direct Iranian
intervention in the fighting."
As readers will recall, following the Iraqi attack on Irbil, the
administration claimed that the Kurdish fighting was a conflict between
pro-Iranian Kurds and pro-Iraqi Kurds, a fight in which the US had no
interests at stake. CIA chairman, John Deutch, was the only
administration official to publicly take issue with that. Pelletrau has
become the second.
Indeed, in the period prior to Aug 31, 96 an effort was made to
address the Kurdish fighting by establishing an INC monitoring force.
The terms of a cease-fire had been agreed upon, but its implementation
waited upon the establishment of the monitoring force. Some $4 million
was needed and a number of people, in and out of Gov't, sought to obtain
it, including the head of State's Northern Gulf Affairs, a point to
which Pelletrau alluded when he wrote that the State Dept "could not at
the time fund a neutral force to supervise a cease-fire."
But why not? It was because the White House ran Iraq policy from
behind the scenes. And it did not want the INC to get the money. It was
still angry at the INC for its Mar 95 offensive. The White House feared
that if the Iraqi army attacked the INC, the US would have to defend it.
And that they didn't want to do, even as the administration never
provided the INC any weapons with which to defend itself either.
Rather, the White House convinced itself there was an easier way to
overthrow Saddam--through a coup.
Thus, the White House made it impossible for the State Dep't to
acquire the money it sought for the INC monitoring force. It was told
that there was no money for such a force. All the money for Iraq was in
the CIA budget and that money was for covert operations. But a
monitoring force was an overt operation and hence the CIA could not pay
for it, or so it was argued. And when, in Jun 96, Saddam wrapped up the
CIA-backed coup, and then in Aug, attacked the CIA-backed insurgents,
the Clinton administration had a serious problem. But rather than fix
the problem, it dealt with it in the manner described by Pelletrau, with
a well-oiled spin machine in very high gear.
As Pelletrau explained, "I asked the two Kurdish leaders by telephone
to meet in Ankara and I was surprised to a certain extent when both
agreed immediately. . . I tried to involve London and Paris in this
effort. London agreed. But the French ambassador in Washington . . .
informed me of his Government's position, which was that the Kurdish
parties should negotiate with Baghdad. . . .
"The period between our arrival in Ankara and the holding of the
talks on October 30 and 31 saw an important development-the
administration had taken an initiative, under electoral pressures and
charges raised against it of abandoning our allies in Iraqi Kurdistan,
to evacuate those working with American organizations in Northern Iraq
and help also to evacuate members of the INC from the area to Guam, in
the Pacific ocean, to begin their processing as refugees in the US. The
Kurdish leaders showed their distress about the redirection of the US
presence in their areas and they only responded very reluctantly to our
request to help in the evacuation. . . "
In Ankara, on the eve of the US elections, Pelletrau managed to
hammer out the text of an agreement between the Kurds. But "after
reading the statement, the head of the KDP delegation, Sami Abd al
Rahman, said he could not accept revenue sharing without Barzani's
agreement. We waited as he tried to call Barzani, but without success,
on a satellite telephone in Salah al Din. This took many hours and we
could wait no longer. . . . . Therefore [we] took Sami Abdul Rahman and
pressured him very strongly to agree and that is what he did in the end,
because he had no other choice. I then called in the journalists and
read them the final statement. The successful result was a source of
comfort to the Secretary of State and came at a time when the
Republicans were waiting fiercely to attack US policy."
But they weren't really. Some of Bob Dole's foreign policy advisors
wanted him to make an issue of the Iraq fiasco in the presidential
campaign, but Dole hesitated. He had been among a group of senators who
met with Saddam in the spring of 1990. They held an obsequious exchange
with him and, after Iraq invaded Kuwait, Baghdad released a transcript
of the meeting. Probably, the meeting was part of an Iraqi campaign of
deception practiced on the US prior to the invasion of Kuwait.
Dole could have acknowledged the mistake [who hasn't made a mistake
on Iraq?] and done the country a service by putting Iraq back on the
national agenda. But Dole didn't want to be embarrassed by recollection
of his meeting with Saddam, which probably would have been part of
Clinton's response to serious criticism from Dole about Iraq.
Consequently, Iraq did not figure much in the election campaign, and it
was not until a year later, with Saddam on the ascendant, that the
Senate was ready to take up the issue.
