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Congress, the State Dept, & the Iraqi Opposition

Iraq News, JULY 14, 1998

The central focus of Iraq News is the tension between the considerable, proscribed WMD capabilities that Iraq is holding on to and its increasing stridency that it has complied with UNSCR 687 and it is time to lift sanctions. If you wish to receive Iraq News by email, a service which includes full-text of news reports not archived here, send your request to Laurie Mylroie .

I.  STATE DEPT REPORT TO CONGRESS ON SUPPORT FOR IRAQI OPPOSITION
II. RESPONSE, FORMER US GOV'T OFFICIAL, "BACK TO SQUARE ONE" 
   Last Mon, Jul 6, Asst Sec State for NEA, Martin Indyk, met Senate 
staffers to report on the State Dept's program to support the democratic 
Iraqi opposition, as mandated by recent Congressional legislation [see 
"Iraq News," May 1].   The discussion was acrimonious.  
   Congress has said, or came very close to saying, that it wants a 
policy that seeks Saddam's overthrow, not merely his "containment," 
through US support for an insurgency.  It authorized an emergency 
appropriation of $5 million as a first step in developing such a policy, 
while affirming its expectation "that a significant portion of the 
support for the democratic opposition should go to the Iraqi National 
Congress, a group that has demonstrated the capacity to effectively 
challenge the Saddam Hussein regime."
   But the administration does not want to back an insurgency.  It 
claims Saddam can not be overthrown, unless the US sends ground forces. 
How can one possibly know?  A former CIA official remarked, that when 
Jimmy Carter signed the finding to support the Afghan resistance to the 
Soviets, there was no guarantee the Aghans would succeed.  Indeed, few 
thought they would. 
   Moreover, the administration is not even ready to acknowledge the 
benefits of an insurgency that fell short of overthrowing Saddam.  At 
least, he would be on the defensive and weaker than he is now.  What is 
the downside?
   A sharp-eyed reader noted that Congress had called for a program "to 
support the democratic opposition IN Iraq," but the State Dept program 
is about "Support for the Democratic Opposition OF Iraq," wherever it 
may be, London and etc.
   As SDOI explained, in its Executive Summary, "The detailed plan 
provided in this report reflects our current planning  . . .  It 
represents our current estimate of how a unique-in some ways 
unprecedented-program will likely proceed. . . . The central goal of US 
support for the democratic opposition of Iraq is to encourage a unity of 
purpose though which these groups can present a credible alternative to 
dictatorship and repression. . . To achieve these goals, the Department 
of State will fund programs to support the opposition, implemented by 
established non-governmental organizations (NGOs), US federal 
institutions (FIs), and independent contractors.  The Secretary of State 
intends to create the position of Special Representative to the Iraqi 
Opposition (SRIO) as principal manager for all Iraqi opposition Economic 
Support Funds (ESF).. . .  
  And "The SRIO will encourage NGO/FI and independent contractor program 
implementers to take a flexible and innovative approach in implementing 
these programs. . .  We will encourage participation in these programs 
by all INC constituent groups and leadership, as well as political and 
nonpartisan Iraqi opposition groups outside the INC. . . . Five major 
interlocking program categories have been established.  To work 
effectively, they must be conducted as a comprehensive whole.  The first 
two programs-organization building and coalition building-address the 
opposition's structural and organizational needs. The final three- 
implementing UN resolutions, a pluralistic Iraq, and Iraqi war 
crimes-are thematic programs which will help unify the opposition.
 Of the two programs: "Organization Building: Developing management 
skills and building membership; training the rank-and-file in word 
processing, fund raising, media relations, etc.  Support to conduct 
membership drives and provide computers, fax machines, etc., with an 
emphasis on using these new skills and equipment in conjunction with the 
three thematic programs: $1,150,000
 And the second program: "Coalition Building: Support for a new 
opposition-wide newsletter and a London "Iraq Center" to present reports 
and conferences related to the three thematic programs.  This will lead 
to grass-roots confidence and dialogue groups and senior leadership 
meetings, which may, in turn, lead to a general opposition congress.  
$630,000
  Of the three themes: "Theme: Implementing UN resolutions: Support for 
opposition leaders to focus on Iraqi government compliance (or lack 
thereof) with relevant UNSC resolutions. Two areas in which they have 
already expressed strong interest are violations of the human rights 
provisions of UNSCR 688 and the UNXs "oil-for-food" program. The 
opposition will have the ability to express and publicize their views 
via delegations to the UN and to Security Council and other capitals 
$375,000
  And the second theme: "Theme: A Pluralistic Iraq: Support for 
conferences/monographs to discuss restoring the rule of law, rebuilding 
the economy, etc.  In conjunction with the Coalition Building effort, 
this will lead to opposition committee meetings and an opposition-wide 
