Back to Square One
Iraq News, 14 July 1998
By Laurie MylroieThe central focus of Iraq News is the tension between the considerable, proscribed WMD capabilities that Iraq is holding on to and its increasing stridency that it has complied with UNSCR 687 and it is time to lift sanctions. If you wish to receive Iraq News by email, a service which includes full-text of news reports not archived here, send your request to Laurie Mylroie .
II. FORMER US OFFICIAL, ON STATE DEP'T REPORT
BACK TO SQUARE ONE
A Response to: Support for the Democratic Opposition of Iraq
In Short. . .
The administration document outlining its plans to assist the
democratic Iraqi opposition, "Support for the Democratic Opposition of
Iraq," is a taxpayer would hope, a work in progress. While renewed aid
to the democratic Iraqi opposition is imperative, the document leaves
many obvious questions unanswered and, more troubling, gives indications
that the plan for providing assistance will repeat many of the mistakes
that have marked many previous US policies associated with Iraq.
The document fails to establish confidence-building measures that
would improve the relationship between the US and the democratic Iraqi
opposition that has been undermined by the disastrous events of the past
few years.
The document does not rigorously describe the command, control,
coordination, and administrative structures of the assistance program;
without a clear description, the budget line items and values appear to
have been drawn from a vacuum or worse, by fiat from bureaucrats whose
credentials for the task are unknown.
The document emphasizes the participation of NGOs and contractors; no
explanation is given for: why using NGOs and contractors is the best
strategy; which specific NGOS/contractors are to be used, and with an
exception for the reference to the Iraqi National Congress website
capabilities; how the inherent experiences; skills, and tactics of the
democratic Iraqi opposition acquired over the years will be used within
the new program. A taxpayer accusation of NGO contractor welfare would
be obvious.
The document lacks focus. The taxpayer might question whether finding
monographs on establishing "pluralism" in Iraq is relevant. What does
this have to do with the problem for US policy that sanctions do not
hurt Saddam Hussein, only civilians? What do monographs have to do with
the horror that is going on inside Iraq?
In the Beginning...
The recent administration plan for the support of the democratic
Iraqi opposition to Baghdad, Support for the Democratic Opposition of
Iraq (SDOI), states that now "the central goal of US support for the
democratic opposition of Iraq is to encourage a unity of purpose through
which [opposition] groups can present a credible alternative to
dictatorship and repression." The plan, unfortunately, gives only a
cursory nod to past efforts of the democratic Iraqi opposition that were
centered in the activities of the Iraqi National Congress (INC) and the
subsequent fragmentation of the Iraqi opposition. SDOI also borders on
an arrogance that fails to recognize the experiences, skills, and
successful tactics developed by the Iraqi opposition movement during its
struggle with Baghdad over the years.
The administration, while planning renewed support for the democratic
Iraqi opposition, should keep in mind the dictum of George Santayana.
"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it." The
past, in terms of administration involvement with the Iraqi opposition.
provides several valuable lessons for future administration involvement,
possibly in contrast to those envisioned by SDOI.
...At Least to Do No Harm
The administration bears a measure of responsibility for the
divisiveness that has plagued the Iraqi opposition. This has led to
deterioration in the relationship between the US and the democratic
Iraqi opposition. Examples of past administration actions that have
exacerbated opposition divisiveness include:
The administration policy of ignoring smuggling between Turkey and
Baghdad had the consequence of providing windfall profits to one of the
Kurdish constituent parties of the INC to the disadvantage of another
Kurdish constituent party in resource-starved northern Iraq. The
administration failed to redress this asymmetry and, when the resulting
hostilities between the two parties began, the administration refused to
intercede, other than by "jawboning," in any meaningful way.
The administration countenanced the clientism of a Federal
Institution (Fl) that caused dysfunctional competitiveness between much
of the INC leadership and an INC constituent party. With encouragement
and support from the Fl, this constituent party became a rival, parallel
opposition organization to the INC when it became apparent that the
party's plan to foment a coup in Baghdad would not be successful. This
party collapsed in July 1996.
Administration officials anonymously provided to the press
derogatory and sensitive information about the INC, although the
administration claimed to support the INC. These press leaks undercut
the influence and prestige of the INC and placed INC members in northern
Iraq at increased risk.
SDOI offers no assurances that the administration has recognized its
role in the fragmentation of the opposition nor that it has considered
ways to prevent similar problems from arising with this new initiative.
In fact the SDOI appendix gives the ominous warning that "...U.S policy
towards Iraq must sometimes change dramatically on short notice."
Opposition leaders are intelligent, highly political men: they
understand the necessities of realpolitik. The administration must, in
turn, understand the U.S requirement to inspire trust. Measures to
increase mutual trust must be developed.
Don't Worry, Be Happy
Although at times the administration might seem to deny it, the Iraq
crisis is serious business. Iraqis are dying every day because Saddam
Hussein manipulates the burdens imposed by UN sanctions and the benefits
of oil-for-food UN resolutions: he also uses his military and security
establishment to summarily eliminate any opposition inside Iraq. Since
the end of Desert Storm, the US taxpayer has paid billions for the
deployment of military forces to contain an enemy who is supposedly "in
his box."