On Wed, Jul 29, Asst Sec State for NEA, Martin Indyk, testified
before the House International Relations Committee. In his prepared
statement, Indyk reiterated Clinton policy on Iraq, "Containing the
threats to regional stability goes hand in hand with our efforts to
promote peace in this volatile region. We are doing this by working to
maintain international support for actions against the Saddam Hussein
regime until it complies fully with all relevant security council
resolutions. Frankly, given Saddam Hussein's track record, we do not
believe this is likely to occur . . ."
In response to Congress' pressure to develop a policy toward Iraq
that would aim at Saddam's overthrow, Indyk explained, "We will
encourage a united opposition with the shared goals of fostering a
pluralistic post-dictatorship Iraq that is secure in its borders, at
peace with itself and its neighbors and in voluntary compliance with UN
resolutions. In the first instance, this money will go to developing
the opposition's basic organizational skills..."
Indyk's statement also said that Saddam was "still in his box."
But Congress is not happy with this. The chairman, Ben Gilman,
explained, "We also have serious concerns about how to address the
ongoing threats of Iraq. And as you know, just a few days ago the
committee marked up a resolution finding Iraq in material breach of its
requirements of the post-war cease-fire." That is, Congress is moving
to find Iraq in breach of UNSCR 687, the formal cease-fire to the Gulf
war. The resolution passed the full Senate Friday, and the House is to
vote on it this week.
When asked about prospects of a civil war in Iraq, if Saddam were
overthrown by an insurgency rather than a coup, Indyk said, "I
personally tend to be more sanguine. I think that there is a lot more
cohesion to the Iraqi state and to the Iraqi people than is normally
given them credit for. After the Gulf war, there was great concern that
the Shiite rebellion in the South would lead to the breakaway of the
South under Iranian tutelage. I think that fear was much exaggerated
and unfortunately led to or had an influence on the calculations of
Iraq's southern neighbors and of Washington about whether to support
that rebellion or not. So I don't think that we should be overly
concerned about that."
Indyk also explained that Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah would be coming
to Wash DC in Sept.
Finally, the Wash Post, Aug 2, "US Aims to Unify Foes of Saddam,"
reported, "Directed by Congress to pursue more vigorous efforts to bring
down Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, the Clinton administration has
responded with a detailed, 27 page plan to rebuild Iraq's shattered
political opposition and prepare a case for a possible war crimes
indictment of Iraqi leaders [see "Iraq News," Jul 14] . . .
"[Senior administration officials] said they have no illusions that
their plan will put an early end to Saddam Hussein's regime, but said
they want to support and unify the Iraqi opposition in hopes of
fostering an orderly transition to democracy should Saddam Hussein
unexpectedly fall."
Yet "Two staff members of House International Relations Committee
Chairman Benjamin A. Gilman (R-NY) assessed it as a 'baby step' that
might 'lead to a slightly higher profile for the Iraqi opposition abroad
but [be of] little help in Iraq.' In a report they said the
administration's list of 73 Iraqi opposition groups with which it
intends to work is 'absurd [because] many of the groups listed number
only one person and several are not even Iraqi.'" [see "Iraq News," Jun
18] ...
"A Republican Senate aide who has analyzed the plan called it 'fatally
flawed,' and said some of the 73 listed opposition groups are
'penetrated by Baghdad.'" He said GOP lawmakers asked Indyk at a testy
meeting to redirect some of the $5 million to a London-based group
called Indict, which is promoting war crimes prosecution of the Iraqi
leadership. [ED: The INC helped found Indict, after Iraq's Aug 96 attack
on Irbil]. When Indyk raised legal objections to funding the group, the
senators reminded him that the bill appropriating the money contained
the phrase, 'notwithstanding any other provision of law.' [ED: This is
the same kind of argument the administration used in '96 to deny money
for an INC monitoring force.] This source said GOP senators are also
unhappy because they want most of the money to go to the Iraqi National
Congress."
Finally, the Wash Post offered its own evaluation of the State Dep't
proposal, "Much of the plan reads like an organizational manual for
grass-roots activists." And that is because the Clinton administration,
even now, seems to believe that all that it has to do regarding Iraq is
to maintain the sanctions.
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