plenary on Iraq's future to identify the benefits of a pluralistic Iraq. 
$675,000.
  And the third theme: "Theme: War Crimes/Crimes Against Humanity: 
Support for the more than five million war crimes documents already in 
the public domain to be collected, analyzed and translated for use in 
international education and media efforts, to draw up model legal 
briefs, and in opposition governmental liaison.  Video evidence will be 
digitized and indexed.  $2,170,000
Budgetary notes:
1) The Act earmarks $5 million in ESF in support for the Iraqi 
democratic opposition as an emergency earmark.  The Administration sees 
this as the start of a renewed effort to work with the opposition which 
will very probably require significant additional funding in FY99 and 
beyond. . . .
3) This plan does not include the $5 million appropriate for Radio Free 
Iraq, which will be created and administered by Radio Free Iraq/Radio 
Liberty . .
   In its next section, "Organization Building," SDOI explained, 
"Organization building seeks to help the opposition help itself by 
developing greater institutional strength.  Enlarging group membership 
and improving group administration are the two primary objectives of the 
organization building program . . . Group leaders will be invited to a 
series of seminars conducted by organizational management consultants.  
. . ."
 A former US Govt official, familiar with US dealings with the Iraqi 
opposition, wrote a response to SDOI, "Back to Square One."  The plan, 
he suggested, "is, a taxpayer would hope, a work in progress.  While 
renewed aid to the democratic Iraqi opposition is imperative, the 
document leaves many obvious questions unanswered and, more troubling, 
gives indications that the plan for providing assistance will repeat 
many of the mistakes that have marked many previous US policies 
associated with Iraq.  The document fails to establish confidence- 
building measures that would improve the relationship between the US and 
the democratic Iraqi opposition that has been undermined by the 
disastrous events of the past few years.  The document does not 
rigorously describe the command, control, coordination, and 
administrative structures of the assistance program; without a clear 
description, the budget line items and values appear to have been drawn 
from a vacuum or worse; by fiat from bureaucrats whose credentials for 
the task are unknown.
   "The document emphasizes the participation of NGOs and contractors; 
no explanation is given for: why using NGOs and contractors is the best 
strategy; which specific NGOs/contractors are to be used, and with an 
exception for the reference to the Iraqi National Congress website 
capabilities, how the inherent experiences, skills, and tactics of the 
democratic Iraqi opposition acquired over the years will be used within 
the new program.  A taxpayer accusation of NGO contractor welfare would 
be obvious. . . The taxpayer might question whether funding monographs 
on establishing 'pluralism' in Iraq is relevant.
  Moreover, the former official noted, "The administration bears a 
measure of responsibility for the divisiveness that has plagued the 
Iraqi opposition . . .  [It] countenanced the clientism of a Federal 
Institution [FI] [ED: the CIA] that caused dysfunctional competitiveness 
between much of the INC leadership and an INC constituent party [ED: the 
ex-Baathists of the Iraqi National Accord].  With encouragement and 
support from the FI, this constituent party became a rival, parallel 
opposition organization to the INC when it became apparent that the 
party's plan to foment a coup in Baghdad would not be successful.  This 
party collapsed in July, 1996.   
  "Administration officials anonymously provided to the press derogatory 
and sensitive information about the INC, although the administration 
claimed to support the INC. These press leaks undercut the influence and 
prestige of the INC and placed INC members in northern Iraq at increased 
risk.  SDOI offers no assurances that the administration has recognized 
its role in the fragmentation of the opposition. . . 
   "Unfortunately a recent visit by an FI officer to London has again 
confused the position of the US regarding INDICT," the campaign to 
indict Saddam and his cronies for war crimes, launched in the spring of 
'97, under the chairmanship of Labor MP, Ann Clwyd, in association with 
the INC.  A US envoy recently told the UK and Kuwaiti governments that 
they should not provide any money to INDICT until the US had worked out 
its position.  
  The former US official also observed, "Because almost all opposition 
leaders see Iraq as the legitimate focus of the opposition and not the 
emigre Iraqi community, there is a significant gap between the focus of 
the opposition leaders and the focus of SDOI."  He also noted that there 
should be some connection between the US-supported Iraqi opposition and 
Radio Free Iraq.  Finally, he suggested the need for the opposition to 
have information offices in "front-line" states, rather than London.  
   Lastly, a bright young Iraqi read an excerpt of SDOI, posted on the 
website of the Iraq Foundation http://www.iraqfoundation.org and 
protested, "They are trying to train the exiled opposition to remain an 
exiled opposition."  He also said SDOI "distracts from the INC's 
military plan for opposition on Iraqi soil."  That, indeed, is one of 
its purposes.