The tenor of SDOI does not reflect the gravity of the Iraq crisis.
Reading SDOI, one might think that the Iraqi opposition is a rust belt
community that only needs a series of off-site training sessions for its
leadership and some fund raising in order to return to prosperity.
Nowhere in SDOI is there the immediacy that would indicate lives might
be at stake depending on when and how Saddam Hussein is eventually
driven from the scene.
A common and justifiable opposition criticism of administration
policy towards Iraq over the years has been that the administration is
not serious about challenging Saddam Hussein. In order to underscore the
new importance the US appears to be placing on the opposition mission, a
revised SDOI would need to address the following issues:
Will the US negotiate with democratic Iraqi opposition leaders
concerning the best policies for opposing Saddam Hussein's Iraq and will
the US publicize such negotiations?
What is the political role of the Special Representative to the Iraqi
Opposition (SRI)? Will the SRI provide strong verbal support for the
Iraqi opposition and generate public administration backing for
consensus democratic Iraqi opposition positions?
Is Radio Free Iraq (RI) to be completely divorced from the opposition
movement? RFE/RL and Radio Marti take advantage of an educated, native,
dialect-fluent work force. If RI is not to be a sterile, Arabic version
of National Public Radio, how will the opposition interface with RI?
Will RI give ample time to opposition views and activities?
What will be the relationship of the SRI be to the INC? The SDOI is
unclear about the status of the INC as an umbrella opposition
organization. Will the SRI work to reestablish the INC as a tool that
can be used to work with the disparate elements of the opposition?
What will be the SRI's relationship with INDICT? Unfortunately, a
recent visit by an Fl officer to London has again confused the position
of the US regarding INDICT. What is the U.S position on INDlCT?
Will the administration use its diplomatic influence to help the
opposition establish a presence in Arab states such as Jordan and
Kuwait? Opposition information offices would be useful for both the
opposition and RI.
Let's Put on a Show
One criticism of the opposition effort in the early 1990s was the
cost of Western contractors that were employed. Contractor use of the
Concorde was greatly resented by the democratic Iraqi opposition. An
inference that can be drawn from SDOI is that the new initiative to
support the Iraqi opposition is lightly disguised NGO/contractor
welfare. Several opposition doubts about NGOs and contractors arise:
Iraqi opposition leaders believe overwhelmingly that their main focus
should be on the people of Iraq. Are contractor/trainers who are
familiar with Western political activities relevant to a movement that
is attempting to assist and influence residents in a police state?
Where can such relevant trainer contractors be found?
The major conflict within the INC--the conflict between the two major
Kurdish parties in northern Iraq--is based on objective economic
inequities and political differences caused by events in northern Iraq
that have included an invasion by Iraqi military forces and attacks by
the Turkish military. It is questionable whether trainer contractors
can address problems of this magnitude when they present conflict
resolution techniques.
Why are NGOs necessary for the process of planning for a pluralistic
Iraq? The process is political and it is about Iraq. What role would an
NGO or a contractor have other than to add an additional, expensive
bureaucratic layer to the program? Many of the Iraqi oppositionists are
well-educated with high status in their own milieu. Would even the most
expensive trainers be effective in this setting?
How would NGO contractor trainers lake advantage of the considerable
expertise that the INC already has in the website, computer operations,
and cross-border media operation?
Training in fund raising might be an unproductive expense.
Philanthropy is largely a western phenomenon. Unfortunately SDOI makes
no mention of US assistance to efforts by the opposition to obtain
funding from other governments. This omission, in conjunction with SDOI
plans for training in "cookie-selling," might be construed by opposition
leaders as an effort by the US to distance itself once again from the
fight against Saddam Hussein.
Home is Where the Heart Is
Because almost all opposition leaders see Iraq as the legitimate focus
of the opposition and not the emigre Iraqi community, there is a
significant gap between the focus of the opposition leaders and the
focus of SDOI. An effort must be made to close this gap if SDOI is not
to turn into a meaningless exercise and a waste of taxpayer money. To
close this gap, a revised SDOI might consider:
Propaganda efforts to reach the populations of the former Warsaw Pact
countries have drawn praise from Eastern European and Russian
luminaries. Seminar training in the methods used in this program and
discussions with the opposition on how these methods could be modernized
and tailored to Iraq might be useful.
The U.S should allow opposition access to RI or fund an opposition
radio.
Efforts have to be made to reconcile opposition public hostility to
sanctions and US support of this policy; SDOI, unfortunately, lightly
treats this contradiction.
With US and foreign-government assistance, the opposition could
explore the possibility of using satellite TV. It is inconceivable to
most opposition leaders that an organization that the US considers to be
a terrorist group can use television (MED-TV), but friends of the US
cannot.
The opposition needs to have information offices in "front-line"
states. Opposition collection and dissemination of information to the
information-starved Iraqi people will be crucial to the SDOI goal of
making the opposition "a credible alternative to dictatorship and
repression".
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